15 October 1968
Supreme Court
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NANI GOPAL MITRA Vs THE STATE OF BIHAR

Case number: Appeal (crl.) 181 of 1965


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PETITIONER: NANI GOPAL MITRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/10/1968

BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1636            1969 SCR  (2) 411  CITATOR INFO :  R          1976 SC1471  (5)

ACT:     Prevention of Corruption Act 2 of 1947 s. 5(1), (2)  and (3)-After  conviction of appellant under s. 5(2) and  before hearing  of  appeal  by  High  Court,  s.  5(3)  repealed-If presumption in s. 5(3) could be invoked an appeal.     S.  5A-Magistrate  not giving  reasons  for   permitting Officer  other than D.S.P. to investigate-If  non-compliance with section.     Particulars-Insufficient   particulars  given   in   the charge-Appellant  not  complaining at trial or  before  High Court-Effect of.

HEADNOTE:     In  connection  with an investigation  in  January  1958 relating to another case, the appellant, who was employed as a  railway  guard  on  the Eastern  Railway,  was  found  in possession  of pecuniary resources disproportionate  to  his known  sources  of income.  As it was thought that  he’  had come   in  possession  of  these  pecuniary   resources   by committing acts of misconduct defined in clauses (a) ,to (d) of s. 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 2 of 1947, on the  recommendation of the Deputy Superintendent  of  Police for  the  area, an Inspector of Police was appointed  by  an Order dated 27th February 1959 of the Magistrate, Ist Class, Sahibganj,  to investigate the case against  the  appellant. The   Investigating   Officer,  upon   completion   of   the investigation   and   after   obtaining  sanction   of   the appropriate  authority  for prosecution  of  the  appellant, submitted a charge sheet on March 31, 1960.  The Trial Court convicted  the appellant under s. 5(2) of the Act and  s.411 I.P.C.  In appeal, by a judgment dated September 14,  1965,. the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence of  the appellant  under s. 411 I.P.C. but confirmed his  conviction under s. 5(2) of the Act and reduced the sentence awarded by the Trial Court.     On  December  18,  1964  Parliament  enacted  the  Anti- Corruption  Laws (Amendment) Act 40 of 1964  which  repealed sub-section  (3) of s. 5 of the. Act and enlarged the  scope of criminal misconduct in s. 5 by inserting a new clause (e) in  s.  5(1)  of  the  Act.   In  appeal  to this  Court  it

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was contended on behalf of the appellant (i) that s. 5(3) of the Act having been repealed while the appeal was pending in the. High Court, the presumption enacted in s. 5(3) was  not available to  prosecuting authorities after the repeal  ’and it was not open to the High Court to invoke the  presumption in   considering  the   case  against  the  appellant;   the presumption  contained in s. 5(3) was a rule  of  procedural law  and as alterations in the form of procedure are  always retrospective   in  character,  unless  it   was    provided otherwise,   it was not open to the High Court to apply  the presumption  in  the present case; (ii) that  the  statutory safeguards under s. 5A of the Act had not been complied with as  the Magistrate had not given reasons for entrusting  the investigation  to a Police Officer below the rank of  Deputy Superintendent Police; and (iii) that the charge against the appellant under s. 5(2) the Act was defective as there  were no  specific  particulars of misconduct as  envisaged  under clauses (a) to (d) of s. 5(1) of the Act, nothing was stated about the amounts the appellant took as bribes and  the 412 persons  from  whom he had taken such bribes  so  that  the, appellant  had  no  opportunity to  rebut  the   presumption raised under s. 5(3) of  the Act and to prove his innocence. HELD:  Dismissing the appeal v:    (i) The High Court was right  invoking  the   presumption under  s.  5(3) of the Act .even though it was  repealed  on December 18, 1964 by the Amending Act. Although  as  a  general rule the amended  law  relating  to procedure operates retrospectively, there is another equally important   principle, which is also embodied in s. 6 of the General  Clauses  Act,  that  a statute  should  not  be  so construed  ’as to create new disabilities or obligations  or impose new duties ties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the amending Act came into force.   The effect of the application of this principle is that  pending cases  although  instituted  under  the old  Act  but  still pending are governed by the new procedure’ under the amended law,  but  whatever  procedure  was  correctly  adopted  and concluded  under the old law cannot be opened again for  the purpose of applying the new procedure.  In the present case, the trial of the appellant was taken up when s. 5(3) of  the Act  was still  operative.  The conviction of the  appellant was  pronounced on March 31, 1962 long before  the  amending Act was promulgated. It Was not therefore possible to accept the  contention that the conviction pronounced by the  trial Court  had  become illegal or in any way  defective  in  law because of the amendment to procedural law made on  December 18, 1964.  [417 G; 418 D]     James  Gardner v, Edward A. Lucas, [1878] 3 A.C. 582  at p. 603; King V, Chandra Dharrna, [1905] 2 K.B. 335; In re  a Debtor [1936] .1 Ch.237 and In re Vernazza; [1960] A.C. 965; referred to.     (ii)  Although the Magistrate’s order on  the,  petition filed  by   the DepUty Superintendent of  Police  suggesting that the Inspector of Police be empowered to investigate the case  does  not  state  any reasons  for  his  granting  the permission  sought,  the High Court  had  rightly  concluded ’that as the Magistrate was working in the area for a period of  two years prior to the passing of the order in  question he must have known that the Deputy Superintendent of  Police could not devote his whole. time to the investigation of the case  and  therefore  the inspector  of  Police  .should  be entrusted to do the investigation. [419 F]     (iii)  The  charge, as framed, dearly  stated  that  the appellant   accepted   gratification   other   than    legal

