17 January 1962
Supreme Court
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NETA RAM Vs JIWAN LAL

Case number: Appeal (civil) 646 of 1961


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PETITIONER: NETA RAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JIWAN LAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/01/1962

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. DAS, S.K. SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1963 AIR  499            1962 SCR  Supl. (2) 623  CITATOR INFO :  R          1965 SC 553  (2)  APL        1971 SC 942  (14)  R          1979 SC1559  (4,8)  RF         1987 SC2117  (26)  RF         1988 SC1060  (6)

ACT:      Rent  Control-Re-building   of  premises-Bona fides and  means of the landlord-East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (East Punj. 3 of 1949), 8. 15(5)-Patiala  and  East  Punjab  States  Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2006 B. K. (8 of 2006 BK), ss. 13, 16(4), 19.

HEADNOTE:      The  application  for  eviction  against  the appellant was  based inter alia on the ground that the premises  in suit  were  dilapidated  and  the landlord wished  to rebuild them after dismantling the structure.  The Rent  Controller dismissed the application observing  that there  was hardly  any proof that  the  building  was  in  a  dilapidated condition and  that the  landlord had  no means to rebuild  the  premises.  The  appellate  authority confirmed the  finding holding  that the  premises were in  good condition  and that the landlord was not,  in   good  faith,  wanting  to  replace  the building. An  applications purporting  to be under s. 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949,  was made  before the  High Court.  The High Court  following an  earlier decision  of the same Court  allowed the  revision petition holding that in  determining the  question  of  ejectment, what needs  alone to  be considered is whether the landlord genuinely  wants to  rebuild the permises and that  the condition  of  the  premises  is  ’a wholly irrelevant factor’. ^      Held, that  the  investigation  by  the  Rent Controller  cannot   be  confined   only  to   the existence of  an intention  in  the  mind  of  the

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landlord to  reconstruct. This  intention must  be honestly  held  in  relation  to  the  surrounding circumstances, otherwise  the very  purpose of the Rent Restriction  Act would  be defeated,  if  the landlords were  to come forward and to get tenants turned out,  on the  bare plea  that they  want to reconstruct the  house without first establishing, that the  plea is  bona fide  with regard  to  all circumstances,   viz.   that   the   houses   need reconstruction or  that they  have  the  means  to reconstruct them.      Held, further,  that when  the Tribunals have examined the  facts after  instructing  themselves correctly about law, a Court of Revision should be slow to interfere with the decision, thus reached, unless it  demonstrates by  its own  decision  the impropriety of the order which it seeks to revise.      Under s.  15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,  1949, the  powers  of  the  High Court do not include 624 powers to  perverse a  concurrent finding  without showing  how   those  finding  are  erroneous  and without giving  any substantial  reasons  for  its finding.      Held,  also,   that  a   case  cannot  be  an authority on a point of fact and reach case has to be examined  in the  light  of  the  circumstances existing.      Moti Ram  v. Suraj  Bhan, [1960]  2 S.  C. R. 896, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:  Civil  appeal No. 646 of 1961.      Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated  April 7,  1961, of  the Punjab  High Court in Civil Revision No. 354 of 1959.      Gopal Singh, for the appellates.      Bishan  Narain   and  Naunit   lal,  for  the respondent No. 1.      1962. January,  17.-The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against an order of the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh, dated April 7, 1961.      The appellants  are five  tenants,  who  have been evicted  from certain  shops and  chobaras in the town  of Patiala,  on the  application of  the first respondent, the landlord. The application by the landlord  was made  in June, 1957, under s. 13 of the  Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction  ordinance, 2006  BK (No. VIII of 2006 BK).  The grounds  urged by the landlord were (a) non-payment  of rent  by the  tenants, (b) non payment of  house tax  by the tenants and (c) that the shops  were in  a state of great disrepair and were  dilapidated,  and  the  landlord  wished  to rebuild them after dismantling the structures. The landlord averred  that he had obtained sanction of the Municipal  Committee to  a  proposed  plan  of construction,  and   accumulated   some   building material before making the application.

