http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8  

PETITIONER: NATABAR PARIDA BISNU CHARAN PARIDA BATAKRUSHNAPARIDA BABAJI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ORISSA

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/04/1975

BENCH: UNTWALIA, N.L. BENCH: UNTWALIA, N.L. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1975 AIR 1465            1975 SCR  137  1975 SCC  (2) 220  CITATOR INFO :  R          1987 SC 149  (21)  R          1992 SC1768  (9)

ACT: Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1898, Sections  167  and  344- Remand  of  an accused to custody-Courts, if  have  inherent power. Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sections 167(1),  Proviso (a)  to  Section  167(2),  428  and  484(2)(a)-Investigation pending  at  the commencement of the Act and  not  completed within  the period of 60 days-Accused, if has a right to  be released on bail.

HEADNOTE: In  respect of an occurrence which took place on 8th  March, 1974,  at  a  place in the District  of  Cuttack,  a  police investigation  commenced  in connection  with  the  offences alleged to have been committed under sections 147, 148, 307, 302  simpliciter as also with the aid of section 149 of  the Indian  Penal  Code.  Of the eight persons  arrested  during investigation,  four  have  been enlarged  on  bail  by  the Sessions  Judge of Cuttack, but the learned  Sessions  Judge refused to grant bail to the four appellants.  Their conten- tion based on proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of Section  167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was rejected by the learned  Judge  relying  on the saving clause  (a)  of  sub- section  (2) of section 484.  The High Court  also  rejected their  contention.  This appeal has been filed on the  basis of the special leave granted by the Supreme Court. HELD  : (i) A Magistrate having jurisdiction to try  a  case could  remand an accused to jail custody from time  to  time during the pendency of the investigation in exercise of  the power  under section 344 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1898.  In other words, the power of remand by the Magistrate during  the  process  of  investigation  and  collection  of evidence was an integral part of the process.  The power was meant  to  be  exercised  whenever  necessary  to  aid   the investigation and collection of further evidence. 14 1 E-F] A.Lakhmanrao   v.   Judicial   Magistrate   First   Class Parvatipuram  and  others,  [1970] 3 S.C.C.  501  and  Gouri Shankar  Jha  v.  The State of Bihar and  others,  [1972]  1 S.C.C. 564, relied on.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8  

The   Superintendent  and  Remembrancer  of  Legal   Affairs Government of West Bengal v. Bidhindra Kumar Roy and others, A.I.R.  1949, Calcutta 143; Chandradin Dubey v.  The  State, 1955  Bihar Law Journal Reports, 323; Dukhi and  another  v. State  and  another,  A.I.R. 1955  Allahabad,  521;  Shrilal Nandram  & Another, v. R. R. Agrawal, S. D. M. First  Class, Gwalior  and  another  Kuttan,  A.T.R.  1964,  Kerala,  232; Artatran  Mahasuara  and others v. State of  Orissa,  A.I.R. 1956 Orissa, referred to. (ii)Courts  will  have no inherent power of  remand  of  an accused to any custody unless the power is conferred by law. The  High Court has crred in assuming, without reference  to section  344  of the old Code, that such  a  power  existed. [140D] (iii)The  command of the Legislature in  proviso(a)  to section  167(2) of the new Code is that the  accused  person has got to be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish  bail  and cannot be kept in  detention  beyond  the period  of  60 days even if the investigation may  still  be proceeding.   Although  the  expression  ’reasonable  cause’ occurring in sub-section (1A) of section 344 is no where  to be found in section 309 of the New Code, the explanation  to section 344 of the Old Code has been retained as explanation 1  to  Section 309 in the identical language.   The  law  as engrafted in                             138 proviso (a) to section 167(2) and section 309(2) of the  New Code confers the powersof  remand to jail  custody  during the pendency of the investigation only tinderthe former and not under the latter.  Section 309(2) is attracted  only aftercognizance  of  an  offence  has  been  taken   or commencement of trial has proceeded. [142G-H] Quere : What is the purpose of Explanation-1 in section  309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (iv)Unlike  the  wordings of section 428  the  language  of section  167(1) which will govern sub-section (2) also,  is- "whenever  any person is arrested", suggesting thereby  that the section would be attracted when the arrest is made after coming  into force of the Act of 1973.  The expression  used in  section  428  is  "where  an  accused  Person  has,   on conviction  been sentenced. . . . . ". To the facts  of  the present  case, clause (a) of subsection (2) of  section  484 will  apply.  Immediately before the 1st day of April,  1974 the  investigation of this case was pending.  Saving  clause (a) therefore, enjoins that the said investigation shall  be continued or made in accordance with Chapter XIV of the  old Code.   Section  167  of  that Code  could  not  enable  the Magistrate  to remand the appellants to jail custody  during the  pendency of the investigation.  The police  could  seek the  help of the Court for exercise of its power  of  remand under  section 344, bringing it to the notice of  the  Court that  sufficient  evidence  had been  obtained  to  raise  a suspicion that the appellants may have committed an  offence and  there  will be hindrance to the  obtaining  of  further evidence unless an order of remand was made. [143C-D-144B-C] Mr.   Boucher Pierre Andra v. Superintendent, Central  Jail, Tihar, New Delhi and another, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 164, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 359  of 1974. Appeal  by special leave from the Judgment and  order  dated

