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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  914 of 2006

PETITIONER: NAMDEO

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/03/2007

BENCH: C.K. THAKKER & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

C.K. THAKKER, J.

       The present appeal is filed against the judgment  and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at  Bombay (Nagpur Bench) on March 29, 2005 in Criminal  Appeal No. 262 of 2001 by which the High Court  dismissed the appeal against an order of conviction  recorded by the Sessions Judge, Buldana on July 23,  2001 in Sessions Case No. 19 of 2001 convicting the  appellant for an offence punishable under Section 302 of  Indian Penal Code (IPC).         Short facts leading to the present appeal are that  the deceased Ninaji Rupaji Ghonge was a resident of  Deodhaba, Taluk Malkapur, District Buldana. He was  residing with his son Sopan (PW6). His other sons were  staying separately. Deceased Ninaji possessed she goats,  sheep and she buffalos. The appellant-accused Namdeo  was also residing in a nearby house. Relations between  the deceased Ninaji and the accused Namdeo were  strained.  The reason was the belief entertained by the  accused.  Namdeo harboured a suspicion that she goats  and sheep belonged to him died due to some disease and  the deceased Ninaji and his friends were responsible for  the death of those animals as deceased Ninaji had played  a witch craft. This resulted in accused Namdeo abusing  the deceased and administering threat to kill. PW6- Sopan, son of the deceased, however requested village  people to settle the dispute between his father and the  accused. Accordingly, some responsible persons  intervened, called both of them and advised not to  quarrel.         On October 25, 2000 between 8.00 to 9.00 p.m., a  she buffalo of accused Namdeo died. Deceased Ninaji,  after taking his meal, was sleeping on the wooden cot in  the backyard of his house. On the same night, at about  2.00 to 3.00 a.m., PW6-Sopan (complainant) heard  shouts of his father calling ’Bapa re Bapa re’. On hearing  the cry, PW6-Sopan and his wife rushed towards the  backyard of his house where Ninaji was sleeping and  noticed that the accused Namdeo was assaulting him.  PW6-Sopan saw the accused administering axe blow on  the head of his father Ninaji, in the light of electric bulb.  On seeing Sopan, the accused Namdeo fled away from  the place taking axe in his hand. Sopan chased him, but  the accused disappeared in the darkness and Sopan  could not catch him. PW8-Raju Prahlad Sonune, who

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was a neighbour, also heard the shout of Ninaji and came  there. He also tried to catch the accused Namdeo but  could not succeed. Sopan and Raju returned to the  backyard where Ninaji was lying. They noticed two  injuries one on the head and another near his right eye  and they were bleeding. Meanwhile neighbours had  gathered. Ninaji was then taken to Dr. Suresh Wagh  (PW7). According to the prosecution, Dr. Suresh Wagh- PW7 asked Ninaji as to what had happened and the latter  told him that accused Namdeo had assaulted him with  axe. Dr. Suresh Wagh gave one injection to Ninaji and  asked Sopan to take Ninaji to the hospital at Malkapur  for better treatment. Sopan and his friends brought  Ninaji to Malkapur in a jeep at about 6.30 a.m. in the  following morning at the hospital of Dr. Suhas Borle  (PW3), who advised to take Ninaji to ’Advance Critical  Center’ at Malkapur and accordingly he was taken there.  Dr. Suhas Borle examined Ninaji and applied stitches to  his wounds. However, at about 8.00 a.m. on that day,  Ninaji succumbed to the injuries in the hospital itself. At  about 8.15 a.m., Dr. Suhas Borle sent report to police  station, Malkapur about the accidental death of Ninaji. A  case was registered at Malkapur police station being  Accidental Death Case No. 24 of 2000. At about 12.00  noon, PSI Diwakar Pedgaonkar (PW10) and other police  officers came to Advance Critical Center, prepared  inquest panchnama of the dead body of Ninaji and seized  the quilt, kerchief from dead body and sent the dead  body for autopsy. Then, complainant Sopan went to  Malkapur rural police station and gave oral information  which was reduced to writing and the same was treated  as complaint (Ex.38).         On the basis of the above report, offence vide Crime  No. 94 of 2000 was registered under Section 302 IPC. PSI  Diwakar himself took over the investigation of the case.  He went to village Deodhaba, where the offence was  committed. He prepared sketch of scene of offence in  presence of panchas. He found the blood lying on the  earth at the place and one wooden cot also. One pillow  stained with blood was on the cot. He collected samples  of blood smeared earth and simple earth and attached  the pillow and wooden cot under the panchanama. He  noticed that one electric bulb was near one room in that  house. It was tested and found operating. Supplementary  statement of complainant Sopan and of other witnesses  were recorded. After completion of investigation, charge  sheet was submitted against the accused in the Court of  Judicial Magistrate, Malkapur who committed the case to  the Sessions Court, Buldana.         The prosecution, in all, examined 10 witnesses in  support of the case. PW6-Sopan is the son of deceased  Ninaji and a star witness. He is complainant also. He  stated that he was sleeping in his house along with his  wife on the night of October 25, 2000 after taking meal.  His father slept on a wooden cot (charpai) in the backyard  of the house. At about 2.00 or 3.00 a.m., he heard shouts  of his father calling ’Bapa re Bapa re’. Immediately, he  and his wife rushed towards the backyard and saw that  the accused Namdeo was assaulting his father Ninaji  with axe. He specifically stated that he and his wife  witnessed the incident in the light of electric lamp.  Namdeo fled away from the place along with axe in his  hand.  Though the witness chased the accused, but he  disappeared in darkness. He further stated that PW8- Raju was behind him when he was chasing the accused.

