06 January 1981
Supreme Court
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NEW BIHAR BIRI LEAVES CO. & ORS. Vs STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

Bench: SARKARIA,RANJIT SINGH
Case number: Writ Petition (Civil) 2222 of 1977


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PETITIONER: NEW BIHAR BIRI LEAVES CO. & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/01/1981

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1981 AIR  679            1981 SCR  (2) 417  1981 SCC  (1) 537        1981 SCALE  (1)1

ACT:      Constitution of  India 1950, Articles 19(6) clauses (i) & (ii)-Clauses  whether distinct and separate-Law covered by the clauses whether to satisfy the test of reasonableness      Article 19(1)(g) citizen’s right to enter into contract with State-Whether  fundamental right can be enforced though contractual      Bihar Kendu  Leaves (Control of Trade) Act 1973 & Bihar Kendu Leaves  (Control of  Trade) Rules,  1973-Clause 13 and Clause  4(bb)   of  agreement  prescribed  by  rules-Whether unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 19

HELD:

    Kendu leaves used in the manufacture of bidis are grown as forest  produce in  several States. On March 10, 1972 the State of  Bihar issued  the Bihar  Kendu Leaves  (Control of Trade) Ordinance,  1972, which  was replaced  by  the  Bihar Kendu Leaves  (Control of  Trade) Act, 1973. The purpose was to create  a State  monopoly in  the matter of sale of Kendu leaves to  the manufacturers  of bidis to regulate the trade in  relation  to  the  grower  of  Kendu  plants  and  their collection and  sale through  the agency of the State to the registered manufacturers  of bidis. Section 4, empowered the State Government  for the  purpose of  purchase and  sale of Kendu leaves  on its behalf, to appoint agents in respect of different units.  Section 9  provided  that  the  authorised agents will  be bound  to accept delivery of all those Kendu leaves which  are fit  for the  purpose  of  manufacture  of bidis.      In  exercise   of  its  rule-making  powers  the  State Government notified  the  Bihar  Kendu  Leaves  (Control  of Trade) Rules, 1972, which was continued by Section 23 of the Act even  after the  repeal  of  the  Ordinance.  Provisions regarding the  disposal of Kendu leaves were made in Rule 9. Sub-rule (I)  provided that Kendu leaves collected or likely to be  collected shall  be sold  or otherwise disposed of by tender on  terms and  conditions  specified  in  the  Tender Notice. The  Tender was  required  by  sub-rule  (2)  to  be advertised in  newspapers. Sub-rule  (9) provided  that  the successful tenderer  or successful bidder shall be appointed as  purchaser  and  the  entire  quantity  of  Kendu  leaves collected or  likely to be collected or such lesser quantity out of  it as  may be  offered to  him by the State shall be

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purchased by him on terms and conditions in the agreement to be executed  by the  purchaser. Sub-rule  (10) required  the purchaser to execute an Agreement in Form ‘M’ within 15 days of the receipt of the order of appointment.      By a Notification dated January 16, 1974 the Rules were amended and  sub-clause (bb)  after clause 4(b) was added in Form ‘M’  of the Agreement which provided that the purchaser shall not  raise any  objection against the quality of Kendu leaves or  shortage of  leaves. Condition  13 of  the Tender Notice was  also incorporated  in the  statutory  Agreement, Form ‘M’ providing 418 that for  every unit  a minimum  royalty will be ‘payable by the purchaser,  and that this amount shall be payable by the tenderer even  if by  the end  of the  season, the  price of Kendu leaves at the offered rate, collected and delivered to the purchaser,  fell short  of this amount, the amount being payable before  the leaves  are utilized or taken out and if not paid, realisable as arrears of land revenue.      In  their  writ  petitions  the  petitioners  who  were carrying on trade in Kendu leaves, assailed the Rules framed under the  Act and  clause 13 and clause 4(bb) of the Tender Notice and the Statutory Agreement and the notices of demand issued demanding  royalty  in  respect  of  the  undelivered quantity of Kendu leaves.      It  was   contended  that:   (i)  the   provisions  and conditions contained in clause 4(bb) and clause 13 amount to an unreasonable  restriction on freedom to carry on trade or business in  Kendu leaves guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g) of the  Constitution  and  that  they  are  not  within  the protection of  sub-clause (ii)  in the second part of clause (6) of  Article  19;  (ii)  that  the  provisions  in  their immediate operation  and effect,  are harsh, unconscionable, arbitrary, unfair  and oppressive, thereby violating Article 14, (iii)  the foreclosure  of the right of the purchaser to refuse delivery  on the  ground of  the leaves  offered, not being of  requisite quality, is inconsistent and ultra vires of the  proviso to Section 9(1) of the Act and (iv) that the auctions are  held in  January, while  the  Agents  are  not appointed till  March or  April, the  plucking  season,  and consequently, no  reasonable estimate  of the expected yield is possible.      The respondents  argued that  (i) there is a paucity of skilled people  who could  be employed  as  Agents  and  the prevailing practice is that the persons appointed as Agents, are sponsored  by the  purchasers and  that the terms of the Agreement, taken  as a  whole are  not one-sided,  (ii) if a person voluntarily  takes upon  himself under the terms of a contract, such risks and chances of benefit, he has no right in the  event of  suffering a  loss to be compensated for it even under  the ordinary  law in a suit, much less the Court of writ  jurisdiction can  grant any  such relief, (iii) the right to  enter into a contract on particular terms with the State is  not a  fundamental right,  (iv) as the petitioners had not  paid amounts  required to  be adjusted  against the remuneration of  the Agents  they are not entitled to relief under Article  32, and  (v) the  provisions are directly and essentially related  to the  operation of  monopoly and,  as such are  within the protection of sub-clause (ii) of clause (6) of Art. 19.      Dismissing the petitions and appeal ^      HELD: 1.  The condition  in 4(bb) in the Tender Notices and  the  statutory  agreement  is  couched  in  peremptory, drastic and  absolute language,  not qualified  by any words

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showing that  the bar envisaged in it will be attracted only in cases  where the purchaser has had an earlier opportunity to raise his objection but failed to do so, or, where he had on an  earlier occasion  raised such  an objection which was heard  and   overruled  by  the  competent  Forest  Officer. Condition 4(bb) therefore is inconsistent with and repugnant to Section  9(1), proviso of the Act which contains a built- in-warranty, that  the Kendu leaves offered would be fit for manufacture of bidis; that is to say, the leaves would be of merchantable quality and as such, invalid. [442D-H] 419      2. The  scheme of the Bihar Act and the Rules and Forms including that  of the  impugned condition  13 was  designed remove the  deficiencies, infirmities  and vices pointed out in Rashbihar’s Panda v. State of Orissa [1969] 3 S.C.R. 374. The  impugned   condition   13   satisfied   the   test   of reasonableness under  the first  part of Articles 19(6). The contention, that in actual operation, the impugned provision (clause 13)  creates a  monopoly in  favour of  a  class  of middlemen consisting of ‘Agents’ and purchasers, and enables them to  earn unduly large profits at the cost of the public or pluckers and growers is not acceptable.[439G-H, 440A-B]      3. (i).  Clause (6) of Article 19 falls into two parts, indicating that  the two parts of the clause are intended to be   distinct    and   separate.   The   words   "reasonable restrictions" which  find pivotal mention in the first part, have not  been repeated  in the  second part  which omission makes it  clear that a law covered by sub-clause (ii) is not required to  satisfy the  test of  reasonableness under  the first part  of the  clause and no objection to have validity of such a law is tenable on the ground that it infringes the right guaranteed  under Article 19(1)(g). Sub-clause (ii) is thus an  exception to  the  main  substantive  provision  in clause (1) of the Article. [431G-H, 432A-B]      3(ii). The  basic  and  essential  features  which  are directly and  immediately connected with the creation of the State monopoly  are found in the body of the Act itself. The provisions incorporated  in the  Forms of  Tender Notice and Agreement are  merely subsidiary  or incidental  provisions, therefore, do  not fall  within the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of Article 19(6). [432E-F]      3(iii). Where  the business  to  be  carried  on  by  a citizen is  in a  commodity, the  sale of  which is  a State monopoly, conditioned by some statutory terms, (analogous to the impugned  conditions) which  in operation, have a direct and immediate  impact on  the  fundamental  freedom  of  the citizen guaranteed  under Article  19(1)  (g),  the  citizen cannot  enter  into  a  contract  with  the  Government  for purchase of  such a  commodity except on the statutory terms laid down  by the  seller-State. The  Tender Notice  and the Agreement  which   the  purchasers   enter  into   with  the Government,  although   couched  in   statutory  Forms,  are therefore, not bereft of their contractual character. [432G- H, 433A & C]      4. The  minimum royalty or price payable being fixed on the basis  of 75  per cent  of the estimated annual yield in standard bags  from the unit multiplied by the rates offered and accepted.  Such an estimate, is made on the basis of the average actual  yield from that unit for the preceding three years. Such  an estimated yield is notified and published in the Tender Notices every year. Purchasers in the trade, know beforehand as  to what  they are  bidding for,  and they are generally persons  who have  been in  the trade  for several years and, as such have a special knowledge of forming their own estimates  of the  expected yield  and  the  chances  of

