24 September 1976
Supreme Court
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NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE Vs M.N. SOl AND ANOTHER

Case number: Appeal (civil) 541 of 1976


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PETITIONER: NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M.N. SOl AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/09/1976

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR  302            1977 SCR  (1) 731  1976 SCC  (4) 535  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1977 SC 308  (4,9)

ACT:             New Delhi House Rent Control Order 1939--Cl. 5--Standard         rent of house fixed in 1944--Rateable value enhanced on  the         basis  of  rent received in 1966 Whether  rating  should  be         correlated to actual income.

HEADNOTE:             Under  cl. 5 of the New Delhi House Rent Control  Order,         1939  standard rent of the respondent’s house in  New  Delhi         was fixed in 1941 at Rs. 170/- per mensem on annual  tenancy         and  no  fixation of fair rent or standard  rent  had  taken         place  thereafter.  In 1966 an assessment order  was  passed         and  then  modified in appeal, by  the  Additional  District         Magistrate,  Delhi.  enhancing  the rateable  value  of  the         premises  on the basis of the rent then received  which  was         Rs.  1500  p.m.  The writ petition filed by  the  respondent         under Art. 226 of the Constitution questioning the  validity         of  the order of assessment was allowed by the  High  Court,         quashing the impugned order of assessment.             On  the question whether rating, for purposes  of  house         tax,  is  to be correlated to the actual income  from  house         property or is to be regulated by an artificially determined         basis fixed in the past without reference to the actual rent         derived from the house.         Dismissing the appeal,             HELD:  It is the reasonable rent at which the  house  is         let  that governs valuation for purposes of rating and  such         reasonable  rent  is the fair rent or  standard  rent  fixed         under the Rent Control legislation. [737A; E]             (1) The fixation of rates for the purposes of assessment         of house tax is governed by the provisions of s. 3(1) of the         Punjab  Municipal  Act,  1911.  The  section  provides  that         although  annual value, for purposes of rating land, may  be         linked  to  the  assessment of land revenue,  if  the  State         Government  so  directs,  yet, in the cases  of  houses.  or         buildings  under  s.  3(1)(b) of the Punjab Act  it  is  the         reasonable  expectation  to let such buildings,  subject  to         certain  reasonable  deductions,  which  governs  valuation,         whatever may have been the origin of rating. [737 A--B]             (2)(a) For purposes of rating, it is the rent which  had

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       been  held to be fair rent in the past. even though it  does         not bear a real relationship to the prevailing conditions of         the  market  that determines ultimately  the  standard  rent         which still affects the assessment of rates.  Therefore,  if         a  rent which is higher than that which can be  legally  de-         manded  by the landlord was actually paid by a  tenant,  de-         spite.  the fact that such violation of the  restriction  on         rent chargeable by law is visited by penal consequences, the         Municipal authorities cannot take advantage of this defiance         of the law by the landlord.  Rating cannot operate as a mode         of sharing the benefits of illegal rack-renting indulged  in         by rapacious landlords. [738 H; 739 A--B]             Corporation of Calcutta v. Smt. Padma Debi & Ors. [1962]         3 S.C.R. 49 followed.             (b) The analogy of cases where income tax had to be paid         on income illegally made referred to by the appellant has no         application  to this case because the basis of  taxation  in         such cases was the actual income and not a determination  of         what  a prudent man could reasonably do to get the.  income.         It is not prudent for a landlord to extract higher rent than         what  law  enjoins and then punishes  violation  with  penal         consequences. [739 C-D]         15--1234SCI/76         732             It  is not the expectation of a landlord who  takes  the         risk  of prosecution and punishment, but the expectation  of         the landlord who is prudent enough to abide by the law  that         serves  as the standard of reasonableness for  purposes.  of         rating. [740 G]             (c)  The  appellant’s contention that the absence  of  a         restriction  in the Punjab Act similar to the one  found  in         the  proviso  to s. 116 of the Delhi  Municipal  Corporation         Act,  1957,  that is to say, that the rateable  value  of  a         building shall not exceed the annual amount of the  standard         rent so fixed implies that there is no such restriction upon         the  powers of assessment under the Punjab Act,  is  without         force.  The provision in the Delhi Act, far from helping the         appellant, suggests that it is in conformity with notions of         reasonable  rental value today for the purposes  of  assess-         ment.   The  mere. fact that s. 3(1 )(b) of the  Punjab  Act         left the determination of reasonable expectations of rent to         the assessing authorities does not mean that they can  today         ignore  the subsequent law fixing the restrictions  on  rent         and the penal consequences with which their infringement  is         visited.   The provisions of the Delhi Act  were  introduced         after  the  concept of restrictions on rent and  letting  of         accommodation  had become well established in this  country.         It  shows  what reasonable expectation in  the  new  context         could  or  should  mean.  Therefore the  existence  of  such         provisions supports the case of the respondent. [740 B---D]         ARGUMENTS         For the Appellant:             (a)  The decision of the Supreme Court in  Padma  Devi’s         case [1962] 3 S.C.R. 49 while stating that the rental  value         cannot be fixed higher than the standard rent under the Rent         Control Act rested on different facts.  In that case no rent         higher  than the standard rent was in fact received  by  the         owner. It was also observed that "a bargain between a  will-         ing lessor and willing lessee uninfluenced by any extraneous         circumstances (inflating or deflating the rent) may afford a         guiding test of reasonableness.             (b)  In none of the decisions relied on in the  judgment         under  appeal  there  was agreement to pay rent  at  a  rate         higher  than the standard rent nor was any such higher  rent         paid.  In the present case the rent actually received by the