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After disappearance of accused, both of them i.e., Sopan- PW6 and Raju-PW8, returned to his house. At that time,  Ninaji was saying that he was assaulted by the accused  Namdeo. Ninaji was bleeding from the injuries sustained  by him. The evidence of PW6-Sopan was corroborated by  PW8-Raju. He stated that he is a neighbour of deceased  Ninaji and his house is situated at a distance of only 30  feet from the house of deceased Ninaji. He also stated  that house of accused Namdeo is situated at a distance of   about 25 feet from his house. According to him, the  relations between the accused Namdeo and the deceased  Ninaji were strained. Regarding the incident, he stated  that he was sleeping in the courtyard of his house on the  day of the incident and at about 3.00 a.m., he heard the  shouts to the effect ’Bapa re Bapa re’, ’Namya assaulted’.  On hearing the shouts, he rushed to the house of Ninaji  and saw that accused Namdeo was coming out of the  house of Ninaji and PW6-Sopan was following him i.e.  running behind him. The witness also started running  behind Sopan. He deposed that he witnessed this in the  electricity light. According to him, there were two injuries  on Ninaji, one on head and another near right ear. PW7-Dr. Suresh Wagh stated that on inquiry, the  injured (deceased) Ninaji told him that it was the accused  Namdeo who assaulted him with an axe. The injuries  sustained by Ninaji were duly proved by the evidence of  PW7-Dr. Suresh Wagh, PW3-Dr. Suhas Sopan Borle and  PW4-Dr. Laxminarayan Ashokchand Jaiswal who effected  autopsy of dead body of Ninaji on October 26, 2000. The trial Court, on the basis of the above evidence,  held that it was proved that Ninaji died of homicidal  death. So far as the guilt of the accused is concerned, the  trial Court held that from the evidence of PW6-Sopan  (complainant), son of deceased, it was clear that he had  witnessed the incident in electric light. His evidence was  corroborated by PW8-Raju who not only heard the shout  ’Bapa re Bapa re’, ’Namya assaulted’ but Ninaji also told  the witness that it was the accused who caused him  injuries. The Court also held that when injured  (deceased) was taken to the house of PW7-Dr. Suresh  Wagh, Ninaji informed the Doctor that it was the accused  who had assaulted him. During the investigation, the axe was also recovered  at the instance of accused Namdeo by the Investigating  Officer. The prosecution had examined PW9\027Nivrutti  Patil who was a panch witness. The accused had made a  statement that he had concealed the axe beneath the  fodder of his cattle shed and he would produce it.  Memorandum of statement (Ex.44) was prepared and the  accused led the panch and PSI Diwakar to the cattle shed  from where the axe stained with blood was found.  PW10\027PSI Diwakar sent muddamal axe to Chemical  Analyzer, Nagpur which was found to have human blood.   No blood group, however, could be ascertained. On the basis of the above evidence, the trial Court  held that it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that it  was accused and accused alone who had caused injuries  to the deceased which resulted in his death. The accused  was, therefore, convicted for an offence punishable under  Section 302 IPC and was awarded imprisonment for life. The appeal filed by the accused before the High  Court was dismissed observing that the trial Court had  not committed any error and the judgment and order did  not deserve interference. The said order is challenged