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profit and  loss from  that particular  unit in a particular year. [433F-G]      5. As  the chances  of profit  and risks  of  loss  are evenly divided  between the seller-state and the purchasers, it cannot  be said  that the impugned condition in clause 13 of  the  Tender  Notice  and  the  Agreement  is  manifestly unreasonable. The  impugned condition  13 is  a  restriction imposed in the general public interest. [434B-C]      6. Although  the Act and the Rules contemplate that the Agents appointed  by the  Government will  be under its full control and liable to compensate 420 the Government  for any  shortage, damage  or loss caused in collection or  delivery or  any defect in the quality of the leaves  collected,   to  the   Government,  yet,  in  actual practice, the real position is that the Agents are generally persons sponsored by and otherwise, deeply interested in the purchasers. [435B-C]      7. The  agents are  to be appointed every year at short notice when the plucking season is at hand and as there is a dearth of  suitable persons  having adequate  experience and skill of  work as efficient agents, the Government is driven into a  situation in  which they  have  to  appoint  persons sponsored by  the purchasers  as Agents.  The  rules  framed under the Act envisage a strict and exclusive control of the Government over the Agents and their activities, and provide for their  liability to  compensate the  Government for  the loss  occasioned   by  their   misconduct  or  neglect.  The condition in  condition 13  far from  creating a monopoly in the trade  in favour  of middlemen,  operates as an ironclad safeguard against  leakage of the public revenue by assuring a minimum  return to  the public  exchequer from the sale of Kendu leaves.  The provision  is aimed  to secure  the  full benefit from  the trade  to the  State  leaving  chances  of making reasonable, marginal profit to the purchasers. [435C- D, 439B-E]      8. It is a fundamental principle of general application that if  a person  of his  own accord, accepts a contract on certain terms  and works  out the  contract,  he  cannot  be allowed to  adhere to  and abide by some of the terms of the contract which  proved advantageous to him and repudiate the other  terms   of  the   same  contract   which   might   be disadvantageous to  him. The  maxim,  is  qui  approbat  non reprobat. A  party to  an instrument  or transaction  cannot take advantage  of one part of a document or transaction and reject the rest. [441E-H]      Verschures  Creameries   Ltd.  v.  Hull  &  Netherlands Steamship Co.  [1921] 2  K  B.608  and  Douglas  Menzies  v. Umphelby [1908] A.C. 224 at p. 232 referred to.      In the  instant case  the petitioners  had by  offering highest bids  at public auctions or by Tenders, accepted and worked out  the contracts  in the past but are now resisting the demands  or other  action, arising  out of  the impugned condition 13  on the ground that this condition is violative of Article 19(1)(g) and 14 of the Constitution. The impugned conditions though  bearing a  statutory  complexion,  retain their basic contractual character. Though a person cannot be debarred from enforcing his fundamental rights on the ground of estoppel or waiver, the principle which prohibits a party to a  transaction from  approbating a part of its conditions and reprobating  the rest, is different from the doctrine of estoppel or waiver. [442A-C]

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JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION  :  Writ  Petitions  Nos.  2222- 2252/77 & 121 to 125/79, 405 & 441/74, 46 & 47/75.           (Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)                             AND               CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 300 OF 1974.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 14-2-1974  of the  Patna High  Court in  Criminal Writ Jurisdiction No. 421      F. S.  Nariman, Anil  B. Devan, J. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John, J.S.  Sinha and  Tarini Prasad  for the Petitioners in WPs. Nos. 121-125/79, 2222-2252/77 & 46-47/75.      Y. S.  Chitale, K.  K. Sinha  and S.  K. Sinha  for the Petitioners in  W.P. Nos.  405 &  441/74  and  Crl.  A.  No. 300/74.      Lal Narain  Sinha, Attorney General of India, Ram Balak Mahto, and  U. P.  Singh for the Respondents Nos. 1-2 in all W.Ps. and Appeal.      Miss A.  Subhashini for  Respondent No.  3 in  WP  Nos. 2222-2252/77.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SARKARIA,  J.-   The  common  question  that  has  been seriously pressed  into  argument  in  this  batch  of  writ petitions  and  criminal  appeal  mentioned  in  the  title, relates to  the constitutional  validity  of  certain  Rules framed under the State of Bihar under the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Act’) particularly  clause 13,  clause 4 (bb) of the Tender Notice and  of the Statutory Agreement notified by the Bihar Government in  the Bihar Government Gazette, and the notices of demand  issued under  the impugned  provisions  demanding "royalty" from the petitioners in respect of the undelivered quantity of Kendu leaves.      All these  writ petitions  will be  disposed of by this common judgment.  The basic  question being  common, it will suffice to  state the  facts giving  rise to  Writ Petitions 2222 to 2252 of 1977, filed by the New Bihar Bidi Leaves Co.      The petitioners  in all these writ petitions are either firms or  individuals carrying  on trade  in Kendu leaves in the State  of  Bihar.  However,  petitioner  No.  31  is  an association of  traders in  Kendu leaves, of which the other petitioners are members.      Kendu leaves  are grown  as forest  produce in  several States,  including  the  States  of  Bihar,  Orissa,  Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra,  Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and a part of Uttar Pradesh.  Under the  old system in Bihar, the right to pluck and  extract Kendu  leaves from  a forest coupe carved out by  the Forest  Department, was  auctioned by  the State Government.      On March  10, 1972,  while the State of Bihar was under the President’s rule, the Governor of Bihar issued the Bihar Kendu  Leaves   (Control  of  Trade)  Ordinance,  1972.  The provisions of this Ordinance were continued under successive Ordinances and  ultimately replaced  by the aforesaid Act of 1973. This  Act created State monopoly in the matter of sale of Kendu leaves to the manufacturers of 422 bidis. Its  purpose is to regulate this trade in relation to the grower  of Kendu  plants and  the collection and sale of the same  through the  agency of the State to the registered manufacturers of  bidis. Under  its scheme, a specified area of Kendu  leaves is  divided into  units.  The  ’grower’  is defined as  ’a grower  who holds lands on which Kendu plants grow or  who is in possession of such lands under a lease or

