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PETITIONER: MURARI LAL S/o RAM SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/11/1979

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1980 AIR  531            1980 SCR  (2) 249  1980 SCC  (1) 704  CITATOR INFO :  R          1992 SC2100  (30)

ACT:      Evidence Act-Expert  opinion-Testimony  of  handwriting expert-If  could  not  be  accepted  without  corroboration- Opinion evidence-Its nature-Explained.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellant   was  charged   with  the   offence  of committing the  murder of the deceased. The two vital pieces of evidence on which he was convicted were : (1) recovery of a wrist watch which belonged to the deceased at the instance of the  appellant and  (2) a note written in pencil in Hindi found by  the side  of the  deadman  on  the  night  of  the occurrence stating  "Though we  have passed B.A. we have not secured any  employment because  there is none to care. This is the consequence".      He was  convicted under s. 302, I.P.C. and sentenced to death. On  appeal the High Court altered the conviction from s. 302 to s. 302 read with s. 34, I.P.C.      In appeal  to this  Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that it was not permissible in law to act upon uncorroborated opinion  evidence of a handwriting expert and that the  High Court fell into a serious error in attempting to compare  the writing  with the  admitted writing  of  the appellant; (2)  the appellant could not be the author of the note because  while he was not even a matriculate the author described himself  as a  graduate and  that a  murderer  and robber would  not have  left behind a note of the kind found by the side of the dead man.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD :  1. An  expert is  no accomplice.  There  is  no justification for  condemning  the  opinion-evidence  of  an expert  to  the  same  class  of  evidence  as  that  of  an accomplice  and   insist  upon   corroboration.   The   view occasionally expressed  that it would be hazardous to base a conviction solely  on the  opinion of  an expert-handwriting expert or  any  other  kind  of  expert-without  substantial corroboration  is  not,  because  experts  in  general,  are unreliable witnesses,  but because  all  human  judgment  is fallible. The more developed and the more perfect a science,

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the less  the chance of an incorrect opinion. The science of identification  of   handwriting  unlike   the  science   of identification of  finger prints  which has  attained  near- perfection is  not quite perfect and the risk is, therefore, higher. But that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of a handwriting expert  as an invariable rule and insisting upon substantial  corroboration  in  every  case,  howsoever  the opinion may  be backed by the soundest of reasons. An expert opinion has to be tested by the acceptability of the reasons given by him. An expert deposes and not decides. His duty is to furnish  the judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing  the accuracy  of his conclusion so as to enable the judge  to form  his  own  independent  judgment  by  the application  of  these  criteria  to  the  facts  proved  in evidence. [253 A-G] 250      2. There  is no  rule of  law nor  any rule of prudence which has  crystalized into  a  rule  of  law  that  opinion evidence of  a hand-writing  expert must never be acted upon unless substantially  corroborated. But having due regard to the imperfect  nature of  the science  of identification  of handwriting, the  approach should be one of caution. Reasons for the  opinion must  be carefully probed and examined. All other relevant  evidence must  be considered. In appropriate cases, corroboration  may be  sought.  In  cases  where  the reasons for  the opinion  are convincing  and  there  is  no reliable  evidence  throwing  a  doubt,  the  uncorroborated testimony of  a handwriting  expert may  be accepted.  There cannot be  an inflexible  rule on  a matter  which,  in  the ultimate analysis, is no more than a question of testimonial weight. [258 A-D]      3. Section  73 of  Evidence Act  expressly enables  the court to  compare disputed  writings with admitted or proved writings to  ascertain whether  a writing  is  that  of  the person by  whom it  purports to  have been  written.  If  is hazardous to  do so,  it is  one of  the hazards  to which a judge  and  litigant  must  expose  themselves  whenever  it becomes necessary. In cases where both sides call experts it becomes the  plain duty of the court to compare the writings and come  to its  own conclusion.  Where  there  are  expert opinions, they  will aid  the Court. Where there is none the Court will  have to  seek guidance  from some  authoritative text book and the Court’s own experience and knowledge. [258 D-G]      Ram Chander  v. U.P.  State A.I.R.  1957  S.C.  Ishwari Prasad Misra  v. Mohammed  Isa [1963]  3, S.C.R. 722; Shashi Kumar v.  Subhodh Kumar, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 529; Fakhruddin v. State of  Madhya Pradesh,  A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1326=(1967) Crl. L.J. 1197;  Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1091, referred to.      