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before this Court. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant contended  that the entire case of the prosecution is based on  solitary testimony of eye witness Sopan, son of the  deceased.  He is thus an ’interested’ witness.  In absence  of any corroboration, it would not be safe to place implicit  reliance on his testimony who could not have seen the  assailant in the dark night.  It was further contended  that though several persons had come at the place of  offence, none was examined except Raju\027PW8, who was  also not an eye witness. It was submitted that oral dying  declaration said to have been made by the deceased  Ninaji either before PW8-Raju or PW7-Dr. Suresh Wagh  cannot be relied upon in the light of the fact that the  injured was in critical condition and died within a short  time. It was finally submitted that even if the case of the  prosecution is believed, only a single blow was given by  the accused and the case would not be covered under  Section 302 IPC but would fall under Section 304, Part II  IPC and the order of conviction and sentence requires to  be modified. The learned advocate for the State supported the  order of conviction and sentence. According to him, both  the Courts considered the evidence in its proper  perspective and no fault can be found when they held the  accused guilty. Regarding nature of offence, it was  submitted that an axe blow was administered on the vital  part of the body i.e. head which resulted in death of the  deceased which was rightly held to be a case of an  offence of murder. A prayer was therefore made to  dismiss the appeal. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in  our opinion, no interference is called for in exercise of  power under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is no  doubt true that there is only one eye witness who is also  a close relative of the deceased, viz. his son.  But it is  well-settled that it is quality of evidence and not quantity  of evidence which is material.  Quantity of evidence was  never considered to be a test for deciding a criminal trial  and the emphasis of Courts is always on quality of  evidence.  So far as legal position is concerned, it is found in  the statutory provision in Section 134 of the Evidence  Act, 1872; which reads; 134. Number of witnesses.\027No  particular number of witnesses shall in any  case be required for the proof of any fact.

Let us now consider few leading decisions on the  point. Before more than six decades, in Mohamed Sugal  Esa Mamasan Rer Alalah v. The King, AIR 1946 PC 3 :  222 IC 304 (PC), one M together with his brother E  caused murder of his half-brother A. The trial Court  convicted M and sentenced him to death acquitting his  brother E. The conviction was confirmed by the appellate  Court. It was contended before the Privy Council that the  conviction was solely based on unsworn evidence of a girl  aged about 10-11 years. The trial Court found her  competent to testify, but was of the view that she was not  able to understand the nature of an oath and, therefore,  oath was not administered. It was contended by the  accused that no conviction could be recorded on a  solitary witness and that too on an unsworn evidence of a

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tender-aged girl of 10-11 years without corroboration.  Considering the question raised before the Judicial  Committee, leave was granted. Their Lordships considered the legal position in  England and in India. It was held that such evidence is  admissible under Indian Law "whether corroborated or  not".  Lord Goddard, speaking for the Board stated: "\005Once there is admissible evidence a Court  can act upon it; corroboration, unless required  by statute, goes only to the weight and value of  the evidence. It is a sound rule in practice not  to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a  child, whether sworn or unsworn, but this is a  rule of prudence and not of law. In a careful  and satisfactory judgment the Judge of the  Protectorate Court shows that he was fully  alive to this rule and that he applied it, and  their Lordships are in agreement with him as  to the matters he took into account as  corroborative of the girl’s evidence."  