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    The tenants  resisted  the  application.  The Rent Controller  framed  issues  relating  to  the three 625 grounds; but  the first  two  have  ceased  to  be material now.  On the  issue relating to the third ground, the  Rent Controller held that in deciding whether the tenants should be ordered to hand over possession to  the landlord,  the Courts must have regard to  the bona  fides of  the request  of the landlord, which  meant that  the desire to rebuild the  premises  should  be  honestly  held  by  the landlord, but  that the  condition of the building also  played  an  important  part  in  determining whether the  landlord had  the intention genuinely and was  not using  this excuse as a devise to get rid of  the tenants.  In this connection, the Rent Controller  observed   that  the   state  of   the building, the  means  of  the  landlord,  and  the possibility of  a better yield by way of rent, all entered into the appraisal of the landlord’s state of mind.  Examining the  case from this angle, the Rent Controller  held that  there was  hardly  any proof that  the  building  was  in  a  dilapidated condition. One  solitary witness  who testified to this, admitted  that he  had not seen the building from the inside. The landlord himself did not give evidence. On  the  other  hand,  there  was  ample evidence that  the building  was good.  As regards the  financial   status  of   the  landlord,   the witnesses who  stated on his behalf that, he could spend Rs.  5,000 to  Rs. 10,000 knew nothing about his  means.   Even  the  landlord’s  brother.  who conducted this  case on  behalf of  the  landlord, could not  give any  details. The  plan  showed  a building requiring  about Rs. 20,000 to build. The landlord had  an income  of Rs. 200/-per month and his  family   consisted  of   his  wife  and  five children. The  Rent  Controller,  therefore,  held that he  had no means to rebuild the premises. The Rent Controller  did not  feel  impressed  by  the alleged purchase  of 40  bags of cement, because a greater part  of the cement was used up already in building two  or three  latrines, and the quantity left was  wholly  insufficient  for  the  proposed building. He, therefore, decided the issue against the landlord. 626      On appeal,  these findings  were confirmed by the appellate  authority, who  held that the shops and chobaras  were in good condition, and that the landlord  was  not,  in  good  faith,  wanting  to replace the  building, when  he had  no  means  to built it.  Against  the  order  of  the  appellate authority, an  application for revision purporting to be under s. 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,  1949 (3  of 1949),  was filed in the High  Court. This application was allowed. The learned single Judge posed the question thus:           "The question  in the  present  case  is      whether  there  is  a  bona  fide  desire  to      rebuild the premises?". He referred to an earlier decision of a Divisional Bench of  that Court  (Civil Revision  No. 223  of 1960), in  which Gosain,  J., laid down the law in