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       owner  has been Rs. 1500/- per month, and not  the  standard         rent of Rs. 150/- per month.         (c) The ultimate test in all cases has to be what rent might         reasonably attributed as between a willing lessor and  will-         ing  lessee.  It would be incongruous and most  unreasonable         to contend that even though the standard rent is on the face         of  it extremely low and in fact and in truth the  owner  is         being willingly paid by the tenant considerably higher  rent         (here  Rs.  150/- per month was the standard  rent  and  Rs.         1500/-  per  month  was the rent actually  received  by  the         owner)  the annual value for letting should not  exceed  the         amount of standard rent.             (d) The operation of the principle of illegality and the         operation  of penal legislation would be confined  to  cases         where the owner is not receiving such higher rent and he was         adversely  affected by fixation of any annual letting  value         at  a  rent higher than the standard  rent.   The  decisions         relied  on  in  the judgment under appeal  proceed  on  such         factual situation.  They do not lay down any rule having the         effect of conferring unmerited and gratuitous benefit on the         owner to the prejudice of Municipal Administration.             (e) Illegality of a. transaction. between an owner and a         lessee  is  not a bar in the context of  rating  and  taxing         statutes.  The ultimate test in matters of rating must  rest         on the principle of reasonableness and fair rent.  The  rent         actually  stipulated  and  paid would be  the  most.  cogent         factor  in determining annual rating value unless there  are         extraneous circumstances inflating or deflating the rate  of         rent.         For the respondent:             The  argument advanced by the appellant comes down to  a         narrow  point  of construction of Section 3 (1 )(b)  of  the         Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (Act No. III         733         of  1911) and in particular the interpretation of the  words         "may  reasonably     be expected to let from year to  year".         The  same expression is used in number of Municipal Acts  of         various States and has been judicially considered in  number         of decisions of this Court.  In the case of Smt. Padma  Devi         [1962] 3 S.C.R. 49, this Court considered Section 127 (a) of         the  Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, which used the  same  ex-         pression as in Section 3(1)(b) of the Act in question.         The word "reasonably" has been considered in the said  deci-         sion.              Under the Rent Control Act, the receipt of higher  rent         other  than  the standard rent fixed under the Act  is  made         penal  for the landlord.  (See Sections 4, 5 and 48  of  the         Act).   A combined reading of the said provisions leaves  no         room  for  doubt that a contract for rent at a  rate  higher         than the standard rent is not only enforceable but also that         the landlord would be committing an offence if he  collected         a rent at a rate higher than the standard rent.  This  Court         has  described  the  hypothetical rent "as a  rent  which  a         landlord  may  reasonably  be expected to get  in  the  open         market.  But the open market cannot include a "black market"         a  term  euphemistically  used  to  commercial  transactions         entered  into between parties in defiance of law.   In  that         situation, a statutory limitation of rent circumscribes  the         scope of the bargain in the market.  In no circumstances the         hypothetical rent can exceed that limit.         The  contentions of the appellant that the first  respondent         has  admitted that he was receiving the monthly rent of  Rs.         1500/- and that should be the basis determining the rateable         value  of the building and the  decision  of this  Court  in         the case of Smt. Padma Devi is distinguishable and should be

