15 November 1995
Supreme Court
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MUNICIPAL COUNCIL WARASEONI AND ANR. Vs SATISH CHANDRA JAIN AND ANR.

Bench: PUNCHHI,M.M.
Case number: Appeal (civil) 3360 of 1979


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PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL COUNCIL WARASEONI AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SATISH CHANDRA JAIN AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/11/1995

BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. SEN, S.C. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  599            1996 SCC  (7)  29  JT 1995 (8)   176        1995 SCALE  (6)421

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3360 OF 1979: ------------------------------      A Division  Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, quashed on a  writ petition,  the bill  and notice of demand, issued against  the  respondent  under  Section  164  of  the  M.P. Municipalities Act,  1961, on the basis that the fees sought to be  collected from the respondent fetched him no quid pro quo.      The respondent herein was granted by auction a lease by the Municipal Council, Waraseoni for a year from 1-4-1971 to 31-3-1972 for recovery of cattle registration fee and market fee, popularly  known in  that  region  as  "Baithaki".  The contracted money  was Rs.1,75,000/-.  The respondent did not pay the  whole and  withheld  a  sum  of  Rs.29,592.63.  The Municipal  Council   was  constrained   to  start   recovery proceedings against  the respondent  under the provisions of the Act.  A bill  for the  amount was sent to the respondent under Section  164(2) and  a  demand  notice  under  Section 164(3)  was   also  issued   against  the   respondent.  The respondent seeking  quashing of  the  bill  and  the  demand notice approached  the High  Court of  Madhya Pradesh  under Article 226  of the Constitution, which quashed the bill and the demand notice on the premise stated earlier.      Two points  were raised before the High Court; (i) that the fee imposed bore no correlation to the services rendered and being  in the nature of tax was, therefore, invalid; and (ii) no lease could be granted for recovery of such fee when the fee  itself was  invalid. A  question  consequential  in nature was also raised that since the said contracted sum of Rs.1,75,000/- compositely related to cattle registration fee as well  as market  fee, the portion representing market fee could not  be made  out if imposition of cattle registration fee was  held beyond  the power  of the  Municipal  Council. Sequally it  was urged that the market fee too, needed to be

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quashed on account of its being inextricably added up in the contracted amount. The High Court, seemingly, relying upon a Full Bench  decision of  that Court in Dhaniram vs. Janapada Sabha, Janjgir, 1965 M.P. L.J. 408, held cattle registration fee to be invalid because it was thought that the imposition of such fee, independent as it was, on the price fetched for an animal,  bore no  correlation to the services rendered by Janpada Sabha,  and, therefore,  cold not  be  described  as fee’. In  the instant  case, the  Municipal Council, did not specifically stated  in its  return as  to what  services it rendered to  the sellers  and buyers of animals and what was the purpose  for which  the fee  was imposed. The return was general in  terms. It  was therefore  spelt out  by the High Court that  there was  an implied  admission  that  the  fee collected was for purposes of general revenue.      This view  of the  High Court, with due respect, cannot be sustained;  more so  at the  instance of  the  respondent contractor. The respondent could not bemoan that no services were rendered  or were  deficient at the site where business of sale  of cattle  was transacted. The High Court seemingly overlooked  the  Madhya  Pradesh  Government  Gazette  dated October 23,  1950  wherein  the  notice  issued  itself  the Municipal Council,  Waraseoni had  justified enhancement  of fees from 1-2 paisa to a rupee because the Municipal Council found  it   difficult  to   put  up  with  the  expenses  of sanitation, lighting,  etc. at  the place  where cattle  was sold and the sale registered within the municipal limits. It is otherwise  a matter  of common  knowledge  that  where  a cattle fair  is held  and business transacted, certain basic facilities are  normally provided  by the Municipal Council. To enumerate  a few,  it would  provide sufficient space for storage and  sale of  fodder, enough  troughs for storage of drinking water  for the  cattle, pegs  and menagers  to  tie cattle, provide  drinking waters  for human  beings visiting the area, as also eating places for them. Besides, it has to look after  sanitation of  the place,  as is natural for the cattle collected to be urinating and dropping dung requiring immediate attention for removal, if not altogether there and then, but  at least for putting it in temporary storage till removed altogether.  These  facilities  are  inherent  in  a cattle fair which the Municipal Council is supposed to offer and maintain.  Additionally, it  is worthy to note that here the cattle  fair is  a weekly affair; all the more requiring constant availability of these facilities. Quid pro quo was, therefore, writ large with the imposition of fee.      Apart from  what has been said above, it did not lie in the mouth  of the  respondent, having  himself collected the fee, to  say that  no services were rendered. He is stealing the language  of those  persons who  paid the  fee and could have objected.  Noticeably, no tax payer has come forward to challenge the  fee in  question. The  respondent was himself clothed with  the authority  of a  tax collector, for he had contracted to  pay a  fixed amount  to the Municipal Council for a  year, having bought and attained the right to collect tax. He  cannot be  allowed to say that he had collected the fee  wrongly  and  on  that  basis  he  would  not  pay  the contracted money,  since he  had to  reimburse himself  by a wrong collection.  In this view of the matter, we think that the High Court overlooked an important aspect of the case as to the  maintainability of the writ petition at the instance of the respondent.      Thus, on either ground of attack, there was no merit in the writ petition preferred by the respondent and equally he had no  locus to  challenge the imposition of fee, which was otherwise validly  imposed. When  imposition of registration

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of  cattle   fee  is  in  order,  the  portion  of  the  fee representing market  fee  is  automatically  in  order.  The question of  splitting the  two vanishes.  In the  view thus taken, this appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court  is set  aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant is dismissed, with costs. CIVIL APPEAL NO.1025 OF 1995: -----------------------------      The appellant  herein, contracted  with  the  Municipal Council, Waraseoni  to pay a sum of Rs.1,59,000/- on account of cattle  registration fee  for the  year 1972-73. Since he fell  in   arrears  in  the  payment  thereof,  a  suit  for Rs.1,11,431.56 was  filed by  the Municipal  Council against the  appellant  being  dues  of  fees  on  sale  of  cattle, including interest.  The appellant  contested the  suit. All the issues,  except one,  were decided by the trial court in favour of  the appellant. The one decided against him was on the basis  of  the  Full  Bench  decision  in  Dhaniram  vs. Janapada Sabha,  Janjgir -  1965 M.P.L.J.  408. The suit was dismissed. The  High Court  on appeal at the instance of the Municipal Council  reversed the  trial  court  judgment  and decreed the suit against the appellant with costs throughout imposing future  interests at  the rate of 6% per annum from the date  of  the  decree  till  realisation.  Challenge  to imposition of  cattle registration fee has been negatived by us in  the earlier  decision made  today in Civil Appeal No. 3360 of  1979. The  basis of  defence of  the appellant thus stands knocked out. On the basis of the said ratio, there is no  merit   left  in   this  appeal,  which  is  accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs.