http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: NEHRU MOTOR TRANSPORT COOPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD., AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/12/1962

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1963 AIR 1098            1964 SCR  (1) 220  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1967 SC1815  (12,13)  RF         1981 SC 660  (9)  R          1992 SC1888  (8)

ACT: Motor  Vehicle-Publication  of  scheme-Scheme,  if   consti- tutionally  valid-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939),  SS. 68c,   68D(3)-Rajasthan   State  Road   Transport   Services (Development Rules, 196O, r. 3-Constitution of India,  Arts. 14, 32.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioners were holders of Stage-carriage permits  on Jodhpur-Bilara  arid  Bilara-Beawar routes.   The  Rajasthan Roadways published a draft scheme which provided for  taking over the transport service on the Jodhpur- Bilara-Beawar-Aj- mer  route  by the Roadways and also for taking  over  three overlapping  routes or portions thereof which were  entirely on  Jodhpur-Bilara-Beawar-Ajmer  road and the names  of  the permit-holders on these three overlapping routes with  their permits  were also specified for cancellation and  no  other transport  vehicles  were to ply on the route  to  be  taken over.   The petitioners filed objection and  challenged  the scheme  on  the ground of discrimination  before  the  Legal Remembrancer  as some overlapping routes were not  notified. He held that even though these routes were not specified  in the draft scheme and no notice had been given to the  permit holders  thereof, it was open to him to render  the  permits ineffective  with  respect to these routes also  and  passed orders accordingly.  The permitholders affected by the order of  the Legal Remembrance filed writ petitions in  the  High Court.  The High Court directed the Legal Remembrancer to go into  the  matter  again and to leave the  question  of  the twelve partially overlapping routes for a subsequent scheme. The  effect  of  the  decision  of  the  Legal  Remembrancer considered  in tile light of the decision of the High  Court was  that all the twelve partially overlapping  routes  were left out of the scheme and only the three routes notified in the  draft-scheme  were affected.  The present  petition  is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

directed  against  his  decision  approving  the  scheme  as modified  by him and published on August 31, 1962.  In  this Court  it  was urged (1) that the procedure of  approving  a part of the scheme once and another part later was illegal;  221 (ii)that  the  approval  of the scheme  by  the  Legal  Rem- embrancer  after  abdication of his own judgment was  not  a valid approval ; (iii) that the Legal Remembrancer ought  to have given a fresh hearing ab initio to the objectors ; (iv) that  there  was no proper hearing and (v)  that  there  was discrimination,  as the, operators of the  twelve  partially overlapping routes were left out of the scheme. Held,  that  as  the twelve overlapping  routes  were  never included  in  the draft scheme, the approval  given  to  the craft scheme without touching these routes cannot be  called 0an approval of a part of the scheme. Held, further that in the present case the order of the High Court  was  analogous to a remand order and  therefore,  the decision  of  the Legal Remembrancer must be  treated  as  a fresh decision and not a review of his earlier decision  and there was no abdication by him of his functions. Held,  further, that when the objectors had been given  full opportunity to lead evidence on the previous occasion  which was  still  there for the Legal Remembrancer  to  take  into account,  it was sufficient for him to hear  the  objector’s arguments.  If it is borne in mind that the order passed  by the  High  Court in the proceedings was in the nature  of  a remand order, this objection must fail. Held, further, that the fact that the rules did not  provide for a coercive process to secure attendance of witnesses did not mean that there could be no proper hearing without it. Held,  further, that under s. 68C it was open to  the  State Government to take over any area or route to the complete or partial  exclusion  of  other  persons  and  there  was   no discrimination  in the present case, for  routes  completely covered,  by  the  route taken over  stand  on  a  different footing from the routes only partially covered.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ petition No. 142 of 1962. PetitioN under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for  the enforcement of fundamental rights. B.Chhangani and B. D. Sharma, for the petitioners. 222 C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Kan Singh,  S. K. Kapoor and P. D. Menon, for the respondents. 1962.   December  14.   The  judgment  of’  the  Court   was delivered by WANCHOO, J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the  Constitution challenges the constitutionality of a scheme finalised under s.  68D  (3)  of the Motor Vehicles Act,  No.  IV  of  1939, (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the Act)  in  the  State  of Rajasthan.   The petitioners are holders  of  stage-carriage permits on Jodhpur-Bilara and Bilara-Beawar routes.  A draft scheme  was  published  under  s. 68C  of  the  Act  by  the Rajasthan Roadways, which is a State Transport  Undertaking, (hereinafter  referred to as the Roadways), on  January  26, 1961.  It provided for taking over of the transport  service on  the  Jodhpur-BilaraBeawar-Ajmer route by  the  Roadways. Further it provided for taking over three overlapping routes or   portions  thereof  which  were  entirely   on   Jodhpur Bilara-Beawar-Ajmerroad,  namely,  Jodhpur-Bilara,   Bilara- Beawar,  and  Beawar-Ajmer, and as required by r. 3  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