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       confined to the facts in that case. are untenable.  The said         decision  of this Court is conclusive on the issue in  ques-         tion.             In  the next case of this Court Corporation of  Calcutta         v.L.I.C.  [1971] 1 S.C.R. 248, Section 168 (1)  of  Calcutta         Municipal Corporation Act, 1951, which used the same expres-         sion came up for consideration of this Court, and this Court         applied the principles laid down in Smt. Padma Devi’s Case.         In  Guntur Municipal Council Case [1971] 2 S.C.R. 423,  this         Court went further and held that no distinction can be  made         between buildings, the fair rent of which has been  actually         fixed  by the Rent Controller and those in respect of  which         no  such  rent has been fixed when the  Controller  has  not         fixed  the fair rent the Municipal Authorities will have  to         arive   at the fair  rent according to the  principles  laid         down in the Rent Act for the determination of  fair rent.             In view of these decisions of this Court, the  appellant         has no power to assess the annual value of the said property         at  a higher rate than the standard rent fixed by  the  Con-         troller  less  10% allowed for repairs.  The fact  that  the         first  respondent is receiving Rs. 1500/- per month  is  not         relevant for assessing the rateable value of the building.

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 541 of 1976.             (Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment  and   Order         dated  30-5-2975 of the Delhi High Court in Civil  Writ  No.         374-D of 1966).             S. T. Desai, Bikramjit Nayar, B.P. Maheshwari and Suresh         Sethi, for the Appellant.             M. Natesan, N.H. Hingorani F.C. Bedi and M.K. Garg,  for         Respondent No. 1.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             BEG,  J.--This  appeal  by  special  leave  is  directed         against the unanimous decision of a Full’ Bench of the Delhi         High  Court.  The case before us arose from a Writ  Petition         flied by the respondent, M.N.         734         Soi,  praying that certain assessment orders, together  with         the  order under Section 84 of the Punjab Municipal Act  1II         of  1911,  passed on 11th February, 1966, by  an  Additional         District  Magistrate of  Delhi relating to the house of  the         petitioner  at 15,  Prithviraj  Road, New  Delhi,  modifying         assessments on appeal, be quashed.  The respondent  landlord         submitted that assessment for purposes of rating, in accord-         ance  with the provisions of Section 3(1)(b) Of  the  Punjab         Municipal  Act 1II of 1911 (hereinafter referred to as  ’the         Act’),  and, in particular, the interpretation of the  words         "may  reasonably be expected to be let from year  to  year",         impose upon the assessing authorities the obligation not  to         assess  at a higher rental value than the  "standard  rent".         It  is,  not disputed that standard rent of  the  house  was         fixed on 25th September, 1941, in the following terms:                        "After due consideration of all the facts and                  circumstances a fair rent of Rs. 170/- one  Hundred                  and Seventy P.M., (unfurnished) on annual  tenancy,                  exclusive   of  House  Tax  and  Irrigation   water                  charges, is hereby fixed for House No. 15,  Prithvi                  Raj  Road,  New Delhi, under Clause 5 of  the  Rent                  Control Order 1939".                      It  appears from the statement of facts by  the                  Full  Bench, which has not been  questioned  before                  us,  that the fixation of rent in 194-1, under  the