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otherwise, and includes the State Government.’ Under Section 3, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare  any area  to be  a specified  area for the purposes of  the Act  and divide  every such  specified area into such number of units as it may deem fit. ’Unit’ means a sub-division of  a specified  area constituted under Section 3. Under  Section 4,  the  State  Government  may,  for  the purpose of  purchase and sale of Kendu leaves on its behalf, appoint agents  in respect  of different  units and any such agent may be appointed in respect of more than, any one unit but not more than three units. The terms, conditions and the procedure for  appointment of agents have been prescribed by the Rules  framed under  the Act,  which we  shall presently notice.  Section   5  places   restriction  on  purchase  or transport of  Kendu leaves.  Section 8  mandates the  Forest Officer incharge  of a  Division to  set up  in each  unit a number of  depots. Section  9 is  important and its material part runs as under:           "(1)  The   State  Government  or  its  authorised      officer or  agent shall  purchase Kendu  leaves offered      for sale  and deliver  at the depot during the business      hours at the rates fixed under Section 7:      Provided that  it shall be open to the State Government      or its  authorised officer  or agent, for reasons to be      communicated in  writing,  to  refuse  to  purchase  or      accept delivery  of any  Kendu leaves  which, in  their      opinion, are  not fit for the purpose of manufacture of      bidis." It will be seen that the proviso to sub-section (1) contains a built-in  warranty inasmuch as it says that the authorised agents will  be bound  to accept delivery of all those Kendu leaves which,  in their  opinion, are fit for the purpose of manufacture of bidis. In other words, the Kendu leaves to be purchased by the authorised agents of the Government must be of merchantable quality.      The next  relevant provision  is to be found in Section 11 which is as follows           "(1) Every  manufacturer of bidis within the State      shall get  himself registered  within  such  period  on      payment of  such fee  and in  such  manner  as  may  be      prescribed. 423           (2) Every  manufacturer of  bidis within the State      registered  under   sub-section  (1)  shall  furnish  a      declaration in  such form  by such  date  and  in  such      manner as may be prescribed." Section 12 provides that Kendu leaves purchased by the State Government or  by its  authorised officer or agent, shall be disposed of  in such  manner as  the  State  Government  may direct. Section 20 of the Act gives the State Government the power to  make rules  subject to  the conditions of previous publication, to carry out all or any of the purposes of this Act. Sub-section  (2) of  that Section  provides  that  such rules may  provide for  all or any of the following matters, namely:-           "(a) procedure   to    be   followed   in   making                appointment of agents;           (b)  to (d) ..............;           (e)  the manner of registration under Section 10;           (f)  the manner of registration, the period within                which such registration shall be made and the                fee payable  thereof under sub-section (1) of                Section 11;           (g)  form of  declaration, authority to whom, date                by  which   and  the   manner  in  which  the

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              declaration shall  be  furnished  under  sub-                section (2) of Section 11;           (h) ............."      In  exercise  of  its  powers  under  the  then  extent Ordinance analogous  to those  under Section  20, the  State Government of Bihar notified the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade)  Rules, 1972  (for short the ’Rules’). These rules were, as  already noticed,  continued by  Section 23  of the Act, event after the repeal of the Ordinance concerned.      Rule 2(8)  defines ’Purchaser’ to mean a person to whom Kendu leaves  have been  sold by  the State Government under Section 12 Under clause (1) of the same Rule, ’Standard bag’ means a  bag containing 1000 standard gaddis of Kendu leaves and where  the standard  gaddis are not bagged, reference to standard bag  shall be  construed as  a  reference  to  1000 standard  gaddis   or  50,000  leaves.  Under  clause  (11), "Standard gaddi" means a bundle containing 50 Kendu leaves.      Rule 3  provides the  manner of  appointing agents. The application for  agency is to be submitted in Form "A". This Form requires 424 the  applicant   for  appointment   as  Agent   to  make   a Declaration, inter alia, to this effect:           "I/We ........  hereby declare that I/We have read      and understood  all the  provisions of  the Bihar Kendu      Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance, 1972 and the rules      made thereunder  and the conditions of agency mentioned      in the  notice issued under rule 3(1) and I/we agree to      abide by  the same.  I/we have personally inspected the      unit No.....  if I/we  am/are appointed as an agent for      the unit  mentioned above,  I/we undertake  to purchase      from growers  and collect from land of State Government      and deliver  a quantity of Kendu leaves on both counts,      which shall  not be  less than  ..... Standard  bags as      mentioned  in   the  notice.  I/we  shall  execute  the      agreement with  the State Government in Form ’C’ within      15 days.      Witness:      1.      2.                         Signature of the applicant."      Under sub-rule (7) of Rule 3, if, in the opinion of the State Government,  it is  not possible  to select a suitable agent for the purpose out of the persons who had applied for appointment as  agent, or where any agency is terminated and there is not sufficient time for calling fresh applications, the State  Government may appoint any person as agent who in their opinion  is suitable for the work. Such a person to be appointed as  Agent is  required to furnish a declaration in Form ’B’.  Sub-rule (9)  requires that  on appointment as an agent, the person so appointed shall execute an agreement in Form ’C’  within fifteen days of the receipt of the order of appointment, failing  which the  appointment shall be liable to be  cancelled and  upon such  cancellation, the  security deposit shall be forfeited; and the agent shall be liable to pay the  loss, if any, incurred by the State Government as a result of  such cancellation  of the  appointment.  Then,  a formula  has   been  provided   as  to   how  such  loss  on cancellation of  the appointment  shall be  calculated.  The loss so  determined shall  be recoverable  from the agent or surety as  arrears of  land revenue.  Sub-rule (10) requires the agent  so appointed  for a  particular unit  to  deposit security before  signing the Agreement. It also provides how the amount  to be  deposited should  be calculated. Sub-rule (11) provides  that the  agent shall  purchase Kendu  leaves from growers  and from such labourers who pluck Kendu leaves

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from the  Government forests  and other  lands at  the depot opened by  him or  ordered to  be opened  by the  Divisional Forest Officer. Clause (ii) of sub-rule (11) lays 425 down that unless ordered by the Divisional Forest Officer or an officer authorised by him in writing, the agent shall not slacken or  stop the  purchase or  collection in  any  depot within the unit. Sub-rule (12) requires the agent to deliver immediately the  Kendu leaves  purchased or collected by him to the  purchaser appointed  for  the  unit.  Sub-rule  (13) provides:           "The agent  shall maintain such account and submit      such  periodical   returns  to  the  Divisional  Forest      Officer or  to any  other officer  authorised by him as      may be directed by the Divisional Forest Officer." Sub-rule (14)  requires the  agent  to  furnish  a  list  of persons employed  by him  with the  unit, immediately to the Divisional Forest  Officer, and  he is  bound to  remove any such  person   whose  employment   is  objected  to  by  the Divisional Forest  Officer. Sub-rule  (15) is  material  and reads as under:           "If the agent during the period of agency has duly      observed and  performed all the terms and conditions of      the agency  to the satisfaction of the State Government      and if  the State  Government is  satisfied that he has      done his  best to  collect maximum  quantity of  leaves      from the unit, it may grant to the agent yearly renewal      of agency  for a  period  to  be  fixed  by  the  State      Government on  such terms  and  conditions  as  may  be      decided upon for each year." Sub-rule (16) provides that the agent shall be advanced such money for  the performance  of agency  as may be directed by the State Government from time to time.      Rule 6(7)  lays down  the procedure  of  enquiry  about rejected Kendu  leaves.  According  to  this  procedure,  on receipt of a complaint under sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Act,  the officer  shall  hold  the  enquiry  after  the necessary notice  to the  person  concerned  and  pass  such orders in terms of sub-section (3) or (4) of Section 9 as he deems fit.      Rule 9  makes provision regarding the disposal of Kendu leaves. Under sub-rule (1), Kendu leaves collected or likely to be collected by the State Government or by its authorised officer shall ordinarily be sold or otherwise disposed of by tender on  such terms and conditions as are specified in the Tender Notice and Tender Form issued by the State Government or by  an officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf. The  Tender Notice is required by sub-rule (2) to be advertised in  newspapers and  in such  other manner  as the State Government may deem-fit. Sub-rule (8) 426 provides:  "Notwithstanding   anything  contained   in   the foregoing provisions,  the  State  Government  may  sell  or otherwise dispose  of Kendu leaves collected or likely to be collected by  it or  by its officers or agents by auction on such terms and conditions as may be decided by it." Sub-rule (9) reads as under:           "The successful  tenderer or successful bidder, as      the case  may be,  shall be  appointed as purchaser for      the particular  unit, and  the entire quantity of Kendu      leaves collected  or likely  to be  collected from such      unit or  such lesser  quantity out of it may be offered      to him by the State, its officer or agent in such unit,      shall be  purchased by  him in  such manner and on such      terms  and  conditions  as  may  be  specified  in  the