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remuneration  and obtained pecuniary advantage  .by  corrupt ,and illegal means.  The  absence of sufficient  particulars could  not invalidate the charge though it may be  a  ground for  asking  for. better particulars.  The  appellant  never complained  in  the trial court or the High Court  that  the charge did not contain the necessary particulars, he ,  was. misled on that account in his defence.  In view this and the provisions  of  s. 225 Cr. P.C. it could not  be  said  that charge was defective. [421 F]

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Criminal  Appeal  No. 181 of 1965.     Appeal  by  special leave from the judgment  and  order, dated September14, 1965 of the Patna High Court in  Criminal Appeal No. 268  of 1962. S.C. Agarwala, for the appellant. D. Goburdhun, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by special  leave, from  the judgment of the Patna High Court  dated  September 14,  1965  in Criminal Appeal No. 268 of 1962 filed  by  the appellant against the judgment of the Special Judge, Santhai Pargangs, Dumka dated March 31, 1962.     In January, 1958 the appellant was employed as a Railway Guard  on  the Eastern Railway and was posted  at  Sahibganj Railway Station.  On January 18, 1958 Hinga Lal Sinha  (P.W. 47) who was in charge of squad of traveling ticket examiners caught  hold of Shambu Pada Banerji (P,.W. 54) as  he  found him working as a bogus traveling ticket examiner in a train. P.W.47 handed Shambu Pada Banerji to Md. Junaid (P.W.48) who was a police officer in charge of Barharwa Railway  outpost. A  Fard  Beyan was recorded on the statement of P.W. 47  and G.R.P. Case No. 12 (1)58 was registered against Shambu  Pada Banerji.  In connection with the investigation of that  case the  house of the appellant which was at a distance  of  300 yards  from   Sahebganj   Railway station  was  searched  on January  19,  1958 at about 3. p.m.  by P.W. 56  along  with other  police Officers, Md. Junaid (P.W. 48) and  Dharrnadeo Singh  (P.W. 57 ). Various articles were recovered from  the house  of  the appellant and a search list  (Ex.  5/17)  was prepared. A charge sheet was submitted in G.R.P. Case No. 12 (1)58  against the appellant and Shambu Pada Banerji.   Both of  them were tried and convicted by the Assistant  Sessions Judge,  Dumka  by  a  judgment  dated  June  12,  1961.  The appellant flied Criminal Appeal No. 405 of 1961 against  his conviction  under s. 474/466 of the Indian Penal Code.   The appeal was allowed  by the High Court by its judgment  dated September  14,  1962 on the ground that there was  no  proof that  the  appellant  was in  conscious  possession  of  the incriminating articles. During the course of the investigation of G.R.P. Case No. 12 (1)58, the Investigating Officer (P.W.  56) found a  sum  of Rs.  51,000 standing to the credit of the appellant  in  the Eastern Railway Employees’ Co-operative Credit Society Ltd., Calcutta.  He  also  found the appellant  in  possession  of National   Savings Certificates of the value of  Rs.  8,000. On August 24, 1958 the Investigating Officer (P.W.56) handed over charge of the investigation of G.R.P. Case No.  12(1)58 to  P.W. 46 of Sahebganj Government Railway Police  Station. P.W.  46 completed the investigation on February  26,  1958. Since  by that time it was found that the appellant  was  in possession  of pecuniary resources disproportionate  to  his

