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PETITIONER: NIRMAL KUMAR KHANDELWAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/05/1978

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH KAILASAM, P.S.

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1155            1978 SCR  (3) 817  1978 SCC  (2) 509  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1979 SC1953  (13)

ACT: Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities  Act,  1974,  Section  8,  clause  (f)-No   order confirming   the   detention  passed  by   the   appropriate Government  within three months of the commencement  of  the detention-Whether violates Art, 22(4) of the Constitution.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner  was detained with effect from  October  24, 1977  by an order passed by the Secretary to the  Government of Maharashtra under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA.  The Advisory Board  reported on 23-12-77 that there was sufficient  cause for the detention but the Government did not pass any  order confirming  the detention within three months from the  date of  detention.  The petitioner assailed it as  violative  of Art. 22(4) of the Constitution. Allowing the petition the Court. HELD  : 1. since no order of confirmation of  the  detention was  made under clause (f) of Section 8 within three  months of  the  date of detention by  the  appropriate  Government, further detention of the petitioner after the expiry of that period is without the authority of law. [822 C] 2.The law does not lend its authority to the  continuance of the detention even for a day more than the initial period of  three months if the Government does not take a  decision for that purpose on the report of the Advisory Board  within three months of the commencement of the detention. [822 A-B] 3.The expression "may confirm" in clause (f) of Section 8 of COFEPOSA, is significant.  It imports a discretion.  Even where the Advisory Board makes a report that in its opinion, there  is sufficient cause for the detention of  the  detenu concerned,  the  Government may not  confirm  the  detention order.    Read  in  the  light  of  Article  22(4)  of   the Constitution  and  the context of the  words  "continue  the detention",   the   expression  definitely  leads   to   the conclusion  that  the  sine  qua  non  for  continuing   the detention  made  beyond the period of three months.  is  the confirmation  of  the  detention order  by  the  appropriate Government.   Conversely,  non-confirmation of  the  initial order by the appropriate Government before the expiry of the

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period of three months detention, shall automatically result in revocation and termination of the legal authority for its continuance.   This  position  is  further  clear  from  the language of Section 10, which provides : "The maximum period for  which  any person may be detained in pursuance  of  any detention order...... which has been confirmed under  clause (f)  of  Section  8,  shall be one year  from  the  date  of detention."  The crucial words in the Section are  :  "which has  been  confirmed under clause (f) of  Section  8."  They underscore  the  same policy which underlies  the  constitu- tional mandate in Article 22(4).  These words put it  beyond doubt  that  if  the  initial  order  of  detention  is  not confirmed by the appropriate Government within three  months of the date of the detention, the detention after the expiry of that period ipso facto becomes unauthorised and  illegal. [821 C-F] Ujjal  Mandal  v.  State of West Bengal, AIR  1972  SC  1446 reiterated; Shibapada Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 1356, Deb Sadhan Roy v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 2 SCR 787; Micki Khan etc. etc. v. The State of West Bengal. AIR  1972  SC 2262; and Satyadeo Parshad Gupta v.  State  of Bihar, [1975] 2 SCR 854 referred to. 818

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Criminal Writ Petition No. 1238 of 1978. Under Article 32 of the Constitution for grant of a Writ  of habeas corpus. A.   K. Sen and Herginder Singh for the Petitioner. E. C. Agarwal and (Miss) A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 1 M.   N. Phadke and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No. 2 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA,  J.-This  is a petition under Article  32  of  the Constitution for the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.   The petitioner  has been detained with effect from  October  24, 1977  by an order passed by the Secretary to the  Government of  Maharashtra under Section 3 (1) of the  Conservation  of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short called COFEPOSA).  Reference was made to the Advisory Board on 24-11-1977.  At its sitting held on 23-12- i977,  the Board rejected the representation of  the  detenu and   opined  that  there  was  sufficient  cause  for   the detention. The detention has been challenged mainly on the ground  that no order under clause (f) of Section 8 of the Act confirming the  detention  was  passed by  the  appropriate  Government within  three  months of the commencement of  the  detention and,  as such, the continuance of the detention  beyond  the initial period of three months was violative of the  mandate of  Article 22(4) of the Constitution.  In support  of  this contention, Mr. Asoke Sen, appearing for the petitioner, has cited  five decisions of this Court-Shibapada  Mukherjee  v. State  of  West  Bengal(1); Ujjal Mondal v.  State  of  West Bengal(2); Deb Sadhan Roy v. State of West Bengal(3);  Micki Khan etc. etc. v. The State of West Bengal (4); and Satyadeo Parshad Gupta v. State of Bihar(5). As against the above, Mr. Phadke, appearing for the State of Maharashtra,  contends that the view taken in the  aforesaid decisions of this Court, is not in conformity with the plain language  of  Article 22(4).  In the  counsel’s  view,  what Article  22(4)  requires  is  that  no  law  providing   for preventive  detention  shall authorise the  detention  of  a