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    agreement to  be executed  by such purchaser under sub-      rule (10)."      Sub-rule (10)  requires the  purchaser  to  execute  an Agreement in  Form ’M’  within 15 days of the receipt of the order of  appointment. Sub-rule (11) requires such purchaser before  signing   the  agreement  to  deposit  the  security calculated as  provided  in  that  sub-rule.  Sub-rule  (13) provides that  the purchaser,  if he  desires to consume the leaves within  the unit or to remove the leaves delivered to him outside  the unit  immediately or at any time before the 30th June,  shall pay  the purchase  price in  full for  the quantity of  leaves delivered  to him calculated at the rate specified in  the purchaser’s  agreement. If  the  purchaser agrees in  writing to  keep the  delivered leaves within the unit under  his supervision  and risk  and  under  insurance against theft, fire and wastage at his expense but under the custody and  control of the Divisional Forest Officer he may at the  time of delivery of leaves pay only such part of the purchase price  of the delivered leaves, as may be specified in the  purchaser’s agreement.  The balance  of the purchase price may  be paid  in instalments on the dates specified in the purchaser’s  agreement or on any earlier date before the leaves are  removed outside  the unit  or are  delivered for consumption within  the unit. In no case the purchaser shall be allowed  to remove  all the  leaves unless full price has been paid.      By Notification,  dated January  16, 1974, published in the Extra-ordinary  Gazette of  Bihar Government of the same date, the  Rules were  amended, and  sub-clause  (bb)  after clause 4(b)  was added  in Form  ’M’ of  the Agreement. This sub-clause (bb) reads as under:           "The  purchaser  shall  not  raise  any  objection      against the  quality of  Kendu leaves  or  shortage  of      leaves in the standard gaddis." 427 This is  one of  the impugned provisions. The other impugned provision is  to be  found in  condition (13)  of the Tender Notices published  in the  Bihar Government  Gazette,  every year inviting tenders for the purchase of Kendu leaves. This condition (13)  which is  also incorporated in the statutory Agreement (Form-M), runs as follows:           "For every  unit a minimum royalty will be payable      by the purchaser. The amount of minimum royalty will be      75%  of  the  amount  arrived  at  by  multiplying  the      notified yield  in standard  bags by  the offer made by      the purchaser  per standard  bag. This  amount shall be      payable by  the tenderer  even if  by the  end  of  the      season, the  price of Kendu leaves at the offered rate,      collected and delivered to the purchaser, fell short of      this amount.  This whole  amount will be payable before      the leaves  are utilized or taken out and, if not paid,      will be realised as arrears of land revenue."      The  first   proposition  canvassed   by  Mr.   Nariman appearing for  the petitioners in Writ Petitions 405 and 441 of 1974,  is  the  Petitioners  argued  that  the  aforesaid impugned provisions/conditions  comprised in  the  aforesaid clause 4(bb)  and clause  (13)  amount  to  an  unreasonable restriction on the petitioners’ fundamental freedom to carry on trade  or business  in  Kendu  leaves;  guaranteed  under Article 19(1)(g)  of the  Constitution;  that  the  impugned provisions are  not within the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the  second part  of clause (6) of Article 19 because the impugned provisions  are  not  "integrally  and  essentially connected" with  the creation  of the  monopoly in favour of the State,  but are  only incidental  or subsidiary  to  the

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operation of the monopoly.      In support  of this  proposition, learned  counsel  has referred to the decisions of this Court in Akadesi Padhan v. State of  Orissa and  Rashbihari  Panda  etc.  v.  State  of Orissa.      The second  proposition propounded  by Mr.  Nariman  is that the  impugned provisions violate the fundamental rights of the  petitioners’ guaranteed  under  Article  14  of  the Constitution,  because  in  their  immediate  operation  and effect, they are harsh, unconscionable, arbitrary unfair and oppressive; that  even where  the quantity  offered  to  the purchaser is  far less  than 75%  of the  notified estimated yield,  or  the  leaves  offered  are  not  of  merchantable quality, the  impugned provisions  unreasonably obligate the purchaser to  pay royalty  for 75  per cent of the estimated yield irrespective of whether the shortfall in the quantity 428 offered/delivered  or  the  unmerchantable  quality  of  the leaves offered  is due  to the  fraud or  negligence of  the Agent who, under the Rules, is supposed to be independent of the  purchaser  and  under  the  exclusive  control  of  the Government;   that    the   impugned    provisions   operate irrationally  and   unfairly  as  they  make  no  discerning distinction between  honest purchasers  who are not blamable for the shortfall and dishonest purchasers who through their fraud or  collusion  with  the  agent  or  officers  of  the Government contribute  to the  shortfall. Thus, the impugned provisions tar  honest and dishonest purchasers with one and the same brush which results in procrustean cruelty.      Third, the  impugned  provision  which  forecloses  the right of  the purchaser  to refuse delivery on the ground of the leaves  offered, not  being  of  requisite  quality,  is inconsistent with  and ultra vires of the Proviso to Section 9(1) of  the Act which contains a built-in warranty that the leaves offered  or delivered shall be fit for the purpose of manufacture of bidis.      Dr. Chitale,  appearing for  the  petitioners  in  Writ Petitions 121  to 125  of 1979, has by and large adopted the arguments of  Mr. Nariman.  He has  drawn our  attention  to Annexure ’C’  to Writ  Petition 47  of 1975, wherein quite a large number  of  instances  are  given  to  show  that  the shortfall in  the actual delivery of the Kendu leaves to the purchasers as  against the  estimated yield is considerable. Learned counsel has emphasised that the auctions are held in January, while  the Agents  are not  appointed till March or April, which  is the  plucking season,  and in  January,  no reasonable estimate of the expected yield is possible. It is maintained that  the allegations  in  the  counter-affidavit filed on  behalf of  the  State  to  the  effect,  that  the purchasers inspect the units and make their own estimates of the expected yield is factually incorrect because in January no such estimate is possible.      Dr.  Dewan,   who  has   appeared  for   some  of   the petitioners, cited  Maneka Gandhi’s  case in  support of his contention, that the impugned provisions in their direct and inevitable effect,  impinge upon  the fundamental  rights of the petitioners  guaranteed under  Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. Learned counsel contrasted the impugned provisions with  the Rules  in vogue  in the State of Andhra Pradesh, which, according to him, have a reasonable basis.      Mr.  K.  S.  Sinha,  appearing  for  the  appellant  in Criminal Appeal  300 of 1974, submitted that the validity of the impugned  provisions was  indirectly  involved  in  this appeal, though  in a  different context.  It is  pointed out that the permit to remove the leaves was refused to

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429 the appellant  on the  ground that  he had  taken  away  the leaves without  paying 75  per cent  of the  royalty and had contravened Rule 16. The point sought to be made out is that if the  impugned Rules are not held to be valid, this appeal must, in consequence, succeed.      On the  other hand,  Mr. L. N. Sinha, learned Attorney- General submits on behalf of the respondents that there is a paucity of  skilled people  who could be employed as Agents; that in  actual practice the persons appointed as Agents are sponsored by the purchasers.      (i) It  is submitted  that the  terms of the Agreement, taken as  a whole,  are not  one-sided.  Whereas  under  the conditions of  the  Tender  Notice  and  the  Agreement  the purchasers voluntarily bind themselves to pay the full price of  the   unit  which  is  fixed  according  to  the  Rules, irrespective of  any shortfall  in the  quantity offered and delivered, they,  under the  terms of the same Agreement get the benefit  of purchasing Kendu leaves offered in excess of 75 per  cent of the estimated yield at the concessional rate of 55 per cent only of the purchase price. It is argued that if the  conditions of  the Tender  Notice and  the statutory Agreement are  considered as a whole, it is evident that the risks of  loss and  chances of  benefit are  equally divided between the purchasers and the State.      (ii) It  is stressed  that what  is sold at the time of auction is  the estimated  produce from a unit, as such, and the highest bidder or tenderer gets the contract to purchase that unit at a price the minimum of which is fixed at 75% of the amount  arrived at by multiplying the notified estimated yield in  terms of standard bags from that unit. It is urged that (if  a person  voluntarily takes upon himself under the terms of  a contract,  such risks and chances of benefit, he has no  right in  the  event  of  suffering  a  loss  to  be compensated for  it even  under the  ordinary law in a suit, much less  the Court  of writ jurisdiction can grant him any such relief). It is pointed out that actually, in 110 out of 1000 units,  that yield  exceeded in the notified estimates, and as  a result,  the purchasers reaped full benefit of the excess supply at concessional rates.      (iii) (a)  It is  emphasised that  the liability of the petitioners to  pay the whole price for the unit arises from the contract and, as such, it cannot be considered to have a direct impact on the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on  their trade  or business;  that the right to enter into a  contract on particular terms with the State is not a fundamental right.  Even this  Court-proceeds the  argument- cannot reconstruct  the  terms  and  conditions  voluntarily agreed between the petitioners and the State. 430      (iii) (b)  It is argued that it is not a fit case to be decided under  Article 32  of the  Constitution, because  in several of these petitions the purchasers (petitioners) were in default,  inasmuch  as  they  did  not  pay  the  amounts required to  be adjusted  against the  remuneration  of  the Agents; that in most of the cases the purchasers reaped that full benefits  of the contract and only in stray cases, they suffered loss;  that since they had availed of the chance of reaping and  advantage, they could not turn round and attack the validity  of the  terms and  conditions of  the contract which they had voluntarily made and worked out.      (iv) Another  point sought  to be  made out is that the impugned provisions  are directly and essentially related to the operation  of the monopoly and, as such, fall within the protection of sub-clause (ii) of clause (6) of Art. 19.

