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PETITIONER: NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LIMITED

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI SHRI KISHAN BHAGERIA & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/11/1987

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) OZA, G.L. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR  329            1988 SCR  (1) 985  1988 SCC  Supl.   82     JT 1987 (4)   569  1987 SCALE  (2)1301

ACT:      Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947: Section 2(s)-’Workman’- who is-Internal  Auditor in  Company-Not  doing  supervisory work-only checking  up on  behalf of employer-No independent authority or  right  to  take  decision-Such  employee  held ’workman’-I. D.  Act not  repugnant to  Rajasthan Shops  and Commercial Establishments Act 1958.      Rajasthan  Shops  and  Commercial  Establishments  Act, 1958: Sections  28A and  37-Whether repugnant  to Industrial Disputes Act  1947-Employee’s  petition  against  dismissal- Dismissed on  ground of  limitation-Relief through  petition under I. D. Act 1947-Whether barred.

HEADNOTE: %      The Ist respondent was working in the appellant-company as an  Internal Auditor  on a  monthly salary of Rs.1186-60P per month. The appellant alleged that the respondent started absenting himself  from 28th  January, 1978  and as such was not entitled  to any  salary for  any period beyond the said date. The  respondent was thereafter placed under suspension on 30th March, 1978.      On 4th  May, 1978  the respondent  filed an application under section  33C(2) of  the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 claiming a  total sum  of Rs.4746-40p  on account  of salary from Ist  January, 1978  to 30th  April, 1978. The appellant objected on  the  ground  that  the  respondent  was  not  a ’workman’.  On   9th  November,  1978  there  was  an  order dismissing the respondent from service.      On  2nd   January,  1979   the  respondent   filed   an application under  section 28A  of the  Rajasthan Shops  and Commercial Establishments  Act, 1958  which was dismissed on 31st July, 1979 on the ground of limitation.      On the  2nd August, 1979 the Labour Court held that the respondent was  doing clerical  duties and  as  such  was  a ’workman’ under  the Industrial  Disputes  Act  and  he  was entitled to Rs.2060-98p as salary 986 from 9th  March, 1978  to 30th April, 1978. There was also a reference under  section 10  of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on 8th August, 1960 arising out of the dismissal of the

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respondent. The  appellant filed a writ petition challenging this order.      All the  aforesaid writ petitions were disposed of by a Single Judge  of the  High Court on 16th March, 1982 holding that the respondent was not a ’workman’.      Division Bench  of the High Court, however reversed the aforesaid judgment  and  held  that  the  respondent  was  a ’workman’. The  two writ  petitions of  the  appellant  were dismissed, while  the writ  petition of  the respondent  was allowed.      Aggrieved  by   the  aforesaid   orders  the  appellant appealed to  this Court.  On the  questions: (1) whether the respondent was  a ’workman’  or not within the definition of section 2(s)  of the  Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947 and (2) whether the  Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947 or the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 would apply.      Dismissing the appeals, ^      HELD: 1.(a) Whether a person was performing supervisory or  managerial  work  is  a  question  of  fact.  One  must, therefore, look  into the  main work  and that must be found out from the main duties. A supervisor has to take some kind of decision  on behalf of the company. One who was reporting merely  as   to  the  affairs  of  the  company  and  making assessment for  the purpose  of reporting is not supervisor. [992A-B]      (b) There  is no  controversy in the instant case, that the  respondent   is  not  employed  in  any  managerial  or administrative capacity.  Distribution of work may easily be the work of a manager or an administrator but "checking" the work so distributed or "keeping an eye" over it is certainly supervision. A  manager or  administrator’s work  may easily include supervision  but that does not mean that supervision is the only function of a manager or an administrator. Where there is  a power  of assigning  duties and  distribution of work there is supervision. [990C,991A-B,991D]      Mcleod and Co. v. Sixth Industrial Tribunal West Bengal and others, A.I.R. 1958 Calcutta 273; All India Reserve Bank Employees Association  v. Reserve  Bank of  India, [1966]  1 S.C.R. 25; Llyods Bank 987 Ltd. v. Pannalal Gupta, [1961] 1 L.L.J. 18; Burmah Shell Oil Storage  &  Distribution  Co.  Of  India.  v.  Burmah  Shell Management Staff Association & Ors. [1971] 2 S.C.R. 758; The Punjab Co-operative  Bank Ltd. v. R.S. Bhatia (dead) through Lrs, [1975] 4 S.C.C. 696; Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration JUDGMENT: Delton Cable  India (P)  Ltd., [1984]  2 S.C.C. 569 and Hind Construction and  Engineering Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1965] 1 L.L.J. 462 referred to.      (c) A  checker on  behalf of the management or employer is not a supervisor. [993E]      In the  instant case, the nature of duties performed by Respondent No.  1 were  mainly reporting  and checking up on behalf of  the management. A reporter or a checking clerk is not a supervisor. The respondent does not appear to be doing any kind of supervisory work. He was undoubtedly checking up on behalf of the employer but he had no independent right or authority to take decision and his decision did not bind the company. The  Division Bench came to the conclusion that the respondent was  a ’workman’  within the  meaning of  section 2(s) of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  taking  into consideration the  evidence recorded before the Labour Court that the  respondent is a workman and not a supervisor. That conclusion  on   the  appreciation  of  evidence  cannot  be