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                New Delhi House Rent Control Order, 1939, continues                  to  be  valid  notwithstanding the  repeal  of  the                  Control  Order  by  Section 15  of  the  Delhi  and                  Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947, which, in its                  turn,  was repealed by Section 46 of the Delhi  and                  Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.  The repealing provi-                  sions  maintained intact the validity of  all  that                  was legally done under the repealed Order.                      The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of  1958),                  contains  a very elaborate procedure for the  fixa-                  tion  of  "standard rent" under Section 6  of  this                  Act.  In so far as such premises as "have been  let                  at any time before the 2nd day of June, 1944",  are                  concerned,  the  standard  rent  is  determined  as                  follows:                        "6(1) (a) if the basic rent of such  premises                  per  annum does not exceed six hundred rupees,  the                  basic rent; or                        (b)  if the basic  rent of such premises  per                  annum  exceeds six hundred rupees, the  basic  rent                  together with ten per cent of such basic rent;"                  The first two clauses of the second schedule to the                  1958 Act define the basic rent for the purposes  of                  the ease before us:                        "1.  In this Schedule, ’basic rent’ in  rela-                  tion  to any premises let out before the 2nd  June,                  1944,  means  the original rent  of  such  premises                  referred  to in paragraph 2 increased by such  per-                  centage  of  the original rent as is  specified  in                  paragraph  3 of paragraph 4 or paragraph 5, as  the                  case may be.                        2.  ’Original rent’ in relation  to  premises                  referred to in paragraph 1, means--                  (a) Where the rent of such premises has been  fixed                  under                  735                   the  New Delhi House Rent Control Order, 1939,  or                  the Delhi Rent Control Ordinance, 1944, the rent so                  fixed; or                      (b)  in any other case,--                      (i)  the rent at which the premises were let on                  the 1st  November, 1939, or                      (ii) if the premises were not let on that date,                  the  rent at which they were first let out  at  any                  time  after  that  date but before  the  2nd  June,                  1944".                  Thus,  the "fair rent" fixed under the  1939  Order                  determines,  ultimately the "standard  rent"  which                  still affects the assessment of rates in the manner                  indicated below.                      It is clear that, although, legislative  provi-                  sions,  for the fixation of ’standard rent  in  New                  Delhi,  contained in. Section 9 of the  Delhi  Rent                  ’Control  Act 59 of 1958, are comparatively  recent                  and  fairly elaborate, yet, the fixation  of  rates                  for  purposes of assessment of house tax  is  still                  governed  by the provisions of Section  3(1)(b)  of                  the   Punjab  Municipal Act of 1911, enacted  at  a                  time when there was no machinery for the control of                  rents.   The whole of the Section 3(1 ) may be  set                  out  here in order to get an idea of the nature  of                  valuation contemplated ’by the Act of 1911 for  the                  purposes of rating.  Section 3 (1) reads:                  "3 ( 1 ) ’Annual value’ means--                        (a)  in  the case of land, the  gross  annual

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                rent at which it may reasonably be expected to  let                  from year to year;                       Provided that, in the case of land assessed to                  land-revenue or of which the land-revenue has  been                  wholly  or  in part released, compounded  for,  re-                  deemed or assigned, the annual value, shall if  the                  State Government so direct,  be deemed to be double                  the aggregate of the following amounts, namely :-                     (i) the amount of the land-revenue for the  time                  being assessed on the land, whether such assessment                  is  leviable or not; or when the  land-revenue  has                  been wholly or in part compounded for or  redeemed,                  the  amount  which,  but for such   composition  or                  redemption, would have been leviable and                    (ii)  when  the improvement of the  land  due  to                  canal irrigation has been excluded from account  in                  assessing  the land-revenue, the amount of  owner’s                  rate or water advantage rate, or other rate imposed                  in respect of such improvement:                       (b) in the case of any house or building,  the                  gross  annual rent at which such house or  building                  together  with its appurtenances and any  furniture                  that may be let for use or enjoyment therewith, may                  reasonably  be expected to let from year ’to  year,                  subject to the following deductions:  ....                    (i) such deduction and  exceeding 20 per cent  of                  the  gross  annual rent as the  committee  in  each                  particular                  736                  case may consider a reasonable allowance on account                  of the furniture let therewith;                      (ii) a deduction of 10 per cent for the cost of                  repairs  and  for all other expenses  necessary  to                  maintain  the building in a state to  command  such                  gross  annual rent.  The deduction under this  sub-                  clause  shall be calculated on the balance  of  the                  gross  annual  rent after the  deduction  (if  any)                  under sub-clause (i);                      (iii)  where land is let with a building,  such                  deduction, not exceeding 20 per cent, of the  gross                  annual  rent, as the committee in  each  particular                  case  may  consider reasonable on  account  of  the                  actual  expenditure, if any, annually  incurred  by                  the  owner on the upkeep of the land in a state  to                  command such gross annual’ rent:                        Explanation   I.---For the purposes  of  this                  clause it is immaterial whether the house or build-                  ing, and the furniture and the land let for use  or                  enjoyment  therewith, are let by the same  contract                  or  by  different contracts, and if  by  different’                  contracts, whether such contracts are’ made  simul-                  taneously or at different times.                        Explanation  II.---The  term  ’gross   annual                  rent’  shall  not include any, tax payable  by  the                  owner in respect of which the owner and tenant have                  agreed that it shall be paid by the tenant.                        (c) In the case of any house or building, the                  gross  annual  rent of which cannot  be  determined                  under  clause (b), 5 per cent, on the sum  obtained                  by  adding the estimated present cost  of  erecting                  the building, less such amount as the Committee may                  deem reasonable to be deducted on account of depre-                  ciation  (if any) to the estimated market value  of                  the  site  and any land attached to  the  house  or                  building:

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                Provided that--                        (i) in the calculation of the annual value of                  any  premises  no  account shall be  taken  of  any                  machinery thereon;                        (ii)   when   a  building  is   occupied   by                  the  .owner under such exceptional circumstances as                  to  render a valuation at 5 per cent.  On the  cost                  of erecting the building, less depreciation, exces-                  sive, a lower percentage may be taken."                      The  question raised before us is whether  rat-                  ing, for purposes house tax, is to be correlated to                  the actual income from house property, or, it is to                  be  regulated by an artificially determined  basis,                  fixed in the’ past, without reference to the actual                  rent that may be derived from the house or building                  today ?             On a bare reading of the provisions of Section  3(1)(a),         set  out  above,  no doubt is left  that,  although,  annual         value, for purposes of         737         rating  land, may be linked to the assessment of land  reve-         nue,  if the State Government so directs, yet, in the  cases         of houses or buildings, it is the reasonable expectation  to         let  such  buildings, subject to certain  reasonable  deduc-         tions,  which governs valuation whatever may have  been  the         origin of rating.  The concept of rating and its origin have         been commented upon by this Court several times (see:  Patel         Gordhandas Hargovindas v. Municipal  Commissioner,   Ahmada-         bad,.(1)  and,  Municipal Corporation of Greater  Bombay  v.         M/s. Poly-chem Ltd.) (2)             In  the case of the Municipal  Corporation  of   Greater         Bombay  (supra),  after  considering various  cases  on  the         rating  and  commenting upon the case  of  Patel  Gordhandas         (supra), this Court observed (at p. 697) .                         "This case links the nature of the  property                  tax  called  a  rate levied  for  local  Government                  purposes with the mode adopted for  its levy.  Each                  mode had  necessarily to be directed to finding out                  the  annual rental value of land as that  was  what                  was taxed and not either the capital or the  poten-                  tial value of land".                      It  is true that,  in the case  before us,  the                  actual  rent  obtained by the landlord now  is  Rs.                  1500/-  p.m.,  which is about nine times  the  fair                  rent fixed in 1941.  But, the fixation of 1941  has                  continued  unaltered.  No fresh fixation of a  fair                  or standard rent, in accordance with the applicable                  provisions of law, has taken place.  The  argument,                  therefore,  which prevailed before the  Full  Bench                  and  is pressed before us also for  acceptance,  on                  the strength of the view expressed by this Court in                  the  Corporation of Calcutta v. Smt. Padran Debi  &                  Ors.,  (3)  followed by the Full  Bench,  was  that                  reasonable rent, contemplated by Section 3(1)(b) of                  the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, can, in no case, be                  above  the fair rent or standard rent fixed by  the                  provisions  relating  to fixation of rent  in  rent                  control  legislation  an infringement of  which  is                  penalised.  The crucial words used in the enactment                  before the Court in Smt. Padma Debi’s case  (supra)                  were  (at p. 53): "gross annual rent at  which  the                  land  or building might at the time  of  assessment                  reasonably  be expected to let from year to  year".                  Subba  Rao, J. speaking for a bench of four  Judges                  of this Court said there (at p. 53):

