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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5764 of 1997

PETITIONER: The New India Assurance Co. Ltd.                                 

RESPONDENT: C. Padma & Anr.                                                         

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/09/2003

BENCH: S.N. VARIAVA &  H.K. SEMA.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

SEMA,J

                        This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated  5.12.1996 passed by the High Court.              Briefly stated the facts leading to the filing of the present appeal arise  out of the following circumstances.  In a motor accident, which took place  on 18.2.1989, the respondents sustained bodily injuries. The claim petition  was filed on 2.11.1995, claiming compensation of Rs.one lakh.  The Claims  Tribunal rejected the plea of limitation raised by the appellant herein and  awarded compensation of Rs. 45,000/-.  The Revision Petition, filed by the  appellant, was also dismissed by the High Court on 5.12.1996.           We have heard Mr. Sunil Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant.   Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were put to notice.  The Office Report dated  24.7.2003 disclosed that the notice was served on respondent No.1 on 14th  October, 1997 by affixing notice on the door of the house of respondent  No.1.  A certificate of the High Court dated 24th October, 1997 indicates that  respondent No.2 had refused to accept the notice and the same was affixed  on the door of her given address.     The respondents are, therefore, not  represented before us.            The only contention, which has been strenuously urged by the counsel  for the appellant, is that the accident had taken place on 18.2.1989 and the  claim petition was filed on 2.11.1995; when the claim was barred under the  old Act, the same could not have been revived under the new Act.   It is his  contention that on this score alone the claim petition should have been  dismissed.      To answer this contention it would be useful to have a quick  survey of changes that have taken place in the Act.  The old Act of 1939 has  been repealed and since then there is a sea of changes in the Act.  In the old  Motor Vehicles Act, 1939(hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) sub-section (3)  of Section 110-A provided:         "110-A.  (3) No application for such compensation shall  be entertained unless it is made within six months of the  occurrence of the accident:         Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the  application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it  is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause  from making the application in time."                    The 1939 Act was repealed w.e.f 1.7.1989.  The period of limitation  prescribed in the new Act is provided under sub-section (3) of Section 166.   It reads:-  "166.(3) No application for such compensation shall be  entertained unless it is made within six months of the  occurrence of the accident:  Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the  application after the expiry of the said period of six months but

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not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant  was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application  in time."    

The only difference that has been brought about in between the old  Act and the new Act is that the Tribunal may entertain an application after  the expiry of period of six months but not later than twelve months. In the instant case, at the time, when the respondents had filed claim  petition on 2.11.1995, the situation was completely different.  Sub-section  (3) of Section 166 of the Act had been omitted by Act 53 of 1994 w.e.f.  14.11.1994.  The result of the Act 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment)  Act, 1994 is that there is no limitation prescribed for filing claim petitions  before the Tribunal in respect of any accident w.e.f. 14.11.1994.       It is noticed that the High Court while dismissing the Revision  Petition filed by the appellant had followed the decision rendered by this  Court in Dhannalal   vs.   D.P.Vijayvargiya, (1996) 4 SCC 652.  The facts  of that case were like this.  The appellant was injured in a motor accident,  which took place on 4-12-1990.  The claim petition for compensation was  filed before the Tribunal on 7.12.1991 along with an application for  condonation of delay, which was allowed by the Tribunal by its order dated  18.11.1993.  The validity of order of the Tribunal was challenged before the  High Court and the High Court by its order dated 31.7.1995 set-aside the  order of the Tribunal holding that the power of Tribunal to condone the  delay under Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act of  1988 had been withdrawn and therefore the claim petition must be filed  within the period prescribed therein.  This Court set aside the High Court  order.     This Court in Dhannalal’s case (supra), after examining the effect of  the various amendments that have been brought about in the Act, stated in  paragraphs 6 and 7 as under:-  6."Before the scope of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act  is examined, it may be pointed out that the aforesaid sub- section (3) of Section 166 of the Act has been omitted by Act  53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 which came  in force w.e.f. 14.11.1994.  The effect of the Amending Act is  that w.e.f. 14.11.1994 there is no limitation for filing claims  before the Tribunal in respect of any accident.  It can be said  that Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which  was being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the  victims who died in accidents by rejecting their claim petitions  only on ground of limitation.  It is a matter of common  knowledge that majority of the claimants for such  compensation are ignorant about the period during which such  claims should be preferred.  After the death due to the accident  of the breadearner of the family, in many cases such claimants  are virtually on the streets.  Even in cases where the victims  escape death some of such victims are hospitalised for months  if not for years.  In the present case itself the applicant claims  that he met with the accident on 4.12.1990 and he was being  treated as an indoor patient till 27.9.1991.  According to us, in  its wisdom, Parliament rightly thought that prescribing a period  of limitation and restricting the power of the Tribunal to  entertain any claim petition beyond the period of twelve months  from the date of the accident was harsh, inequitable and in  many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants.  The  present case is a glaring example where the appellant has been  deprived by the order of the High Court from claiming the  compensation because of delay of only four days in preferring  the claim petition.         