Rajasthan State Road Transport Services (Development) Rules, 1960,  (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), the names  of the  permitholders  on these three overlapping  routes  with their  permits were also specified for cancellation, and  no transport vehicles other than the vehicles of the Road  ways were  to ply on the route to be taken over.  The usual  time was  also  given for filing objections to  all  those  whose interests were affected by the draftscheme.  The petitioners filed objections under s.68D of the Act, which were heard by the  Legal Remembrancer to the Government of  Rajasthan,  he being  the  person appointed to hear and decide  the  objec- tions, The objectors wanted to lead evidence and did produce some  witnesses  but some witnesses to whom  summonses  were issued did not turn up and  223 the objectors wanted the issue of coercive processes against them.   The Legal Remembrancer however refused this  on  the ground that lie had no power to issue coercive process.   As the  objectors  did not produce any further  witnesses,  the arguments  were  heard and the Legal Remembrancer  gave  his decisions on May 31, 1962. One  of  the  main  points  then  raised  before  the  Legal Remembrancer  was that there were a dozen other  overlapping routes  which were not touched by the scheme, and  therefore the scheme was bad on the ground of discrimination.  It  may be   mentioned  that  these  overlapping  routes  were   not completely overlapping the route to be nationalised,  though the vehicles paying on those twelve routes had to pass  over part of the Jodhpur-Bilara-Beawar-Ajmer road.  It was  urged on behalf of the Roadways before the Legal-Remembrancer that the intention was to render ineffective the permits on these twelve  routes also insofar as they overlapped the route  to be  taken over, though these, routes were not  mentioned  in the draft-scheme like the three routes which were completely covered  by  the Jodhpur-Bilara-Beawar-Ajmer  route  and  no notice  was  apparently  given to  the  seventy-two  permit- holders on these twelve partially over-lapping routes.   The Legal  Remembrancer held that even though these routes  were not  specified  in the draft-scheme and no notice  had  been given  to  the permit-holders thereof, it was  open  to  him to render the  permits  ineffective  with respect  to  these routesalso and proceeded to pass orders accordingly. Thereupon  five writ petitions were filed in the High  Court of Rajasthan by the permit-holders on the three routes which had  been notified in the draftscheme as well as by some  of the  permit-holders  of  the  twelve  partially  overlapping routes which had not been notified but which had been 224 affected  by the order of the Legal Remembrancer.  Two  main points  were urged before the High Court in support  of  the cbchallenge  to  the  validity  of  the  scheme  as  finally published  on  June 16, 1962.  In the first  place,  it  was urged  that the State Government when publishing the  scheme as required by s. 68D(3) of the Act had made certain changes in  it  beyond the decision of the  Legal  Remembrancer  and therefore  the final scheme as published was invalid  as  it was not open to the State Government to make any changes  in the scheme as approved by the Legal Remembrancer.  Secondly, it  was  urged  on behalf of the  operators  on  the  twelve partially overlapping routes which had not been notified  in the  draft  scheme  that  it  was  not  open  to  the  Legal Remembrancer  to  affect their interests when  their  routes were  not  specified in the draft scheme and they  had  been given no notice thereof.  The High Court accepted both these contentions.  It was of the opinion that it was not open  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