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                      "The  dictionary  meaning of the   words  ’to                  let’  is ’grant use of for rent or hire’.   It  im-                  plies  that the rent which the landlord might  rea-                  lise  if the house was let is the basis for  fixing                  the  annual value of the building.  The  criterion.                  therefore,  is the rent realisable by the  landlord                  and  not the value of the holding in the  hands  of                  the tenant".                      After  quoting from a passage the  judgment  of                  the  Judicial  Committee of the  Privy  Council  in                  Bengal  Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd.  v. Corporation  of                  Calcutta,(4) showing that a hypothetical tenancy of                  an improbable character was not contemplated,  this                  Court pronounced as follows on the decisive concept                  of "reasonableness":                  (1) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 608.       (2) [1974] 3  S.C.R.                  687.                  (3)  [1962] 3 S.C.R 49.         (4) [1946] L.R.  74                  I.A.I.                  738                          "The  word  ’reasonably’  in  the   section                  throws  further light on this interpretation.   The                  word ’reasonably’ is not capable of precise defini-                  tion.  ’Reasonable’ signifies ’in  accordance  with                  reason’.  In the ultimate analysis it is a question                  of fact. Whether a particular act is reasonable  or                  not depends on the circumstances in a given  situa-                  tion.   A  bargain between a willing lessor  and  a                  willing  lessee  uninfluenced  by  any   extraneous                  circumstances may afford a guiding test of reasona-                  bleness.   An  inflated or deflated  rate  of                  rent based upon fraud, emergency, relationship, and                  such  other considerations may take it out  of  the                  bounds  of  reasonableness.  Equally  it  would  be                  incongruous to consider fixation of rent beyond the                  limits  fixed by penal legislation  as  reasonable.                  Under the Rent Control Act, the receipt of any rent                  higher  than the standard rent fixed under the  Act                  is  made penal for the  landlord. Section 3 of  the                  said  Act  says that any amount in excess’  of  the                  standard rent of any premises shall be  irrecovera-                  ble notwithstanding any agreement to the  contrary.                  Section  33(a)  thereof provides  inter  alia  that                  "whoever  knowingly receives, whether  directly  or                  indirectly,  any sum on account of the rent of  any                  premises  in  excess of the standard rent  will  be                  liable  to certain penalties.  ’Standard rent’  has                  been  defined  in 2(1)(b) to mean that  ’where  the                  rent has been  fixed under s. 9, the rent so fixed,                  or at which it would have been fixed if application                  were  made  under the said  section’.   A  combined                  reading  of the said provisions leaves no room  for                  doubt that a contract for a rent at a ’rate  higher                  than the standard rent is not only not  enforceable                  but  also that the landlord would be  cmmitting  an                  offence  if he collected a rent above the  rate  of                  the standard rent.  One may legitimately say  under                  those circumstances that a landlord cannot reasona-                  bly be expected to let a building for a rent higher                  than the standard rent.  A law of the land with its                  penal consequences cannot be ignored in  ascertain-                  ing  the reasonable expectations of a  landlord  in                  the  matter of rent. In thus view, the law  of  the                  land  must necessarily be taken as one of the  cir-                  cumstances obtaining in the open market placing  an

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                upper limit on the rate of rent for which a  build-                  ing can reasonably be expected to let".              It  was held in Smt. Padma Debi’s case (supra) that  it         was  not  the actual rent received by the landlord  but  the         "hypothetical  rent which    can reasonably be  expected  if         the  building  is to be let", which has to    be  the  legal         yard  stick  of a "reasonable expectation" in an  "open  mar         ket".  It was explained:  ".. an open market cannot  include         a ’black    market’, a term euphemistically used to  commer-         cial transactions entered  into between parties in  defiance         of law".         Thus,  whatever  may be our views on the  reasonableness  of         tying    down assessment, for the purposes of rating, to the         concept of a rent which has been held to be fair rent in the         past but does not bear a real relationship to the prevailing         conditions of the market for accommodation if it was  uncon-         trolled, we find it impossible to get over the ratio         739         decidendi  of this Court in Smt. Padma Debi’s  case  (supra)         which  we  are bound to follow.  This was that,  if  a  rent         which  is higher than that which can be legally demanded  by         the landlord and actually paid by a tenant, despite the fact         that such violation of the restriction on rent chargeable by         law is visited by penal consequences, the Municipal authori-         ties  cannot take advantage of this defiance of the  law  by         the  landlord.  Rating cannot operate as a mode  of  sharing         the  benefits of illegal rack-renting indulged in  by  rapa-         cious  landlords  for whose activities  the  law  prescribes         condign punishment.         Cases  were  referred to before us by Mr. S.T.  Desai  where         income  tax had to be paid on income illegally made even  by         indulging  in criminal activities.  In those cases, however,         the basis of taxation was the actual income and not a deter-         mination  of  what a prudent man could reasonably do to  get         the  income.   It is certainly  no part of  prudence  for  a         landlord to extract  higher  rent  than  what  law prescrib-         ing  restrictions  of  rent, by  Rent  Control  legislation,         enjoins and then visits their infringement with penal conse-         quences.  Hence, in the case before us, the prudence of  the         landlord has to be assumed and judged by normal standard  to         determine  his "reasonable expectation". This, we think  was         the ratio decidendi of Smt. Padma Debi’s case (supra)  which         was  decided as long ago as 1962.  If the law  has  remained         unchanged despite that pronouncement by this Court, of which         the  law making authorities must be deemed to be  cognizant,         the  presumption would be that the intention, from  allowing         the  State  of the law so declared to continue,  is  to  let         rating  be governed by the fixation of rent by Rent  Control         authorities and not by the test of actual income derived by.         the  landlord.   In  other words, the concept  of  an  "open         market" applicable to such cases is not one where the  land-         lord is absolutely free to let to anybody at any rent he can         obtain and where the tenant has the corresponding freedom to         offer anything he likes for any accommodation he may want to         hire.   As we know, the right to offer many things one  pos-         sesses  for  either sale or hire as well as the  freedom  to         purchase  or to hire them is hedged round today with  condi-         tions imposed by law.  The concept of this restricted  "open         market", if one may juxtapose such antithetical concepts, is         well  established today.  The area of the "open  market"  is         circumscribed by law. It is within this restricted area that         the reasonable man’s expectations must be deemed to  operate         even if such a concept seems to import an element of unreal-         ity  into the field of rating.  Legal norms often savour  of         some artificiality.  It may be observed here that the provi-

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       so to Section 116 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act  66         of  1957, providing for determination of rateable  value  of         lands and buildings assessable to tax, lays down:                        "Provided further that in respect of any land                  or  building  the standard rent of which  has  been                  fixed  under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control  Act,                  1952,  the rateable value thereof shall not  exceed                  the annual amount of the standard rent so fixed".             Mr.  S.T. Desai, basing his argument on this  provision,         contended that, as there is no such provision in the  Punjab         Municipal Act, 1911,         740         imply such a restriction upon powers of  assessment, due  to         rent  control  legislation, would be incorrect.   We  think,         that  this   provision,  far from helping the  case  of  the         appellant  Municipal Committee, suggests that it is in  con-         formity  with notions of reasonable rental value  today  for         the purposes of assessment.  The mere fact that Section 3(1)         (b) of the Punjab Municipal Act of 1911 left the  determina-         tion  of  reasonable expectations of rent to  the  assessing         authorities  does  not mean that they can today  ignore  the         subsequent  law fixing restrictions on rents and  the  penal         consequences with which their infringement is visited.   The         provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957  were         introduced  after  the concept of restrictions on  rent  and         letting of accommodation had become well established in this         country.  It  shows what reasonable expectation in  the  new         context could or should mean. Therefore, in our opinion, the         existence  of such provisions supports the case of  the  re-         spondent  which was accepted by the Full Bench.In any  case,         so  long as the ratio decidendi of Smt. Padran  Debi’s  case         (supra)  holds  the ground, this Court cannot,  by  judicial         interpretation,introduce a new concept of reasonable  expec-         tation.  If the resulting position is not just or equitable,         its remedy lies in the amendment of the law itself by legis-         lation.  We cannot remedy it. We may here indicate the penal         provisions in the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958, which make         the  ratio decidendi of Smt. Padma Debi’s case  (supra)  ap-         plicable  to the case before us.  Section 5(1) of  this  Act         lays down:                         "5(1 ) Subject to the provisions of this Act,                  no person shall claim or receive any rent in excess                  of the standard rent notwithstanding any  agreement                  to the contrary."                  And, Section 48(1)(a) enacts:                        "48 (1 ) If any person contravenes any of the                  provisions of Section 5, he shall. be punishable--                      (a)  in  the  case of a  contravention  of  the                  provisions   of sub-section (1 ) of Section 5, with                  simple imprisonment for a term which may extend  to                  three  months, or with fine which may extend  to  a                  sum  which exceeds the unlawful charge  claimed  or                  received  under  that sub-section by  one  thousand                  rupees, or with both."          Hence,  the  case before us is completely  covered  by  the         concept of reasonableness of expectation of rent which  must         take the penal law of the State into account.  It is not the         expectation of a landlord who takes the risk of  prosecution         and punishment which the violation of the law involves,  but         the  expectation  of the landlord who is prudent  enough  to         abide by the law that serves as the standard of  reasonable-         ness for purposes of rating.         For  the  foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision  of  the         Full Bench of the Delhi High Court and dismiss this  appeal.         But,  in the circumstances of the case, we make no order  as

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       to costs.         P.B.R.                                                Appeal         dismissed.         741