In the  instant case  the  courts  below  compared  the disputed  handwriting  with  the  admitted  writing  of  the appellant and  found, in conjunction with the opinion of the expert, that the author of the note was the same person. The appellant was  not able  to say  a word  against the reasons given by the expert. [259 A]      (b) The  note was  designed to  lay a  false  trail  by making it  appear that  the murder  and the robbery were the handiwork  of   some  frustrated  and  unemployed  graduates expressing their  resentment against  the  world  which  had shown no regard for their existence. [259 C]      (c) Had the recovery of the wrist watch of the deceased in February,  1973 at the instance of the appellant been the only circumstance  it would  have been  difficult to link it with the  murder which  took place  ten  months  earlier  in

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April, 1972.  But there  is the  vital circumstance  that  a writing made  by the appellant was found on the table by the side  of  the  deceased  on  the  day  of  occurrence.  This circumstance, coupled  with the  recovery of  the dead man’s watch, was  sufficient to  hold him guilty of the offence of which he had man’s convicted. [259 G]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 1975.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 15-1-1974 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 903/73.      R. L.  Kohli, S. K. Gambhir and Miss B. Ramrakhiani for the Appellant. 251      H. K. Puri and V. K. Bhat for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHINNAPPA REDDY,  J.-Murari Lal,  who was accused No. 2 before the  Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, was convicted under s. 302 I.P.C.  and sentenced  to death.  He was  also convicted under s.  460 read  with ss.  34, 457, 380, 392, 394 and 397 I.P.C. but sentenced under s. 460 read with s. 34 and s. 394 read with  s. 397 only to rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7  years on  each count.  On appeal  by Murari Lal and on reference by  the learned  Sessions Judge, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh  altered the conviction from s. 302 I.P.C. to s. 302  read with  s. 34 I.P.C. and substituted the sentence of  imprisonment   for  life  for  the  sentence  of  death. Otherwise the appeal was dismissed. Murari Lal has preferred this appeal by special leave of this Court.      H. D. Sonawala (the deceased) used to live alone in one of  the   two  ‘quarters’  in  the  compound  of  the  Parsi Dharamshala at Jabalpur. He was the Area Organiser of Cherak Pharmaceuticals Company of Bombay. On the night of 12-7-1972 he went  out to  dinner at  the house of P.W. 2 and returned home at  about midnight.  He retired  for  the  night.  Next morning, his  driver PW 9 and his servant P.W. 6 came to the house in  the usual  course to  attend to  their duties. The gate was  found locked.  They called  out their  master  but there was  no response. P.W. 6 who also had a key opened the lock and  went inside.  Sonawala was  found murdered  in his bed. A  first information  report was  given at  the  police station Omti,  Jabalpur. The Station House Officer, P.W. 28, came to  the scene, found things in the room strewn about in a pell-mell  condition. He  seized various  articles. One of the articles  so seized  was a prescription pad Ex. P. 9. On pages A  to F  of Ex.  P. 9,  there  were  writings  of  the deceased but  on page  G, there  was a  writing in  Hindi in pencil which was as follows :                                              Translated into English it  means :     "Though we have passed B.A., we have not secured  any employment  because there  is none to care. This is the consequence. sd/- Balle Singh." The dead body of Sonawala was  sent to  the Medical  Officer for  post-mortem examination. There  was an  incised wound on the neck 7 1/2" long, the  maximum width  of which  was 2"  of  tissues  and vessels upto the trachea were cut. Trachea was also cut. For several months  after  the  discovery  of  the  murder,  the investigation made  no progress  till 18-2-1973. On that day pursuant 252 to information received in connection with one other case of

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theft, in  which one Roop Chand appeared to be involved, the Station House  Officer secured the presence of Petrick (A-1) and questioned. Petrick made a statement and led them to his room from  which two  choppers and  as many  as 234 items of stolen property  were seized. We may mention that out of the 234 items  so seized,  only two  were alleged  to belong  to Sonawala, one was a tie-pin and the other was a cheque-book. Thereafter, the  house of  Petrick’s father Gabriel was also searched and  310 items  of stolen  property were recovered, none of which has anything to do with this case. On 19-2-73, Murari Lal  (A-2)  said  to  be  a  friend  of  Petrick  was questioned. He made a statement and led them to the house of his maternal-uncle  Suraj Prasad (A-4). Murari Lal asked his uncle to produce the wrist-watch, which was done. The wrist- watch had some special characteristics of its own and it was later duly identified by unimpeachable evidence as belonging to the deceased. Specimen writings Ex. P. 41 to Ex. P. 54 of Murari Lal  were obtained.  They were  sent to a handwriting and finger-print  expert P.W.15  along with the prescription pad Ex.  