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the following words:           "It is  pertinent to  note that the word      ’building’ in  the aforesaid  clause  is  not      qualified    by    the    words    ’requiring      reconstruction’  or  ’requiring  rebuilding’.      The landlord  can,  in  these  circumstances,      require any  building for  the re-erection of      the same,  and when  in any  case a  claim to      that effect  is made  by him  the only  point      that has  to be  determined is whether on the      facts and  circumstances  of  that  case  his      requirement is  bona fide.  A  building,  for      instance, may  not be immediately unsafe, but      its condition  may be  such that unless it is      reconstructed it  may involve the landlord at      a later  date  very  heavy  expenditure.  All      round a  particular building  different types      of buildings  may have been constructed of an      entirely different  design and the particular      building in question may then be looking very      ugly and  the landlord  may want to bring the      same in conformity with the structures around      it." 627      After quoting this passage, the learned Judge observed that  the consideration  which must weigh in  determining   the  question  of  ejectment  is whether the  landlord genuinely  wants to  rebuild the  premises,   and  further,   that  the  actual condition of  the premises is "a wholly irrelevant factor". In  dealing with  the merits of the case, the learned  Judge referred  to the  offer of  the landlord to put back the tenants in possession, if the premises were not demolished within a month of his obtaining  possession thereof,  and concluded, without discussing the evidence, as follows:           "Upon the evidence on record it seems to      me established  beyond  all  doubt  that  the      landlord genuinely  and  bona  fide  requires      these premises for rebuilding." He, therefore,  set aside the concurrent orders of the two Tribunals, and ordered the eviction of the tenants, giving  them two month’s time in which to vacate the premises.      Two  questions   have  been  argued  in  this appeal. The first is that the revision application is  incompetent,  because  under  s.16(4)  of  the Patiala and  East Punjab  States Union  Urban Rent Restriction  ordinance,   ’the  decision   of  the appellate  authority  and  subject  only  to  such decision, an  order of  the  Controller  shall  be final and  shall not  be liable  to be  called  in question in  any court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding by way of appeal or revision". It is contended that s.15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction  Act, which  conferred a power of revision on  the High  Court does not apply to the present case,  because this  case did not arise in proceedings  taken   under  the   Act.  The   next contention is  that the  interpretation placed  by the learned  Judge upon  s. 13(3)  (a) (iii)  read with s. 13 (3) (b) is erroneous, and that the High Court had no power to reverse a concurrent finding of fact without itself re-appraising the evidence, if at all.

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628      On the  first point,  the learned counsel for the respondents  relies upon  a decision  of  this court reported  in Moti  Ram v.  Suraj  Bhan  (1), where it  was held  that a revision application in analogous circumstances  was maintainable.  In our opinion, even  if a  revision application lay, the learned  single   Judge  was   in  error   in  his interpretation of  the relevant  sections  of  the ordinance, and  in reversing  a concurrent finding of fact, without giving any substantial reasons.      Section  13   of  the   ordinance,   omitting portions  which  are  irrelevant  here,  reads  as follows:           "13.   (1)    Notwithstanding   anything      contained in any other law for the time being      in  force,   a  tenant  in  possession  of  a      building or  rented land shall not be evicted      therefrom in  execution of  a  decree  passed      before or  after  the  commencement  of  this      ordinance or  otherwise and whether before or      after the  termination of the tenancy, except      in accordance  with the  provisions  of  this      section.           x                                      x x      (3)  (a)   A  landlord   may  apply   to  the           Controller for  an order  directing  the           tenant   to    put   the   landlord   in           possession.               x                                  x x           (iii)in the  case of any building, if he                requires it  for the re-erection of                that   building    or    for    its                replacement by another building, or                for the erection of other building;           x                                      x x      (b)  The Controller shall, if he is satisfied           that  the   claim  of  the  landlord  is           bonafide, make  an order  directing  the           tenant to put the landlord in possession           of the  building or  rented land on such           date as 629           may be  specified by the Controller, and           if the  Controller is  not so satisfied,           he shall  make an  order  rejecting  the           application;           x                                      x x      (4)  where  a   landlord  who   has  obtained           possession of building or rented land in           pursuance  of   an  order   under...sub-           paragraph   (iii)   of   the   aforesaid           paragraph (a)  put that  building to any           use or  lets it  out to any tenant other           then the  tenant evicted  from  it,  the           tenant who has been evicted may apply to           the Controller  for an  order  directing           that he  shall be restored to possession           of such  building or rented land and the           Controller   shall    make   an    order           accordingly......"