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 8  

the  6th  August 1974 of the Orissa High Court  in  Criminal Misc.  Case No. 180 of 1974. Sharad Manohar, R. N. Nath and V. N. Gaupule, for the appel- lant. Gobind Das, and B. Parthasarathi, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :- UTNTWALIA,  J.-An occurrence took place on the 8th of  March 1974 at a place situated in the District of Cuttack, Orissa. First Information Report was lodged on the 9th March, 74 and a  police  investigation  started  in  connection  with  the offences alleged to have been committed under sections  147, 148,  307, 302 simpliciter as also with the aid  of  section 149  of the Indian Penal Code.  The four appellants in  this appeal  by special leave were arrested by the police in  the course of the investigation on the 8th March and four others who  have  been enlarged on bail by the  Sessions  Judge  of Cuttack were arrested on the 14th March.  They were produced before the Magistrate who remanded them to jail custody from time  to time.  The learned Sessions Judge released on  bail four  of  the  accused  but refused to  grant  bail  to  the appellants.   An  argument based upon proviso  (a)  to  sub- section  (2)  of  section  167  of  the  Code  of   Criminal ,Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) hereinafter referred to as the New Code, was rejected by the Sessions Judge  relying on the saving clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 484.                             139 The appellants approached the Orissa High Court and  pressed their cases for releasing them on bail on merits as well  as on the ground of the provision of law aforesaid contained in the New Code.  A Bench of the High Court by its order  dated the 6th August, 1974 has repelled the arguments put  forward on behalf of the appellants and dismissed their  application for  bail.  They have filed the--present appeal  by  special leave of this Court. This Court is not expected to examine afresh the question of releasing  the  appellants  on  bail  on  merits.   But  the question  for  consideration is whether the  appellants  are entitled  to  be released on bail under the proviso  (a)  of section 167(2) of the New Code. The  New Code came into force on and from the 1st of  April, 1974.   Section  484(1)  repealed  the  Code   of   Criminal Procedure,  1898-hereinafter called the Old Code, But  there were  certain saving clauses engravers in  sub-section  (2); the relevant clause (a) would be adverted to hereinafter  in this   judgment.   Before  doing  so  it  is  necessary   to appreciate  the position of law in relation to the power  of remand by a Magistrate during the course of investigation of a case by the police. A person arrested without warrant could not be detained by a police  officer for a period exceeding 24 hours as  provided in section 61 of the Old Code.  Section 167(1) required  the police  officer  to  forward  the  accused  to  the  nearest Magistrate  if  the  investigation could  not  be  completed within  the  period of 24 hours fixed by section 61  and  if there  were rounds for believing that  the  accusation  or information was well-founded.  Sub-section (2) provided               "The  Magistrate to whom an accused person  is               forwarded  under this section may, whether  he               has  or has not jurisdiction to try the  case,               from  time to time authorise the detention  of               the accused in such custody as such Magistrate               thinks  fit, for a term not exceeding  fifteen               days on the whole.  If he has not jurisdiction               to  try the case or commit it for  trial,  and               considers  further detention  unnecessary,  he