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known  sources of income it was thought that he had come  in possession of these pecuniary resources by committing 414 acts of misconduct as defined in clauses (a) to (d) of  sub- s. (1)  s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ( Act 2 or 1947 ), hereinafter referred to as the ’Act’, and since the  investigation of a case under the Act could be  carried only in accordance with the provisions of s. 5A of the  Act, under  the orders of the superior officers, the  case  being G.R.P.  Case No. 12 (1)58 was split up in the sense  that  a new  case  against  the  appellant  being  Sahebganj  Police Station  Case  No.  11(2)59  was  started  upon  the   first information  report of P.W. 46 made on February 26, 1959  to Gokhul Jha (P.W. 45), Officer in charge of Sahebganj  Police Station.  By  his  order dated February 27,  1959  Sri  R.P. Lakhaiyar,  Magistrate First Class, Sahibganj  accepted  the recommendation of the Deputy Superintendent of Police   that Inspector   Madhusudan Haldar, P.W. 55 may  investigate  the case.  Accordingly Madhusudan Haldhar, P.W. 55 proceeded  to investigate  the  case and after obtaining sanction  of  the appropriate  authority  for  prosecution  of  the  appellant submitted  a charge sheet on March 31, 1960. Cognizance  was taken  and  the  case  was  transferred  to  Sri  Banerji  a Magistrate First Class who committed the appellant and  the. two  co-accused Baldeo Prasad and Mrs. Kamla Mitra to  stand trial  before the Court of Session.  By his  judgment  dated March  31,   1962,  the   Special  Judge,  Santhai  Parganas convicted the appellant under s. 5(2) of the Act and s. 411, Indian  Penal Code.  The appellant and the other  co-accused Baldeo  Prasad  and Mrs. Kamla Mitra were acquitted  of  the charge  of  conspiracy under s. 120(B) read  with  ss.  379, 411,406  and 420, Indian Penal Code and s. 5(2) of the  Act. The Special Judge also acquitted the appellant of the charge under  s. 474/466, Indian Penal Code.  The matter was  taken in  appeal  to the High Court which by  its  judgment  dated September 14, 1965 set aside the conviction and sentence  of the appellant under s. 411, Indian Penal Code and  confirmed the  conviction of the appellant under s. 5(2) of  the  Act. The  High  Court, however, reduced the sentence of  6  years simple  imprisonment  and a fine of Rs. 40,000  to  2  years imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 20,000.     Section  5 of the Act, as it stood before its  amendment by Act 40 of 1964, read as follows:         "5.(1)  A  public  servant is  said  to  commit  the offence  of  criminal  misconduct in the  discharge  of  his duty--                   (a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or               agrees  to accept or attempts to  obtain  from               any  person  for  himself  or  for  any  other               person,  any gratification (other  than  legal               remuneration  ) as a motive or reward such  as               is  mentioned  in section 161  of  the  Indian               Penal Code, or                   (b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or               agrees  to  accept or attempts to  obtain  for               himself or for 415               any  other person,any valuable thing   without               consideration or for a consideration which  he               knows  to be inadequate, from any person  whom               he  knows  to  have been, or to be  or  to  be               likely  to be concerned in any  proceeding  or               business transacted or about to be  transacted               by  him, or    having any connection with  the               official functions of himself or of any public

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             servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any               person   whom   he  knows to be interested  in               or  related  to  the person so concerned, or               (c)   if   he  dishonestly   or   fraudulently               misappropriates or otherwise converts for  his               own use any property entrusted to him or under               his control as a public servant or allows  any               other person so to do, or               (d)  if he, by corrupt or illegal means or  by               otherwise  abusing  his  position  as   public               servant, obtains for himself or for any  other               person   any  valuable  thing   or   pecuniary               advantage.     (2)   Any   public  servant   who    commits    criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty shall be  punishable with  imprisonment for a term which shall not be  less  than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall  also be liable to fine:     Provided  that  the court may, for any  special  reasons recorded  in writing, impose a sentence of  imprisonment  of less than one year.     (3)  In  any  trial  of  an  offence  punishable   under subsection  (2)  the fact that the accused  person  or   any other person on his behalf is in possession, for ’which  the accused person cannot satisfactorily  account,  of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known  sources of  income may be proved, and on such proof the court  shall presume,  unless  the contrary is proved, that  the  accused person is guilty of criminal misconduct in the discharge  of his official duty and his conviction therefore shall not  be invalid  by  reason  only that it is based  solely  on  such presumption.     (4)  The provisions of this section-shah be in  addition W,  and  not in derogation of, any other law  for  the  time being  in force, and nothing contained herein  shall  exempt any public servant from any proceeding which 416 might, apart from this section,  be instituted against On December 18, 1964, Parliament enacted the Anti-Corruption Laws  (Amendment)  Act 1964  (Act No. 40  of   1964)   which repealed  subs.  (3 ) of s. 5 of the Act  and  enlarged  the scope Of criminal misconduct in s. 5 of the Act by inserting a  new  clause (e) in s. 5(1) of the Act  to  the  following effect:     "(e) if he or any person on his behalf is in  possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession,   for   which   the   public   servant    cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary  resources or  property disproportionate to his known  sources  of  income."     It  was  in the first place contended on behalf  of  the appellant  that  s.  5  (3)  of  the  Act  was  repealed  by Parliament  while the appeal was pending in, the High  Court and the presumption enacted in s. 5 (3 ) of the Act was  not available to the prosecuting authorities after the repeal of the  sub-section  on  December 18, 1964.  The  argument  was stressed. that it was not open to  the High Court to  invoke the  presumption  contained  in  s. 5( 3 )  of  the  Act  in considering  the  case against the appellant.  It  was  also said  that the presumption contained in s. 5(3) of  the  Act was a rule of procedural law and not a rule of   substantive law   and alterations in the form of procedure  are  always. retrospective in character unless there is some good  reason or  other  why   they  should  not  be.   It  was  therefore submitted that the judgment of the High Court was  defective in  law  as it applied to the present case  the  presumption

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contained  in s. 5(3) of the Act even after its repeal.   We are unable to accept the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant as correct.  It is true that as a general rule alterations in the, form of procedure’ are retrospective  in character  unless  there is some good reason or  other   why they should not be.  In James Gardner v. Edward A. Lucas(1), Lord Blackburn stated:                     "Now  the  general rule, not  merely  of               England and Scotland, but, I believe, of every               civilized nation, is ex. pressed in the maxim,               Noya constitutio futuris formam imponere debet               non prateritis’--prima facie, any new law that               is made affects future transactions,  not past               ones. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the               subject-matter  of an Act might be such  that,               though  there  were not any express  words  to               shew   it,  might   be    retrospective.   For               instance, I think it is perfectly settled that               if  the  Legislature intended to frame  a  new               procedure, that [1878] III App.Cass.582 at p.603 417               instead  of proceeding in this form  or  that,               you should proceed in another and a  different               way; clearly there bygone transactions are  to               be sued for and enforced according to the  new               form of procedure. Alterations in the form  of               procedure  are  always  retrospective,  unless               there  is some good reason or other  why  they               should  not  be.  Then, again,  I  think  that               where   alterations   are made in  matters  of               evidence,  certainly  upon the reason  of  the               thing,  and  I think  upon   the   authorities               also,  those are retrospective, whether  civil               or criminal." In  the King v. Chandra  Dharma (1),  Lord   Alverstone.C.J. observed as follows:                     "The  rule is clearly established  that,               apart from any special circumstances appearing               on  the  face  of  the  statute  in  question,               statutes  which make alterations in  procedure               are  retrospective.  It has been held  that  a               statute  shortening  the  time  within   which               proceedings can be taken is retrospective (The               Ydun,  1899 p. 236.), and it seems to me  that               it is impossible to give ’any good reason  why               a  statute  extending the  time  within  which               proceedings  may be taken should not  also  be               held  to be retrospective.  If the case  could               have  been brought within the  principle  that               unless  the language is clear a statute  ought               not  to  be  construed so  as  to  create  new               disabilities  or  obligations, or  impose  new               duties  in respect of transactions which  were               complete  at the  time when the Act came  into               force,   Mr.Compton  Smith  would  have   been               entitled   to   succeed;  but  when   no   new               disability  or obligation has been created  by               the  statute,  but  it only  alters  the  time               within which proceedings may be taken, it  may               be held to apply to offenses .completed before               the  statute  was passed.  That  is  the  case               here." It is therefore clear that as a general rule the amended law relating  to procedure operates retrospectively.  But  there