       In Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCR  981 : AIR 1957 SC 614, referring to Mahomed Sugal, this  Court stated;         On a consideration of the relevant  authorities and the provisions of the Indian  Evidence Act, the following propositions may  be safely stated as firmly established :  (1) As a general rule, a court can and may  act on the testimony of a single witness  though uncorroborated. One credible  witness outweighs the testimony of a  number of other witnesses of indifferent  character.  (2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon  by statute, courts should not insist on  corroboration except in cases where the  nature of the testimony of the single  witness itself requires as a rule of  prudence, that corroboration should be  insisted upon, for example in the case of  a child witness, or of a witness whose  evidence is that of an accomplice or of an  analogous character.  (3) Whether corroboration of the  testimony of a single witness is or is not  necessary, must depend upon facts and  circumstances of each case and no  general rule can be laid down in a matter  like this and much depends upon the  judicial discretion of the Judge before  whom the case comes.          Quoting Section 134 of the Evidence Act, their  Lordships stated that "we have no hesitation in holding  that the contention that in a murder case, the Court  should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too  broadly stated." The Court proceeded to state; It is not seldom that a crime had been  committed in the presence of only one witness,  leaving aside those cases which are not of  uncommon occurrence, where determination  of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial  evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon

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plurality of witnesses, cases where the  testimony of a single witness only could be  available in proof of the crime, would go  unpunished. It is here that the discretion of  the presiding judge comes into play. The  matter thus must depend upon the  circumstances of each case and the quality of  the evidence of the single witness whose  testimony has to be either accepted or rejected.  If such a testimony is found by the court to be  entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment  to the conviction of the accused person on  such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused  person may be proved by the testimony of a  single witness, the innocence of an accused  person may be established on the testimony of  a single witness, even though a considerable  number of witnesses may be forthcoming to  testify to the truth of the case for the  prosecution.  The Court also stated; There is another danger in insisting on  plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the  quality of the oral evidence of a single witness,  if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses  in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly  encouraging subornation of witnesses.  Situations may arise and do arise where only a  single person is available to give evidence in  support of a disputed fact. The court naturally  has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if  it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and  free from all taints which tend to render oral  testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its  duty to act upon such testimony. The law  reports contain many precedents where the  court had to depend and act upon the  testimony of a single witness in support of the  prosecution. There are exceptions to this rule,  for example, in cases of sexual offences or of  the testimony of an approver; both these are  cases in which the oral testimony is, by its  very nature, suspect, being that of a  participator in crime. But, where there are no  such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes  the duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied  that the testimony of a single witness is  entirely reliable.          In the leading case of Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v.  State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793, this Court held  that even where a case hangs on the evidence of a single  eye witness it may be enough to sustain the conviction  given sterling testimony of a competent, honest man  although as a rule of prudence courts call for  corroboration.  "It is a platitude to say that witnesses  have to be weighed and not counted since quality matters  more than quantity in human affairs."         In Anil Phukan v. State of Assam, (1993) 3 SCC 282  : JT 1993 (2) SC 290, the Court observed; "Indeed,  conviction can be based on the testimony of a single eye  witness and there is no rule of law or evidence which  says to the contrary provided the sole witness passes the  test of reliability.  So long as the single eye-witness is a  wholly reliable witness the courts have no difficulty in  basing conviction on his testimony alone.  However,