the  State  Government  to  make  any  modification  in  the decision of the Legal Remembrancer and inasmuch as that  had been  done  the final scheme as published was  invalid.   It also  held that as the twelve partially  overlapping  routes were not notified in the draftscheme and no notice had  been given  to the permitholders thereof, it was not open to  the Legal Remembrancer to pass any orders with respect to  them. It therefore set aside the scheme as published under s.  68D (3)  of the Act.  Finally, the High Court observed  that  as the  scheme as published was not the scheme as  approved  by the  Legal  Remembrancer and as the decision  of  the  Legal Remembrancer becomes final when it is published, it was open to  the  Legal  Remembrancer to modify  his  decision,  even though  he  may have signed and pronounced  it.   The  Legal -Remembrancer was thus directed to go into the matter  again and  leave the question of the twelve partially  overlapping routes  for  a  subsequent  scheme.   The  final  scheme  as published under s. 68D (3) of the Act was set aside and  the Regional Transport  225 Authority  was  directed not to implement it  until  it  was regularised in accordance with law. The  matter  then went back to the  Legal  Remembrancer  who considered the draft-scheme in the light of the decision  of the High Court and after hearing further agruments  disposed of the objections.  The main effect of his decision was that all the twelve partially overlapping routes were left out of the scheme and only the three routes notified in the  draft- scheme  which were completely covered by the route  Jodhpur- Bilara-Beawar-Ajmer,  were  affected.  The decision  of  the Legal  Remembrancer approving the scheme as modified by  him was  published on August 31, 1962, and the present  petition is directed against that decision. The  decision of the Legal Remembrancer is being  challenged before us on the following grounds:- (1)A  draft-scheme under the Act has to be approved  as  a whole  and the procedure of approving a part of  the  scheme once  and another part later is illegal, and therefore,  the approval given to the draft-scheme by the Legal Remembrancer does not result in approving the scheme, as required by law. (2)It was not open to the Legal Remembracer to review  his order dated May 31, 1962 even after the decision of the High Court,  and  insofar  as the Legal Remembrancer  did  so  in obedience  to the order of the High Court he  abdicated  his own   judgment,  and  the  approval  therefore  after   such abdication of his own judgment, is no approval in law. (3)As  the  scheme as published on June 16, 1962  was  set aside  by  the  High Court, it was the  duty  of  the  Legal Remembrancer  to  give  a fresh hearing  ab  initio  to  the objectors  which he did not do, and therefore  the  approval accorded by him to the draft-scheme 226 after the judgment of the High Court is no approval in law. (4)Hearing  requires taking of evidence; but as the  Legal Remembrancer expressed his inability to compel attendance of witnesses, there was no hearing as contemplated by law,  and therefore the approval of the draft-scheme without a  proper hearing is no approval in law. (5)  There was discrimination inasmuch as the   operatorsof the twelve partially overlapping routes were left out of the scheme. Re. (1) &(2). There  is no doubt that a draft-scheme has to be  considered as  a  whole  and all objections to it have  to  be  decided before it can be approved by the State Government or by  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