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interfered with  under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution. [993A-C]      2.(a) In  order to raise the question of repugnancy two conditions must  be fulfilled.  The State  law and the Union law must operate in the same field and one must be repugnant or inconsistent  with the  other. These  are two  cumulative conditions which are required to be fulfilled. [995E]      Deep Chand  v. The  State of  Uttar Pradesh and others, [1959] Suppl.  2 S.C.R.  8 and  M/s. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and  others v.  State of  Bihar and  others,  [1983]  4 S.C.C. 45 at page 87 referred to.      (b) In  this case there is a good deal of justification to hold  that these  laws, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the  Rajasthan Shops  and Commercial Establishments Act, 1985 tread  on the  same field  and both  laws deal with the rights of  a dismissed  workman or  employee. But  these two laws are  not inconsistent  or repugnant  to each other. The basic test  of repugnancy  is that if one prevails the other cannot prevail.  That is  not the  position  in  this  case. [995F-G] 988      (c) The  application under section 28A of the Rajasthan Act was  dismissed not on merits but on limitation. There is a period  of limitation provided under the Rajasthan Act and it may  be extended  for reasonable  cause. But  there is no period of  limitation as  such provided under the Industrial Disputes Act.  Therefore, that  will be  curtailment of  the rights of  the workmen  or employees  under  the  Industrial Disputes Act. In that situation section 37 declares that law should not  be construed to curtail any of the rights of the workmen. [996A-B]      (d) Social  Welfare and  labour welfare  broadens  from legislation to  legislation in  India. It  will  be  a  well settled principle  of  interpretation  to  proceed  on  that assumption and  section 37  of the  Rajasthan Act must be so construed. In no way the Rajasthan Act could be construed to curtail the  rights of  the workman to seek any relief or to go in  for adjudication  in case  of the  termination of the employment. [996C]      (e)  There  is,  therefore,  no  conflict  between  the Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  and  Rajasthan  Shops  and Commercial Establishments Act, 1985 and there is no question of repugnancy.  These two  Acts  are  supplemental  to  each other. [994G-H; 996D]      3. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that Respondent No.  1 was  a ’workman’ and in granting relief on that basis. [996E]

&      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal  Nos.3521- 3523 of 1987.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  17.10. 1986 of the Rajasthan High  Court in  D.B. Civil  Special (Writ) Appeals Nos. 27,28 of 1983 and 224 of 1982.      Dr. Shankar  Ghosh, N.C. Shah and Praveen Kumar for the Appellant.      Tapas Ray, S.K. Jain, Mrs. P.Jain and S. Atreya for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. After hearing parties and after considering the  relevant documents,  additional as  well as original, we  grant leave  to appeal  in these  matters. The appeals are disposed of by the judgment herein.