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where the single eye witness is not found to be a wholly  reliable witness, in the sense that there are some  circumstances which may show that he could have an  interest in the prosecution, then the courts generally  insist upon some independent corroboration of his  testimony, in material particulars, before recording  conviction.  It is only when the courts find that the single  eye witness is a wholly unreliable witness that his  testimony is discarded in toto and no amount of  corroboration can cure that defect."         In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 614  : JT 1995 (8) SC 425, referring to several cases, this  Court stated; "On a conspectus of these decisions, it  clearly comes out that there has been no departure from  the principles laid down in Vadivelu Thevar case and,  therefore, conviction can be recorded on the basis of the  statement of a single eye witness provided his credibility  is not shaken by any adverse circumstance appearing on  the record against him and the court, at the same time,  is convinced that he is a truthful witness.  The court will  not then insist on corroboration by any other eye witness  particularly as the incident might have occurred at a time  or place when there was no possibility of any other eye  witness being present.  Indeed, the courts insist on the  quality, and, not on the quantity of evidence." In Chittar Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 6 SCC  397 : JT 2003 (7) SC 270, this Court had an occasion to  consider a similar question. In that case, the sole  testimony of a young boy of 15 years was relied upon for  recording an order of conviction. Following Mohamed  Sugal and reiterating the law laid down therein, this  Court stated: "The legislative recognition of the fact that no  particular number of witnesses can be   insisted upon is amply reflected in Section 134  of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short  ’Evidence Act’). Administration of justice can  be affected and hampered if number of  witnesses were to be insisted upon.  It is not  seldom that a crime has been committed in the  presence of one witness, leaving aside those  cases which are not of unknown occurrence  where determination of guilt depends entirely  on circumstantial evidence. If plurality of  witnesses would have been the legislative  intent cases where the testimony of a single  witness only could be available, in number of  crimes offender would have gone unpunished.   It is the quality of evidence of the single  witness whose testimony has to be tested on  the touchstone of credibility and reliability.  If  the testimony is found to be reliable, there is  no legal impediment to convict the accused on  such proof.  It is the quality and not the  quantity of evidence which is necessary for  proving or disproving a fact." (emphasis supplied)

Recently, in Bhimappa Chandappa v. State of  Karnataka, (2006) 11 SCC 323, this Court held that  testimony of a solitary witness can be made the basis of  conviction.  The credibility of the witness requires to be  tested with reference to the quality of his evidence which  must be free from blemish or suspicion and must  impress the Court as natural, wholly truthful and so

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convincing that the Court has no hesitation in recording  a conviction solely on his uncorroborated testimony.         From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that Indian  legal system does not insist on plurality of witnesses.  Neither the Legislature (Section 134, Evidence Act, 1872)  nor the judiciary mandates that there must be particular  number of witnesses to record an order of conviction  against the accused.  Our legal system has always laid  emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather  than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses.  It  is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and  completely rely on a solitary witness and record  conviction.  Conversely, it may acquit the accused in  spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied  about the quality of evidence.  The bald contention that  no conviction can be recorded in case of a solitary eye  witness, therefore, has no force and must be negatived. It was then contended that the only eye witness\027 PW6-Sopan was none other than the son of the deceased.  He was, therefore, ’highly interested’ witness and his  deposition should, therefore, be discarded as it has not  been corroborated in material particulars by other  witnesses. We are unable to uphold the contention. In  our judgment, a witness who is a relative of the deceased  or victim of a crime cannot be characterised as  ’interested’. The term ’interested’ postulates that the  witness has some direct or indirect ’interest’ in having  the accused somehow or other convicted due to animus  or for some other oblique motive. Before more than half a century in Dalip Singh v.  State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145 : AIR 1953 SC 364,  a  similar question came up for consideration before this  Court. In that case, the High Court observed that  testimony of two eye witnesses required corroboration  since they were closely related to the deceased.  Commenting on the approach of the High Court, this  Court held that it was ’unable to concur’ with the said  view. Referring to an earlier decision in Rameshwar  Kalyan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1952 SCR 377 : AIR  1952 SC 54, their Lordships observed that it was a  fallacy common to many criminal cases and in spite of  endeavours to dispel, "it unfortunately still persists, if not  in the judgments of the courts, at any rate in the  arguments of counsel". Speaking for the Court, Vivian Bose, J. stated: "A witness is normally to be considered  independent unless he or she springs from  sources which are likely to be tainted and that  usually means unless the witness has cause,  such as enmity against the accused, to wish to  implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close  relative would be the last to screen the real  culprit and falsely implicate an innocent  person. It is true, when feelings run high and  there is personal cause for enmity, that here is  a tendency to drag in an innocent person  against whom a witness has a grudge along  with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for  such a criticism and the mere fact of  relationship far from being a foundation is  often a sure guarantee of truth".  (emphasis supplied) The Court, no doubt, uttered a word of caution: "However, we are not attempting any  sweeping generalisation. Each case must be