P. 9,  for his opinion. The expert gave his opinion that the  writing in  Hindi at  page of  Ex. P.  9  and  the specimen writings  of P.  41 to  P. 54 were made by the same person. Petrick,  Murari Lal,  Gabriel and Suraj Prasad were tried by  the  learned  Sessions  Judge.  Suraj  Prasad  was acquitted. Gabriel  was convicted  under s. 411. Petrick and Murari Lal  were both  convicted under  s.  302  I.P.C.  and sentenced to  death as  already mentioned.  The sentence  of death passed  on Petrick  and  Murari  Lal  was  altered  to imprisonment for  life by  the High  Court. Petrick  has not further appealed but Murari Lal has.      The two  vital circumstances  against Murari  Lal were: (1) the  recovery of  a wrist-watch  which belonged  to  the deceased Sonawala  and (2) the writing in Hindi at page G of Ex.  P.  9,  which  was  found  to  be  in  his  handwriting indicating his  presence in the house of the deceased on the night of  the murder and his participation in the commission of the  offences. Shri  R. C. Kohli, learned counsel for the appellant, argued  that the  recovery of the wrist-watch was too remote  in point  of time  to connect the appellant with the crime. He further argued that the High Court fell into a grave error  in concluding that the writing at page G of Ex. P. 9  was that  of the  appellant.  He  submitted  that  the evidence of  P.W. 8  who claimed  to be  familiar  with  the handwriting of  the appellant  was wholly unacceptable, that it was not permissible in law to act upon the uncorroborated opinion-evidence of  the expert  P.W. 15  and that  the High Court fell into a serious error in attempting to compare the writing in  Ex. P.  9  with  the  admitted  writing  of  the appellant. 253      We will  first consider  the argument, a stale argument often heard,  particularly  in  criminal  courts,  that  the opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert should not be acted upon without  substantial corroboration.  We shall presently point out  how the argument cannot be justified on principle or precedent.  We begin  with observation that the expert is no accomplice.  There is no justification for condemning his opinion-evidence to the same class of evidence as that of an accomplice and  insist  upon  corroboration.  True,  it  has occasionally been  said on very high authority that it would be hazardous to base a conviction solely on the opinion of a handwriting expert. But, the hazard in accepting the opinion of any  expert, handwriting  expert or  any  other  kind  of expert, is  not because  experts, in general, are unreliable witnesses-the quality  of credibility or incredibility being

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one which  an expert  shares with  all other witnesses-, but because all  human judgment is fallible and an expert may go wrong because  of some  defect of observation, some error of premises or honest mistake of conclusion. The more developed and the  more perfect  a science,  the less the chance of an incorrect opinion  and the  converse if  the science is less developed and  imperfect. The  science of  identification of finger-prints has  attained near  perfection and the risk of an incorrect  opinion is  practically non-existent.  On  the other hand,  the science of identification of handwriting is not nearly  so perfect  and the  risk is, therefore, higher. But that  is a  far cry  from  doubting  the  opinion  of  a handwriting expert  as an invariable rule and insisting upon substantial  corroboration  in  every  case,  howsoever  the opinion may  be backed  by the  soundest of  reasons. It  is hardly fair to an expert to view his opinion with an initial suspicion and  to treat  him as an inferior sort of witness. His opinion  has to  be tested  by the  acceptability of the reasons given by him. An expert deposes and not decides. His duty ‘is  to furnish the judge with the necessary scientific criteria for  testing the  accuracy of his conclusion, so as to enable  the judge to form his own independent judgment by the application  of these  criteria to  the facts  proved in evidence’. (vide Lord President Cooper in Dacie v. Edinbeagh Magistrate :  1953 S. C. 34 quoted by Professor Cross in his Evidence).      From the  earliest  times,  courts  have  received  the opinion of  experts. As  long ago  as 1553  it was  said  in Buckley v. Rice-Thomas(1) :           "If matters  arise in  our law which concern other      sciences or faculties, we commonly apply for the aid of      that science  or faculty  which it  concerns. This is a      commendable thing  in our  law. For  thereby it appears      that we do not dismiss 254      all other  sciences but our own, but we approve of them      and encourage them as things worthy of commendation."      