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 8  

             may  order  the accused to be forwarded  to  a               Magistrate having such jurisdiction : " The  Magistrate  to  whom the accused  was  forwarded  could remand him to police custody or tail custody for a term  not exceeding  15 days in the whole under section 167(2).   Even the  Magistrate who had jurisdiction to try the  case  could not  remand the accused to any custody beyond the period  of 15 days under section 167(2) of the Old Code.  There was  no other  section which in clear or express language  conferred this power of remand on the Magistrate beyond the period  of 15 days during the pendency of the investigation and  before the taking of cognizance on the submission of  Charge-Sheet. Section 344, however, enabled the Magistrate to postpone the corn- 140 mencement of any enquiry or trial for any reasonable  cause. The  explanation  to  section 344 of the Old  Code  read  as follows :               "If  sufficient evidence has been obtained  to               raise  a suspicion that the accused  may  have               committed  an offence, and it  appears  likely               that  further  evidence may be obtained  by  a               remand,  this  is  a reasonable  cause  for  a               remand." Various  High  Courts had taken the view that  a  Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case could remand an accused to jail  custody from time to time during the pendency  of  the investigation  in exercise of the power under section 344  : to  wit,  The  Superintendent  and  Remembrancer  of   Legal Affairs,  Government of West Bengal v. Bidhindra  Kumar  Roy and others(1); Chandradi Dubey v. The State ( 2) , Dukhi and another  v.  State  and another(3)  ;  Shrilal  Nandram  and another v. R. R. Agrawal, S. D. M. First Class, Gwalior  and another(1)  and  State of Kerala v. Madhavan  Kuttan(5).   A contrary view was taken by the Orissa High Court in the case of Artatran Mahasuara and others v. State of Orissa(6).   It may  be  emphasized here that the Court will  have  inherent power  of  remand of an accused to any  custody  unless  the power  is conferred by law.  In the order under  appeal  the High Court without reference to section 344 of the Old Code, seems  to have assumed that such a power existed.   That  is not correct. There  are  two decisions of this Court affirming  the  view expressed by majority of the High Courts and over-ruling the one  taken by the Orissa High Court in the case referred  to above.  In  A. Lakshmanarao  v.  Judicial-Magistrate,  First Class  Parvatipuram and others(7) an argument  was  advanced that section 344 falling in Chapter 24 of the Old Code which contained  general  provisions as to  enquiries  and  trials could  not  apply  to  a case which  was  at  the  stage  of investigation and collection of evidence only.  Dua, J deli- vering  the  judgment on behalf of this Court  repelled  the argument thus at page 506.               "This  argument appears to us to be  negatives               by  the express language both  of  sub-section               (1-A) and the explanation.  Under  sub-section               (1-A) the commencement of the inquiry or trial               can also be postponed.  This clearly seems  to               refer  to the stage prior to the  commencement               of  the  inquiry.  The  explanation  makes  it               clear  beyond doubt that reasonable  cause  as               mentioned  in sub-section (1-A)  includes  the               likelihood   of  obtaining  further   evidence               during  investigation  by securing  a  remand.               The language of section 344 is unambiguous and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 8  