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    (v) In  the  alternative,  it  is  submitted  that  the impugned provisions satisfy the test of reasonableness under the first  part of  clause (6)  of the  said Article, and in applying that  test the voluntary nature of the contract and the obligations  willingly undertaken  by the purchaser with all the risks of loss and chances of gain should not be lost sight of that a purchaser who acts on a contract voluntarily entered into  by him  is precluded  from repudiating some of its conditions  which involve  risk of  loss and  to  accept those which are advantageous to him.      In support of the proposition that one who has received the benefits  of statute  is precluded  from  attacking  the constitutionality of  a condition  attached by  the statute, the learned Attorney-General has referred to these decisions of the  Supreme Court  of United States: Berth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial  Commission of  the State  of  Wisconian;  St. Louis Casting  Co. v. Construction Co.; and United Food Fuel Gas Co. v. Rail Road Commission.      In reply,  Mr. Nariman submits that writ petitions have been filed  from  1973  onwards  by  various  purchasers  to challenge  the  validity  of  the  impugned  provisions,  as notified every  year for inviting tenders, in the High Court or in  this Court,  and from  time to  time  interim  orders staying the  operation of  the impugned provisions have been issued either  by the High Court or this Court; that in view of  this,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  petitioners  are precluded from  challenging the  validity  of  the  impugned provisions  on   the  ground   of  acquiescence,  waiver  or estoppel. It is maintained that fundamental rights cannot be waived, 431 particularly those  under Article 14 of the Constitution and the  principle   of  estoppel  enunciated  in  the  American decisions is  not applicable  in India.  In support  of this argument, reference  has been  made to  the decision of this Court in  Basheshar Nath  v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi & Rajasthan & Anr.      The learned Attorney-General further submitted that his argument was  not to  the effect  that the  petitioners were incompetent to enforce their fundamental right on the ground of waiver  or estoppel;  but that  a person  who voluntarily enters into  a contract cannot retain the benefit accrued to him thereunder  and repudiate the other part of the contract which might have occasioned loss to him; that this principle is different from that of waiver or estoppel.      The first  question for  consideration is,  whether the impugned provisions fall within the protection of sub-clause (ii) of Article 19(6) and therefore, it is not necessary for those provisions to satisfy the test of reasonableness under the first part of clause (6) of the Article.      The relevant part of clause (6) reads thus:           "(6) Nothing  in sub-clause (g) of the said clause      shall affect  the operation  of any  existing law in so      far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any      law imposing,  in the  interests of the general public,      reasonable restrictions  on the  exercise of  the right      conferred by  the said  sub-clause, and, in particular,      nothing  in   the  said  sub-clause  shall  affect  the      operation of  any existing  law in so far as it relates      to, or  prevent the  State from making any law relating      to,-           (i) ....................................           (ii) the  carrying  on  by  the  State,  or  by  a                Corporation owned or controlled by the State,                of any  trade, business, industry or service,

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              whether  to   the  exclusion,   complete   or                partial, of citizens or otherwise."      It will  be seen  that clause (6) falls into two parts. The first  part commences  with the phrase: "Nothing in sub- clause (g) of the said clause (1) of the Article". Phrase to the same  effect, with the addition of pre-fixed words "and, in particular"  are repeated  at  the  commencement  of  the second part,  also. This indicates that the two parts of the clause are  intended to  be distinct  and separate. Further, the  words  "reasonable  restrictions"  which  find  pivotal mention in the 432 first part, have not been repeated in the second part, which omission makes  it clear  that a  law covered  by sub-clause (ii) is  not required  to satisfy the test of reasonableness under the  first part  of the clause and no objection to the validity of  such a  law is  tenable on  the ground  that it infringes the right guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g). Sub- clause (ii)  is thus  in the  nature of  an exception to the main substantive provision in clause (1) of the Article. Its language therefore,  which is explicitly restrictive, has to be strictly  construed. The protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second  part is, in terms, available to the law only "in so far as it relates to" the carrying on by the State, or by a Corporation  owned or  controlled by  the  State,  of  any trade, business,  industry, or  service  to  the  exclusion, complete or  partial of the citizens or otherwise. The ambit of the  words "in so far as it relates to" in the context of sub-clause (ii)  in the  second part  of clause (6), came up for consideration before this Court in Akadasi Padhan’s case (ibid). Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, held  that only those provisions of the law which are "integrally and  essentially" connected with the creation of the monopoly  are protected  under the second part of clause (6), but those provisions which are not absolutely essential for  creating  the  monopoly,  but  are  merely  incidental, subsidiary or  helpful to  the operation  of the monopoly do not fall  under the  second part  of clause  (6)  and  their validity must  be judged,  under the  first part  of Article 19(6).      Now, let us apply this test to the provisions which are impugned  in   the  instant   case.  These   provisions  are incorporated in the Forms of Tender Notice and the Agreement by Rules  framed under  the Act.  The  basic  and  essential features which  are directly  and immediately connected with the creation  of the  State monopoly  are to be found in the body  of   the  Act,  itself.  In  any  case,  the  impugned provisions are  merely subsidiary  or incidental  provisions relating to  the operation  of the  monopoly.  The  impugned provisions, therefore,  do not fall within the protection of sub-clause (ii) in the second part of Article 19 (6).      The question,  however, still remains whether the right to enter  into a contract with the State on particular terms is a fundamental right falling within the purview of Article 19 (1)  (g). The  learned Attorney-General maintains that it is not.      Whatever may  be the  position with regard to contracts relating to  other matters, where the business to be carried on by  a citizen  is in  a commodity, the sale of which is a State  monopoly,   conditioned  by   some  statutory  terms, analogous to  the impugned  conditions, which, in operation, have a direct and immediate impact on the fundamental 433 freedom of  the citizen  guaranteed under  Article 19(1)(g), the citizen cannot enter into a contract with the Government

