REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.383  OF 2002

Nepal Singh  ....Appellant

Versus

State of Haryana ....Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.  

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the  

Punjab and Haryana High Court convicting the appellant for offences  

punishable under Sections 304-B, 498-A of the Indian Penal Code,  

1860 (in  short  the  ‘IPC’).   He was sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous  

imprisonment  for  seven  years  and  to  pay  a  fine  with  default  

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stipulation  for  the  first  offence.   But  no  separate  sentence  was  

awarded  in  respect  of  the  later  offence.   The  appellant  faced  trial  

before learned Sessions Judge, Narnaul, and was acquitted by learned  

Sessions  Judge  giving  him  the  benefit  of  doubt.   The  State  

Government  preferred  an  appeal  which  was  allowed  by  the  High  

Court.  

2. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:

The marriage of Manju (hereinafter referred to as the ‘deceased’) was  

solemnised with appellant-Nepal  Singh on 26.1.1989. Though Yudhishter  

Singh (PW5) the father of the deceased had spent sufficient money for the  

marriage,  accused  Nepal  Singh  was  not  satisfied  with  the  dowry.  He  

demanded a gas connection which deceased conveyed to her mother Lajwant  

(PW6) on which her  father (PW5) got the gas connection and gave it  to  

Manju.

On 16.5.1991, deceased had come to Bapora (village of her father) to  

attend  the  marriage  of  the  daughter  of  Shyam Pal  Singh  (brother  of  her  

father).  Deceased told her father (PW5) and mother (PW6) that accused had  

completed his course and wanted her to bring Rs. One lakh from them and  

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that  if  she  failed  to  do  so,  accused  would  turn  her  out  of  the  house.  

Yudhishter Singh (PW5) told her that he would arrange for the money.

On  23.5.1991  deceased  left  for  Kanti  (village  of  her  in-laws)  

accompanied by Sunil Kumar (PW7), her brother.   While going, deceased  

told her father to arrange for the money otherwise her in laws would not  

allow her to live.

Since Yudhishter Singh (PW5) could not arrange money, Manju had  

committed suicide by consuming some poisonous substance. On receiving  

information  on  26.5.1991,  Yudhishter  Singh  (PW5)  alongwith  Sarpanch-

Mitter  Pal  and  Head  Constable  Rohtas  Singh  (PW3)  met  SI-Ramji  Lal  

(PW8) at the bus stand of Ateli and Yudhishter Singh (PW5) made the above  

said  statement  which  formed  the  basis  for  registering  the  formal  FIR.  

Investigation was undertaken.

After investigation was completed, charge sheet was filed.  Since the  

accused pleaded innocence, trial was held.  The prosecution primarily relied  

upon the evidence of Yudhishter Singh (PW5) father of the deceased  and  

Lajwant (PW6) mother of the deceased and Sunil Kumar (PW7) brother of  

the deceased.  The trial court found that this was a case of suicide and  little  

physical  contact  between  the  accused  and the  deceased  was the  primary  

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reason.  It was noted that the accused was pursuing studies till  13th May,  

1991, and thereafter he returned home.  Finding the prosecution version to  

be suspect, the trial court directed acquittal.  As noted above State preferred  

an appeal.  It was the primary stand that some thing must have happened  

otherwise the victim would not have committed suicide and the fact that the  

accused and the deceased could not  have any sexual relationship was an  

additional ground for suicide.  The High Court found that the evidence of  

Sunil Kumar (PW7) the brother of the deceased conclusively established the  

accusations  and accordingly set  aside the order  of acquittal  and recorded  

conviction.

3. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted  

that the High Court has not even discussed the conclusions of the trial court  

in the proper perspective and even no reason was indicated as to why the  

High Court differed with the view of the trial court.  The allegation of dowry  

demand was not stated during investigation and lot of improvements were  

made in court for the first time. It is in essence submitted that considering  

the limited scope for interference with the judgment of acquittal, the High  

Court should not have interfered with the  judgment of the trial court.

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4. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand supported the  

judgment of the High Court submitting that the High Court has rightly  

analysed the evidence of PWs 5, 6 & 7 which was casually done by the  

trial court.