             clear and the fact that this section occurs in               Chapter  24 which contains general  provisions               as               (1)   A.I.R. 1949, Calcutta, 143.               (2)   1955 Bihar Law Journal Reports, 323.               (3) A.I.R. 1955, Allahabad, 521.               (4) A.I.R. 1960, Madhya Pradesh, 135.               (5) A.I.R. 1964, Kerala, 232.               (6) A.I.R 1956 Orissa. 129               (7) [1970] 3 S.C.C                                    141               to  inquiries  and trials does not  justify  a               strained construction.". In   Gouri   Shankar  Jha  v.  The  State   of   Bihar   and others(1)  Shelat, J. delivering the judgment on  behalf  of the Court         has said at page 569 :               "In   cases  falling  under  section  167,   a               magistrate undoubtedly can order custody for a               period  at  the most of fifteen  days  in  the               whole and such custody can be either police or               jail custody.  Section 344, on the other hand,               appears  in  Chapter  XXIV  which  deal   with               inquiries  and trials.  Further,  the  custody               which it speaks of is not such custody as  the               magistrate  thinks fit as in Section 167,  but               only jail custody, the object being that  once               an enquiry or a trial begins it is not  proper               to   let  the  accused  remain  under   police               influence. Under    this    section,    a               magistrate can remand an accusedperson  to               custody for a term not exceeding fifteen  days               ata time provided that sufficient evidence               has  been collected to raise a suspicion  that               such  an accused person may have committed  an               offence  and  it appears likely  that  further               evidence   may  be  obtained  by  granting   a               remand."               Farther says the learned Judge at page 570 :               "The  fact  that  Section 344  occurs  in  the               Chapter dealing with inquiries and trials does               not  mean that it does not apply to  cases  in               which   the  process  of   investigation   and               collection of evidence is still going on." It would thus be seen that under the Old Code the Magistrate was  given the power under section 344 to remand an  accused to jail custody as the section was also applicable to  cases in which process of investigation and collection of evidence was  going on.  In other words, the power of remand  by  the Magistrate   during   the  process  of   investigation   and collection of evidence was an integral part of the  process. The power was meant to be exercised, whenever necessary,  to aid the investigation and collection of further evidence. Let  us now examine the position of law under the New  Code. No  police officer can detain a person in custody,  arrested without  a  warrant, for a period longer than  24  hours  as mentioned  in section 57 corresponding to section 61 of  the Old Code.  Section 167 occurring in Chapter XII bearing  the heading  "Information  to  the police and  their  powers  to investigate"-the same as in Chapter XIV of the Old  Code-has made  some drastic departure.  Similar, is the  position  in regard  to  section  309 of the New  Code  corresponding  to section 344 of the Old Code.  While retaining the  provision of  forwarding  the accused to the  nearest  Magistrate  (of course  under the New Code to the Judicial Magistrate),  and while  authorising the Magistrate to remand the  accused  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 8  

either police or judicial custody for a period not exceeding 15 days, proviso (a) has been added in these terms (1)  [1972] 1 S.C.C. 564.                             142 "Provided that-               (a)   the  Magistrate may authorise  detention               of  the  accused  person,  otherwise  than  in               custody  of the police, beyond the  period  of               fifteen days if he is satisfied that  adequate               grounds exist for doing so, but no  Magistrate               shall  authorise the detention of the  accused               person  in  custody under this section  for  a               total period exceeding sixty days, and on  the               expiry  of the said period of sixty days,  the               accused person shall be released on bail if he               is  prepared  to and does  furnish  bail;  and               every  person  released  on  bail  under  this               section  shall  be deemed to  be  so  released               under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the               purposes of that Chapter ;"               The expression "the Magistrate" in the proviso               would  the Magistrate having  jurisdiction  to               try the case.  Section 309 (2) says               "If  the Court, after taking cognizance of  an               offence,  or commencement of trial,  finds  it               necessary   or  advisable  to   postpone   the               commencement  of, or adjourn, any  inquiry               or  trial,  it  may, from time  to  time,  for               reasons  to be recorded, postpone  or  adjourn               the  same on such terms as it thinks fit,  for               such time as it considers reasonable, and  may               by a warrant remand the accused if in  custody               : Although the expression ’reasonable cause’ occurring in sub- section  (IA)  of  section 344 is no where to  be  found  in section 309 of the New Code, the explanation to section  344 of  the  Old  Code has been retained  as  Explanation  I  to Section 309 in the identical language.  The law as engrafted in proviso (a) to sections 167(2) and section 309 (2) of the New Code confers the powers of remand to jail custody during the pendency of the investigation only under the former  and not  under  the latter.  Section 309(2)  is  attracted  only after   cognizance   of  an  offence  has  been   taken   or commencement  of trial has proceeded.  In such  a  situation what  is the purpose of Explanation-I in section 309 is  not quite  clear.   But then the command of the  Legislature  in proviso  (a)  is  that  the accused person  has  got  to  be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish  bail and cannot be kept in detention beyond the period of 60 days even  if  the  investigation may still  be  proceeding.   In serious offences of criminal conspiracy-murders,  dacoities, robberies  by inter-state gangs or the like, it may  not  be possible  for  the police, in the circumstances as  they  do exist  in the various parts of our country, to complete  the investigation  within  the  period  of  60  days.   Yet  the intention  of  the  Legislature  seems to  be  to  grant  no discretion to the court and to make it obligatory for it  to release  the  accused  on  bail.  Of  course,  it  has  been provided  in proviso (a) that the accused released  on  bail under section 167 will be deemed to be so released under the provisions  of Chapter XXXIII and for the purposes  of  that Chapter.  That may empower the court releasing him on  bail, if  it  considers necessary so to do, to  direct  that  such person  be arrested and committed to custody as provided  in sub-section  (5) of section 437 occurring in Chapter  XXXHI.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 8  

