REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1206 OF 2006   

Munigadappa Meenaiah …Appellant

Vs.

The State of Andhra Pradesh …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr.  ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge  in this appeal  is to  the  judgment  of  the

Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upholding

the conviction recorded by III Additional District and Sessions

Judge, Ranga Reddy District, holding the appellant guilty for

the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (in short ‘IPC’) and sentencing him imprisonment

for life.     

2.  Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:  

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The  accused  Munigadapa  Meenaiah  is  native  of

Thimmapuram,  Bommalaramaram  of  Nalgonda  District.  He

was  doing  fruit  business  at  Medchal.  Ten  years  back,  his

younger brother Mallaiah died.  After demise of Mallaiah, his

wife Yellamma (hereinafter referred to as the ‘deceased’), along

with her two sons took shelter at the house  of the accused.

During  that  period,  he  developed  illegal  intimacy  with  the

deceased  and both were  living together  and her  sons were

living separately. Suspecting the fidelity of the deceased, the

accused  used  to  pick  up  quarrels  with her,  as  a  result  of

which, he separated and took another portion at Medchal.

While so, the accused hatched up a plan to liquidate the

deceased. On 3.6.2001 at about 9.00 A.M. the accused went

to  the  house  of  deceased  and  invited  her  to  house  to

consume toddy and both of them went to the toddy shop of

PW 2, purchased two bottle of toddy and brought the same to

his house  in a tumbler and both of them consumed toddy.

While consuming toddy, the accused picked up quarrel with

the deceased on the ground of her chastity. As a consequence

of which the deceased grew wild and abused him by denying

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the  allegations of  illegal  contacts with others.  On that,  the

accused  brought  a  pestle  and  murdered  the  deceased  by

hitting the same on her head and laid the body on the road in

front of his house, cleaned the blood stains in the room and

tried to obliterate  the scientific evidence  so as to throw the

suspicion on other persons. On the report given by P.W.1, a

case  in Cr.  No.117  of  2001  of  Medchel  Police  Station  was

registered  for  the  offence  under  Section 302 IPC and after

completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed.

Accused  abjured  guilt  and  demanded  trial.   The

prosecution examined 10 witnesses, and marked Exs P 1 to P

21 and Mos 1 to 5. On the other hand, no oral evidence was

adduced on behalf of the accused, Ex. D1 contradiction was

marked.

After scrutinizing the entire material on record and after

hearing the learned counsel on both sides, the learned District

Judge  found  the  accused  guilty  of  the  offence  punishable

under Section 302 IPC, convicted and sentenced him to suffer

imprisonment for life.  

3. The  Trial Court  placed  reliance  on  the  evidence  of

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PWs. 1 and 10 who spoke to have seen the deceased last in

the company of the appellant.  Reference was also made to the

evidence of PW5 relating to certain recoveries by PW. 19.  PW

2 also deposed to have seen accused and deceased together

when they purchased toddy and thereafter the dead body of

the deceased was found in front of the house of the accused

with injuries  on her  head  and other  parts of  the  body.   As

noted above, the learned Trial Court found the accused guilty.

4. Before the High Court the stand was that PWs. 1 and

10 are sons of the deceased and are interested witnesses and

should not have been believed. It was also submitted that the

circumstances highlighted do not make  a complete  chain of

circumstances.  The High Court did not find any substance in

the plea and dismissed the same by the impugned judgment.

5. In  support  of  the  appeal  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant reiterated the stands taken before the High Court.

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6. In response, learned counsel for the State supported

the judgment of the Trial Court and the High Court.   

7. We  shall  first  deal  with  the  contention  regarding

interestedness  of  the  witnesses  for  furthering  prosecution

version. Relationship is not a factor to affect  credibility of a

witness.  It is more often than not that a relation would not

conceal  actual  culprit  and  make  allegations  against  an

innocent person.  Foundation has to be  laid if plea  of false

implication is made.  In such cases, the court has to adopt a

careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it

is cogent and credible.