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989      Since prior  to Ist of January, 1978 the respondent No. 1 Shri  Kishan Bhageria  was working  under  the  appellant- company as  an Internal  Auditor  on  a  monthly  salary  of Rs.1186.60  per   month.  The  appellant  alleged  that  the respondent started  absenting himself  from 28.1.78  and  as such was  not entitled  to any  salary for any period beyond 28.1.78 The  said respondent  was  thereafter  placed  under suspension on  30th of March, 1978. The respondent on 4th of May, 1978  filed an  application under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called ’the Act’) claiming the  total sum  of Rs.4,746.40 on account of salary from Ist of January, 1978 to 30th of April, 1978 at the rate of Rs.11,86.60  per month.  The appellant  company objected. The main  ground of  objections was  that the respondent was not a  workman. On  or about 9th of November, 1978 there was an  order   dismissing  the  respondent  from  service.  The respondent thereafter  on 2nd  of  January,  1979  filed  an application under  section 28A  of  the  Rajasthan  Shops  & Establishments Act,  1958 (hereinafter called ’the Rajasthan Act’). The  said application  was dismissed  on 31st of July 1979 on the ground of limitation. The Labour Court on 2nd of August, 1979  held that  the respondent  was doing  clerical duties and  as such  was a  workman under the Act and he was entitled to  Rs.2,060 as  salary from  1.1.78 to 9.3.78. The appellant filed  Writ  Petition  No.  765  of  1979  in  the Rajasthan High  Court against  the order of the Labour Court allowing the  said salary. The respondent also filed another writ petition  being writ  petition No.  1091  of  1979  for declaration that  he was  entitled to receive Rs.2,066.98 as salary from  9.3.78  to  30.4.78.  There  was  thereafter  a reference under  section 10 of the Act on 8.8.80 arising out of the  dismissal of  the respondent.  The  appellant  filed another writ  petition being  Writ Petition No. 1623 of 1980 challenging the order of reference. All these aforesaid writ petitions were  disposed of  by the  learned Single Judge of the  Rajasthan  High  Court  on  16.3.82  holding  that  the respondent was  not a  workman. The  other contentions urged before the  leaned Single  Judge were  not considered by the Division Bench  in the  view it  took later  on. On  17th of October, 1986  the Division  Bench reversed  the judgment of the learned  Single Judge and held that the respondent was a workman. Two  writ petitions of the appellant were dismissed and  the  writ  petition  of  the  respondent  was  allowed. Aggrieved by  the aforesaid orders the appellant has come up in these appeals before this Court.      The main question which requires consideration in these appeals is  whether the respondent was a workman or not. For the determination  of this question it is necessary to refer to section  2(s) of  the Act  which  defines  "workman"  and states that it means any person emp- 990 loyed in  any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational,  clerical or  supervisory  work  for hire or  reward, whether  the terms of employment be express or implied,  and includes  any  such  person  who  has  been dismissed discharged  or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence  of any dispute. But sub-clause (iii) does not include any person who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity and sub-clause (iv) does not include any person  who being  employed in  a  supervisory  capacity draws wages  exceeding one  thousand six  hundred rupees per month or  duties attached  to the office or by reason of the powers vested  in him,  discharges  functions  mainly  of  a managerial nature.  In view  of the  said definition, we are

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concerned here  with the question whether the respondent was a workman as not being employed in any supervisory capacity. There is  no controversy  that the  said respondent  is  not employed in any managerial or administrative capacity.      In this  case before  we deal  with the  facts and  the relevant authorities  of this Court it may be appropriate to refer to  a decision  of P.B.  Mukharji, J.  Of the Calcutta High Court  as the  learned Chief Justice then was in Mcleod and Co.  v.  Sixth  Industrial  Tribunal,  West  Bengal  and others, A.I.R.  1958 Calcutta  273. There  the learned Judge observed that  whether a  person was  a workman  within  the definition of  the Industrial  Disputes  Act  was  the  very foundation of  the jurisdiction  of the Industrial Tribunal. The Court  further observed  that in  order to determine the categories of  service indicated  by the  use  of  different words like "supervisory", "managerial", "administrative", it was necessary  not to  import the  notions of  one into  the interpretation of  the other. The words such as supervisory, managerial   and    administrative   are   advisedly   loose expressions with  no rigid  frontiers and  too much subtlety should not  be used  in trying  to  precisely  define  where supervision ends  and management  begins  or  administration starts. For  that would be theoretical and not practical. It has to  be broadly  interpreted from a common sense point of view where  tests will be simple both in theory and in their application. The  learned  Judge  further  observed  that  a supervisor need  not be  a manager or an administrator and a supervisor can be a workman so long as he did not exceed the monetary  limitation   indicated  in   the  section   and  a supervisor irrespective  of his  salary is not a workman who has to  discharge functions  mainly of  managerial nature by reasons of  the duties  attached to  his office  or  of  the powers vested in him. In that case the learned Judge further held that  a person  in charge  of a  Department  could  not ordinarily be  a clerk  even though he may not have power to take disciplinary  action or even though he may have another superior 991 officer above him. It was further observed that distribution of  work  may  easily  be  the  work  of  a  manager  or  an administrator but  "checking" the  work  so  distributed  or "keeping an  eye" over  it is  certainly supervision.  It is reiterated that a manager or administrator’s work may easily include supervision  but that does not mean that supervision is the only function of a manager or an administrator.      Bearing in  mind the  aforesaid indication, it would be necessary to  discuss some  decisions of  this Court. In All India Reserve  Bank Employees Association v. Reserve Bank of India, [1966]  1 S.C.R.  25, this Court dealing with certain types of  employees  observed  "These  employees  distribute work, detect  faults, report  for penalty, make arrangements for filling  vacancies, to  mention only a few of the duties which are  supervisory and  not merely clerical." At page 46 of the  report Hidayatullah, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was  observed that  the work  in a  Bank involved layer upon layer  of checkers  and checking  is hardly supervision but  where   there  is  a  power  of  assigning  duties  and distribution  of   work  there   is  supervision,  (emphasis supplied). There  the Court  referred to a previous decision in Llyods  Bank Ltd.  v. Pannalal Gupta, [1961] 1 L.L.J. 18, where the  finding of  the  Labour  Appellate  Tribunal  was reversed because  the legal  inference from proved facts was wrongly drawn  and it  was reiterated  that before  a  clerk could claim  a special allowance payable to a supervisor, he must prove  that he  supervises the  work of some others who

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are  in   a  sense   below  him.   It  was  pointed  out  by Hidayatullah, J. that mere checking of the work of others is not enough  because this  checking was  a part of accounting and not  of supervision  and the  work  done  in  the  audit department  of   a  bank   was  not  supervision.  (emphasis supplied).      In Burmah  Shell Oil  Storage  &  Distribution  Co.  Of India. v.  Burmah Shell Management Staff Association & Ors., [1971] 2 S.C.R. 758, this Court observed that a workman must be held  to be  employed to  do that  work which is the main work  he   is  required   to  do,  even  though  he  may  be incidentally  doing  other  types  of  work.  Therefore,  in determining which of the employees in the various categories are covered  by the  definition of  ’workman’ one has to see what is the main or substantial work which he is employed to do. In  The Punjab  Co-operative Bank  Ltd. v.  R.S.  Bhatia (dead) through  Lrs., [1975]  4 S.C.C.  696 it was held that the accountant  was supposed to sign the salary bills of the staff even  while performing the duties of a clerk. That did not  make   the  respondent  employed  in  a  managerial  or administrative capacity. The workman was, therefore, in that context rightly held as a clerk. 992      In P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration & Ors., [1983] 3 S.C.R.  949 the  question whether  a person was performing supervisory or  managerial work  was the question of fact to be decided  bearing  in  mind  the  correct  principle.  The principle therefore is, one must look into the main work and that must  be found  out from  the main duties. A supervisor was one  who could  bind the  company to  take some  kind of decision on  behalf of  the company.  One who  was reporting merely  as   to  the  affairs  of  the  company  and  making assessment  for   the  purpose   of  reporting   was  not  a supervisor. See  in this  connection Black’s Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe,  Fifth Edition.  At page  1290, "Supervisor" has been described, inter alia, as follows:           "In a  broad  sense,  one  having  authority  over           others, to superintend and direct.           The term  ’supervisor’ means any individual having           authority, in  the interest  of the  employer,  to           hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,           discharge, assign,  reward,  or  discipline  other           employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to           adjust  their   grievances,  or   effectively   to           recommend such  action, if  in connection with the           foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of           a merely  routine or clerical nature, but requires           the use of independent judgment."      Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Ved  Prakash Gupta  v. M/s.  Delton Cable India (P) Ltd., [1984] 2 S.C.C. 569. There on facts a Security Inspector was held to  be a  workman. At page 575 of the report this Court referred to  the decision  in Llyods  Bank Ltd. v. Panna Lal Gupta, (supra)  and also  the observations  of this Court in Hind Construction  and Engineering  Company  Ltd.  v.  Their Workmen, [1965] 1 L.L.J. 462. In that case the nature of the duties  performed   by  the   appellant  showed   that   the substantial part  of the  work of the appellant consisted of looking after  the security  of the factory and its property by deputing  the watchmen  working under  him to work at the factory gate  or sending  them to watch-towers or around the factory or  to accompany  visitors to the factory and making entries in  the visitors’  register as  regards the visitors and in the concerned registers as regards materials entering into or  going out  of the premises of the factory. There it

