REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1767  OF 2005

Nirbhai Kumar  …..Appellant

Versus

Maya Devi & Ors.  ….Respondents  

J U D G M E N T  

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Noticing that  there were two conflicting decisions of this  Court  in

Martin & Harris Ltd. v.  VIth Additional District Judge and Ors. [1998 (1)

SCC 732] and  Anwar Hasan Khan v.  Mohd. Shafi & Ors. [2001 (8) SCC

540], reference was made to larger Bench.

2. The case decided by two Hon’ble Judges of this  Court in both the

cases related to the scope of and ambit of proviso to Section 21(1)(a) of the

U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, rent and Eviction) Act, 1972

(in short the ‘Act’).  As directed by the Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India,

the matter has been placed before us.

3. In Martin and Harris Limited’s case (supra) it was held in para 13 as

follows:

“It is not possible to agree with the contention of the  learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  appellant  that  the provision containing the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act was for public benefit and could not be waived. It is, of  course,  true  that  it  is  enacted  to  cover  a  class  of tenants who are sitting tenants and whose premises are subsequently purchased by landlords who seek to evict the  sitting  tenants  on  the  ground  of  bona  fide requirement as envisaged by Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, still the protection available to such tenants as found in the  proviso  would  give  the  tenants  concerned  a  locus poenitentiae to avail of it  or not.  It is easy to visualise that proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act would be between the landlord on the one hand and the tenant on  the other.  These  proceedings  are  not  of  any public nature. Nor any public interest is involved therein. Only personal  interest  of  landlord  on  the  one  hand  and  the tenant  on  the  other  hand  get  clashed  and  call  for adjudication  by  the  prescribed  authority.  The  ground raised by the landlord under Section 21(1)(a) would be personal  to him and similarly the defence taken by the tenant  would  also  be  personal  to  him.  Six  months’ breathing  time  is  given  to  the  tenant  after  service  of notice to enable him to put his house in order and to get the  matter  settled  amicably  or  to  get  alternative accommodation  if  the  tenant  realises  that  the  landlord has a  good case.  This  type of  protection  to  the  tenant would naturally be personal to him and could be waived.

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In this connection we may profitably refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Krishan Lal v. State of J&K (1994 (4)SCC 422) wherein Hansaria, J., speaking for a Bench  of  two  learned  Judges  has  made  the  pertinent observations  concerning  the  question  of  waiver  of  a mandatory provision providing for issuance of notice to the parties sought to be proceeded against by the person giving the notice, in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Report as under: (SCC p. 430)

“16. ... As to when violation of a mandatory provision  makes  an  order  a  nullity  has  been  the subject-matter of various decisions of this Court as well  as  of  courts  beyond  the  seven  seas.  This apart, there are views of reputed text writers. Let us  start  from  our  own  one-time  Highest  Court, which  used  to  be  Privy  Council.  This  question came up for examination by that body in Vellayan Chettiar v.  Govt. of the Province of Madras (AIR 1947  pc  197) in  which  while  accepting  that Section  80  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  is mandatory,  which  was  the  view  taken  in Bhagchand Dagadusa v.  Secy. of State for India- in-Council  [(1927)  54 IA 338]   it  was held  that even if a notice under Section 80 be defective, the same would  not  per  se  render  the  suit  requiring issuance  of  such  a  notice  as  a  precondition  for instituting the same as bad in the eye of law, as such a defect can be waived. This view was taken by  pointing  out  that  the  protection  provided  by Section  80  is  a  protection  given  to  the  person concerned and if  in  a particular case that  person does  not  require  the  protection  he  can  lawfully waive  his  right.  A distinction  was  made  in  this regard  where  the  benefit  conferred  was  to  serve ‘an important purpose’, in which case there would not be waiver, (see paragraph 14).

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17.  This  point  had  come up  for  examination  by this  Court  in  Dhirendra  Nath  Gorai v.  Sudhir Chandra  Ghosh  (AIR  1964  SC  1300) and  a question was posed in paragraph 7 whether an act done  in  breach  of  a  mandatory  provision  is  per force  a  nullity.  This  Court  referred  to  what  was stated in this regard by Mookherjee, J. in Ashutosh Sikdar v. Behari Lal Kirtania (ilr 35 Cal 61)  ILR at p. 72 and some other decisions of the Calcutta High  Court  along  with  one  of  the  Patna  High Court  and it  was held  that  if  a  judgment-debtor, despite having received notice of proclamation of sale, did not object to the non-compliance of the required  provision,  he  must  be  deemed  to  have waived  his  right  conferred  by  that  provision.  It was observed that  a mandatory provision  can be waived  if  the  same  be  aimed  to  safeguard  the interest  of  an  individual  and  has  not  been conceived in the public interest.”

