15 February 1996
Supreme Court
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NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CEMENT & BLDG.MTRLS Vs STATE OF HARYANA

Bench: AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J)
Case number: C.A. No.-003519-003519 / 1996
Diary number: 16505 / 1995


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PETITIONER: NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CEMENT &BUILDING MATERIALS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       15/02/1996

BENCH: AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J) BENCH: AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J) KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (3) 206        1996 SCALE  (2)371

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T S.SAGHIR AHMAD, J.      Leave granted. 2. After  the decision  of this  Court  in  Bangalore  Water Supply &  Sewerage Board  vs. A.  Rajappa &  Ors.  1978  (1) Labour Law  Journal 349  = 1978  (3)  SCR  207  in  which  a comprehensive  definition   of  the   word  "Industry"   was attempted to be given followed by legislative changes in the Industrial Disputes  Act, it was thought that the Management or Establishments  would give  up their old habit of raising preliminary issues  in Industrial References as to " whether they are  an ’Industry’ within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Actor  not", but  Samuel Johnson’s observation that "one of  the maxims  of civil  law is  that definitions  are hazardous" is  still true  and this question continues to be raised almost in every case before the Tribunal. 3. The  appellant is no exception and it has also raised the same question  which has brought this industrial litigation, still at its infancy, to this Court. 4. The appellant is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 and respondent no.3 is an association of its employees. In Writ Petition No.12525 of 1991 filed in the High  Court of  Punjab & Haryana, respondent no.3 prayed for a  direction  that  the  appellant  should,  like  other industrial establishments,  have its  own certified standing orders  made  under  the  Industrial]  Employment  (Standing Orders) Act,  1946. The  Writ Petition  was resisted  by the appellant on  the grounds,  inter alia,  that it  was not an "industry" within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, there was no occasion for it to make its own certified standing  orders under  the Industrial  Employment (Standing Orders)  Act, 1946.  The High  Court by  its Order dated 24th  of March,  1992 directed the State of Haryana to refer the  dispute between  the parties  to  the  Industrial Tribunal and acting on that basis, the State of Haryana made the following reference to the Industrial Tribunal:

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    "Whether     the      establishment      "NATIONAL COUNCIL  FOR  CEMENT  AND      BUILDING  MATERIALS"   M-10,  SOUTH      EXTENSION  -II,   RING  ROAD,   NEW      DELHI, is  an "INDUSTRY" within the      meaning of  definition of the terms      "INDUSTRY"   as    given   in   the      Industrial Disputes Act."  5.  The appellant  has already  put in  appearance and  has filed a  written statement  before the  Tribunal in which he has raised  certain  preliminary  objections  including  the objection that  it was not an "Industry" and consequently no reference could be made to the Industrial Tribunal. 6. On  10th May,  1994, the  Industrial Tribunal  passed the following orders:-      "Both  the  sides  agree  that  the      following   additional   issue   be      framed and  decided as  preliminary      issue:      a) Whether  the reference is bad in      law?  O.P.Mgt."   To  come   up  on      26.7.94 for  evidence and arguments      in this issue." 7. The Industrial Tribunal, however, by its order dated 22nd of August,  1995 directed that the preliminary issue as also other issues  will be considered together. Its order read as under:-      "Affidavits are not filed. Reply to      the application moved on 27.7.95 is      filed after hearing the Ars for the      parties at  length, I feel it shall      be in  t he  fitness of things that      the parties  file their  affidavits      in   support    of   their    rival      contentions. The preliminary issues      as well as the other main issue may      be considered  later on. To come up      on 26.9.95 for filing affidavits." 8. The  appellant challenged the above order in C.W.No.14201 of 1995  in the  High Court  of Punjab  & Haryana but it was dismissed on  22nd October, 1995. The appellant has now come up in appeal. 9. The  reference of a dispute to the Industrial Tribunal is made under Section 10 of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 10 provides as under:-      "(4) Where in an order referring an      industrial  dispute  to  ’a  Labour      Court,   Tribunal    or    National      Tribunal’(h) under  this section or      in   a    subsequent   order,   the      appropriate     Government      has      specified the points of dispute for      adjudication, "the  Labour Court or      the  Tribunal   or   the   National      Tribunal, as  the case  may  be’(i)      shall confine  its adjudication  to      those points and matters incidental      thereto"(j). 10.  This   sub-section  indicates   that  the   extent   of jurisdiction of  the adjudicatory  Tribunals is  confined to the points  specified in  the order  of reference or matters incidental thereto.  Matters which  are  incidental  to  the reference may, sometimes, assume significant proportions and may relate  to  questions  which  go  to  the  root  of  the jurisdiction of  the  Tribunal  as,  for  example,  question