5. The  parameters  for  dealing  with  an  appeal  against  judgment  of  

acquittal have been laid down by this Court in several cases.

 6. It would be appropriate to consider and clarify the legal position first.  

Chapter XXIX (Sections 372-394) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  Code”)  deals  with  appeals.  Section  372  

expressly declares that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a  

criminal court except as provided by the Code or by any other law for the  

time being in force.  Section 373 provides for filing of appeals in certain  

cases.  Section  374  allows  appeals  from  convictions.  Section  375  bars  

appeals  in cases  where  the accused pleads guilty.  Likewise,  no appeal  is  

maintainable in petty cases (Section 376). Section 377 permits appeals by  

the State for enhancement of sentence. Section 378 confers power on the  

State to present an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal. The  

said section is material and may be quoted in extenso:

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“378.  Appeal in case of acquittal.—(1) Save as otherwise  provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions of  sub-sections (3) and (5), the State Government may, in any  case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the  High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal  passed by any court other than a High Court, or an order of  acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision. (2)  If  such an order  of  acquittal  is  passed in any case in  which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special  Police  Establishment  constituted  under  the  Delhi  Special  Police  Establishment  Act,  1946  (25  of  1946),  or  by  any  other  agency  empowered  to  make  investigation  into  an  offence  under  any  Central  Act  other  than  this  Code,  the  Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to  present an appeal,  subject to the provisions of sub-section  (3), to the High Court from the order of acquittal. (3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall  be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. (4)  If  such  an  order  of  acquittal  is  passed  in  any  case  instituted  upon  complaint  and  the  High  Court,  on  an  application  made  to  it  by  the  complainant  in  this  behalf,  grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the  complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. (5)  No  application  under  sub-section  (4)  for  the  grant  of  special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be  entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months,  where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in  every other case, computed from the date of that order of  acquittal. (6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for  the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal  is  refused,  no appeal from that order of acquittal  shall  lie  under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2).

7. Whereas  Sections  379-380  cover  special  cases  of  appeals,  other  

sections lay down procedure to be followed by appellate courts.

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8. It may be stated that more or less similar provisions were found in the  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as “the old Code”)  

which  came  up  for  consideration  before  various  High  Courts,  Judicial  

Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  as  also  before  this  Court.  Since  in  the  

present appeal, we have been called upon to decide the ambit and scope of  

the power of an appellate court in an appeal against an order of acquittal, we  

have confined ourselves to one aspect only i.e. an appeal against an order of  

acquittal.

9. Bare reading of Section 378 of the Code (appeal in case of acquittal)  

quoted above, makes it clear that no restrictions have been imposed by the  

legislature  on  the  powers  of  the  appellate  court  in  dealing  with  appeals  

against  acquittal.  When such  an  appeal  is  filed,  the  High Court  has  full  

power  to  reappreciate,  review  and  reconsider  the  evidence  at  large,  the  

material  on which the order of acquittal  is founded and to reach its own  

conclusions on such evidence. Both questions of fact and of law are open to  

determination by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal.

10. It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal, there is a double  

presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is  

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available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that  

every person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty  

by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal,  

the  presumption  of  his  innocence  is  certainly  not  weakened  but  reinforced,  

reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

11. Though the above principles are well established, a different note was  

struck in several decisions by various High Courts and even by this Court. It  

is, therefore, appropriate if we consider some of the leading decisions on the  

point.

12. The first important decision was rendered by the Judicial Committee  

of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor  [(1934) 61 IA 398)].  In  

Sheo Swarup,  the accused were acquitted by the trial  court  and the local  

Government directed the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High  

Court from an order of acquittal under Section 417 of the old Code (similar  

to Section 378 of the Code). At the time of hearing of appeal before the High  

Court, it was contended on behalf of the accused that in an appeal from an  

order of acquittal, it was not open to the appellate court to interfere with the  

findings of fact recorded by the trial Judge unless such findings could not  

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have  been  reached  by  him  had  there  not  been  some  perversity  or  

incompetence on his part. The High Court, however, declined to accept the  

said view. It held that no condition was imposed on the High Court in such  

appeal.  It  accordingly  reviewed  all  the  evidence  in  the  case  and  having  