officer  appointed  in  that behalf, and the  Act  does  not envisage approving of a part of the scheme once and  putting it into effect and leaving another part unapproved and  left over  for enforcement later.  It is also true that  the  Act does not provide for review of an approval once given by the Legal Remembrancer, though he may be entitled to correct any clerical  mistakes or inadvertent slips that may have  crept in  his order.  It is also true that the Legal  Remembrancer when  considering  the objections has to  exercise  his  own judgment  subject  to any directions that  the  High  Court. might  give  on questions of law relating  to  a  particular draftscheme.  But we do not think that this is a case  where the draft-scheme has been approved in part and another  part of it has been left unapproved to be taken up later; nor  is this  a case where the Legal Remembrancer abdicated his  own judgment or reviewed his earlier decision when he  proceeded to reconsider the matter after the High Court had set  aside the scheme as published under s. 68D (3) of the Act on  June 16, 1962.  227    Let us see what the draft-scheme was meant to  provide in this  case.  As we have already indicated, the  draft-scheme was  published  in order to take  over  the  Jodhpur-Bilara- Beawar-Ajmer  route.  It also provided for taking  over  all the  three completely overlapping routes,  namely,  Jodhpur- Bilara,  Bilara-Beawar,  and Beawar-Ajmer routes,  and  also portions thereof falling entirely on this road from Jodhpur- Ajmer.   There  was no indication in  the  draft-scheme  for taking  over what are called partially  overlapping  routes, only parts of which overlapped on the Jodhpur-Bilara-Beawar- Ajmer road.  These partially overlapping routes were of  two kinds.   In some cases one terminus was  on  Jodhpur-Bilara- Beawar-Ajmer  road while the other terminus was not on  this road.   In other cases, both the termini of the  overlapping routes  were  not on this road, though a part of  the  route fell  on this road.  Rule 3 of the Rules provides for  indi- cating  all  such overlapping routes as are intended  to  be affected  and  the  draft scheme in the  present  case  only indicated  three routes which were completely on  this  road namely, Jodhpur-Bilara, Bilara-Beawar, and Beawar-Ajmer, and was not concerned at all with the other overlapping  routes, where overlapping was only partial.  It was therefore in our opinion  unnecessary to bring in the question of the  twelve partially  overlapping routes when objections to this  draft scheme  were being considered.  There is no doubt  that  the Roadways  was also responsible for the introduction of  this confusion  for  it seems to have been urged on  its  behalf, when  the objections were considered on the first  occasion, that  these partially overlapping routes were also meant  to be  covered by the draft scheme, even though they  were  not mentioned  in  the draft scheme as required by r. 3  of  the Rules and no notice had been issued to the permitholders  of those  routes.   The petitioners also raised  a  point  with respect to these overlapping routes, and that is how on  the first occasion, the Legal Remembrancer held that even though these routes had 228 not been included in the draft scheme and no notice had been given  to the permit-holders thereof, it was open to him  to pass orders with respect thereto and he proceeded to  render the  overlapping  part of these routes ineffective.   It  is obvious from a perusal of the draft scheme that these twelve partially overlapping routes were not included in it at  all and  they  were  brought in only because  of  the  objection raised by the petitioners and the reply of the Roadways that

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

they  were meant to be included.  That is why when the  writ petitions  were  decided by the High Court, it  pointed  out that  the  scheme  did not intially  include  the  partially overlapping routes.  The High Court then went on to  observe that if the Legal Remembrancer thought fit to include  these routes  in the scheme also, he should have given  notice  to all  concerned to file their objections.  With  respect,  it seems  to us that this observation of the High Court is  not correct.   If  the  scheme did  not  include  the  partially overlapping  routes-as it undoubtedly did not, in  spite  of what  the  objectors might have said and what  the  Roadways might  have maintained before the Legal Remembrancer on  the first occasion-it was not open to the Legal Remembrancer  to include these overlapping routes in the scheme at all and he could  not do so even if he had given notice to the  permit- holders on these overlapping routes.  The question therefore whether the final approval of the draft scheme as  published on  August  31,1962 is an approval of a part of  the  scheme only,  leaving  another part of the  scheme  unapproved  and therefore liable to enforcement later, can only admit of one answer,  namely,  that the approval was of the scheme  as  a whole.    The   contention  therefore  on  behalf   of   the petitioners  that part of the scheme has been  approved  and the  rest of it has been left unapproved, can have no  force on  the facts of the present case.  The  twelve  overlapping routes  were never meant to be affected by the scheme  which left  them untouched.  The contention that only part of  the scheme has been  229 approved  appears to have been based on the fact that  these routes  have  not  been  rendered  ineffective  as  to   the overlapping  part.  But as these routes were never  included in the draft scheme, the approval given to the draft  scheme without touching these routes cannot in the circumstances be called an approval of a part of the scheme. Nor  do we think that there is any force in  the  contention that  the  Legal Remembrancer abdicated  his  judgment  when going  into  the question on the second occasion  after  the judgment  of  the  High  Court.   The  order  of  the  Legal Remembrancer   dated   August  17,  1962   shows   that   he reconsidered   the  entire  matter  after  hearing   further arguments  and there can be no doubt that he was  exercising his  own  judgment when he finally decided  to  approve  the draft  scheme  with certain modification.   What  the  Legal Remembrancer  has  done in this case is  to  reappraise  the evidence in the light of the legal position indicated by the High Court.  Nor do we think that there is any substance  in the argument that the order of the Legal Remembrancer  dated August 17, 1962, is a review of his earlier order dated  May 31,  1962.  No question of review of that order  arises  for that  order was in effect set aside when the High Court  set aside the final scheme as published on June 16, 1962.  It is true  that  publication made certain  further  modifications into  the scheme as approved by the Legal  Remembrancer  but that in our opinion makes no difference to the fact that the order  of the High Court setting aside the final  scheme  as published  on.June 16, 1962 put an end to the order  of  the Legal  Remembrancer dated May 31, 1962 also.  This  argument as  to review has been raised because of the observation  in the  Judgment of the High Court that the scheme  as  finally published on June 16, 1962 was not the decision of the Legal Remembrancer because of the changes made in it by the  State Government and 230 therefore  it was open to him to modify it, though he  might