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relating to the nature of the activity of the Employer as to whether it  constitutes an industry or not, as has been done in the  instant case.  It is  on the  determination of  this question that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate upon the reference rests. 11. Usually,  whenever  a  reference  comes  up  before  the Industrial’ Tribunal,  the Establishment,  in order to delay the  proceedings,  raises  the  dispute  whether  it  is  an "industry" as  defined  in  Section  2(j);  or  whether  the dispute referred  to it  for adjudication  is an ’industrial dispute" within  the scope  of Section 2(k) and also whether the employees  are "workmen"  within the  meaning of Section 2(s). A  request is  made with  that these  questions may be determined  as preliminary issues so that if the decision on these questions  are in  the affirmative,  the Tribunal  may proceed to deal with the real dispute on merits. 12. We,  however, cannot  shut our  eyes  to  the  appalling situation created by such preliminary issues which take long years to  settle as  the decision  of the  Tribunal  on  the preliminary issue  is immediately  challenged in  one or the other forum  including the High Court and proceedings in the reference are stayed which continue to lie dormant till, the matter relating to the preliminary issue is finally disposed of. 13. This Court in Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P.Mundhe(ja), 1975(2) Labour Law Journal 379 =  1976 (1) SCR 361, in order to obviate  undue delay  in the  adjudication  of  the  real dispute, observed   that  the  Industrial  Tribunals  should decide the  preliminary issues  as also  the main  issues on merits all  together so  that there  may not  be any further litigation  at  the  interlocutory  stage.  It  was  further observed that  there was no justification for a party to the proceedings to  stall the final adjudication  of the dispute referred to  the Tribunal by questioning the decision of the Tribunal on the preliminary issue before the High Court. 14. Again  in S.K.Verma v. Mahesh Chandra, (1983) Labour and Industrial Cases  1483  =  1983  (3)  SCR  799,  this  Court strongly  disapproved  the  practice  of  raising  frivolous preliminary objections  at the  instance of  the employer to delay and defeat the purpose of adjudication on merits. 15. In  D.P.Maheshwari v.  Delhi Administration, 1983 Labour and Industrial  Cases 1629  1983 (3)  SCR  949,  this  Court speaking through  O,Chinnappa Reddy,  J. observed  that  the policy to  decide the  preliminary issue required a reversal in view of the "unhealthy and injudicious practices resorted to  for  unduly  delaying  the  adjudication  of  industrial disputes for  the resolution  of which an informal forum and simple procedure  were devised with avowed object of keeping them from the dilatory practices of Civil Courts". The Court observed that  all issues  whether preliminary or otherwise, should be  decided together  so astorule out the possibility of any  litigation at  the interlocutory  staye. To the same effect is  the decision  in Workmen  employed  by  Hindustan Lever  Ltd.   vs.  Hindustan  Lever  Ltd.  (1984)  Labour  & Industrial Cases 1573 = 1985(1) SCR 641. 16.  The  facts  in  the  instant  case  indicate  that  the appellant adopted  the old  tactics of raising a preliminary dispute so  as to  prolong the  adjudication  of  industrial dispute on  merits.  It  raised  the  question  whether  its activities constituted  an ’Industry’  within the meaning of the Industrial  Disputes Act  and  succeeded  in  getting  a preliminary issue  framed on that question. The Tribunal was wiser. It  first passed an order that it would be heard as a preliminary issue,  but subsequently, by change of mind, and we think  rightly, it  decided to  hear the issue along with

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other issues  on merits at a later stage to the proceedings. It was  at this  stage that the High Court was approached by the  appellant   with  the  grievance  that  the  Industrial Tribunal, having  once decided  to  hear  the  matter  as  a preliminary issue,  could not  change its mind and decide to hear that  issue along with other issues on merits. The High Court  rightly  refused  to  intervene  in  the  proceedings pending before  the Industrial  Tribunal at an interlocutory stage and  dismissed the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The decision of the High Court is fully in consonance with  the law  laid down  by this  Court  in  its various decisions  referred to  above and  we do not see any occasion to  interfere with  the order  passed by  the  High Court. The  appeal is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.