Consequently it must be held that the provision for six months’  notice  before  initiation  of  proceedings  under Section  21(1)  of  the  Act,  though  is  mandatory  and confers  protection  on  the  tenant  concerned,  it  can  be waived by him. On the facts of the present case there is no  escape  from the  conclusion  that  the  appellant,  for reasons best known to it, consciously and being alive to the clear factual situation that the suit was filed on that ground prior to the expiry of six months’ notice, did not think it  fit  to pursue that  point  any further  and on the contrary joined issues on merits expecting a favourable decision in the suit  and having lost  therein and got  an adverse decision did not think it fit even to challenge the decision  on  the  ground  of  maintainability  of  the  suit while  filing  an  appeal  and  argued  the  appeal  only  on merits  and only as  an afterthought  at  the stage of writ petition in the High Court such a contention was sought to be taken up for the first time for consideration. On the facts of the present case, therefore, it must be held that the appellant had waived that contention about the suit being premature having been filed before the expiry of six months from the date of the suit notice.”

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4. In  Anwar  Hasan  Khan’s case  (supra)  it  was  held  in  para  10  as

follows:

“Keeping  in  mind  the  object  of  the  Act  to  provide safeguards to the tenant, the first proviso to Section 21 of the  Act  was  added  to  ensure  that  the  unscrupulous litigants do not transfer properties only for the purposes of  creating  grounds  for  eviction  of  the  tenant  in occupation thereof. The aforesaid proviso, however, was not intended to put any restriction upon the owners of the property not to transfer it  under any circumstances.  To ensure that the sale transaction was valid and not mala fide,  a  statutory  bar  was  created  vide  the  aforesaid proviso  for  the  transferee  to  seek  the  eviction  of  the tenant  with  respect  to  such  purchased  property.  The proviso mandates that no application shall be entertained by the prescribed authority on the grounds mentioned in clause  (a)  of  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  21  of  the  Act unless a period of three years had elapsed since the date of such purchase. It further provides that no application under  the  said  clause  shall  be  entertained  unless  the landlord had given a notice to the tenant not less than six months  before  the  filing  of  such  application  and  such notice  may  be  given  even  before  the  expiration  of  a period  of  three years.  The object  of  the service of  the notice is to furnish information to the tenant  about the requirement  of  the  landlord  in  order  to  enable  him to search for an alternative accommodation or to find out as to  whether  the  sale  made  by his  erstwhile  owner  was genuine and bona fide or not. The proviso and the notice contemplated  under  it  was  never  intended  to  be permanent  clog  on  the  rights  of  the  purchaser.  The period  contemplated  for  not  initiating  the  eviction against the tenant on the ground as specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act was intended to be for a period of three years and in no case for more

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than  three  years  and  six  months.  Any  proceedings initiated  for  release  of  building  under  occupation  of tenant  on  the  aforesaid  ground  after  the  period contemplated  under  the  aforesaid  proviso  does  not require the service of the aforesaid notice of six months.”

5. Section 21(1) of the Act so far as relevant reads as follows:

“21.  Proceedings  for  release  of  building  under occupation of tenant:

1. The  prescribed  authority  may,  on  an application of  the  landlord  in that  behalf,  order eviction  of  a  tenant  from  the  building  under tenancy  or  any  of  the  following  grounds  exist, namely- (a) xxxx (b) xxxx Provided  that  where  the  building  was  in  the occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord,  such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained  on  the  grounds  mentioned  in  Clause (a) unless a period of three years has elapsed since the  date  of  such  purchase  and  the  landlord  has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years.”

6. A three  years  period  becomes  relevant  when  there  is  a  change  of

ownership. This three years period is a sort of moratorium intended for the

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tenant’s  protection.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  crucial  expression  in  the

proviso is “and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the

aforesaid period of three years”.  In other words notice can be given either

before or after the three years period.  After expiry of the three years period

the  protection  given  to  the  tenant  from  being  evicted  has  no  further

relevance.  Thereafter it is only the question of notice.

7. Above being the position the decision in Martin & Harris Ltd.’s case

(supra)  expressed  the  correct  view.  Unfortunately,  the  said  decision  not

appear to  have been placed before the Bench which heard  Anwar Hasan

Khan’s case (supra).

8. That being the position the appeal deserves to be allowed which we

direct.  

…………..……………………….J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

……………………..…………….J. (LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA)  

…………..…………………… ….J.

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(P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, March 24, 2009  

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