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for purchase  of such  a commodity  except on  the statutory terms laid  down by  the seller-State.  Sale of Kendu leaves for  manufacture  of  bidis  being  a  State  monopoly,  the petitioners-purchasers could,  if they  so desired, purchase the Kendu  leaves only  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the statutory rules  on terms  and conditions  notified  in  the Tender Notices.  Even so,  these conditions leave sufficient room to  the free  volition  of  the  intending  purchasers, particularly in  the matter  of fixing  the  rates  and  the minimum  price  payable  for  the  estimated  yield  from  a particular unit in terms of standard bags. The Tender Notice and the  Agreement which  the purchasers enter into with the Government, although  couched in  statutory Forms,  are  not bereft of their contractual character, either.      Since  the  impugned  provisions  do  not,  as  already noticed, fall  within the  protection of  sub-clause (ii) in the second part of clause (6), they must satisfy the test of being a  reasonable restriction under the first part of that clause.      The first point in this connection to be determined is, what actually  is sold  to the purchasers under the terms of the Tender  Notice and  the statutory  Agreement ?  Is it an estimated yield of a unit in terms of standard bags which is sold or  the actual  yield in terms of standard bags offered or delivered  ? From  the scheme  of the Rules, particularly Rule 9(9) extracted in a foregoing part of this judgment, it is clear  that what  is sold to the successful bidder at the annual auction  is  the  entire  quantity  of  Kendu  leaves collected or  likely to  be collected from a particular unit or such  lesser quantity  out of that unit as may be offered to him by the State or its agent or officer for a particular year at  a price  called ‘royalty’.  The minimum  royalty or price payable being fixed on the basis of 75 per cent of the estimated annual  yield  in  standard  bags  from  the  unit multiplied by  the  rates  offered  and  accepted.  Such  an estimate, as  it appears  from the counter-affidavit is made on the  basis of the average actual yield from that unit for the preceding  three  years.  Such  an  estimated  yield  is notified and  published in  the Tender  Notices every  year. Purchasers in  the trade,  therefore, know before-hand as to what they  are bidding for. Purchasers are generally persons who have  been in  the trade  for several years and as such, have a  special knowledge  of forming their own estimates of the expected  yield and  the chances of profit and loss from that particular  unit in a particular year. While it is true that the  bidders have  to enter into Agreement on the terms and conditions  notified by the Government, yet it cannot be lost sight of that in spite of the fact that 434 the impugned provisions in Condition 13 of the Agreement and the Tender  Notice in  1973 and the impugned Condition 4(bb) has been  notified  annually  since  the  amendment  of  the statutory Forms  in January  1974, the petitioners and their fellowmen in  the trade have been offering rates of bids and entering  into   agreement  on   the  notified   terms   and conditions, including  the impugned  provisions. Only  a few writ petitions  have been  filed now  and  then  by  certain purchasers who  suffered loss,  to challenge  these impugned provisions since  1973. In view of the fact that the chances of profit  and risks  of loss are evenly divided between the seller-State and  the purchasers  and in  the light  of  the aforesaid historical  background, it cannot be said that the impugned condition in clause 13 of the Tender Notice and the Agreement is manifestly unreasonable. The impugned Condition 13 is  a restriction imposed in the general public interest.

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Fixation of  a minimum price on the basis of estimated yield from a  particular unit  in a particular year operates as an insurance against  loss or  leakage of public Revenue due to connivance or  collusion between purchasers on the one hand, and the  servants and  agents of  the  seller-State  on  the other. This  method also  assures  a  minimum  wage  to  the pluckers of  the Kendu  leaves who,  as has been affirmed in the counter-affidavit of the respondent-State, are generally Adivasis  or  persons  belonging  to  economically  backward classes.      We are  unable to  accept the contention of the learned counsel for  the petitioners,  that the  impugned provisions are harsh  and unreasonable  inasmuch as  they obligate  the purchasers to  pay for  the undelivered  shortfall of  Kendu leaves even where such shortfall is due to the negligence or fraud of  the Agent of the Government. The real position has been explained  in the  counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State in Writ Petitions 2222 to 2252 of 1977, thus :           "Technically speaking the Agents were appointed by      the State  Government but the persons so appointed were      actually sponsored  by the  respective purchasers.  The      Agents were  the persons  of the  purchasers  and  were      loyal to their old masters. This is an incontrovertible      fact. In  most of  the cases  the agents  got the  full      amount  of   their  commission   and  handling  charges      adjusted towards the purchase price of the units at the      end of  collection season.  Specific instances  are  on      record  that  in  many  cases  the  Agents  were  close      relatives  such   as  father,  sons,  brothers  of  the      purchasers. In  the case  of  firms,  the  Agents  were      partners in the same firm. In some cases the purchasers      and the Agents interchanged their positions. Purchasers      became Agents while the latter 435      became purchasers. This was a common trick of the trade      which is still in vogue.      Some of  the instances showing the relationship between the petitioners/purchasers  and the  Agents are tabulated in Annexure ‘A’ hereto."      Although  the   Act  and   the  Rules  noticed  earlier contemplate that the Agents appointed by the Government will be under  its full  control and  liable  to  compensate  the Government for  any  shortage,  damage  or  loss  caused  in collection or  delivery or  any defect in the quality of the leaves  collected,   to  the   Government,  yet,  in  actual practice, the real position is that the Agents are generally persons sponsored by and otherwise, deeply interested in the purchasers. In  their counter-affidavit,  the Government has explained that  there is a dearth of suitable persons having adequate experience  and skill  of work as efficient Agents. The Agents  are to  be appointed  every year at short notice when the  plucking season  is at  hand. Circumstances  being what they  are, the Government is driven into a situation in which  they   have  to  appoint  persons  sponsored  by  the purchasers as Agents. From this real factual position, viz., the close  bond and  rapport between  the purchasers and the agents, two  inferences arise.  First, that  at the  time of auction, the  intending purchasers are in a position to form a reasonable estimate of the return which they are likely to have for  the year  concerned from  that particular  unit or units for  which they offered the rates. Second, that if the purchase price  were to  be fixed  not on  the basis  of any estimated annual  yield from  a particular  unit but  on the basis of  the quantity  actually delivered, the risk of loss or  leakage  of  public  revenue  by  reason  of  fraud  and

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collusion  between   the  purchasers  and  the  agents  will manifestly increase. Looked at from this angle also, against the real  factual  background,  the  impugned  Condition  13 cannot be said to be unreasonable.      Mr. Nariman  contended that if the factual position, as stated in  the counter-affidavit  filed  on  behalf  of  the State, is  correct, then  the impugned  condition 13 will be hit by  the ratio  of this  Court’s decisions  in Rashbihari Panda etc.  v. State  of Orissa  (ibid) and Akadasi Padhan’s case (ibid),  because in that situation the conclusion would be ineluctable  that the  monopoly is  being worked  by  the State not  for  its  exclusive  benefit  or  in  the  public interest but  to benefit  a class of profiteers comprised of the purchasers and their agents, thereby creating a monopoly within a monopoly.      In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to notice  Rashbihari Panda’s  case. To  regulate  trade  in Kendu  leaves   and  prevent  exploitation  of  growers  and pluckers, the State of Orissa enacted 436 the Orissa  Kendu Leaves  (Control of  Trade) Act.  1961. By Section 3  of that  Act, which  is analogous to Section 3 of the Bihar  Act, no  person other  than  the  Government,  an authorised officer  of the Government, or an agent appointed by the  Government, is  entitled to  purchase  or  transport Kendu  leaves;   and  under  Section  4  of  that  Act,  the Government is  authorised to  fix the  price  at  which  the leaves shall be purchased from the growers by the officer or agent of  the Government.  Section 10  of that  Act provided that the Kendu leaves purchased shall be sold or disposed of in such  manner as  the Government  may  direct,  and  under Section 11,  at least one-half of the net profits derived by the Government is to be paid to Samitis and Gram Panchayats. In Akadasi  Padhan’s case  (ibid), a  grower of Kendu leaves challenged Sections  3 and  4 and  Rule 7(5) made under that Act on  the ground that it contravened his fundamental right under Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) and (g) in this Court. It was held that  Sections 3  and 4  did not infringe Article 19(6) (ii), but  the State Government was incompetent to implement the provisions  of the  Act and give effect to its monopoly, because the  agents appointed  were not really agents of the Government but  were authorised  to carry  on trade  in  the leaves purchased  not on  behalf of  the Government  but  on their own  account, and that it thus gave rise to a monopoly in favour  of the  agents which was not protected by Article 19(6) (ii) since the law cannot be used by the State for the private benefit  of agents.  After the  decision in  Akadasi Padhan’s case,  the Orissa  State made  some changes  in the implementation of  its monopoly. In 1966, it invited tenders from persons  desirous of  purchasing Kendu leaves purchased by the  officers and  agents of  the Government.  During the years 1966  and 1967,  the prices of Kendu leaves ruled very high and  when sales were effected by public auction, prices considerably in  excess  of  those  at  which  tenders  were accepted were  realised. Early  in 1968,  the State  evolved another scheme under which, it offered to renew the licences of  those  traders  who  in  the  State’s  view  had  worked satisfactorily in the previous year and had paid the amounts due from  them regularly.  The scheme  was objected  to, and realising that, the scheme arbitrarily excluded many persons interested in  the trade,  and hence  was objectionable, the Government decided to invite offers for advance purchases of Kendu  leaves   but  restricted   the  invitation  to  those individuals  who  had  carried  out  the  contracts  in  the previous year without default and to the satisfaction of the

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Government that  is, the existing contractors were given the exclusive right  to make  offers to  purchase Kendu  leaves. This new  method of  offering to  enter into  agreements for advance purchases  of Kendu  leaves  by  private  offers  in preference to  open  competition,  was  challenged  by  writ petitions in the High Court as 437 violative  of  the  petitioner’s  fundamental  rights  under Articles 14 and 19(1) (g).      Reversing the  decision of  the High Court, this Court, in appeal, held,           The validity  of a  law by which the State assumed      the monopoly  to trade  in a  given commodity has to be      judged by  the test  whether the entire benefit arising      therefrom is to enure to the State, and the monopoly is      not used as a cloak for conferring private benefit upon      a limited  class of persons. The monopoly of purchasing      Kendu leaves  under Section  3 may  be held to be valid      if, it  be administered  only for  the benefit  of  the      State. Similarly, the right to sell or dispose of Kendu      leaves by the State under Section 10, in such manner as      the Government  may direct,  would be  valid if  it  be      exercised in  public interest  and  not  to  serve  the      private interest and not to serve the private interests      of any person or class of persons. The profit resulting      from the  sale must  be for  the public benefit and not      for  private  gain.  Section  11  also  emphasises  the      concept that  the machinery  of sale or disposal of the      leaves  must   also  be  geared  to  serve  the  public      interest. If  the scheme of disposal creates a class of      middlemen who  could purchase  from the  Government  at      concessional   rates    and    earn    large    profits      disproportionate to  the nature of the service rendered      or  duty   performed  by  them,  it  cannot  claim  the      protection of  Article 19(6)  (ii) as it is not open to      the Government  to create a monopoly in favour of third      parties from its own monopoly.                           (Head-note of the Official Report) It was further held :           "The right  to make offers being open to a limited      class of  persons the  schemes effectively shut out all      other persons carrying on trade in Kendu leaves as well      as new  entrants into  the  trade.  Both  the  schemes,      evolved by  the Government, namely, the one of offering      to enter  into contracts  with certain named licencees,      and the  other of  inviting tenders  from licencees who      had in  the previous  year carried  out their contracts      satisfactorily gave  rise to a monopoly in the trade in      the leaves  to certain  traders and  singled out  other      traders for  discriminating treatment.  Therefore, they      were  violative   of  the   fundamental  right  of  the      petitioners under  Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) and as the      schemes were not integrally and 438      essentially’  connected   with  the   creation  of  the      monopoly, they  were not  protected  by  Article  19(6)      (ii).      It was further observed that if the only anxiety of the Government was  to  ensure  due  performance  by  those  who submitted  tenders,   Government   could   devise   adequate safeguards. But the classification based on the circumstance that certain  existing contractors  had  carried  out  their obligation  in  the  previous  year  regularly  and  to  the satisfaction of the Government, is not based on any real and substantial  distinction   bearing  a  just  and  reasonable

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relation to  the objects  sought to  be achieved namely, the effective execution  of the monopoly in public interest, the prevention of  exploitation of pluckers and growers of Kendu leaves, or  the securing of the full benefit from the trade, to the State.      On the  basis of  this reasoning,  it was  finally held that the scheme could not be supported on the ground that it imposed  reasonable  restrictions,  within  the  meaning  of Article 19(6), on the fundamental rights of traders to carry on business in Kendu leaves. Hence, the plea that the action of the  Government was  bona fide  could not be an effective answer to that challenge.      It may  be noted  that the  decision of  this Court  in Rashbihari’s case  (ibid) was announced on January 16, 1969. The Bihar  Act, with  which we  are concerned, was passed in 1973. The  Bihar Legislature,  therefore could  not  but  be aware of  the unconstitutional  features pointed out by this Court in  the schemes of the Orissa Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Care  has been  taken by  the Bihar Legislature, and the  Government to  exercise the scheme of the Bihar Act and the  Rules and Forms framed or prescribed thereunder, of the vices  from which  the  schemes  of  Orissa  Legislation suffered. This will be clear from a comparative study of the Orissa schemes  and the  Bihar scheme.  Firstly,  under  the Orissa schemes,  the monopoly  was not  being worked for the entire benefit  of  the  State  or  in  the  general  public interest, but  was being  used as  a  cloak  for  conferring private benefit  upon a limited class of persons. The offers for purchasing  Kendu leaves were restricted to a particular class of  contractors and  were  not  open  to  the  general public. This  vice  does  not  exist  in  the  Bihar  scheme including  the   scheme  of  the  impugned  provisions.  The notified estimate  annual yield  for a unit or units is sold either by  inviting tenders  from the public by publishing a Tender Notice  or by  public auction after a similar notice. Any person  who wants to carry on the business of purchasing Kendu leaves  for the  purpose of  manufacture of  Bidis  is entitled to  submit his  offer in the prescribed Tender Form in response  to the public notice inviting tenders, or offer his bid at the auction, if the disposal is by public 439 auction. Secondly,  the scheme  of disposal envisaged by the impugned provisions  of the  Orissa Act and the Orissa rules created a  class of  middlemen who  could purchase  from the Government at  concessional rates  and  earn  large  profits disproportionate to  the service  rendered or duty performed by them. In contrast with this, the Bihar scheme in question does not  operate to  create any  monopoly in  favour of any particular class  of purchasers.  Nor does  the Bihar scheme enable the  purchasers to  make unduly  large profits at the cost of the public revenue or others. Even if the agents, in actual practice,  are persons  sponsored by  the purchasers, then also,  the rules  framed under the Bihar Act envisage a strict and  exclusive control  of the  Government  over  the Agents and their activities, and provide for their liability to compensate  the Government  for the  loss  occasioned  by their misconduct  or neglect.  Under the  impugned Condition 13,  the  minimum  price  payable  for  the  unit  or  units concerned by  a purchaser  is 75  per cent  of the  notified estimated yield  from  that  unit  or  units,  in  terms  of standard bags  multiplied by the rates or bid offered by the purchaser and accepted by the Government, even if the actual yield from  that unit or units falls short of 75 per cent of the estimated  yield. This  condition far  from  creating  a monopoly in the trade in favour of middlemen, operates as an

