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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  4911 of 2006

PETITIONER: National Institute of Technology,Jamshedpur & Ors.

RESPONDENT: Chandra Shekhar Chaudhary

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/11/2006

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15833 of 2004)

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

       Leave granted.

       Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a  Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court dismissing the  Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant against the  judgment of the learned Single Judge in a writ petition.  The  respondent filed a writ petition for a direction to the appellant  to relieve him so that he would be in a position to pursue his  Ph.D course in Indian Institute of Technology, Madras (in  short ’IIT’).  

       The background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The writ petitioner (respondent herein) is an Associate  Professor in Metallurgical Engineering Department of the  National Institute of Technology, Jamshedpur, the appellant  herein. According to the writ petition, the writ petitioner  submitted an application for admission in Quality  Improvement Programme (QIP) sponsored by AICTE through  Regional Institute of Technology, Jamshedpur. He was  selected for admission in IIT, Madras and was asked to appear  at that institution for completing pre-registration formalities.  According to the writ petition, though he made an application  to the appellant for relieving him to make the pre-registration  visit, he had been illegally and arbitrarily denied the  permission by the appellant. According to the writ petitioner,  the action of the appellant was unreasonable and was also  discriminatory. The appellant resisted the writ petition by  pointing out that according to the norms, if on relieving a  teacher to attend such a programme, the staff strength in that  department would go below 70 percent of the fixed capacity,  the permission was to be denied and if the writ petitioner was  to be relieved as sought for by him, the strength in that  department would be reduced to 6l.9% of the sanctioned  strength and it was in that situation that he was not accorded  permission to get himself registered for the course. It was also  submitted that even originally, while forwarding his  application, the writ petitioner had been informed that he  would be able to pursue his course only if he could be relieved  from the Institute and only if on his being relieved, the staff  strength would not be reduced below 70%. The plea of  discrimination was denied and it was submitted that the writ  petitioner was deliberately attempting to malign the

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department by raising the bogey of his being a member of a  Scheduled Caste and was trying even to blackmail the  authorities by threatening that he would commit suicide if he  was not relieved.  The writ petition deserves to be dismissed.         Though the learned Single Judge found that there was a  norm providing for refusal of permission to a teacher to go in  for such a course if the staff strength would be reduced below  70% yet it was observed that there was no consistency in that  regard and the norms were not followed in several cases.   Therefore, it would not be fair to deny such an opportunity.  The appellant preferred Letters Patent Appeal before the High  Court.  

       It was pointed out that pursuant to an administrative  decision dated 9.11.2003 by the Ministry of Human Resources  Development (in short the ’HRD’) the Board of Governors had  adopted the Leave Rules and Conduct Rules of the National  Institute of Technology for implementation in the institute.   Such decision was taken on the day the matter was heard by a  learned Single Judge and the orders were reserved. By the  time the learned Single Judge pronounced its judgment IIT,  Delhi Rules had already become operative and, therefore, no  member of the teaching staff could be relieved for such a  course, if the available strength of the staff gets reduced below  85%.  To state differently, only quota of 15% could be  permitted for such a course.   

       The Division Bench held that though on principles it  would have agreed with the appellant’s stand that when the  norms prescribed that the strength should not be reduced  below 70% by relieving a teacher for a programme such a  teacher should not be relieved, yet it was held because the  norm was universally implemented.  The learned Single Judge  was justified in his view.

       Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that merely  because there may have been any lapse in the past, that could  not have been taken as a ground by the High Court to grant  relief to the respondent.  It was further pointed out that the  respondent did not continue his programme as Ph.D. degree at  IIT, Madras after April, 2005.  But as is evident from the letter  of IIT Madras, respondent had secured low grades in the three  subjects he had appeared and he had not attended the rest of  the course.  It was pointed out that the respondent has  manipulated and fabricated documents to show that he was  being prevented by the functionaries of the appellant from  carrying on the study course. Respondent is also guilty,  according to him, of making false and biased allegations  against the functionaries of the appellant.   

       Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand  submitted that there is no reason as to why a different  yardstick was sought to be applied for the respondent.  He was  the victim of machination. The respondent has clearly  established as to how and why it was not possible for him to  attend the course after April, 2005.  It is submitted that the  appellant with mala fide intention has pursued the  respondent.

In      State  of Haryana & Ors. v.  Ram Kumar Mann  [1997 (3) SCC 321] this Court observed:

"The   doctrine of discrimination is founded  upon existence of an enforceable right.  He was  discriminated and denied equality as some

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similarly situated persons had been given the  same relief.  Article 14 would apply only when  invidious discrimination is meted out to equals   and similarly circumstanced without any  rational basis or relationship in that behalf.   The respondent has no right, whatsoever and  cannot be given the relief wrongly given to  them, i.e., benefit of withdrawal of resignation.   The High Court was wholly wrong in reaching  the conclusion that there was invidious  discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to  perpetrate, an employee, after committing mis- appropriation of money, is dismissed from  service and subsequently        that order is  withdrawn and he is reinstated into the  service. Can a similarly Circumstanced person  claim equality under Section 14 for  Reinstatement?  The answer is obviously "No".

In a converse case, in the first instance, one may be  wrong but the wrong order cannot be the foundation for  claiming equality for enforcement of the same order.  As stated  earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right to  entitle him to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof.   A wrong decision by the Government does not give a right to  enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two  wrongs can never make a right". [See: State of Bihar and  others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Another (2000) 9 SCC  94, Vikrama Shama Shetty v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.  (2006 (6) SCC 70), South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Prem  Kumar Sharma and Ors. (2006 (7) SCALE 240), Ekta Shakti  Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi (JT 2006 (6) SC  500), and South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Prem Kumar  Sharma and Ors. (AIR 2006 SC 2727).  

       Merely because in some cases the norms may not have  been followed that cannot be a ground to hold that departure  from norms should be continued. There are serious allegations  about respondent having manipulated and fabricated  documents to substantiate his stand.  We need not go into  these allegations.  But as has been fairly accepted by the  learned counsel for the respondent, there is no official  communication from IIT Madras to support the respondent’s  stand that he was asked by the authorities of the said institute  not to attend the programme.  There should have been some  material to support the stand. Unfortunately, for the  respondent there is none.  On the other hand admittedly after  April, 2005 the respondent had abandoned the programme.  It  is also on record that the appellant notwithstanding these  facts had asked the respondent to report back to IIT, Madras  to continue studies in terms of High Court’s direction.  But  that does not seem to have been done by the respondent.   

       The inevitable result is that the orders of the learned  Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court cannot  be maintained and are accordingly set aside. The appeal is  allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to  costs.