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

have  signed his decision and pronounced it.  With  respect, we consider that this observation is not correct.  It may be that  the  State Government had no authority to  modify  the decision  of the Legal Remembrancer but when the High  Court set  aside the finally approved scheme as published on  June 16,  1962, it meant the decision of the  Legal  Remembrancer dated  May  31,  1962, also came to an end,  for  the  final scheme  as published on June 16, 1962 was undoubtedly  based on  it,  even  though there were  further  changes  in  that decision  at the time of publication.  In the  present  case the  order  of the High Court was analogous to a  remand  as understood  in courts of law.  What the  Legal  Remembrancer did on the second occasion was to reappraise the evidence in the  light  of  the  law  laid  down  by  the  High   Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that the decision of the  Legal Remembrancer on August 17, 1962, is a review of his  earlier decision dated May 31, 1962.  It must be treated as a  fresh decision,  after  the  High Court had set  aside  the  final scheme as published on June 16, 1962.  Though therefore  the proposition put forward on behalf of the petitioners may  be accepted  as  correct, there is no scope  for  applying  the principles  contained in these propositions to the facts  of this  case.   The contention therefore that  the  scheme  as finally  published  on  August 31, 1962 is  bad  because  it militates against these principles must be rejected. Re. (3) & (4). It  is urged that after the High Court set aside  the  final scheme as published on June 16, 1962, the Legal Remembrancer should have given a fresh hearing ab initio and that he  did not do so.  It is further urged that in as much as there  is no  provision in the Rules for compelling the attendance  of witnesses whom an objector might like to produce, there  231 can be no effective hearing of the objection, and  therefore the  scheme  as  finally published on August  31,  1962,  is invalid.  It is not disputed that the Legal Remembrancer did give a hearing to the objectors after the order of the  High Court.   What is urged however is that the objectors  should have  been allowed to give evidence afresh before the  Legal Remembrancer finally disposed of the objections.  We are  of opinion  that  though the result of the order  of  the  High Court  was to set aside the order of the  Legal  Remembracer dated May 31, 1962, it cannot be said that the order of  the High  Court wiped out the evidence which the  objectors  had given  before the Legal Remembrancer on the first  occasion. We have already mentioned the two grounds on which the  High Court  set aside the final scheme as published on  June  16, 1962, and those grounds had nothing to do with the  evidence which was already produced.  In our opinion, it was open  to the  Legal Remembrancer to take that evidence  into  account and  it  was  not necessary that evidence  should  be  given again, particularly when no fresh issues arose; nor was  the Legal  Remembrancer  bound  to take  fresh  evidence  simply because  the final scheme as published on June 16, 1962  had been  set  aside on account of certain technical  and  Legal defects.  When the objectors had been given full opportunity to  lead evidence on the previous occasion which  was  still there  for the Legal Remembrancer to take into  account,  it was  sufficient  for  the Legal  Remembrancer  to  hear  the objectors’  arguments  in full after the order of  the  High Court  in the light of the observations made by it, and  the petitioners therefore cannot have any grievance on the score that they were not given any hearing after the order of  the High Court.  If it is borne in mind that the order passed by the  High  Court in the proceedings was in the nature  of  a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