Expert testimony  is made  relevant by  s.  45  of  the Evidence Act and where the Court has to form an opinion upon a point  as to  identity of  handwriting, the  opinion of  a person ‘specially  skilled’ ‘in  questions as to identity of handwriting’ is  expressly made  a relevant  fact. There  is nothing  in   the  Evidence   Act,  as   for  example   like illustration (b)  to s.  114 which  entitles  the  Court  to presume that  an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated  in material particulars which justifies the court in  assuming that  a handwriting  expert’s opinion  is unworthy of  credit unless  corroborated. The  Evidence  Act itself (s.  3) tells  us that  ‘a fact  is said to be proved when, after  considering the  matters before  it, the  Court either believes  it to  exist or  considers its existence so probable that  a prudent  man ought, under the circumstances of the  particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists’. It is necessary to occasionally remind ourselves of this interpretation  clause in  the Evidence Act lest we set an  artificial  standard  of  proof  not  warranted  by  the provisions of the Act. Further, under s. 114 of the Evidence Act, the  Court may  presume the existence of any fact which it thinks  likely to  have happened, regard being had to the common course  of natural  events, human conduct, and public and private  business, in  their relation  to facts  of  the particular case.  It is also to be noticed that s. 46 of the Evidence Act  makes facts,  not otherwise relevant, relevant if they  support or  are inconsistent  with the  opinions of experts, when  such opinions are relevant. So, corroboration

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may not  invariably be  insisted upon  before acting  on the opinion of  handwriting expert  and there need be no initial suspicion. But,  on the  facts of a particular case, a court may require  corroboration of a varying degree. There can be no  hard  and  fast  rule,  but  nothing  will  justify  the rejection  of   the  opinion   of  an  expert  supported  by unchallenged reasons  on the  sole ground  that  it  is  not corroborated. The approach of a court while dealing with the opinion  of  a  handwriting  expert  should  be  to  proceed cautiously, probe  the reasons for the opinion, consider all other relevant  evidence and  decide finally  to  accept  or reject it.      Apart from  principle, let  us  examine  if  precedents justify invariable  insistence  on  corroboration.  We  have referred to  Phipson on  Evidence, Cross on Evidence, Roscoe on  Criminal  Evidence,  Archibald  on  Criminal  Pleadings, Evidence and  Practice and Halsbury’s Laws of England but we were unable  to find  a single  sentence hinting  at such  a rule. We may now refer to some of the decisions of this 255 Court. In  Ram Chander  v. U.P. State,(1) Jagannatha Das, J. observed :  "It may be that normally it is not safe to treat expert evidence  as to  handwriting as  sufficient basis for conviction" (emphasis  ours) "May"  and "normally"  make our point about  the absence  of an  inflexible rule. In Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohammed Isa,(2) Gajendragadkar, J. observed : "Evidence  given by  experts can never conclusive, because after all it is opinion evidence", a statement which carries us nowhere on the question now under consideration. Nor, can the statement  be disputed  because it is not so provided by the Evidence Act and, on the contrary, s. 46 expressly makes opinion   evidence   challengeable   by   facts,   otherwise irrelevant. And  as Lord  President Cooper observed in Davie v. Edinburgh  Magistrate :  "The parties  have  invoked  the decision  of   a  judicial  tribunal  and  not  an  oracular pronouncement by an expert".      In Shashi  Kumar v. Subodh Kumar,(3) Wanchoo, J., after noticing various  features of the opinion of the expert said :           "We do  not consider  in the circumstances of this      case that  the evidence of the expert is conclusive and      can falsify the evidence of the attesting witnesses and      also the  circumstances which go to show that this will      must have  been signed  in 1943  as it  purports to be.      Besides  it  is  necessary  to  observe  that  expert’s      evidence as  to handwriting  is opinion evidence and it      can rarely,  if ever  take  the  place  of  substantive      evidence. Before acting on such evidence it is usual to      see if  it  is  corroborated  either  by  clear  direct      evidence or  by circumstantial evidence. In the present      case the probabilities are against the expert’s opinion      and the direct testimony of the two attesting witnesses      which we accept is wholly inconsistent with it".      So, there  was acceptable  direct testimony  which  was destructive  of   the  expert’s  opinion;  there  are  other features also  which made  the expert’s  opinion unreliable. The observation regarding corroboration must be read in that context and it is worthy of note that even so the expression used was ‘it is usual’ and not "it is necessary’.      In  Fakhruddin   v.   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh,(4) Hidayatullah, J. said :           "Both under  s. 45  and s.  47 the  evidence is an      opinion, in  the former  by a scientific comparison and      in the latter on the 256

