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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1214 of 2007

PETITIONER: New Delhi Municipal Council

RESPONDENT: Pan Singh & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/03/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 21024 of 2005]

S.B. Sinha, J.

       Leave granted.

       Appellant is a local authority constituted under the New Delhi  Municipal Act, 1994.   It has been performing its municipal functions in the  New Delhi area; one of them being distribution of electricity to the  consumers upon buying the same from the Electricity Supply Companies.   For the said purpose, it has a electricity department.   In the said department,  there were posts of Meter Readers as also Shifts Incharge.  The pay scale of  Shifts In-charge was Rs. 220-400 and that of the Meter Readers Rs. 185-300.   The post of Meter Readers was meant to be filled up by direct recruitment.    17 senior most Shift In charge, however, for certain reasons opted to become  Meter Readers.  As they were working in a higher scale of pay, their pay was  protected.   Such protection of pay was given to them by an Order dated  10.2.1982, stating :

"1.  The matter regarding revision of pay scale from Rs.  185-300 to Rs. 220-440 of those Meter Readers who were  promoted as Meter Readers from the Cadre of Shift-In- charge II Grade was discussed in the meeting held on  15.12.81 at 11.00 AM under the Chairmanship of the  Administrator.   It was decided by the Administrator that  the matter be examined whether higher pay scale of Rs.  220-400 could be given to the 17 such senior-most Meter  Readers, purely as on ad hoc measure which would be  personal to them.

2.      Accordingly, the case was discussed in the meeting  of Heads of Departments namely CE(E)/CE(C)/FA,CA,  Secretary, MOH, DD(H) and LWO headed by the  Administrator on 06.02.1982 and was decided that the pay  scale of Rs. 220-10-300-EB-400 be allowed w.e.f. 6.2.82  to all those 17 Meter Readers who had previously worked  as Shift In charge Grade II, but this revision of scale will  be personal to them without making any precedent\005"       

       Some other Meter Readers who were in services of the appellant at the  relevant time raised an industrial dispute purported to be on the premise that  they had been discriminated against.  Reference was made to the Presiding  Officer, Industrial Tribunal No. 3, Delhi for determination of inter-alia the  following industrial dispute:-

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"1.  Whether the pay scale of Meter Readers should be  revised from Rs. 520-815 to Rs. 590-1000/- as has been  done in case of 17 Meter Readers namely 1) Shri Turen  Singh, 2) Ram Chander Singh, 3) Shri Rameshwar Lal  Bali, 4. Shri Prem Chand Sharma, 5. Raj Kumar Kalia  (6) Sh. Prabhu Dayal, (7) Sh. Anand Kishore Aggarwal  (8) Shri Jagannath Parshad (9) Sh. D.P. Malhotra (10)  Sh. Bhu Dev Sharma (11) Sh. Sukh Dev Singh (12)  Shri Ajaib Singh (13) Shri H.C. Chauhan (14) Shri K.S.  Rawat (15) Shri Devi Sanai, (16) Shri Mansa Ram, (17)  Shri Subhash Chand Sharma and if so what directions  are necessary in this respect?"

       Respondents were not parties therein.  They did not file any  application for their impleadment.   By reason of an Award dated 7.1.1998,  the Industrial Court directed :-

"In the light of the above observations of the meter  readers, who were in service at the time when the benefit  was given to 17 meter readers, whose names are morefully  detailed in Annexure B of claim statement are entitled to  get the benefit of the said order in the similar manner in  which the same has been given to those 17 meter readers  purely as an adhoc measure to be personal to them and  discrimination made by the management amongst the same  class of meter readers is an act of arbitrariness and  amounts to misuse of the principles of law.   The  management is directed to pay the arrears of the said  amount on the same analogy to which 17 meter readers  have been given benefit to the same as per order dated  12.02.82 within a period of 6 months from the date the  award become enforceable under law failing which the  meter readers of the said period will be entitled to get an  interest @ 18% per annum to the same..."

       The respondents were appointed after 12.2.1982 i.e during the period  1.4.1982 and 3.6.1984.  They filed a Writ Petition claiming parity in the  matter of grant of scale of pay by filing a Writ Petition with the Awardees  before the High Court of Delhi.   By reason of the impugned Judgment, the  said Writ Petitions have been allowed stating that although they are not  covered by the Award, the appellant being model employer must treat the  employees similarly situated and, thus as the respondents had passed the test  in June, 1981, they could not be denied the pay scale which has been granted  to them.   

Respondent filed the Writ Petition in July, 1999 claiming inter-alia the  following reliefs:-

"a) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the  Respondent to grant to the petitioners the benefit of the  revised pay scale, as had been granted to other meter  readers vide office order dated 10.02.1982 (Annexure- B).   Office order dated 23.12.1998 (Annexure-D) and  office order dated 17.5.1999 (Annexure \026 D-1)  alongwith all the consequential reliefs.

b)      Grant to the petitioners the appropriate amount of  damages including cost of the present  petition as also  such other or further relief’s as this Hon’ble Court may  deem fit, proper and expedient in the facts and  circumstances of the present case."

