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PETITIONER: MUNSHI & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RICHPAL & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/02/1977

BENCH: SINGH, JASWANT BENCH: SINGH, JASWANT KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1206            1977 SCR  (3)   1  1977 SCC  (2) 665

ACT:         Pepsu  Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955--Ss.  7  and         7A--Scope of.

HEADNOTE:             Section  7 of the Pepsu  Tenancy and Agricultural  Lands         Act, 1955, which deals with termination of tenancy, provides         that  no tenancy  shall be ’terminated except on any of  the         grounds mentioned in the section. Section 7 gives additional         grounds for termination of tenancy in certain cases.             Respondent  no.  2  sold his  land  to  the  appellants.         Claiming that he was a non-occupancy tenant under respondent         no.  2, respondent no. 1 filed a suit for possession of  the         land  by pre-emption.  The trial Court decreed the  suit  in         favour of the plaintiff-pre-emptor holding that he had  been         a  tenant-at-will  on the date of the sale and that  he  was         forcibly dispossessed after the sale.             The District Judge as well as the High Court upheld  the         trial Court’s decision.             It  was contended on behalf of the appellants  that  the         pre-emptor had  to prove his subsisting right of pre-emption         on  the  date of sale, date of institution Of the  suit  and         date  of passing of the decree and since the  plaintiff  had         failed to file a suit for recovery of possession under s. 50         of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 his right and title had been         extinguished.         Dismissing the appeal,             HELD:  The  plaintiff  cannot but be deemed  to  be  the         tenant  of the  suit land on the date of sale as well as  on         all  other  material dates and is thus fully  qualified  and         entitled to pre-empt the land. [5H]             The point now sought to be raised was not raised by  the         appellant in the Courts below.  In view of the provisions of         ss.  7  and 7A of the Pepsu Tenancy and  Agricultural  Lands         Act, 1955, which have an over-riding effect and the decision         of this Court in Rikki Ram & Anr v. Ram Kumar & Ors [1975] 2         SCC  318 it cannot be disputed that an order or  decree  di-         recting eviction of a tenant is necessary to be obtained  to         bring  about a determination of  the tenancy.   A  fortiori,         the  person who has been in possession of the land with  the         right  to  possess it continues to hold the land  and  be  a         tenant in spite of having been wrongfully put out of posses-

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       sion specially if he has initiated proceedings for  recovery         of possession. [3E & 5F]             Since  in  the instant case, it  has  been  concurrently         found by the Courts below that the plaintiff-pre-emptor  was         a  tenant of the suit land  on  the date of sale and it  has         not been alleged that his tenancy was thereafter  determined         or terminated on any of the grounds set out in ss. 7 and  7A         of  the Act and the plaintiff had applied to  the  Tehsildar         for restoration of possession, he could not but be deemed to         be a tenant of the suit land on the date of the sale as well         as on all other material dates and thus fully qualified  and         entitled to pre-empt the land.  [5G]         Rikki  Ram  & Anr. v. Ram Kumar & Ors. [1975] 2  S.C.C.  318         followed.             Bhagwan Das v. Chet Ram [1971] 2 S.C.R. 640 and  Dindyal         & Anr. v. Rajaram [1971] 1 S.C.R. 298 referred to.         2