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    basis   of    familiarity   resulting   from   frequent      observations and  experience. In  either case the Court      must satisfy  itself by such means as are open that the      opinion may  be acted  upon. One such means open to the      Court is  to apply  its own observation to the admitted      or  proved  writings  and  to  compare  them  with  the      disputed one,  not to  become an handwriting expert but      to verify  the premises  of the  expert in the one case      and  to  comparison  depends  on  an  analysis  of  the      characteristics in appraise the value of the opinion in      the other case. This the admitted or proved writing and      the  finding  of  the  same  characteristics  in  large      measure in  the  disputed  writing.  In  this  way  the      opinion of  the deponent  whether expert  or  other  is      subjected to  scrutiny and  although relevant  to start      with becomes  probative. Where  an expert’s  opinion is      given, the  Court must  see for  itself  and  with  the      assistance of  the expert  come to  its own  conclusion      whether it can safely be held that the two writings are      by the  same person.  This is not to say that the Court      must play  the role  of an  expert but  to say that the      Court may  accept the  fact proved  only  when  it  has      satisfied itself on its own observation that it is safe      to accept  the opinion  whether of  the expert or other      witness."      These observations  lend no  support to any requirement as to  corroboration of expert testimony. On the other hand, the facts  show that  the Court  ultimately did act upon the uncorroborated testimony  of the  expert though these Judges took the precaution of comparing the writings themselves.      Finally, we  come to  Magan  Bihari  Lal  v.  State  of Punjab,(1) upon  which Sri  R. C.  Kohli,  learned  counsel, placed great reliance. It was said by this Court :           "......but  we   think  it   would  be   extremely      hazardous  to  condemn  the  appellant  merely  on  the      strength of  opinion evidence  of a handwriting expert.      It is  now well settled that expert opinion must always      be received with great caution and perhaps none so with      more caution  than the opinion of a handwriting expert.      There is  a profusion  of presidential  authority which      holds that  it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on      expert opinion  without substantial corroboration. This      rule has  been universally acted upon and it has almost      become a  rule of law. It was held by this Court in Ram      Chandra v. State of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 381 that it is 257      unsafe  to   treat  expert   handwriting   opinion   as      sufficient basis  for conviction,  but it may be relied      upon when  supported by  other items  of  internal  and      external evidence.  This Court  again  pointed  out  in      Ishwari Prasad v. Md. Isa, AIR 1963 SC 1728 that expert      evidence of handwriting can never be conclusive because      it is,  after all  opinion evidence,  and this view was      reiterated in Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar, AIR 1964 SC      529 where  it  was  pointed  out  by  this  Court  that      expert’s  evidence  as  to  handwriting  being  opinion      evidence  can  rarely,  if  ever,  take  the  place  of      substantive  evidence   and  before   acting  on   such      evidence, it  would be desirable to consider whether it      is corroborated  either by  clear direct evidence or by      circumstantial evidence.  This Court had again occasion      to consider the evidentially value of expert opinion in      regard to  handwriting in  Fakhruddin v. State of M.P.,      AIR 1967  SC 1326  and it  uttered a  note  of  caution      pointing  out  that  it  would  be  risky  to  found  a

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    conviction solely  on the  evidence  of  a  handwriting      expert and  before acting upon such evidence, the court      must always  try to  see whether  it is corroborated by      other evidence, direct or circumstantial." The above  extracted  passage,  undoubtedly,  contains  some sweeping general  observations. But we do not think that the observations  were  meant  to  be  observations  of  general application or  as laying  down any  legal principle. It was plainly intended  to be  a rule of caution and not a rule of law as  is clear  from the statement ‘it has almost become a rule of  law’. "Almost",  we presume,  means "not quite". It was said by the Court there was a "profusion of presidential authority" which  insisted upon  corroboration and reference was made  to Ram Chandra v. State of U.P., Ishwari Prasad v. Mohammed Isa, Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar and Fakhruddin v. State of M.P. (supra). We have already discussed these cases and observed that none of them supports the proposition that corroboration  must  invariably  be  sought  before  opinion evidence can  be accepted.  There appears to be some mistake in the  last sentence of the above extracted passage because we are  unable to  find in  Fakhruddin v.  State  of  M.  P. (supra) any  statement such  as the one attributed. In fact, in that  case,  the  learned  Judges  acted  upon  the  sole testimony of  the expert  after satisfying  themselves about the correctness  of the  opinion by  comparing the  writings themselves. We  do think  that  the  observations  in  Magan Bihari Lal  v. State of Punjab (supra) must be understood as referring to the facts of the particular case. 258      We are  firmly of  the opinion that there is no rule of law, nor  any rule  of prudence which has crystalized into a rule of  law, that  opinion evidence of a handwriting expert must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated. But, having  due regard  to  the  imperfect  nature  of  the science of  identification of  handwriting, the approach, as we indicated  earlier, should be one of caution. Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed and examined. All other relevant evidence  must be considered. In appropriate cases, corroboration may  be sought. In cases where the reasons for the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing  a   doubt,  the  uncorroborated  testimony  of  an handwriting expert  may be  accepted. There  cannot  be  any inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate analysis, is no  more than  a question  of testimonial weight. We have said so much because this is an argument frequently met with in subordinate courts and sentences torn out of context from the judgments of this Court are often flaunted.      The argument  that the  court  should  not  venture  to compare writings  itself, as  it  would  thereby  assume  to itself the  role of  an expert  is entirely  without  force. Section 73  of the  Evidence Act expressly enables the Court to  compare   disputed  writings  with  admitted  or  proved writings to  ascertain whether  a writing  is  that  of  the person by  whom it  purports to  have been written. If it is hazardous to  do so,  as sometimes said, we are afraid it is one of  the hazards  to which judge and litigant must expose themselves whenever it becomes necessary. There may be cases where both  sides call experts and two voices of science are heard. There  may be  cases  where  neither  side  calls  an expert, being  ill able to afford him. In all such cases, it becomes the  plain duty of the Court to compare the writings and come  to its  own conclusion. The duty cannot be avoided by recourse  to the  statement that  the court is no expert. Where there  are expert  opinions they  will aid  the Court. Where there  is none,  the Court  will have to seek guidance

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from  some   authoritative  textbook  and  the  Court’s  own experience and  knowledge. But  discharge it must, its plain duty,  with   or  without  expert,  with  or  without  other evidence. We  may mention  that Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar and Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) were cases where the Court itself compared the writings.      Reverting to the facts of the case before us, Sri Kohli had not  a word  of criticism  to offer  against the reasons given by  the expert  P.W. 15,  for  his  opinion.  We  have perused the  reasons given  by the  expert as  well  as  his cross-examination. Nothing  has been  elicited to  throw the least doubt on the correctness of the opinion. Both the 259 Sessions Court  and the  High Court  compared  the  disputed writing at page G in Ex. P. 9 with the admitted writings and found, in  conjunction with  the opinion of the expert, that the another  was the  same person. We are unable to find any ground for disagreeing with the finding.      We may  at this  juncture consider  the argument of Sri Kohli that  the internal  evidence afforded  by the document showed that the appellant was not its author. He argued that the appellant  was not even a matriculate whereas the author of the  document had  described himself  as a graduate. And, what necessity  was there for a murderer and robber to write a note  like that,  questioned Mr.  Kohli. It  appears to us that the note was designed to lay a false trail by making it appear that the murder and the robbery were the handiwork of some frustrated  and unemployed  young graduates, expressing their resentment against the world which had shown no regard for their existence.      The other  important circumstance against the appellant was the  recovery of the deceased’s watch at the appellant’s instance. That  the deceased  was the owner of the watch was not disputed  before us. That the watch was recovered at the instance of  the appellant  was also not disputed before us. What was  urged was  that there  was no reason to reject the explanation given by the appellant in his statement under s. 313 Cr.  P. C.  that he  had purchased  the watch  from Roop Chand. Apart  from his  statement, there  is nothing  in the evidence to  substantiate his  case. On  the other  hand, we think that,  having come  to know that the statement of Roop Chand in  connection with  the  investigation  into  another theft case  had led  the police  to interrogate Patrick, the appellant very  cleverly tried to foist previous possessions of the  watch on  Roop Chand.  We are not prepared to accept the appellant’s  explanation. Even  so, it  was  urged,  the recovery was  too remote  in point of time to be linked with the robbery  and the  murder. It  is true  that there  was a considerable time-lag.  We might  have found it difficult to link the  recovery of  the watch  with the  robbery and  the murder had this been the only circumstance. But, we have the other  vital   circumstance  that  a  writing  made  by  the appellant was  left on the deceased’s table that night. That circumstance coupled  with the  recovery of  the dead  man’s watch at  the instance  of the appellant, are sufficient, in our opinion, in the absence of any acceptable explanation to hold the  appellant guilty  of the  offences of which he has been convicted. The appeal is dismissed. P. B. R.                                   Appeal dismissed. 260