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person  for  a longer period than three  months,  unless  an Advisory   Board   consisting   of   persons   having    the qualifications   specified  therein,  reports   before   the expiration of the said period of three months that there is, in  its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention.   This requirement-proceeds the argument-was fully complied with in (1)  A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1356 (2)  A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1446 (3)[1972] 2 S.C.R. 787 (4)A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2262 (5)  [1975] 2 S. C. R. 854 819 the instant case because the Advisory Board had made such  a report  within  three months of the date  of  detention  and within  11  weeks of the receipt of the Reference  from  the Government.   It  is stressed that there is nothing  in  the language of Article 22(4) or in COFEPOSA which requires that the confirmation of the detention on the basis of the report of  the Advisory Board, should also be within  three  months from the commencement of the detention. According to Mr. Phadke, COFEPOSA on the other hand  clearly indicates that an order of confirmation of the detention can be passed by the appropriate Government within a  reasonable time  even after the expiry of the initial period  of  three months’   detention.   In  this  ’connection,  counsel   has adverted us to Clause (c) of Section 8, which requires  that the  Advisory Board shall, on receiving the  Reference  from the appropriate Government, submit its report as to  whether or  not there is sufficient cause for the detention,  within 11  weeks  from the date of the detention; while  under  the corresponding  provisions  of the  Maintenance  of  Internal Security Act, 1971, the period prescribed for the report  of the  Advisory Board is ten weeks only.  The point sought  to be  made  out is that if the Advisory Board makes  a  report that  there  is sufficient cause for the detention,  to  the appropriate  Government  just  before  the  expiry  of   the aforesaid  period  of 11 weeks, then hardly about 13  or  14 days would be left to the Government to consider whether  or not  the detention should be confirmed.  This period, it  is contended,  left to the Government for taking a decision  on the  report  of  the  Advisory Board is  too  short  from  a practical point of view. On  the above premises, Mr. Phadke urges that the  aforesaid decisions  of  this  Court-none  of  which  was  a  case  of detention under COFEPOSA-need reconsideration. Before  dealing with these arguments, it may be  noted  that the  aforesaid  ground of challenge  has  been  specifically adumbrated as Ground No. 12 in the petition.  In the counter filed on behalf of the, respondent-State, the fact that  the order of confirmation of the detention was not passed by the appropriate  Government within three months of the  date  of detention, appears to have been impliedly admitted in  these terms :               "    .  No confirmation is needed  on the part               of the State Government.  After the advice  of               the  Advisory  Board, the  detention  of  the,               detenu  was  continued and the  order  of  the               State continuing the detention on the basis of               the  advice of the Advisory Report was  served               upon the detenu of 27-2-78." Nothing has been placed before us to show that the order  of detention was, in fact, passed by the appropriate Government within the requisite period of three months.  We  therefore, take  it  that the order, if any, for  confirmation  of  the detention  of  the petitioner by the  Government,  was  made

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beyond three months of the date of the detention. 820 The  ground is now clear for considering the legal  question raised  by  Mr. Asoke Sen. The decisions cited by  Mr.  Sen, primarily  proceed on an interpretation of Article 22(4)  of the  Constitution, though they also in the  context  examine the  relevant provisions of the detention law,  under  which the  detention  in question in those cases  was  purportedly made.   We  can do no better than  reiterate  what  Mathew,. J.   speaking  for this Court, said in Ujjal  Mondal’s  case (supra):               "Article   22(4)  of  the   Constitution   has               specified   the  maximum  limit   of   initial               detention,  and detention for a longer  period               than 3 months can only be made on the basis of               the report of the Board.  The Act authorises a               possible detention of more than 3 months.   It               is because the appropriate Government wants to               detain  a person for more than 3  months  that               the matter is referred to the Board and it  is               only ’when the Board makes its report that the               appropriate  Government can fix the period  of               detention  under sub-section (1)  of’  Section               12.   So  when  the  Government  receives  the               report  of  the Board stating  that  there  is               sufficient cause for detention of a person, if               the  Government  wants  to detain  him  for  a               period  beyond  3 months, it has  to  pass  an               order  or make a decision under section  12(1)               to  confirm  the  order  of  detention.    The               confirmation  of the detention  order  without               anything  more  would result in  an  automatic               continuation  of the detention, even if  there               is  no;  separate  decision  to  continue  the               detention for any specific period. as held  by               this  Court  in (1952) SCR  612-(AIR  1952  SC               181).  When Section 12(1) of the Act speaks of               "and  continue  the detention  of  the  person               concerned  for such period as it thinks  fit",               it can only mean continuance of detention from               the  point  of time at which  detention  would                             become illegal if the order of detention is no t               confirmed, namely, the expiry of 3 months from               the  date  of  detention.   It  would  not  be               necessary  to, confirm the order of  detention               even  after the receipt of the report  of  the               Board by the Government if the Government only               wants to continue the detention for the period               of three months from the date of detention, as               the initial order of detention would authorise               the  continuance of detention for that  period               without  any  confirmation.   Confirmation  is               necessary only to continue the detention after               the  expiry  of 3 months.  If that be  so,  it               stands  to  reason to held that the  order  of               detention must be confirmed before the  expiry               of 3 months."               The   observations  extracted   above,   apply               mutatis mutandis to the language of clause (f)               of Section 8, which is similar.  This  clause-               runs as follows               "8.  For  the purposes of  sub-clause  (a)  of               clause (4), and sub-clause (c) of clause  (7),               of  article 22 of the  Constitution--."(f)  in