7."In this background, now it has to be examined as to  what is the effect of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166  of the Act.  From the amending Act it does not appear that the  said sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively.  But at the  same time, there is nothing in the amending Act to show that

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benefit of deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 is not to be  extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation  has been raised.  The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from  Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration.  Suppose  an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.1994 when  sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166.  For one reason  or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the  heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994.  Can a claim petition be not  filed after 14.11.1994 in respect of such accident?  Whether a  claim petition filed after 14.11.1994 can be rejected by the  Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of  twelve months which had been prescribed when sub-section (3)  of Section 166 was in force having expired the right to prefer  the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be  revived after deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 w.e.f.  14.11.1994?  According to us, the answer should be in negative.   When sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the  Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of  the date on which such accident had taken place.  The claim  petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim  petitions were barred by time when sub-section (3) of Section  166 was in force.  It need not be impressed that Parliament from  time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well  as in the new Act in order to protect the interests of the victims  of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die.  One such  amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid  Amendment Act 54 of 1994 by substituting sub-section (6) of  Section 158 which provides:

"158. (6) As soon as any information regarding any  accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is  recorded or report under this section is completed by a police  officer, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward a  copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording  of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such  report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy  thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made  available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt  of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and  insurer."

In view of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the  officer-in-charge of the police station is enjoined to forward a  copy of information/report regarding the accident to the  Tribunal having jurisdiction.  A copy thereof has also to be  forwarded to the insurer concerned.  It also requires that where  a copy is made available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall  within thirty days of receipt of such copy forward the same to  the Claims Tribunal and insurer.  In this background, the  deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 should be given  full effect so that the object of deletion of the said section by  Parliament is not defeated.  If a victim of the accident or heirs  of the deceased victim can prefer claim for compensation  although not being preferred earlier because of the expiry of the  period of limitation prescribed, how the victim or the heirs of  the deceased shall be in a worse position if the question of  condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is pending  either before the Tribunal, the High Court or the Supreme  Court.  The present appeal is one such case.  The appellant has  been pursuing from the Tribunal to this Court.  His right to get  compensation in connection with the accident in question is  being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in  filing the same.  If he had not filed any petition for claim till  14.11.1994 in respect of the accident which took place on  4.12.1990, in view of the amending Act he became entitled to

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file such claim petition, the period of limitation having been  deleted, the claim petition which has been filed and is being  pursued up to this Court cannot be thrown out on the ground of  limitation."                                                                   (Emphasis supplied)

       The ratio laid down in Dhannalal’s  case (supra) applies with full  force to the facts of the present case.   When the claim petition was filed sub- section (3) of Section 166 had been omitted.  Thus, the Tribunal was bound  to entertain the claim petition without taking note of the date on which the  accident took place.  Faced with this situation, Mr. Kapoor submitted that  Dhannalal’s case does not consider Section 6A of the General Clauses Act  and therefore, needs to be reconsidered.  We are unable to accept the  submission.  Section 6A of the General Clauses Act undoubtedly provides  that the repeal of a provision will not affect the continuance of the enactment  so repealed and in operation at the time of repeal.  However, this is subject  to "unless a different intention appears".  In Dhannalal’s case the reason for  the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been set out.  It is noted  that the Parliament realized the grave injustice and injury caused to heirs and  legal representatives of the victims of accidents if the claim petition was  rejected only on ground of limitation.   Thus "the different intention" clearly  appears and Section 6A of the General Clauses Act would not apply.   Mr. Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant, has placed reliance on  the decision rendered by this Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar   vs.    National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 2156.  The facts of that case  were that the appellant was injured in an accident, which took place on  22.1.1989.  The claim petition of the appellant was filed on 15.3.1990 with a  prayer for condonation of delay.  The Tribunal held that in view of sub- section (3) of Section 166 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, which came into  force on 1.7.1989, the delay of more than six months could not be condoned.   In the facts and circumstances of that case this Court held that the case of the  appellant was covered by the new Act and the delay for a longer period than  six months could not be condoned.  In our view, the facts of the case in  Vinod Gurudas (supra) are different from the facts of the present case, as  noticed above.   

Learned counsel for the appellant, next contended that since no period  of limitation has been prescribed by the Legislature, Article 137 of the  Limitation Act may be invoked, otherwise, according to him, stale claims  would be encouraged leading to multiplicity of litigation for non-prescribing  the period of limitation.  We are unable to countenance with the contention  of the appellant for more than one reason.  Firstly, such an Act like Motor  Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the  victims or their families, if otherwise the claim is found genuine.  Secondly,  it is a self contained Act which prescribes mode of filing the application,  procedure to be followed and award to be made.  The Parliament, in its  wisdom, realised the grave injustice and injury being caused to the heirs and  legal representatives of the victims who suffer bodily injuries/die in  accidents, by rejecting their claim petitions at the threshold on the ground of  limitation, and purposely deleted sub-section (3) of Section 166, which  provided the period of limitation for filing the claim petitions and this being  the intendment of the Legislature to give effective relief to the victims and  the families of the motor accidents untrammeled by the technicalities of the  limitation, invoking of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would defeat the  intendment of the Legislature.

In the result, we do not find any infirmity in the order under  challenge, which would warrant our interference.  This appeal, being devoid  of merits, is, accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.