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       Mr. Rakesh K. Khanna, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of  the appellant would urge that once the cut off date was fixed by the Tribunal  as on 6.2.1982, the respondents, having joined the services of the appellant  thereafter, could not have been directed to be treated alike in the matter of  grant of the same scale of pay.   In any event, the Writ Petitions having been  filed in July, 1999, the High Court committed a serious illegality in directing  back wages in their favour.   

Ms. Asha Jain Madan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  respondent, on the other hand, would submit that the Award of the Industrial  Tribunal was binding upon the appellant in terms of Section 18(3)(b) of the  Industrial Disputes Act and in that view of the matter, as respondents  perform same or similar nature of duties as are performed by the other  workmen, they were entitled to be treated alike.   The learned counsel would  contend that the respondent did not raise a separate industrial dispute as they  had all along been under the impression that they would be covered by the  Award which may be made in the said Reference.   

Respondents were appointed on different dates, admittedly after  6.2.1982.   Entitlement of an employee to be placed on a particular scale of  pay  would depend upon the terms and conditions laid down in the contract  of service.

       Seventeen persons who were granted higher scale of pay as noticed  hereinbefore had been working as Shifts in charge.  As Shifts In charge, they  were entitled to a higher scale of pay.   They were given a higher scale so as  to protect their pay which were personal to them and that too on an ad-hoc  measure.   It was not by way of a revision of scale of pay as understood in  the ordinary sense of the term.

       Those Meter Readers who were purported to be similarly situated  meaning thereby those who were in service as on 12.2.1982 i.e the date  when the purported pay scales of 17 senior most Meter Readers on ad-hoc  basis were revised, raised an industrial dispute.  The Industrial Tribunal in  its Award proceeded on the basis that the concerned workmen were entitled  to the benefit of higher scale as they were similarly situated to those 17  senior most Meter Readers.

       The direction in terms of the Award was confined only to those who  were in employment at the time when the said benefit was given to the said  17 Meter Readers.

       They, thus, formed a class by themselves.  A cut-off date having been  fixed by the Tribunal, those who were thus not similarly situated, were to be  treated to have formed a different class.  They could not be treated alike with  the others.  The High Court, unfortunately, has not considered this aspect of  the matter.

       Submission of learned counsel for the respondent that Section  18(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act would govern the Award, in our  opinion is not correct.  Section 18(3)(b) although, provides that all workmen  who were employed in an establishment, subsequently become employed  therein would also be bound by the Award of the Industrial Tribunal.   But,  they must be entitled to the similar benefits.  Respondents were not parties to  the said dispute.  They did not raise any grievance in regard to their  conditions of service.

       Had they been parties to the Reference, the matter might have been  otherwise, as was held in Punjab National Bank And Others v. Manjeet  Singh And Another [(2006) 8 SCC 647], whereupon Ms. Asha Jain Madan,  learned counsel for respondent strongly relied upon.   Section 18(3)(b) does  not postulate that although the concerned workmen would form different  classes, an Award made in favour of another class of workmen would  automatically be extended to the other.  In Punjab National Bank (supra), the  workman contended that they were not bound by the Award, which

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contention was rejected having regard to the fact that they were similarly  situated and in fact were parties in the industrial disputes and were  represented through their Union.

       There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of.   Respondents herein filed a Writ Petition after 17 years.  They did not agitate  their grievances for a long time.   They, as noticed herein, did not claim  parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity.   They did  not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State  before the Industrial Tribunal.   It is not their case that after 1982, those  employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date  have been granted the said scale of pay.   After such a long time, therefore,  the Writ Petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly  situated.  It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in  favour of those who approach the Court after a long time.  Delay and laches  are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction.  See Govt. of W.B.  v. Tarun K. Roy And Others [(2004) 1 SCC 347], Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam  & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh And Anr. [2006 (12) SCALE 347] and Karnataka  Power Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing Director and Another   v. K. Thangappan and Another [(2006) 4 SCC 322]

       Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a Writ  Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, Writ  Petition should be filed within a reasonable time.

       See Lipton India Ltd. And Others  v. Union of India And Others  [(1994) 6 SCC 524], M.R. Gupta v. Union of India And Others [(1995) 5  SCC 628].  

       In  Shiv Dass v. Union of India & Ors. [ 2007(2) SCALE 325 : (2007)  1 Supreme 455], this Court held:-          "9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a  number of cases that representations would not be  adequate explanation to take care of delay.   This was  first stated in K.V. Raja Lakshmiah v. State of Mysore  (AIR 1967 SC 993).  There is a limit to the time which  can be considered reasonable for making  representations and if the Government had turned down  one representation the making of another representation  on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of  Orissa v. Sri Pyarimohan Samantaray, (AIR 1976 SC  2617) making of repeated representations was not  regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay.   In  that case the petition had been dismissed for delay  alone.  See State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar (AIR 1976  SC 1639 also).

         10.  In the case of pension the cause of action  actually continues from month to month.  That,  however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing  the petition.  It would depend upon the fact of each  case.  If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say  three years normally the Court would reject the same or  restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable  period of about three years.  The High Court did not  examine whether on merit appellant had a case.  If on  merits it would have found that there was no scope for  interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition  on that score alone."

       We, therefore, are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where the  High Court should have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of  the respondents herein.   

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For the reasons aforementioned, impugned Judgment cannot be  sustained which is set aside accordingly.   The Appeal is allowed.  In the  facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to  costs.