formed an opinion of its weight and reliability different from that of the trial  

Judge,  recorded  an order  of  conviction.  A petition  was presented  to  His  

Majesty in Council for leave to appeal on the ground that conflicting views  

had been expressed by the High Courts in different parts of India upon the  

question whether in an appeal from an order of acquittal, an appellate court  

had the power to interfere with the findings of fact  recorded by the trial  

Judge.  Their  Lordships  thought  it  fit  to  clarify  the  legal  position  and  

accordingly upon the “humble advice of their Lordships”, leave was granted  

by His Majesty. The case was, thereafter, argued. The Committee considered  

the scheme and interpreting Section 417 of the Code (old Code) observed  

that there was no indication in the Code of any limitation or restriction on  

the High Court in exercise of powers as an Appellate Tribunal. The Code  

also made no distinction as regards powers of the High Court in dealing with  

an appeal against acquittal and an appeal against conviction. Though several  

authorities were cited revealing different views by the High Courts dealing  

with an appeal from an order of acquittal,  the Committee did not think it  

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proper to discuss all the cases.

 13. Lord Russel summed up the legal position thus:  

“There  is,  in  their  opinion,  no  foundation  for  the  view,  apparently  supported by  the  judgments  of  some courts  in  India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to  reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in  cases in which the lower court has ‘obstinately blundered’,  or  has  ‘through  incompetence,  stupidity  or  perversity’  reached such ‘distorted conclusions as to produce a positive  miscarriage  of  justice’,  or  has  in  some  other  way  so  conducted  or  misconducted  itself  as  to  produce  a  glaring  miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by the defence so  as to produce a similar result.”

14. His Lordship, then proceeded to observe: (IA p.404)

“Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High  Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which  the  order  of  acquittal  was  founded,  and  to  reach  the  conclusion  that  upon  that  evidence  the  order  of  acquittal  should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that  power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code.”

15. The Committee, however, cautioned appellate courts and stated: (IA  

p.404)

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“But  in  exercising  the  power  conferred  by  the  Code  and  before reaching its  conclusions upon fact,  the High Court  should and will always give proper weight and consideration  to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the  credibility  of  the  witnesses;  (2)  the  presumption  of  innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly  not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his  trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt;  and (4) the slowness of an appellate  court  in disturbing a  finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage  of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say  that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and   will act in accordance with rules and principles well known  and recognised in the administration of justice.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. In  Nur  Mohd. v.  Emperor  (AIR  1945  PC  151), the  Committee  

reiterated the above view in Sheo Swarup (Supra) and held that in an appeal  

against acquittal, the High Court has full powers to review and to reverse  

acquittal.

17. So far as this Court is concerned, probably the first decision on the  

point was Prandas v. State (AIR 1954 SC 36) (though the case was decided  

on 14-3-1950, it was reported only in 1954). In that case, the accused was  

acquitted by the trial court. The Provincial Government preferred an appeal  

which was allowed and the accused was convicted for offences punishable  

under  Sections  302  and  323  IPC.  The  High  Court,  for  convicting  the  

accused, placed reliance on certain eyewitnesses.

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18. Upholding  the  decision  of  the  High  Court  and  following  the  

proposition  of  law  in  Sheo  Swarup  (supra),  a  six-Judge  Bench  held  as  

follows:

“6.  It  must be observed at the very outset that  we cannot  support the view which has been expressed in several cases   that  the  High  Court  has  no  power  under  Section  417,   Criminal  Procedure  Code,  to  reverse  a  judgment  of   acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate  court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to   produce a miscarriage of justice.”

    (emphasis supplied)   

19. In  Surajpal  Singh v.  State  (1952  SCR  193), a  two-Judge  Bench  

observed that it was well established that in an appeal under Section 417 of  

the (old) Code, the High Court had full power to review the evidence upon  

which the order of acquittal was founded. But it was equally well settled that  

the presumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced by his  

acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the  

advantage  of  seeing  the  witnesses  and  hearing  their  evidence  could  be  

reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.

 20. In  Ajmer Singh v.  State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418) the accused was  

acquitted by the trial court but was convicted by the High Court in an appeal  

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against acquittal filed by the State. The aggrieved accused approached this  

Court. It was contended by him that there were “no compelling reasons” for  

setting aside the order of acquittal and due and proper weight had not been  

given by the  High Court  to  the  opinion of  the  trial  court  as  regards  the  

credibility of witnesses seen and examined. It was also commented that the  

High Court  committed  an error  of  law in  observing that  “when a  strong  

‘prima facie’ case is made out against an accused person it is his duty to  

explain the circumstances appearing in evidence against him and he cannot  

take shelter behind the presumption of innocence and cannot state that the  

law entitles him to keep his lips sealed”.

21. Upholding the contention, this Court said:  

“We think this criticism is well founded. After an order of  acquittal  has  been  made  the  presumption  of  innocence  is  further reinforced by that order, and that being so, the trial  court’s decision can be reversed not on the ground that the  accused had failed to explain the circumstances appearing  against  him but  only  for  very  substantial  and compelling  reasons.”

(emphasis supplied)   

22. In Atley v. State of U.P. (AIR 1955 SC 807) this Court said:  

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“In  our  opinion,  it  is  not  correct  to  say  that  unless  the  appellate  court  in  an  appeal  under  Section  417,  Criminal  Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the judgment of  acquittal  under appeal  was perverse  it  could not  set  aside  that order.

It  has been laid down by this Court that it  is open to the  High Court  on  an  appeal  against  an  order  of  acquittal  to  review  the  entire  evidence  and  to  come  to  its  own  conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established  rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not  weakened  but  strengthened  by  the  judgment  of  acquittal  passed  by  the  trial  court  which  had  the  advantage  of  observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have  been recorded in its presence.

It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide  powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an  order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order  of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of  innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial  court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the  appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of  the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.

If  the appellate court  reviews the evidence,  keeping those  principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the  judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated.”

           (emphasis supplied)   

23. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra [(1955) 2 SCR 1285)] the  

accused was prosecuted under Sections 302 and 447 IPC. He was acquitted  

by the trial court but convicted by the High Court. Dealing with the power of  

the  High  Court  against  an  order  of  acquittal,  Bose,  J.  speaking  for  the  

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majority (2:1) stated: (para 1) “It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is not  

enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence;  there  

must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial   

court was wrong.”  

        (emphasis supplied)

24. In  Sanwat Singh v.  State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120, a three-

Judge  Bench  considered  almost  all  leading  decisions  on  the  point  and  

observed that there was no difficulty in applying the principles laid down by  

the Privy Council and accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court, however,  

noted that appellate courts found considerable difficulty in understanding the  

scope  of  the  words  “substantial  and compelling  reasons”  used  in  certain  

decisions. It was observed inter-alia as follows:

“This Court obviously did not and could not add a condition  to Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The words  were intended to convey the idea that an appellate court not  only shall bear in mind the principles laid down by the Privy  Council but also must give its clear reasons for coming to  the conclusion that the order of acquittal was wrong.”

The Court concluded as follows:   “9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1)  an  appellate  court  has  full  power  to  review the  evidence  

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upon  which  the  order  of  acquittal  is  founded;  (2)  the  principles laid down in  Sheo Swarup case afford a correct  guide  for  the  appellate  court’s  approach  to  a  case  in  disposing  of  such  an  appeal;  and  (3)  the  different  phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (i)  ‘substantial  and  compelling  reasons’,  (ii)  ‘good  and  sufficiently cogent reasons’, and (iii) ‘strong reasons’ are not  intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court  in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence  and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should  not only consider every matter on record having a bearing  on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court  below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a  conclusion  on  those  facts,  but  should  also  express  those  reasons  in  its  judgment,  which  lead  it  to  hold  that  the  acquittal was not justified.”