remand   order,  all  these  objections  will   plainly   be untenable. 232 As  to  the  contention that the Rules do  not  provide  for compelling  the  attendance of witnesses and  all  that  the Legal Remembrancer can do is to summon witnesses who may  or may  not appear in answer to the summonses, it is enough  to say  that  the  proceedings before  the  Legal  Remembrancer though  quasi-judicial are not exactly like  proceedings  in court.   In  proceedings of this kind, it may very  well  be concluded  when a witness is summoned and does  not  appear, that he does not wish to give evidence, and that may be  the reason  why  no  provision  is made in  the  Rules  for  any coercive  process.   We think in the  circumstances  of  the hearing to be given by the Legal Remembrancer, it is  enough if  he  takes evidence of the witnesses whom  the  objectors bring  before him themselves and if he helps them to  secure their  attendance by issue of summonses.  But the fact  that the  Rules  do not provide for coercive processes  does  not mean in the special circumstances of the hearing before  the Legal  Remembrancer  that  there can be  no  proper  hearing without  such  coercive  processes.   We  are  therefore  of opinion  that the Legal Remembrancer did give a  hearing  to the objectors after the order of the High Court and that  in the  circumstances that hearing was a proper and  sufficient hearing.   The  challenge therefore to the validity  of  the scheme as published on June 16, 1962, on this ground must be rejected. Re. (5). Lastly  we  come  to the question  of  discrimination.   The argument  is  based on the fact that  the  twelve  partially overlapping routes to which we have already alluded have not been  touched  by the scheme.  That is undoubtedly  so.   We have  already pointed out that in the case of some of  these routes  one terminus is on  the  Jodhpur-Bilara-Beawar-Ajmer road  while  the other is not on this road.  In  some  cases neither termini is on this road and only a part of  233 the  route overlaps this road.  The argument is that as  the permit-holders  on these partially overlapping  routes  have not  been  touched by the scheme,  there  is  discrimination inasmuch  as  the permit-holders on the three  routes  which were  totally  overlapping the route which was  being  taken over,  have been completely excluded.  We do not think  that this amounts to discrimination.  It may be pointed out  that under  s. 68C it is open to take over any area or  route  to the   complete  or  partial  exclusion  of  other   persons. Therefore, it was open to the State Government to take  over this  route  only  and  exclude  those  who  may  be  plying completely on this route or parts thereof and unless it  can be  shown that others who are similarly situated  have  -not been  excluded from the scheme there can be no  question  of discrimination.  In our opinion it cannot be said that-those permit-holders  whose routes were completely covered by  the route  taken over stand on the same footing as  those  whose routes were only partially covered by the route taken  over. It  may  very well have been considered that  in  the  first instance  only those permit-holders will be  excluded  whose routes are completely covered by the routes taken over,  and if that is permissible under the law it cannot be said  that that would amount to discrimination when there is an obvious distinction  between routes completely covered by the  route to  be  taken over and the routes partially covered  by  the route  to be taken over.  We have been informed  that  since this  scheme  was  approved steps have been  taken  even  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

exclude  those  permit-holders whose  routes  are  partially covered  by  making  their  permits  ineffective  over   the overlapping  part of the route.  But that apart, we can  see no  ground  to  uphold the plea  of  discrimination  in  the present  case,  for routes completely covered by  the  route taken over stand on a different footing from the routes only partially covered.  The contention therefore that the  final scheme  as  published on August 31, 1962 is bad  because  it discriminates in this manner, must be rejected. 234 We  therefore dismiss the petition but in the  circumstances of this case pass no order asto costs. Petition dismissed.