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Civil Appeal No. 2054/69.             (Appeal  by  Special Leave from the Judgment  and  Order         dated  the 5-8-1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court  in         Regular Second Appeal No. 983 of 1969).             V.C.  Mahajan,  Mrs. Urmila Kapoor   and   Miss  Kamlesh         Bansal, for the appellants.         Ram  Sarup and R. A. Gupta, for respondent No. 1. The  Judg-         ment of the Court was delivered by             JASWANT SINGH, J. This appeal by special leave which  is         directed against the judgment and order dated September  24,         1969, of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh,         passed  in  R.S.A. No. 983 of 1969 arises in  the  following         circumstances :-             Bhawani  Dass, respondent No. 2 herein, who owned  agri-         cultural land measuring 50 kanals and 6 mafias comprised  in         Khewat  No.  223, Khatauni No. 467-468, situate  in  village         Kohlawas,   Tehsil  Dadri, District Mohindergarh,  sold  the         same to Munshi, Dina and Rani Dutt, appellants before us, in         lieu  of Rs.10,000/- by means of registered sale deed  (Ext.         D-1)  dated  October 17, 1966.  Alleging that he held  as  a         non-occupancy tenant under Bhawani Dass  the  aforementioned         land  on  the  date of its sale to the  appellants  and  had         continued  to do so and as such had a preferential right  of         its  purchase under clause Fourthly of section  15(1)(a)  of         the  Punjab  Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab Act  1  of  1913)         which  still applies to the State of Haryana,  Richpal,  re-         spondent  No. 1 herein, brought a suit on October  17,  1967         for  possession  of the said’ land by  pre-emption,  in  the         Court of the Sub-Judge, Charkhi Dadri.  The suit was resist-         ed  by the appellants contending inter alia that the  plain-         tiff-respondent  was  neither a nonoccupancy tenant  of  the         land  in question under Bhawani Dass, vendor, nor was he  in         possession  of the land either on the day of  the  aforesaid         sale  or on the day of the institution off the suit.   After         settling   the necessary issues and recording  the  evidence         adduced  by  the parties, the trial court  by  its  judgment         dated  February 1, 1969, decreed the suit in favour  of  the         plaintiff-pre-emptor on payment of Rs. 10,000/- (the consid-         eration  of  the aforesaid sale) plus Rs. 727/-  (the  costs         incurred by the vendees-appellants on the stamps,  registra-         tion  fee  etc.) holding that he had been  a  tenant-at-will         under  the vendor from Kharif, 1957 to Rabi, 1968;  that  he         was  forcibly  dispossessed after the  sale;  that  wrongful         eviction  of a tenant could be of no consequence in the  eye

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       of law; that the plaintiff-pre-emptor continued to hold  his         rights as a tenant, including the right to immediate posses-         sion and cultivation of the land notwithstanding his  wrong-         ful ouster therefrom by the vendees who could not be allowed         to take advantage of their own wrongs and the former must be         deemed to continue in legal possession of the land which was         comprised in his tenancy under the vendor on the date of the         sale  right  upto the date of the suit and the date  of  the         decree  of the trial court in his favour.  The  trial  court         further  held   that  ’a tenant’s eviction can only  be  had         under sections 7 and  7A  of  the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricul-         tural Lands Act, 1955, and there is nothing on the record of         the case to even insinuate that the plaintiff’s tenancy         3         which  subsisted at the time of the impugned sale  was  ever         determined  or terminated under section 7 or 7A of  the  Act         and the plaintiff who was in physical possession of the land         in  suit  as a tenant at the time    of the sale has  to  be         taken to be in legal possession up till the present moment’.         In  conclusion,  the trial could held that the mere  act  of         forcible  dispossession of the plaintiff-pre-emptor  at  the         hands  of  the  vendees after the sale could  not  have  the         effect of divesting him of his right to hold the land  which         he had acquired as a tenant of the vendor and in the eye  of         law he must be presumed to have continued to be a tenant all         along  and as such had a preferential right of  pre-emption.         The  judgment  and  decree passed by  the  trial  court  was         affirmed   in  appeal not only by  the  Additional  District         Judge,  Gurgaon,  but  also by a learned  Single  Judge  and         Letters  Patent Bench of the High Court. Aggrieved by  these         decisions  the vendees-appellants have, as  already  stated,         come up in further appeal to this Court.             The  sole point that has been urged before us on  behalf         of   the appellants is that as according to the decision  of         this Court in Bhagwan Das v. Chet Ram(1) the  plaintiff-pre-         emptor  has to prove his subsisting right of pre-emption  on         all  the three material dates viz.(1) the date of sale,  (2)         the  date  of institution of the suit and (3)  the  date  of         passing of the decree and in the instant case, he failed  to         file a suit in the revenue court for recovery of  possession         of the suit land within one year of the date of his  dispos-         session as contemplated by section 50 of the Punjab  Tenancy         Act  1887   not  only  his  remedy  was  destroyed  but  his         right and title was also extinguished at the expiry of  that         period  on the general principles underlying section  27  of         the Limitation Act, 1963, which may not in terms be applica-         ble to the present case.  Though the learned counsel for the         appellants  cited a few cases in support of  his  contention         but  did not unfortunately bring to our notice the  decision         of this Court in Dindyal & Anr. v. Raja Ram (2) which may in         an  appropriate  case require reconsideration  by  a  larger         bench of this Court, we think, he cannot be allowed  canvass         the aforesaid point.  A reference to the record of the  case         shows that the point now sought to be agitated before us was         not raised by the appellants either in their written  state-         ment  or  in the grounds of the three appeals  preferred  by         them  before  the courts below.  All that appeals  from  the         record  to  have. been urged by them in the grounds  of  the         aforesaid appeals was that the evidence had not been proper-         ly  appraised and that in the absence of any lease  deed  in         his favour or any receipt evidencing payment of rent by  him         to  the vendor, mere entries in the khasra girdawaries  were         not enough to establish that the plaintiff-pre-emptor was  a         tenant of the suit land under the vendor at the time of  the         sale.   The  suit land being situate in  the   district   of