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    Reading these  provisions as  a whole,  it is obvious that if the landlord’s need be genuine and he  satisfies   the  Controller,   he  can  obtain possession of  the building  or the  land, as  the case may be. If, however, he does not re-erect the building and  puts it  to any other use or lets it out to another tenant, the former tenant can apply to be  put back  in possession. Clause (b) clearly shows both  affirmatively and  negatively that the landlord must  satisfy the  Controller  about  his claim, before  he  can  obtain  an  order  in  his favour. The  Controller has  to be satisfied about the  genuineness  of  the  claim.  To  reach  this conclusion,  obviously   the  Controller  must  be satisfied about  the reality  of the claim made by the landlord,  and this can only be established by looking at all the surrounding circumstances, such as the  condition of  the building, its situation, the  possibility  of  its  being  put  to  a  more profitable use  after construction,  the means  of the landlord  and so on. It is not enough that the landlord  comes   forward,  and   says   that   he entertains   a   particular   intention,   however strongly, 630 said to  be entertained  by him. The clause speaks not of  the bona  fides of the landlord, but says, on the  other hand, that the claim of the landlord that he  requires the  building for reconstruction and re-erection must be bona fide, that is to say. honest in  the circumstances.  It  is  impossible, therefore, to  hold that  the investigation by the Controller  should   be  confined   only  to   the existance of  an intention  to reconstruct, in the mind of  the  landlord.  This  intention  must  be honestly  held  in  relation  to  the  surrounding circumstances. In  our opinion, the interpretation placed by  the Punjab  High Court (in the decision of Gosain, J.) puts too narrow a construction, and leaves very  little for  the Controller to decide. It is  well-known that  Rent Restriction Acts were passed in  view of  the shortage of houses and the High rents which were being demanded by landlords. The very  purpose of  the  Rent  Restriction  Acts would be  defeated, if  the landlords were to come forward and to get tenants turned out, on the bare plea that  they want  to reconstruct  the  houses, without first  establishing that  the plea is bona fide with  regard to  all the circumstances, viz., that the  houses need  reconstruction or that they have the  means to  reconstruct them, etc. The two Tribunals  below   had  gone   into   the   matter thoroughly, and  had agreed  that the landlord had neither the  means to reconstruct the building nor had he  made any attempt to face cross-examination as a party. They were also of the opinion that the building was  in a  good state and did not need to be pulled  down or  reconstructed. With such clear findings, one  would expect that a revising Court, however vide  its powers  may be, would, at least, go into  the question  over again, if it was going to depart  from this  unanimous conclusion.  It is hardly necessary  to go  into the  question of the extent of  the powers  of the  High Court under s. 15(5) of  the Rent Restriction Act. They have been

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adverted to  in the  ruling of  this Court,  above mentioned. They 631 do not,  however, include  the  power  to  reverse concurrent findings,  without  showing  how  those findings are  erroneous. In  the present case, the learned Judge  has given  his  conclusion  without adverting to  single piece of evidence, from which his conclusion  was drawn.  In these circumstances it  cannot  be  said  that  he  had  examined  the propriety of  the order sought to be revised, even under  the   provisions  of   the   law   he   was administering.      Learned counsel  relying  upon  the  case  to which we  have already  referred, said  that there the sanction  by the Municipal Committee was taken into consideration  in deciding  the need  of  the landlord. The  facts in  that case  are not  fully stated, and from the observations, it would appear that there was other evidence besides the sanction by  the   Municipal  Committee,   on   which   the conclusion of the High Court was supported. In any event, a case cannot be an authority on a point of fact, and  each case  will have  to be examined in the light  of the circumstances existing in it. In the present  case,  the  two  Tribunals  specially appointed  to   consider   these   matters,   went thoroughly into  the question,  and  discussed  it from a  correct angle.  If they  had examined they facts after instructing themselves correctly about the law,  a Court  of revision  should be  slow to interfere with  the decision  thus reached, unless it  demonstrates   by  its   own   decision,   the impropriety  of  the  order,  which  it  seeks  to revise. No  attempt of  this kind has been made in this case,  and in our opinion, the High Court was not justified in reversing the clear finding.      In the  result, this  appeal must be allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside, and that of  the   appellate  authority  is  restored.  The landlord shall  pay the costs here and in the High Court.                                    Appeal allowed. 632