25. Again, in M.G. Agarwal v.  State of Maharashtra (1963) 2 SCR 405,   

the point was raised before a Constitution Bench of this Court. Taking note  

of earlier decisions, it was observed as follows:

“17. In  some  of  the  earlier  decisions  of  this  Court,  however,  in  emphasising  the  importance  of  adopting  a  cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals,  it  was  observed  that  the  presumption  of  innocence  is  reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, ‘the findings of  the  trial  court  which  had  the  advantage  of  seeing  the  witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only  for very substantial and compelling reasons’: vide Surajpal  Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193). Similarly in Ajmer Singh v.  State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418), it  was observed that the  interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order  of  acquittal  would  be  justified  only  if  there  are  ‘very  substantial and compelling reasons to do so’. In some other  decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal can be  reversed only for ‘good and sufficiently cogent reasons’ or  

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for  ‘strong  reasons’.  In  appreciating  the  effect  of  these  observations, it must be remembered that these observations  were  not  intended  to  lay  down  a  rigid  or  inflexible  rule  which  should  govern  the  decision  of  the  High  Court  in  appeals  against  acquittals.  They  were  not  intended,  and  should  not  be  read  to  have  intended  to  introduce  an  additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423(1) of the  Code.  All  that  the  said  observations  are  intended  to  emphasize is that the approach of the High Court in dealing  with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because  as Lord Russell observed in Sheo Swarup the presumption of  innocence  in  favour  of  the  accused  ‘is  not  certainly  weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial’.  Therefore, the test suggested by the expression ‘substantial  and  compelling  reasons’  should  not  be  construed  as  a  formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case. That  is  the  effect  of  the  recent  decisions  of  this  Court,  for  instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Harbans  Singh v. State of Punjab (1962 Supp 1 SCR 104) and so, it   is  not  necessary  that  before  reversing  a  judgment  of   acquittal, the High Court must necessarily characterise the   findings recorded therein as perverse.”  

(emphasis supplied)   

26. Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.  State  

of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793) this Court held that in India, there is no  

jurisdictional limitation on the powers of appellate court. “In law there are  

no fetters on the plenary power of the appellate court to review the whole  

evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty  

to  scrutinise  the  probative  material  de  novo,  informed,  however,  by  the  

weighty  thought  that  the  rebuttable  innocence  attributed  to  the  accused  

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having been converted into an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes  

to  individual  liberty  constrains  the  higher  court  not  to  upset  the  holding  

without very convincing reasons and comprehensive consideration.”  

 27. Putting emphasis on balance between importance of individual liberty  

and evil of acquitting guilty persons, this Court observed as follows:

“6.  Even  at  this  stage  we  may  remind  ourselves  of  a  necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffers  from  insufficient  forensic  appreciation.  The  dangers  of  exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the  expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that  all  acquittals  are  always  good regardless  of  justice  to  the  victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the  contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The  judicial  instrument  has  a  public  accountability.  The  cherished  principles  or  golden  thread  of  proof  beyond  reasonable doubt which runs thro’ the web of our law should  not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy  and degree of doubt.  The excessive solicitude reflected in  the  attitude  that  a  thousand  guilty  men  may  go  but  one  innocent  martyr  shall  not  suffer  is  a  false  dilemma.  Only  reasonable  doubts  belong  to  the  accused.  Otherwise  any  practical  system of  justice  will  then  breakdown  and  lose  credibility  with  the  community.  The  evil  of  acquitting  a  guilty person light-heartedly, as a learned author (Glanville  Williams  in  Proof  of  Guilt)  has  saliently  observed,  goes  much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has  gone  unpunished.  If  unmerited  acquittals  become general,  they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in  turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions  against  indicted  ‘persons’  and more severe punishment of  those who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of  the  guilty  may  lead  to  a  ferocious  penal  law,  eventually  

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eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these  reasons  it  is  true  to  say,  with  Viscount  Simon,  that  ‘a  miscarriage  of  justice  may arise  from the acquittal  of  the  guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent....’ In  short,  our  jurisprudential  enthusiasm  for  presumed   innocence  must  be  moderated  by  the  pragmatic  need  to  make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to   be  struck  between  chasing  chance  possibilities  as  good  enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of   preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents.”