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       Mohindergarh  which  formed part of the territories  of  the         erstwhile  of  Pepsu, the case, as rightly observed  by  the         court  of first instance, was governed by sections 7 and  7A         of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, which         in  view of section 4 of that Act have an overriding  effect         and provide as under :--                       "4.  Act  to over ride  other  laws--Save,  as                       otherwise expressly provided in this Act,  the                       provisions                       of this   Act                         (1) [1971] 2 S.C.R. 640.                         (2) [1971] 1 S.C.R. 298.                       4                       shall  have  effect  notwithstanding  anything                       inconsistent therewith contained in any  other                       law for the time being in force or any instru-                       ment  having effect by virtue of any such  law                       or  any usage, agreement,  settlement,  grant,                       sanad  or  any decree or order of any court or                       other authority.                             7.   Termination  of  tenancy.--(1)   No                       tenancy shall be terminated except in  accord-                       ance with the provisions of this Act or except                       of any of the following grounds, namely :--                          (b) that the tenant has failed to pay  rent                       within  a period of six months after it  falls                       due;                             Provided that no tenant shall be ejected                       under this clause unless he has been  afforded                       an  opportunity  to pay the  arrears  of  rent                       within a further period of six months from the                       date  of  the decree or  order  directing  his                       ejectment  and he had failed to pay  such  ar-                       rears during that period;                          (c)  that the tenant, not being a widow,  a                       minor,  an  unmarried woman, a member  of  the                       Armed Forces of the Union or a person  incapa-                       ble of cultivating land by reason of  physical                       or  mental infirmity  has  after  commencement                       of  the  President’s Act  sublet  without  the                       consent in writing of the landowner, the  land                       comprising his tenancy or any part thereof;                          (d) that the tenant has, without sufficient                       cause,  failed  to cultivate  personally  such                       land in the manner and to the extent customary                       in the locality in Which such land is  situat-                       ed;                          (e)  that the tenant has used such land  or                       any  part thereof in a manner which is  likely                       to  render the land unfit for the purpose  for                       which it was leased to him;                          (f)  that the tenant, on demand in  writing                       by  the  landowner, has refused to  execute  a                       kabuliyat  agreeing to pay rent in respect  of                       his tenancy in accordance with the  provisions                       of sections 9 and 10.                       (2)..............................                             7A.  Additional grounds for  termination                       of  tenancy  in certain cases.--(1) Subject to                       the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3),  a                       tenancy subsisting at the commencement of  the                       Pepsu  Tenancy and Agricultural Lands  (Second                       Amendment)  Act,  1956 may be  terminated   on                       the   following  grounds in  addition  to  the                       grounds specified in  section  7, namely :-