It is also clear that after the taking of the cognizance the                             143 power of remand is to be exercised under section 309 of  the New  Code.   But  if  it is not  possible  to  complete  the investigation  within  a  period of 60  days  then  even  in serious  and  ghastly types of crime, the  accused  will  be entitled  to  be released on bail.  Such a law may  be  a  " paradise for the criminals," but surely it would not be  so, as  sometimes it is supposed to be, because of  the  courts. It would be so under the command of the Legislature. But the question in this case is whether during the pendency of the investigation which started before coming into  force of  the  New  Code the appellants  can  press  into  service proviso (a) to section 167 (2) of that Code and claim to  be released on bail as a matter of right when they are prepared to furnish bail.  The answer to this question depends on the interpretation  of  sections 167 and 484 of  the  New  Code. Unlike  the wordings of section 428 the language of  section 167(1) which will govern sub-section (2) also,  is-"whenever any person is arrested", suggesting thereby that the section would be attracted when the arrest is made after coming into force of the Act.  While the expression used in section  428 is  "where  an  accused  person  has,  on  conviction,  been sentenced........  Interpreting  such a phrase it  has  been held  in  the case of Mr. Boucher Pierre Andra  v.  Superin- tendent,  Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi and  another(1)  by Bhagwati,  J. delivering the judgment of this Court at  page 166 :               "This section, on a plain natural construction               of its language, posits for its  applicability               of  fact situation which is described  by  the               clause  "Where  an  accused  person  has,   on               conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for               a  term".   There is nothing  in  this  clause               which   suggests,  either  expressly   or   by               necessary implication, that the conviction and               sentence  must be after the coming into  force               of the New Code of Criminal Procedure." We  may, however, hasten to add that in spite of the  phrase "is  arrested"  occurring in section 167(1), since  the  Old Code has been repealed by sub-section (1) of section 484  of the New Code, the provision would have applied, a  fortiori, if  the  savings provided in subsection (2) would  not  have applied to the situation with which we are concerned in this case.   In  our  judgment clause (a) of  subsection  (2)  of section 484 does apply.  It reads as follows "Notwithstanding such repeal,-               (a)If,  immediately,  before  the  date  on               which this Code comes into force, there is any               appeal,   application,   trial,   inquiry   or               investigation  pending,  then,  such   appeal,               application,  trial, inquiry or  investigation               shall be disposed of, continued, held or made,               as  the case may be, in accordance  with the               provisions  of the Code of Criminal  Procedure               1898,  as  in force  immediately  before  such               commencement, (hereinafter referred to as  the               Old  Code), as if this Code had not come  into               force" (1)A.I.R. 1 975 S.C. 164. 144 Immediately   before  the  1st  day  of  April,   1974   the investigation  of this case was pending.  Saving clause  (a) therefore  enjoins  that  the said  investigation  shall  be continued  or made in accordance with the provisions of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 8  

Old  Code.   The  police  officer,  therefore,  making   the investigation has to continue and complete it in  accordance with Chapter XIV of the Old Code.  Section 167 of that  Code could not enable the Magistrate to remand the appellants  to jail custody during the pendency of the investigation.   The police could seek the help of- the Court for exercise of its power of remand under section 344, bringing it to the notice of  the Court that sufficient evidence had been obtained  to raise a suspicion that the appellants may have committed  an offence  and  there will be hindrance to  the  obtaining  of further evidence unless an order of remand was made.  As  we have  said  above,  invoking the power of  the  court  under section  344  of the Old Code by the  Investigating  Officer would be a part of the process of investigation which is  to be continued and made in accordance with the Old Code.  That being  so, we hold that the appellants in this  case  cannot claim to be released under proviso (a) to section 167(2 ) of the New Code. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. V. M. K. 145