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is  another equally important principle, viz. that a statute should not be, so construed as to create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in respect of  transactions which  were complete at the time the amending Act came  into force--(See In re a Debtor(1) and In re Vernazza(3).The same principle  is  embodied in s. 6 of the General  Clauses  Act which is to the following effect:                     "6. Effect of repeal. ’Where this Act or               any  Central Act or Regulation made after  the               commencement   of   this  Act,   repeals   any               enactment hitherto made or here- (1) [1905] 2 K.B. 335.       (2) [1936] 1 ch. 237. (3) [1960] A.C. 965. 418 after  to  be made, then,  unless  a   different   intention appears, the repeal shall not--        ...........................................                   (b)  affect the previous operation of  any               enactment so repealed or anything duly done or               suffered thereunder; or                   (e)   affect  any   investigation,   legal               proceeding   or remedy in respect of any  such               right,   privilege,  obligation,    liability,               penalty,    forfeiture   or   punishment    as               aforesaid;               and  any such investigation, legal  proceeding               or  remedy  may be  instituted,  continued  or               enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture  or               punishment may be imposed as if the  repealing               Act or Regulation had not been passed."     The effect of the application of this principle is  that pending  cases  although instituted under the  old  Act  but still  pending are governed by the new procedure  under  the amended  law,  but whatever procedure was correctly  adopted and  concluded under the old law cannot be opened again  for the  purpose of applying the new procedure. In  the  present case, the trial of the appellant was taken up by the Special Judge,   Santhai   Parganas  when s. 5 (3) of  the  Act  was still  operative.   The. conviction  of  the  appellant  was pronounced on March 31, 1962 by the  Special Judge,  Santhai Parganas  long before the amending Act was promulgated.   It is  not  hence  possible  to  accept  the  argument  of  the appellant  that  the conviction pronounced  by  the  Special Judge,  Santhai  Parganas has become illegal or in  any  way defective in law because of the amendment to procedural  law made on December 18,  1964.  In our opinion, the High  Court was   right  in invoking the presumption under s. 5  (3)  of the Act even though it was repealed on December 18, 1964  by the  amending  Act. We ,accordingly reject the  argument  of the appellant on tiffs aspect of the case.     It  was next argued on behalf of the appellant that  the statutory  safeguards under s. 5A of the Act have  not  been complied  with and the Magistrate has not given reasons  for entrusting  the investigation to a police officer below  the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.  Section 5A of  the Act provides as follows:     "Notwithstanding  anything  contained in  the   Code  of Criminal  Procedure,  1898,  no  police  officer  below  the rank---                    (a)  in the presidency towns  of   Madras               and Calcutta, of an assistant commissioner  of               police, 419                    (b) in the presidency town of Bombay,  of               a superintendent of police, and