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judged on its own facts. Our observations are  only made to combat what is so often put  forward in cases before us as a general rule of  prudence. There is no such general rule. Each  case must be limited to and be governed by  its own facts".                 (emphasis supplied) In Darya Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, (1964) 3  SCR 397 : AIR 1965 SC 328, this Court held that   evidence of an eye witness who is a near relative of the  victim, should be closely scrutinized but no corroboration  is necessary for acceptance of his evidence.  Speaking for the Court, Gajendragadkar, J. (as His  Lordship then was) stated: "There can be no doubt that in a murder case  when evidence is given by near relatives of the  victim and the murder is alleged to have been  committed by the enemy of the family, criminal  Courts must examine the evidence of the  interested witnesses, like the relatives of the  victim, very carefully. But a person may be  interested in the victim, being his relation or  otherwise, and may not necessarily be hostile  to the accused. In that case, the fact that the  witness was related to the victim or was his  friend, may not necessarily introduce any  infirmity in his evidence. But where the  witness is a close relation of the victim and is  shown to share the victim’s hostility to his  assailant, that naturally makes it necessary for  the criminal Court to examine the evidence  given by such witness very carefully and  scrutinise all the infirmities in that evidence  before deciding to act upon it. In dealing with  such evidence, Courts naturally begin with the  enquiry as to whether the said witnesses were  chance witnesses or whether they were really  present on the scene of the offence. If the  offence has taken place as in the present case,  in front of the house of the victim, the fact that  on hearing his shouts, his relations rushed out  of the house cannot be ruled out as being  improbable, and so, the presence of the three  eye-witnesses cannot be properly characterised  as unlikely. If the criminal Court is satisfied  that the witness who is related to the victim  was not a chance-witness, then his evidence  has to be examined from the point of view of  probabilities and the account given by him as  to the assault has to be carefully scrutinised.  In doing so, it may be relevant to remember  that though the witness is hostile to the  assailant, it is not likely that he would  deliberately omit to name the real assailant  and substitute in his place the name of enemy  of the family out of malice. The desire to  punish the victim would be so powerful in his  mind that he would unhesitatingly name the  real assailant and would not think of  substituting in his place the enemy of the  family though he was not concerned with the  assault. It is not improbable that in giving  evidence, such a witness may name the real  assailant and may add other persons out of  malice and enmity and that is a factor which  has to be borne in mind in appreciating the

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evidence of interested witnesses. On principle,  however, it is difficult to accept the plea  that if a witness is shown to be a relative  of the deceased and it is also shown that  he shared the hostility of the victim  towards the assailant, his evidence can  never be accepted unless it is corroborated  on material particulars."    (emphasis  supplied) In Dalbir Kaur (Mst.) v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC  158 : AIR 1977 SC 472, the accused killed his own father  and real brother over a property dispute.  Eye-witnesses  to the ’gruesome, brutal and unprovoked’ double-murder  were near relatives of the deceased.  It was, therefore,  contended that they were ’interested’ witnesses and their  evidence should not be accepted for holding the  appellants guilty. Negativing the contention, upholding the order of  conviction, and referring to Dalip Singh, this Court  stated; "There can be no doubt that having regard to the  fact that the incident took place at midnight  inside the house of Ajaib Singh, the only natural  witnesses who could be present to see the assault  would be Jaswant Kaur and her mother Shiv  Kaur.  No outsider can be expected to have come  at that time because the attack by the appellants  was sudden.  Moreover a close relative who is a  very natural witness cannot be regarded as an  interested witness.  The term "interested"  postulates that the person concerned must have  some direct interest in seeing that the accused  person is somehow or the other convicted either  because he had some animus with the accused or  for some other reason.  Such is not the case here.   In the instant case there is absolutely no  evidence to indicate that either Jaswant Kaur or  Shiv Kaur bore any animus against the accused." In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 614,  this Court considered several leading cases on the point  and said: "On a conspectus of these decisions, it clearly  comes out that there has been no departure from  the principles laid down in Vadivelyu Thevar’s  case (supra) and, therefore, conviction can be  recorded on the basis of the statement of single  eye witness provided his credibility is not shaken  by any adverse circumstances appearing on the  record against him and the Court, at the same  time, is convinced that he is a truthful witness.  The Court will not then insist on corroboration by  any other eye witness particularly as the incident  might have occurred at a time or place when  there was no possibility of any other eye witness  being present. Indeed, the Courts insist on the  quality, and, not on the quantity of evidence".         (emphasis supplied)