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was found that he had no power to appoint.      In the  instant case  the evidence have been summarised by the  Division Bench.  Reference may  be made to pages 65, 73, 80, 84 to 94, 993 95, 96 and 97 of the Paper Book which indicate the nature of duties performed  by the respondent No. 1 herein. His duties were mainly,  reporting and  checking up  on behalf  of  the management.  A  reporter  or  a  checking  clerk  is  not  a supervisor. The  respondent herein  does not  appear  to  us doing any  kind of  supervisory  work.  He  was  undoubtedly checking up  on  behalf  of  the  employer  but  he  had  no independent right  or authority  to take  decision  and  his decision did  not bind  the company.  In that  view  of  the matter keeping  the correct  principle of  law in  mind  the Division Bench  has  come  to  the  conclusion  taking  into consideration the  evidence recorded before the Labour Court that the  respondent is a workman and not a supervisor. That conclusion arrived  at in the manner indicated above cannot, in our  opinion, be interfered with under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is not necessary for our present purpose to set out  in extenso  the evidence  on record as discussed by the Division Bench. Our attention was, however, drawn by the counsel for  the respondent  to certain  correspondence, for instance the letter at page 65 of the paper book bearing the date 14th  of May,  1976 where  the respondent reported that certain materials  were lying in stores deptt. in absence of any decision.  It was  further reiterated that on inspection of  the   pieces  that  those  pieces  were  found  cracked. Similarly, our  attention was drawn to several other letters and we  have perused  these letters.  We are  of the opinion that the  Division Bench  was right  that these letters only indicated that  the report  was being  made of  the checking done  by   the  respondent.  A  checker  on  behalf  of  the management or employer is not a supervisor.      In the  aforesaid view  of the matter the conclusion of the Division Bench that respondent No. 1 is a workman has to be sustained. We do so accordingly.      The next  question that  arises in this case is whether Act would  apply or  the Rajasthan  Act would apply. In this connection section  28A of the Rajasthan Act is material. It enjoins that no employer shall dismiss or discharge from his employment any  employee who  has been  in  such  employment continuously for  a period  of not less than 6 months except for a  reasonable cause  and after  giving such  employee at least one  month’s prior notice or on paying him one month’s wages in lieu of such notice. Sub-section (2) of section 28A gives every  employee, so  dismissed or discharged, right to make a  complaint in  writing in  the prescribed manner to a prescribed authority  within 30  days of  the receipt of the order of  dismissal or discharge. Sub-section (3) of section 28A provides  that the  prescribed authority  shall cause  a notice to  be served  on the  employer relating  to the said complaint, record 994 briefly the  evidence produced by the parties, hear them and make  such  enquiry  as  it  might  consider  necessary  and thereafter pass  orders in  writing giving reasons therefor. Section 37 of the Rajasthan Act reads as follows:           "37. Saving  of certain  rights  and  privileges.-           Nothing in  this Act  shall affect  any rights  or           privileges which  an employee in any establishment           is entitled  to on  the date  this Act  comes into           force under  any other  law, contract,  custom  or           usage applicable  to  such  establishment  or  any

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         award, settlement  or  agreement  binding  on  the           employer and  the employee  in such establishment,           if such  rights or  privileges are more favourable           to him  than those  to which  he would be entitled           under this Act."      It has  to be  borne in mind that section 2A of the Act was amended  to permit  individual  workman  to  ask  for  a reference in  the case of individual dispute. This amendment was assented  to by  the President on 1st of December, 1965. The Rajasthan  Act received  the assent  of the President on 14th of  July, 1958. On 8th March, 1972 Chapter 6A including section 28A was inserted in the Rajasthan Act. Therefore the material provision  of the  Rajasthan Act  is the subsequent law. Under  Article 254(2)  of the Constitution if there was any law  by the State which had been reserved for the assent of  the  President  and  has  received  the  assent  of  the President, the State law would prevail in that State even if there is  an earlier  law by  the Parliament on a subject in the Concurrent  List. It  appears that  both of  these  Acts tread the same field and if there was any conflict with each other, then section 28A of Rajasthan Act would apply being a later law.  We find, however, that there is no conflict. The learned Single  Judge of  the Rajasthan High Court in Poonam Talkies, Dausa  v.  The  Presiding  Officer,  Labour  Court, Jaipur, (S.B.  Civil Writ  Petition No.  1206/85 decided  on 9.6.1986) so.  That decision has been upheld by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Writ Appeal No. 231/86. The Division  Bench of  the High Court in the instant appeal relying on  the said  decision held  that there was no scope for any  repugnancy. It appears to us that it cannot be said that these  two Acts do not tread the same field. Both these Acts deal  with the rights of the workman or employee to get redressal and damages in case of dismissal or discharge, but there is  no repugnancy because there is no conflict between these  two   Acts,  in  pith  and  substance.  There  is  no inconsistency between these two acts. These two Acts, in our opinion, are supplemental to each other. 995      In Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, [1959] Suppl.  2 S.C.R.  8, Subba  Rao, J.,  as the  learned Chief Justice  then was  observed that  the  result  of  the authorities indicated was as follows:           "Nicholas  in  his  Australian  Constitution,  2nd           Edition,  p.   303,  refers   to  three  tests  of           inconsistency or repugnancy:                1.   There may be inconsistency in the actual                     terms of the competing statutes;                2.   Though there  may be no direct conflict,                     a State  law may  be inoperative because                     the Commonwealth  Code is intended to be                     a complete exhaustive code; and                3.   Even in  the  absence  of  intention,  a                     conflict may  arise when  both State and                     Commonwealth  seek   to  exercise  their                     powers over the same subject matter."      Quoting the  aforesaid observations, this Court in M/s. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals  Ltd. and  others v.  State of Bihar and others, [1983] 4 S.C.C. 45 at page 87 where A.P. Sen, J. exhaustively dealt  with the  principles of  repugnancy  and observed that  one of  the occasions  where inconsistency or repugnancy arose  was when  on the  same subject matter, one law would  be repugnant to the other. Therefore, in order to raise a  question  of  repugnancy  two  conditions  must  be fulfilled. The  State law  and the Union law must operate on the same  field and  one must  be repugnant  or inconsistent