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                  (c) elsewhere, of a deputy superintendent               of  police,     shall investigate any  offence               punishable Under section      161, section 165               or section 165A of the Indian Penal B     Code               or under sub-section (2) of section 5 of  this               Act,       without the order of  a  presidency               magistrate or a magistrate of the first class,               as  the  case  may  be,  or  make  any  arrest               therefore without a warrant:          ........................................ In the present case the officer-incharge of Sahibganj police station  (P.W. 45) filed a petition dated February 27,  1959 (Ex. 1) to the First Class Magistrate upon which the  Deputy Superintendent  of  Police  made  an  endorsement   (Ex.1/1) suggesting  that  Inspector  Haldhar  may  be  empowered  to investigate the case.  The order of the Magistrate is Ex.1/2 and is dated February 27, 1959.The order states:  "Inspector Sri  M.S.  Haldhar is’ allowed to do it".  The  evidence  of P.W.  11 is that he was posted at Sahebganj as a  Magistrate from  1956  and used to do the work  of  the  Sub-divisional Officer also in his absence.  He passed the order (Ex.  1/2) authorising M.S. Haldhar to investigate the case because the Deputy Superintendent of Police used to remain busy with his work and the present case needed a whole-time investigation. It  was  argued on behalf of the appellant  that  there  was nothing  in the endorsement of the   Deputy   Superintendent of Police that he was busy and therefore the inquiry  should be  entrusted  to  Sri  Haldhar.  But  the  High  Court  has observed  that P.W. 1 was a Magistrate working at  Sahibganj for a period of two years prior to the passing to the  order in  question  and  he  must  have  known  that  the   Deputy Superintendent of Police could not devote his whole-time  to the  investigation of the case  and therefore the  Inspector of  Police should be entrusted to do the investigation.   On this  point the  High Court has come to the conclusion  that the  order of the  Magistrate was not   mechanically  passed and the permission of the Magistrate authorising Haldhar  to investigate the case was not  illegal  or  improper.  In our opinion  Counsel on behalf of the appellant has been  unable to make good his argument on this point.      It was then said that the charge against the  appellant under  s.  5(2) of the Act was defective as  there  were  no specific  particulars of misconduct as envisaged under  cls. (a) to (d) of s. 5 (1) of the Act. It was suggested that the charge  was  ’defective  in  as  much  as  it  deprived  the appellant of the opportunity to rebut the presumption raised under s. 5(3) of the Act.  .The charge against the appellant reads as follows ’: 420     "First--That  during  the   period  of  1956  to    19th January,  1958 at Sahebganj Police Station Sahebganj  G.R.P. and Sahebganj Local, District Santhai Parganas and at  other places,  within and without the said district, you, being  a public  servant viz. Guard of trains in the Eastern  Railway of  the Railway Department and while holding the said  post, habitually  accepted or obtained from persons  for  yourself gratifications other than legal remuneration as a motive  or reward  such  as mentioned in sec. 161 of the  Indian  Penal Code, habitually accepted or obtained for yourself  valuable things  without consideration or for a  consideration  which you  know  to be inadequate from persons  having  connection with  your  official function, habitually,  dishonestly  and fraudulently,  misappropriated  or otherwise  converted  for your  own use properties entrusted to you or put under  your control as a guard of trains or otherwise, and habitually by

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corrupt  and  illegal means, or by  otherwise  abusing  your position as a public servant obtained for yourself  valuable things  or pecuniary advantage, with the result that  during the search of your house at Sahebganj aforesaid on 19-1-1958 and  during  the  investigation  of the  Sahebganj  G.R.P.S. Case  no.  12 dated 19-1-58 u/s 170 etc.  I.P.C.,  you  were found,  during the month of Jan. 1958 in possession of  cash amount  to the  extent  of Rs. 59,000 and  other  properties fully described in  the appendix no. 1 attached herewith and forming  part  of this charge [of Sahebganj  P.S.  Case  No. 11(2)59],  and that the said cash amount and properties  are disproportionate  to your known sources of income  and  that you cannot satisfactorily account the possession of the same and  that  you thereby committed the  offenses  of  criminal misconduct,  under  clauses  (a) to (b) of s.  5(1)  of  the Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  1947  (Act  II  of  1947), punishable  under  Sec. 5(2) of the  said  Act,  within  the cognizance of this Court.        ............................................     It  was  argued  that the charge did  not  disclose  the amounts  the appellant took as bribes and the  persons  from whom   he   had  taken such bribes  and  the  appellant  had therefore  no opportunity to prove his innocence.   But,  in our view, this circumstance does not invalidate the  charge, though it may be a ground for asking for better particulars. The charge, as flamed,  clearly  stated. that the  appellant accepted  gratification  other than legal  remuneration  and obtained pecuniary advantage by corrupt and illegal.  means. The  charge,  no  doubt,  should  have   contained    better particulars so as to enable the appellant to prove his case. But 421 the  appellant  never complained in the trial court  or  the High  Court  that the charge did not contain  the  necessary particulars.   The record on the other hand  disclosed  that the  appellant understood the case against him  and  adduced all  the   evidence  which  he wanted to  place  before  the Court.   Section  225 of the  Criminal Procedure  Code  says "that  no  error  in stating either the offence  B   or  the particulars  required to be stated in the  charge,  and   no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded  at any stage of the case as material,  unless  the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice."  It also appears  that the  appellant  never raised any objection either before the Special  Judge  or in the High COurt on the score  that  the charge  was defective and that he was misled in his  defence on  the ground that no particulars of the persons from  whom the bribes were taken were mentioned. We accordingly  reject the argument of the  appellant  on  this  point. For  the reasons expressed we hold that the judgment of  the High  Court  dated September 14, 1965 is  correct  and  this appeal must be dismissed. R.K.P.S.                                   Appeal dismissed. 422