8. In Dalip Singh and Ors.  v. The State of Punjab (AIR

1953 SC 364) it has been laid down as under:-

“A  witness  is  normally  to  be  considered independent  unless  he  or  she  springs  from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate  him  falsely.   Ordinarily  a  close relation would be  the last to screen  the real culprit  and  falsely  implicate  an  innocent person.  It is true, when feelings run high and

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there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness  has a grudge  along with the  guilty, but foundation must be  laid for  such  a  criticism  and  the  mere  fact  of relationship  far  from  being  a  foundation  is often a sure guarantee of truth.  However, we are  not  attempting  any  sweeping generalization.  Each case must be judged on its own facts.  Our observations are only made to  combat  what  is  so  often  put  forward  in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be  limited  to  and  be  governed  by  its  own facts.”

9. The above  decision has since been  followed in  Guli

Chand and Ors. v.  State of Rajasthan (1974 (3) SCC 698) in

which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614)

was also relied upon.

10. We  may  also  observe  that  the  ground  that  the

witness  being  a  close  relative  and  consequently  being  a

partisan  witness,  should  not  be  relied  upon,  has  no

substance.  This theory was repelled by this Court as early as

in Dalip Singh’s case (supra) in which surprise was expressed

over  the  impression  which  prevailed  in  the  minds  of  the

Members  of  the  Bar  that  relatives  were  not  independent

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witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed:  

“We  are  unable  to  agree  with  the  learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the  two eyewitnesses  requires  corroboration. If  the  foundation for  such an observation is based  on  the  fact  that  the  witnesses  are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur.  This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of  this  Court  endeavoured  to  dispel  in  – ‘Rameshwar v.  State  of Rajasthan’ (AIR 1952 SC  54  at  p.59).   We  find,  however,  that  it unfortunately  still  persists,  if  not  in  the judgments  of  the  Courts,  at  any rate  in the arguments of counsel.”

11. Again in  Masalti and Ors.    v.  State  of  U.P.  (AIR

1965 SC 202) this Court observed: (p, 209-210 para 14):

“But it would,  we  think, be  unreasonable  to contend  that  evidence  given  by  witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is  evidence  of  partisan  or  interested witnesses.......The  mechanical  rejection  of such evidence  on the  sole  ground  that it  is partisan  would  invariably  lead  to  failure  of justice.   No  hard  and  fast  rule  can  be  laid down  as  to  how  much  evidence  should  be appreciated.   Judicial  approach  has  to  be cautious  in  dealing  with such evidence;  but the  plea  that  such  evidence  should  be rejected  because  it  is  partisan  cannot  be

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accepted as correct.”

12. To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab

v.  Jagir  Singh (AIR  1973  SC 2407)  and  Lehna v.  State  of

Haryana (2002 (3) SCC 76).  

13. As observed  by this Court in  State  of  Rajasthan v.

Teja Ram and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 1776) the over-insistence on

witnesses having no relation with the victims often results in

criminal justice going awry. When any incident happens in a

dwelling house  or nearby the most natural witnesses would

be the inmates of that house.  

14. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that

where  a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence,  the

inference  of  guilt  can  be  justified  only  when  all  the

incriminating  facts  and  circumstances  are  found  to  be

incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of

any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR

(1977 SC 1063);  Eradu and Ors. v.  State  of Hyderabad (AIR

1956  SC 316);  Earabhadrappa v.  State  of  Karnataka   (AIR

1983 SC 446);  State of U.P. v.  Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985

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SC 1224);  Balwinder Singh v.  State  of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC

350);  Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v.  State of M.P. (AIR 1989 SC

1890). The circumstances from which an inference  as to the

guilt  of  the  accused  is  drawn  have  to  be  proved  beyond

reasonable  doubt  and  have  to  be  shown  to  be  closely

connected  with the principal fact sought to be  inferred from

those circumstances. In  Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR

1954 SC 621), it was laid down that where the case depends

upon  the  conclusion  drawn  from  circumstances  the

cumulative  effect  of  the  circumstances  must be  such as to

negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences

home beyond any reasonable doubt.

15. We may also make a reference  to a decision of this

Court in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P. (1996) 10

SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus:

“In a case based  on circumstantial evi- dence,  the  settled  law  is  that  the  circum- stances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be  fully proved  and such cir- cumstances  must  be  conclusive  in  nature. Moreover,  all  the  circumstances  should  be

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complete  and there  should be  no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved cir- cumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and to- tally inconsistent with his innocence....”.

16. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors.  (AIR

1990 SC 79), it was laid down that when a case rests upon

circumstantial  evidence,  such  evidence  must  satisfy  the

following tests:  

“(1) the  circumstances  from  which  an

inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must

be cogently and firmly established;

(2) those  circumstances  should  be  of  a

definite  tendency unerringly pointing towards

guilt of the accused;

(3) the  circumstances,  taken

cumulatively should form a chain so complete

that  there  is  no  escape  from the  conclusion

that  within  all  human  probability  the  crime

was committed by the accused and none else;

and     

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(4) the  circumstantial evidence  in order

to  sustain  conviction  must  be  complete  and

incapable  of  explanation  of  any  other

hypothesis  than  that  of  the  guilt  of  the

accused and such evidence should not only be

consistent  with the  guilt  of  the  accused  but

should be inconsistent with his innocence.

17. In  State  of  U.P. v.  Ashok  Kumar Srivastava,  (1992

Crl.LJ 1104), it was pointed out that great care must be taken

in  evaluating  circumstantial  evidence  and  if  the  evidence

relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in

favour of the accused must be accepted.  It was also pointed

out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have

been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts

so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of

guilt.

18. Sir  Alfred  Wills  in  his  admirable  book  “Wills’

Circumstantial Evidence” (Chapter VI) lays down the following

rules  specially  to be  observed  in the  case  of  circumstantial

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evidence:  (1)  the  facts  alleged  as  the  basis  of  any  legal

inference  must  be  clearly  proved  and  beyond  reasonable

doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden

of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence  of

any  fact,  which  infers  legal  accountability;  (3)  in  all  cases,

whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence

must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in

order  to  justify  the  inference  of  guilt,  the  inculpatory  facts

must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and

incapable  of  explanation,  upon  any  other  reasonable

hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be any reasonable

doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to

be acquitted”.

19. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely

on  circumstantial  evidence  but  it  should  be  tested  by  the

touch-stone  of  law  relating  to  circumstantial  evidence  laid

down by the this Court as far back as in 1952.   

20. In  Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. V.  State

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of  Madhya  Pradesh,  (AIR  1952  SC  343),  wherein  it  was

observed thus:

“It  is well  to remember  that in cases  where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances  from which the  conclusion of guilt  is  to  be  drawn  should  be  in  the  first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the  hypothesis  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused. Again,  the  circumstances  should  be  of  a conclusive  nature  and  tendency  and  they should  be  such  as  to  exclude  every hypothesis  but  the  one  proposed  to  be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of  evidence  so  far complete  as not  to leave any  reasonable  ground  for  a  conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability  the  act  must  have  been done by the accused.”

21. A  reference  may  be  made  to  a  later  decision  in

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1984

SC 1622). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence,

it has been  held that onus was on the prosecution to prove

that  the  chain  is  complete  and  the  infirmity  of  lacuna  in

prosecution cannot be  cured  by false  defence  or plea.   The

conditions  precedent  in  the  words  of  this  Court,  before

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conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be

fully established. They are:

(1) the  circumstances  from  which  the

conclusion of  guilt is to be  drawn should be

fully  established.  The  circumstances

concerned ‘must’ or ‘should’ and not ‘may be’

established;

(2) the  facts  so  established  should  be

consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt

of the accused, that is to say, they should not

be explainable on any other hypothesis except

that the accused is guilty;

(3) the  circumstances  should  be  of  a

conclusive nature and tendency;

(4) they  should  exclude  every  possible

hypothesis except the one to be proved; and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so

complete  as  not  to  leave  any  reasonable

ground for the conclusion consistent with the

innocence of the accused and must show that

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in  all  human  probability  the  act  must  have

been done by the accused.     

22. These aspects were highlighted in State of Rajasthan

v. Rajaram (2003 (8) SCC 180) and State of Haryana v. Jagbir

Singh (2003 (11) SCC 261).

23. In the instance PWs 1 and 10 as well as PW2 saw the

deceased  and  the  accused  together  in  the  night  of  the

occurrence.  In the morning, dead body of the deceased was

found in front of the house of the accused.  Additionally, on

the basis of information given by the accused certain articles

were  recovered  and  one  of  them  was  the  pestle  used  for

inflicting the injury on the head.  That being so, the judgment

of the Trial Court and the High Court do not suffer from any

infirmity.      

24. The  appeal  is  without  merit,  deserves  dismissal,

which we direct.

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                            …………………….....................J.

          (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)              

        ………….……….......................J.

 (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) New Delhi,      July 23, 2008

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