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ironclad safeguard  against leakage of the public revenue by assuring a  minimum return  to the public exchequer from the sale of  Kendu leaves.  The provision is aimed to secure the full benefit  from the trade to the State leaving chances of making reasonable, marginal profit to the purchasers.      It was  observed in Rashbihari’s case, that it would be in the  interest of  State to  invite tenders  in  the  open market from  all persons  irrespective of their having taken contracts in  the previous  year. This  suggestion has  been adopted by the scheme of the Bihar Act and the Rules and the Forms of  Tender Notice and Agreement prescribed thereunder. Some  other  defects  pointed  out  by  this  Court  in  the operation of  the Orissa  schemes, were  that the Government had not  estimated the  crop and  the prevailing  prices  of Kendu leaves  about the  time when offers were made, nor the conditions in  the market,  nor offers  of higher prices and the likelihood  of offerers  of higher  prices carrying  out their obligations.  The scheme  of the  Bihar  Act  and  the Rules, and Forms including that of the impugned condition 13 is designed  to remove  the  deficiencies,  infirmities  and vices pointed out by this Court in Rashbihari’s case.      For  these   reasons,  we  are  unable  to  accept  the contention, that in actual operation, the impugned provision (clause 13)  creates a  monopoly in  favour of  a  class  of middlemen consisting of ‘Agents’ and pur- 440 chasers, and  enables them  to earn  unduly large profits at the cost of the public or pluckers and growers.      The  impugned   Condition  13  satisfies  the  test  of reasonableness under  the first  part of  Article 19(6). We, therefore, repel  the challenge  to  the  validity  of  that condition on the ground of Article 19(6).      The next  question is  whether the  impugned provisions are violative  of the  fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article  14 of  the Constitution. The argument is that these provisions treat unequals as equals, even where crying dissimilarities exist  and thus  their operation  results in Procrustean cruelty.      The point  sought to  be made  out is  that even if the shortfall in the quantity supplied or the substandard nature of the quality offered to the purchaser is solely due to the fraud, negligence  or misconduct  of the Agent or servant of the Government, the loss due to such shortfall or deficiency in quality  must fall  on the purchaser, notwithstanding the fact that he (purchaser) was in no way privy or contributory to that  fraud, negligence  or misconduct  of the  Agent  or Government servant  and thus  the impugned provisions do not make any  discerning distinction  between honest  purchasers and  dishonest   purchasers,  but   tar  those  dissimilarly situated classes  with one  and the same brush. The argument though attractive, does not stand a close examination.      At the  time of inviting Tenders in the prescribed Form or inviting  purchasers  to  bid  at  the  publication,  all tenderers or  bidders are  treated equally in the sense that they can  offer their rates or bids subject to the statutory conditions  including   the   impugned   provisions.   While accepting the  highest Tender  of rates  per standard bag or the  highest  bid,  it  is  not  possible  to  classify  the purchasers  whose   offers/bids  have   been  accepted  into ‘honest’ purchasers  and ‘dishonest’  purchasers.  Everybody whose offer or bid is accepted, is assumed to be honest.      Secondly, in  entering into  a contract  of purchase of the notified  estimated yield in terms of standard bags, the discretion and  volition of  the tenderer  or bidder,  also, plays an  important part  in calculating  the minimum  price

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payable for  the estimated  yield from  the particular unit. According to the impugned Condition 13 of the Tender Notice, which also  forms a  part of  the prescribed  Form in  which tenders are invited, the successful tenderer or bidder whose tender or  bid is  accepted by  the Department, has to pay a minimum royalty, also described as ‘revenue’ or price, which will be 75 per cent of the notified estimated yield in terms of standard bag by the tenderer or bidder. 441 Thus, the  volition of  the purchaser also plays a prominent part in fixing the rate or price payable by him. By means of his offer  in the  Tender Form or by bidding at the auction, the purchaser binds himself to pay this minimum royalty even if by  the end  of the year, the number of bags collected is less than  the notified estimated yield. The purchasers form their own  estimates of the expected yield from a particular unit for  a particular  year and  then make  their offers of rates in the prescribed Tender Form, or when the disposal is by public auction, the purchasers make their bids subject to the terms  published in  the Tender  or Auction Notices. If, according to  the estimate  of an  intending purchaser,  the unit concerned is not likely to yield the quantity notified, it is  open to  him either not to submit any tender or offer or rates  at all,  or not to offer a bid or an amount higher than  that   which,  according   to  his   own  estimate  or calculation, would  be a reasonable price of the bargain. In other words,  if a  person with  his eyes  open tenders  the highest rates  per standard bag or offers the highest bid at public auction,  as the  case may  be, of his own accord, it will be assumed that he did so because in his own estimation the acceptance of the contract at those rates and subject to the  notified   terms  and  condition  would  afford  him  a reasonable scope  for making  profit. Furthermore, under the scheme  of  the  Bihar  Act  and  Rules,  the  sale  is  not restricted  to   any  particular  class  of  persons  as  in Rashbiharis  case.  Anyone  who  wants  to  do  business  of purchase of  Kendu leaves  can submit his tender of rates in the prescribed Form, or offer his bid at the auction, as the case may  be, subject  to the  notified  conditions  of  the Tender Notice/Auction Notice.      It is  a fundamental  principle of  general application that if  a person  of his  own accord, accepts a contract on certain terms  and works  out the  contract,  he  cannot  be allowed to  adhere to  and abide by some of the terms of the contract which  proved advantageous to him and repudiate the other  terms   of  the   same  contract   which   might   be disadvantageous to  him.  The  maxim  is  qui  approbat  non reprobat,  (one   who  approbates  cannot  reprobate).  This principle, though originally borrowed from Scots Law, is now firmly embodied  in English  Common Law.  According to it, a party to  an instrument or transaction cannot take advantage of one  part of  a document  or transaction  and reject  the rest. That  is to  say, no  party can  accept and reject the same instrument or transaction (Per Scrutton L.J. Verschures Creameries, Ltd.  v. Hull  & Netherlands  Steamship Co.; See Douglas Menzies  v. Umphelby;  See  also  Stroud’s  Judicial Dictionary, Vol. I, page 169, 3rd Edn.). 442      The aforesaid  inhibitory principle squarely applies to the cases  of those  petitioners who had by offering highest bids at  public auctions  or by Tenders, accepted and worked out the  contracts in  the past  but are  now resisting  the demands  or  other  action,  arising  out  of  the  impugned Condition 13  on the ground that this condition is violative of Articles  19(1)(g) and  14 of  the Constitution.  In this

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connection, it will bear repetition, here, that the impugned conditions though  bear a statutory complexion, retain their basic contractual  character, also. It is true that a person cannot be  debarred from enforcing his fundamental rights on the  ground   of  estoppel  or  waiver.  But  the  aforesaid principle which  prohibits a  party to  a  transaction  from approbating, a  part of  its conditions  and reprobating the rest, is different from the doctrine of estoppel or waiver).      For  the   foregoing  reasons,  the  challenge  to  the impugned Condition  No. 13,  on the  ground of  Article  14, also, is unsustainable and is rejected.      Now, we  take  up  the  impugned  Condition  4(bb).  It provides that no objection from the purchaser with regard to the quantity or quality of the leave in the gaddis (bundles) offered would  be tenable.  This  condition  is  couched  in peremptory,  drastic   and  absolute  language.  It  is  not qualified by  any words showing that the bar envisaged in it will be  attracted only in cases where the purchaser has had an earlier opportunity to raise this objection but failed to do so,  or, where  he had on an earlier occasion raised such an objection  which was heard and overruled by the competent Forest Officer.  We have  already noticed that Section 9(1), proviso, of  the Act  contains a built-in-warranty, that the Kendu leaves  offered would be fit for manufacture of bidis; that is to say, the leaves would be of merchantable quality. Condition  4(bb)   therefore,  is   inconsistent  with   and repugnant to  Section 9(1), proviso of the Act and, as such, invalid.  It  is,  therefore,  not  necessary  to  test  its validity on  the  ground  of  Articles  19  and  14  of  the Constitution.      In the  light of the above discussion, we would dismiss all the  Writ petitions, namely, Writ Petitions 2222 to 2252 of 1977,  Writ Petitions  121 to 125 of 1979, Writ Petitions 405 and  441 of  1974, Writ  Petitions 46  and 47  of  1975, excepting to  this extent that the aforesaid clause 4(bb) in the Tender  Notices and the statutory Agreement in question. being inconsistent  with the  proviso to Section 9(1) of the Act, is declared to be invalid.      In Criminal  Appeal 300 of 1974, the prosecution of the appellants for  an offence under Section 379, Penal Code has already been quash- 443 ed by  the High  Court by  its judgment  dated February  14, 1974; but  the Order  dated September  11, 1973  of the Sub- Divisional Magistrate,  Saheb Ganj,  taking cognizance  of a case instituted by the Divisional Forest Officer, Dumka, for offences under Section 409, Penal Code and Section 5(2) read with Section 16 of the Bihar Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Ordinance (46 of 1973) was not quashed.      The main  contention of  appellant  1,  Shankar  Prasad Bhagat, was  that he  received only  650  standard  bags  as against the  notified estimated 1500 bags, and the Condition 13 of the statutory Agreement under which he was required to pay for  the undelivered or unoffered quantity of the leaves was unconstitutional.      Since we  have held  that the aforesaid Condition 13 is valid, this  contention must  fail. We,  therefore,  dismiss this appeal.  The  case  shall  now  go  back  to  the  Sub- Divisional Magistrate  for disposal  in accordance with law. We advisedly abstain from making any observation with regard to the merits of the case. N.K.A.                       Petitions and Appeal dismissed. 444