(emphasis supplied)

28. In K. Gopal Reddy v.  State of A.P (1979) 1 SCC 355, the Court was  

considering the power of the High Court against an order of acquittal under  

Section 378 of the Code. After considering the relevant  decisions on the  

point it was stated as follows:

“9. The principles are now well settled. At one time it was  thought  that  an  order  of  acquittal  could  be  set  aside  for  ‘substantial and compelling reasons’ only and courts used to  launch  on  a  search  to  discover  those  ‘substantial  and  compelling  reasons’.  However,  the  ‘formulae’  of  ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficiently  cogent reasons’ and ‘strong reasons’ and the search for them  were abandoned as a  result  of  the  pronouncement  of  this  Court in  Sanwat Singh v.  State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR  120.  In  Sanwat  Singh case this  Court  harked back to  the  principles enunciated by the Privy Council in  Sheo Swarup  v. R. Emperor and reaffirmed those principles. After Sanwat  Singh v.  State  of  Rajasthan this  Court  has  consistently  recognised  the  right  of  the  appellate  court  to  review  the  entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion bearing in  mind the considerations mentioned by the Privy Council in  

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Sheo  Swarup  case.  Occasionally  phrases  like  ‘manifestly  illegal’,  ‘grossly  unjust’,  have  been  used  to  describe  the  orders  of  acquittal  which  warrant  interference.  But,  such  expressions have been used more as flourishes of language,  to emphasise the reluctance of the appellate court to interfere  with an order of acquittal than to curtail  the power of the  appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to  its own conclusion. In some cases (Ramaphupala Reddy v.  State of A.P., (AIR 1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh Rup Singh v.  State of Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC 286), it has been said  that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh case may be  added  the  further  principle  that  ‘if  two  reasonable  conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on  record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of  the trial  court’.  This,  of course,  is  not a new principle.  It  stems  out  of  the  fundamental  principle  of  our  criminal  jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit  of  any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and evenly  balanced  views  of  the  evidence  are  possible,  one  must  necessarily  concede  the  existence  of  a  reasonable  doubt.  But,  fanciful  and  remote  possibilities  must  be  left  out  of  account.  To entitle  an accused  person to  the  benefit  of  a  doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the  possible view in favour of the accused must be as  nearly  reasonably  probable  as  that  against  him.  If  the  preponderance  of  probability  is  all  one  way,  a  bare  possibility  of  another  view will  not  entitle  the  accused to  claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that   any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be   reasonable  even  as  any  doubt,  the  benefit  of  which  an  accused person may claim, must be reasonable.”

          (emphasis supplied)

 29. In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225, this  

Court said:  

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“While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate  court  is  first  required to seek an answer to the question  whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong,  manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the  appellate court answers the above question in the negative  the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if  the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that  the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of  any  of  the  above  infirmities  it  can  then-and  then  only- reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions.”

 30. In  Allarakha  K.  Mansuri v.  State  of  Gujarat  (2002)  3  SCC  57,  

referring to earlier decisions, the Court stated:  

“7. The paramount consideration of the court should be to  avoid miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice which  may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from  the conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court  has taken a view based upon conjectures and hypothesis and  not on the legal evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court  to  reappreciate  the  evidence  in  acquittal  appeal  for  the  purposes  of  ascertaining  as  to  whether  the  accused  has  committed any offence or not. Probable view taken by the  trial court which may not be disturbed in the appeal is such a  view which is  based upon legal  and admissible  evidence.  Only  because  the  accused  has  been acquitted  by  the  trial  court, cannot be made a basis to urge that the High Court  under all circumstances should not disturb such a finding.”   

31. In  Bhagwan Singh v.  State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85, the trial court  

acquitted the accused but the High Court convicted them. Negativing the  

contention of the appellants that the High Court could not have disturbed the  

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findings of fact of the trial court even if that view was not correct, this Court  

observed:  