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with the  other. These are two conditions which are required to be fulfilled. These are cumulative conditions. Therefore, these laws  must tread  on the  same field and these must be repugnant or  inconsistent with  each other. In our opinion, in this  case there  is a good deal of justification to hold that  these  laws,  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  and  the Rajasthan Act  tread on  the same  field and  both laws deal with the  rights of dismissed workman or employee. But these two laws  are not  inconsistent or  repugnant to each other. The basic  test of  repugnancy is  that if  one prevails the other cannot prevail. That is not the position in this case. Learned  counsel   on  behalf  of  the  appellant,  however, contended that  in this  case, there had been an application as indicated  above under  section 28A  of the Rajasthan Act and which  was  dismissed  on  ground  of  limitation.  Sree Shankar  Ghosh   tried  to   submit  that   there  would  be inconsistency or  repugnancy between  the two decisions, one given on limitation and the other if any 996 relief is  given under the Act. We are unable to accept this position, because  the application  under Section 28A of the Rajasthan Act  was dismissed not on merit but on limitation. There is a period of limitation provided under the Rajasthan Act of  six months  and it  may be  extended for  reasonable cause. But  there is  no period of limitation provided under the  Industrial   Disputes  Act.  Therefore,  that  will  be curtailment of  the rights of the workmen or employees under the Industrial  Disputes Act.  In the  situation section  37 declares that  law should not be construed to curtail any of the rights  of  the  workmen.  As  Poet  Tennyson  observed- "freedom broadens from precedent to precedent" so also it is correct to  state that  social welfare  and  labour  welfare broadens from  legislation to  legislation in India. It will be a  well-settled principle of interpretation to proceed on that assumption  and section 37 of the Rajasthan Act must be so construed. Therefore in no way the Rajasthan Act could be construed to  curtail the  rights of the workman to seek any relief or  to go  in for  an adjudication  in  case  of  the termination of  the employment.  If that  is the position in view of  the provisions 6 months’ time in section 28A of the Rajasthan Act  has to  be ignored  and that  cannot have any binding effect  inasmuch as  it curtails  the rights  of the workman under  the Industrial Disputes Act and that Act must prevail. In  the premises,  there is no conflict between the two Acts and there is no question of repugnancy.      The High  Court was,  therefore, right  in holding that the respondent  was workman  and in  granting relief on that basis. Before  we conclude  we note  that our  attention was drawn  to   certain  observations   of   this   Court   that interference by  the High  Court in  these  matters  at  the initial stage  protracts adjudication  and defeats  justice. Reference was  made to certain observations in P. Maheshwari v.  Delhi   Admn.  &   Ors.,  (supra).   But  as   mentioned hereinbefore in  this case, the interference was made by the High Court not at the initial stage.      In the  premises, we  are of  the opinion that the High Court  was  right  in  the  view  it  took.  These  appeals, therefore, fail  and are  accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be  no order  as to costs. The reference before the Tribunal should proceed as expeditiously as possible. N.V.K.                                    Appeals dismissed. 997