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             every  case,  where  the  Advisory  Board  has               reported that there is in                821               its opinion sufficient cause for the detention               of  a person, the appropriate  Government  may               confirm  the detention order and continue  the               detention  of  the person concerned  for  such               period  as  it thinks fit and  in  every  case               where  the  Advisory Board has  reported  that               there  is in its opinion no  sufficient  cause               for the detention of the person concerned, the               appropriate   Government  shall   revoke   the               detention  order  and cause the person  to  be               released forthwith."               (emphasis supplied) ’The  key  words  in clause (f) are those  which  have  been underlined.  These very words were also, employed in Section 12(1)  of the West Bengal Prevention of  Violent  Activities Act,  1970,  the interpretation of which had  come,  up  for consideration  in  the  context  of  Article  22(4)  of  the Constitution  in  Ujjal  Mondal’s case.   These  words  also occurred  in Sections 10 and 11 of the Preventive  Detention Act,  1950, which were in pari materia with Sections 11  and 12  of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971.   The expression  "may  confirm"  in clause (f) of  Section  8  is significant.   It  imports  a discretion.   Even  where  the Advisory  Board makes a report that in its opinion there  is sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu  concerned, the Government may not confirm the detention order.  Read in the  light  of  Article 22(4) of the  Constitution  and  the context   of  the  words  "continue  the  detention",   they definitely lead to the conclusion that the sine qua non  for continuing  the  detention made beyond the period  of  three months,  is  the confirmation  the detention  order  by  the appropriate Government.  Conversely, the non-confirmation of the  initial order by the appropriate Government before  the expiry  of  the  period of  three  months  detention,  shall automatically  result in revocation and termination  of  the legal  authority  for  its continuance.   This  position  is further  clear  from  the  language  of  Section  10,  which provides  : "The maximum period for which any person may  be detained in pursuance of any detention order...... which has been  confirmed under clause (f) of Section 8, shall be  one year  from the date of detention." The crucial words in  the Section are : "which has been confirmed under clause (f)  of Section   8.".  They  under-score  the  same  policy   which underlies  the  constitutional  mandate  in  Article  22(4). These words put it beyond doubt that if the initial order of detention  is  not confirmed by the  appropriate  Government within  three  months  of the date  of  the  detention,  the detention after the expiry of that period ipso facto becomes unauthorised and illegal. We  do not find any merit in the contention that  since  the period prescribed for the Advisory Board to make its  report has been increased from 10 weeks (as prescribed under  MISA) to 11 weeks in COFEPOSA, leaving only a short period for the Government  to  take  a decision  under  Section  8(f),  the legislative intent was that the order of confirmation of the detention and its continuance could be made after the expiry of three months from the date of the detention.  It is  true that in certain situation when the Advisory Board makes  its report in favour of the detention just before the expiry  of II  weeks from the date of the detention, the time  left  to the Govern- 822

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ment  for  taking a decision as to the confirmation  of  the detention  and  its continuance would be hardly  two  weeks. That  only shows the anxiety on the part of the  legislature to  ensure  that  the Government  continues  the  preventive detention  of  a  person  beyond  three  months  after   due application  of mind and for that purpose acts  with  utmost promptitude.   The  law does not lend its authority  to  the continuance  of the detention even for a day more  than  the initial  period of three months if the Government  does  not take  a  decision  for that purpose on  the  report  of  the Advisory  Board within three months of the  commencement  of the detention. There is no reason to doubt the law enunciated by this Court in  the  aforesaid decisions.   Respectfully  following  the ratio  of  those decisions, we hold that since no  order  of confirmation  of the detention was made under clause (f)  of Section  8 within three months of the date of  detention  by the   appropriate  Government,  further  detention  of   the petitioner  after the expiry of that period is  without  the authority of law. In  the result, we allow this petition, quash the  detention of  the  petitioner  and direct that he be  set  at  liberty forthwith.  Rule made absolute. S.R.                 Petition allowed. 823