 “7.  We do not  agree  with  the  submissions  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  that  under  Section  378  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  the  High  Court  could  not  disturb the finding of facts of the trial court even if it found  that the view taken by the trial court was not proper. On the  basis  of  the  pronouncements  of  this  Court,  the  settled  position of law regarding the powers of the High Court in an  appeal against an order of acquittal is that the Court has full  powers  to  review  the  evidence  upon  which  an  order  of  acquittal is based and generally it will not interfere with the  order of acquittal because by passing an order of acquittal  the  presumption of  innocence  in  favour of  the accused is  reinforced. The golden thread which runs through the web of  administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views  are  possible  on  the  evidence  adduced  in  the  case,  one  pointing  to  the  guilt  of  the  accused  and  the  other  to  his  innocence,  the  view  which  is  favourable  to  the  accused  should be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction limitation on  the  appellate  court  but  judge-made  guidelines  for  circumspection. The paramount consideration of the court is  to  ensure  that  miscarriage  of  justice  is  avoided.  A  miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal of  the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent.  In a case where the trial court has taken a view ignoring the  admissible evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to  reappreciate  the  evidence  in  acquittal  appeal  for  the  purposes  of  ascertaining  as  to  whether  all  or  any  of  the  accused has committed any offence or not”.  

32. In  Harijana  Thirupala v.  Public  Prosecutor,  High  Court  of  A.P.   

(2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court said:  

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“12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an  order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal  has  full  power  to  review the  evidence  to  reach  its  own  independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with  an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other  view is possible, because with the passing of an order of  acquittal  presumption  of  innocence  in  favour  of  the  accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court  would not be justified to interfere with order of acquittal  merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would  have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the  High  Court  while  reversing  an  order  of  acquittal  to  examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to  acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the  High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment  will suffer from serious infirmity.”

33. In  Ramanand Yadav v.  Prabhu Nath Jha (2003) 12 SCC 606, this  

Court observed:  

“21. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing  the  evidence  upon  which  an  order  of  acquittal  is  based.  Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with  because  the  presumption  of  innocence  of  the  accused  is  further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which  runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal  cases  is  that  if  two  views  are  possible  on  the  evidence  adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused  and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable  to  the  accused  should  be  adopted.  The  paramount  consideration of the court  is  to ensure that miscarriage of  justice  is  prevented.  A  miscarriage  of  justice  which  may  arise from acquittal  of the guilty is  no less than from the  conviction  of  an  innocent.  In  a  case  where  admissible  

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evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to  reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has  been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether  any of the accused committed any offence or not”.  

34. Again in Kallu v. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313, this Court stated:  

“8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of  the appellate court is no less than the power exercised while  hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals,  the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one  significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be  interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of  the trial  court is based on evidence and the view taken is  reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of  the trial court merely because a different view is possible.  The appellate  court  will  also bear  in  mind that  there is  a  presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the  accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if   it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing  with the decision of the trial court.”

                         (emphasis supplied)

 35. From  the  above  decisions,  in  Chandrappa  and  Ors.  v.  State  of   

Karnataka (2007 (4) SCC 415), the following general principles regarding  

powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order  

of acquittal were culled out:

(1)  An appellate court has full  power to review, reappreciate  

and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,  

restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court  

on  the  evidence  before  it  may  reach  its  own  conclusion,  both  on  

questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various  expressions,  such as,  “substantial  and compelling  

reasons”,  “good and sufficient  grounds”,  “very  strong circumstances”,  

“distorted  conclusions”,  “glaring  mistakes”,  etc.  are  not  intended  to  

curtail  extensive  powers  of  an  appellate  court  in  an  appeal  against  

acquittal.  Such phraseologies  are  more  in  the  nature  of  “flourishes  of  

language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere  

with  acquittal  than  to  curtail  the  power  of  the  court  to  review  the  

evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case  

of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,  

the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental  

principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to  

be  innocent  unless  he  is  proved  guilty  by  a  competent  court  of  law.  

Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal,  the presumption of  

his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the  

trial court.

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(5) If  two  reasonable  conclusions  are  possible  on  the  basis  of  the  

evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of  

acquittal recorded by the trial court.

36. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an  

offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond  

reasonable  doubt.  Though  this  standard  is  a  higher  standard,  there  is,  

however,  no  absolute  standard.  What  degree  of  probability  amounts  to  

“proof”  is  an  exercise  particular  to  each  case.  Referring  to  the  

interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence  

by  another,  a  learned  author  says  [see  “The  Mathematics  of  Proof  II”:  

Glanville Williams,  Criminal Law Review,  1979, by Sweet and Maxwell,  

p.340 (342)]:

“The  simple  multiplication  rule  does  not  apply  if  the  separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are  dependent  when  they  tend  to  occur  together,  and  the  evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In  a  criminal  case,  different  pieces  of  evidence  directed  to  establishing that  the defendant  did the prohibited act  with  the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A junior  may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and  doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant  fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than  innocent  people  who  make  confessions,  and  guilty  rather  than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not  

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to be multiplied together.  The one piece of evidence may  confirm the other.”

 37. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest  for  

abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To  

constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response.  

Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused  

persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere  

vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a  

merely  possible  doubt,  but  a  fair  doubt  based  upon reason and common  

sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.

38. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be  

expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many  

of  such  units  constitute  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  There  is  an  

unmistakable  subjective  element  in  the  evaluation  of  the  degrees  of  

probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last  

analysis,  rest  on  a  robust  common  sense  and,  ultimately,  on  the  trained  

intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the criminal process to  

the  accused  persons  is  not  to  be  eroded,  at  the  same  time,  uninformed  

legitimization  of  trivialities  would  make  a  mockery  of  administration  of  

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criminal justice. This position was illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah,  

J. (as His Lordship then was) in  State of U.P. v.  Krishna Gopal (1988 (4)   

SCC 302).

39. The above position was highlighted in  Krishnan and Anr. v.  State   

represented by Inspector of Police (2003 (7) SCC 56).

40. PW5 had gone to the Police Station at Ateli at about 9.50 P.M. on  

25.5.1991 to  lodge  the  report  regarding the  death of  the  deceased.   The  

father of the appellant had already sent one Dharam Pal for giving intimation  

of the death to her parents.  PW5 admitted that at the time of marriage Nepal  

Singh was studying in MA Class in Delhi and after doing M.A. he had gone  

to Ahmedabad to undergo some training.  He accepted that the deceased had  

told him that the accused had returned from Ahmedabad on 13.5.1991 after  

completing his course.  It has also been admitted by PW5 that he did not  

send  any  amount  to  Nepal  Singh  while  he  was  prosecuting  studies  at  

Ahmedabad.   In  the  FIR PW had stated  that  he  had told  that  he  would  

arrange money. After the marriage on 23.5.1991 victim went back to village  

Kanti with her brother Sunil Kumar (PW7) and while going back she told  

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her  father  that  if  money  was  not  arranged  the  accused  and  his  family  

members will not allow her to breathe.

41. During  cross-examination  he  accepted  that  all  this  was  not  stated  

during investigation.  He also accepted that it was not mentioned in the FIR  

that gifts and other articles were given as dowry.  He accepted that his father  

in law Udai Singh had settled the marriage between the accused and the  

deceased.  Interestingly  Udai  Singh  (DW1)  has  stated  that  there  was  no  

demand from the side of the accused at the time of marriage.  The deceased  

and  her  parents  had  never  complained  to  him  that  the  accused  or  any  

member of his family was raising any demand of any kind when confronted  

with the statement made during investigation, PW5 accepted that he had not  

stated many vital things during investigation which for the first time he was  

speaking  in  Court.  Similar  is  the  position  with  PW7 the  brother  of  the  

deceased. He also accepted on being confronted with the statement made  

during  investigation  that  he  had  not  stated  particularly  certain  relevant  

aspects.   Similar is the position with the evidence of mother of deceased  

(PW6).  

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42. As was rightly noted by the trial court there was no evidence towards  

the claim regarding any demand of dowry.  That being so the High Court  

ought not to have interfered with the well  reasoned judgment of the trial  

court directing acquittal.  The reasoning of the High Court that something  

must  have  happened  and  otherwise  deceased  would  not  have  committed  

suicide is clearly indefensible.  That certainly could not have been a reason  

to set aside the trial Court’s judgment of acquittal.

43. The appeal is allowed.  The bail bonds executed with effect to the  

order  of  bail  dated  18th May,  2002  and  subsequent  date  shall  stand  

discharged.

..............................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…….......................................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi; April 24, 2009

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