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                        (a)  that the land comprising  the  tenancy                       has  been reserved by the land-owner  for  his                       personal  cultivation in accordance  with  the                       provisions of Chapter II:                          (b) that the landowner owns thirty standard                       acres   or  less of land and  the  land  falls                       within the permissible limit;                       5                             Provided that no tenant shall be ejected                       under this subsection--                          (i) from any area of land if the area under                       the  personal cultivation of the  tenant  does                       not exceed five standard acres,                          (ii)  from an area of five standard  acres,                       if the area under the personal cultivation  of                       the tenant exceeds  five standards acres.                       until  he is allowed by the  State  Government                       alternative land of equivalent value in stand-                       ard acres.                             (2) No tenant, who immediately preceding                       the   commencement of the President’s Act  has                       held  any  land continuously for a  period  of                       twelve years or more under the same land-owner                       or  his predecessor in title, shah be  ejected                       on the grounds specified in sub-section (1)-                          (a)  from  any area of land,  if  the  area                       under  the personal cultivation of the  tenant                       does  not  exceed  fifteen standards acres, or                          (b)  from  an  area  of  fifteen  standards                       acres, if the area under the personal cultiva-                       tion  of the tenant exceeds  fifteen  standard                       acres;                       provided  that  nothing  in  this  sub-section                       shall  apply to the tenant of a landowner  who                       both,  at  the commencement of the tenacy  and                       the commencement of  the  President’s Act, was                       a widow, a minor, an unmarried woman, a member                       of  the Armed Forces of the Union or a  person                       incapable  of  cultivating land by  reason  of                       physical or  mental infirmity.                           Explanation.--In  computing the period  of                       twelve years, the period during which any land                       has been held under the same land-owner or his                       predecessor in title by the father, brother or                       son of the tenant shall be included.                             (3)  For the purpose of computing  under                       sub-sections  (1)  and (2) the  area  of  land                       under  the personal cultivation of  a  tenant,                       any area of land owned by the tenant and under                       his personal cultivation shall be included."             It cannot, in view of the above noted provisions of law         and  the  decision of this Court in Rikh Ram & Anr.  v.  Ram         Kumar & Ors.(1) be disputed that an order or decree  direct-         ing  eviction  of a tenant is necessary to  be  obtained  to         bring about a determination of the tenancy.    A fortiori, a         person who has been in possession of land with the right  to         possess it continues to hold the ’land and to be a tenant in         spite of having been wrongfully put out of possession  espe-         cially   if  he  has initiated proceedings for  recovery  of         possession.   As in  the  instant case, it has been  concur-         rently   found   by   all  the   courts   below   that   the         plaintiff-pre-emptor  was a tenant of ’the suit land on  the         date of sale         (1) [1975] 2 S.c.c. 318.         6

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       and  it  has  not been alleged much  less  proved  that  his         tenancy  was, thereafter determined or terminated on any  of         the grounds set out in sections 7 and 7A of the Pepsu Tenan-         cy  and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 and he  had  admittedly         applied  to the Tehsildar for restoration    of his  posses-         sion,  he  cannot but be deemed to be a tenant of  the  suit         land on the date of the sale as well as on all other materi-         al  dates and thus fully qualified and entitled to  pre-empt         the  land.  We must fairly state that our judgment is  based         on the provisions  of  law brought to our notice by  counsel         and our conclusion is confined to the interpretation of  the         Acts referred to above.             For  the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit  in         this appeal which is dismissed.  In the circumstances of the         case,  we leave the parties to bear their own costs of  this         appeal.         P.B.R.                                                Appeal         dismissed.         7