Recently, in Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana,  (2005) 9 SCC 195, the conviction of the accused was  challenged in this Court, inter alia, on the ground that  the prosecution version was based on testimony of  relatives and hence it did not inspire confidence. Negativing the contention this Court said: "There is no proposition in law that relatives are

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to be treated as untruthful witnesses. On the  contrary, reason has to be shown when a plea of  partiality is raised to show that the witnesses had  reason to shield actual culprit and falsely  implicate the accused."  

From the above case-law, it is clear that a close  relative cannot be characterised as an ’interested’  witness. He is a ’natural’ witness. His evidence, however,  must be scrutinized carefully.  If on such scrutiny, his  evidence is found to be intrinsically reliable, inherently  probable and wholly trustworthy,conviction can be based  on the ’sole’ testimony of such witness. Close relationship  of witness with the deceased or victim is no ground to  reject his evidence. On the contrary, close relative of the  deceased would normally be most reluctant to spare the  real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent one. In the present case, PW6-Sopan is the son of  deceased Ninaji. The incident took place at the residence  of Ninaji as well as the witness (PW6-Sopan). It was night  time about 3.00 a.m. Obviously, therefore, his presence  in his own house was natural and he could not be said to  be a ’chance witness’. PW6 was sleeping in his own room  along with his wife and deceased Ninaji was in the  courtyard on his cot. That was also natural.  There is  nothing unusual in his (PW6-Sopan) coming out of his  room when his father cried ’Bapa re Bapa re’. It was also  normal behaviour on the part of the son to chase the  accused as he had seen the accused administering axe  blow on the head of his father. Unfortunately, however,  due to darkness outside the house, the accused was  successful in making his escape. The testimony of PW6- Sopan appears to both the Courts to be trustworthy and  reliable. In addition, the Court also found further  corroboration from the evidence of PW8-Raju who could  not strictly be said to be an eye witness but who saw the  accused coming out of the house of Ninaji with axe in his  hand. He referred to electric light in the courtyard where  deceased Ninaji was sleeping.  He also stated that Ninaji  was saying that he was assaulted by Nanya, i.e. accused  Namdeo.  Similar dying declaration was made by  deceased Ninaji before PW 7- Dr. Suresh Wagh as well.  Medical evidence of PW7\027Dr. Suresh Wagh, PW3\027Dr.  Suhas Borle and PW4\027Dr. Jaiswal further corroborates  the prosecution story and injuries sustained by Ninaji.   It, therefore, cannot be said that the Courts below had  committed an error in relying upon the sole testimony of  PW6-Sopan, particularly when it was corroborated in  material particulars with the testimony of PW8-Raju and  three Doctors. The contention raised by the accused,  therefore, cannot be upheld.         Finally, we are unable to uphold the argument of  the learned counsel for the appellant-accused that the  case falls under Section 304, II IPC. Considering the  nature of weapon used by the accused (axe) and the vital  part of the body (head) of the deceased chosen by him, it  was clear that the intention of the accused was to cause  death of Ninaji.   PW 4 Dr. Jaiswal in his deposition  stated that injury No. 1 was sufficient in the ordinary  course of nature to cause death of the victim.  In the  circumstances, both the Courts were right in holding that  the case was covered by Section 302 IPC. For the foregoing reasons, we see no infirmity in the  orders passed by the courts below.  The appeal deserves  to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. The order

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of conviction and sentence is hereby maintained.