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PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHIV SHANKAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/02/1971

BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA

CITATION:  1971 AIR  815            1971 SCR  (3) 607  1971 SCC  (1) 442

ACT: Repeal-Implied-Prevention  of Food Adulteration  Act,  1954- Fruit  Products  Order, 1955-Sale  of  adulterated  Vinegar- Prosecution   under  Adulteration  Act-Competence-If   Fruit Products Order impliedly repeals Adulteration Act.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent,  who was selling Vinegar  under  a  license granted  under the Fruit Products Order, 1955, made  by  the Central  Government under s. 3 of the Essential  Commodities Act,   was   prosecuted  under  the   Prevention   of   Food Adulteration Act. 1954, for selling adulterated vinegar.  He pleaded  that vinegar, whether brewed or synthetic, being  a food  product  and standard specification for  such  vinegar being tabulated in Part XIV attached to the Second  Schedule of  the  Fruit  Order,  persecution  without  the   previous sanction  of the licensing Officer as required by clause  15 of the said order was incompetent.  The trial judge rejected the contention.  But the High Court quashed the proceedings. It  was  observed that the special provisions of  the  Fruit Order had overriding effect and therefore a manufacturer  of fruit products could only be prosecuted under the provisions of the Fruit Order. In  the  appeal  to  this Court it  was  contended  for  the respondent that there was an irreconcilable conflict between the two statutory provisions, and the Fruit Order being, not only  of a date later than the Adulteration.  Act  but  also having,  by virtue of s. 3(6) of the  Essential  Commodities Act  overriding effect over all other laws, it must  prevail over  the Adulteration Act and the rules.  On  the  question whether  the Fruit Order impliedly repeals the  Adulteration Act, HELD : The plea of implied repeal must fail and the  appeals must be allowed. To  determine  if  a later statutory  provision  repeals  by implication an earlier one it is necessary to scrutinise and consider the true meaning and effect both of the earlier and the  later  statute.  If the objects of  the  two  statutory provisions are different and the language of each statute is restricted  to  its  own object or subject,  then  they  are generally intended to run in parallel lines without  meeting

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and there would be no real conflict though apparently it may appear to be so on surface. [611 D-G] The provisions of the Adulteration Act and the Fruit  Order, for  effectuating  their respective objects,  have  imposed, different  restrictions  in  the  manufacture  and  sale  of vinegar  whether  brewed or synthetic. in  the  interest  of public  health  the  respondent  has  to  comply  with   the provisions  of  the Adulteration Act and Rules  and  in  the interests of equitable distribution of essential commodities including  the  articles of food covered  by  the  Essential Commodities Act and the Fruit Order they have to comply with the provisions of the fruit Order.  Both the provisions  are supple- 608 mentary  and cumulative in their operation and no  provision of the Fruit Order is shown to be destructive of or fatal to any  provision  of the Adulteration Act or  the  Rules  made thereunder  so  as  to compel the court to  hold  that  they cannot  stand  together.  If the Adulteration Act  or  Rules impose  some  restrictions on the manufacturer,  dealer  and seller  of  vinegar,  then they have  to  comply  with  them irrespective  of  the  fact that the  Fruit  ,Order  imposes lesser  number of restrictions in respect of these  matters. The  former  do  not  render  compliance  with  the   latter impossible, nor does compliance with the former  necessarily and automatically involve violation ,of the latter.  Even if both  ’statutes  to some extent overlap, section 26  of  the General  Clauses  Act  fully  protects  the  guilty  parties against double jeopardy or double penalty. [618 C-H] Om Prakash Gupta V., State of U.P., [1957] S.C.R. 423, T. S. Baliali  v.  T. S. Rengachari, 1969 3 S.C.R.  65,  State  v. Gurcharan Singh, A.I.R. 1952 Punjab 89, and Paine v. Stater, [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 120. ,referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:, Criminal Appeals Nos.  151 to 158 of 1966. Appeals from the judgment and order dated December 30.  1964 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Criminal Revisions  Nos.  81-D to 83-D, 107-D and 129-D to  132-D  of 1964. Bishan  Narain,  B. P. Maheshwari and N. K.  Jain,  for  the appellant (in all the appeals). C. K. Daphtary, N. N. Goswami, K. L. Mehta and S. K.  Mehta, the respondent (in Cr.  A. No. 151/1966). K.  L. Gossain, N. N. Goswami, K. L. Mehta and S. K.  Mehta, the respondent (in Cr.  As.  Nos. 152 to 158 of 1966). S. K. Mehta for the intervener. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua,  J.-These  eight appeals with certificate  (Crl.   Al)- peals  Nos. 151 to 158 of 1966) raise a common  question  of law  and  would,  therefore,  be disposed  of  by  a  common judgment.  In-deed, all the appeals in the Punjab High Court were  also  disposed of by a learned single  Judge  of  that Court  sitting on circuit at Delhi by a common judgment  and another  learned  single Judge of the same  Court  similarly certified the cases to be fit for ,appeal to this Court by a common order. The only question canvassed at the bar requiring  determina- tion  by  us  is  whether the respondent  is  liable  to  be prosecuted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 37 of 1954 (hereafter called the Adulteration Act) for  selling adulterated  vinegar when the vinegar is being sold under  a

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licence  granted  under  the  Fruit  Products  Order,   1955 (hereafter  called  the  Fruit Order) made  by  the  Central Government under s. 3 of the Essen-  609 tial Commodities Act.  The High Court has relying on an  un- reported Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in State v. RaJ Kumar (Crl.  A. 996 f 1961 decided on October 29,  1962) held  that they cannot be prosecuted.  It was argued in  the High  Court that the rules made under the  Adulteration  Act had come into force after the enforcement of the Fruit Order and  vinegar being mentioned as an article of food in  those rules,  prosecution  under both the provisions  of  law  was permissible.  Reliance in support of this argument was  also placed  on s. 26 of the General Clauses Act.  This  argument was  not  accepted  and it was  observed  that  the  special provisions  of  the Fruit Order had overriding  effect  and, therefore,  a manufacturer of Fruit Products could  only  be prosecuted under the provisions of the Fruit Order.   Prayer for  reference to a larger Bench for reconsideration of  Raj Kumar’s  case (supra) did not find favour with  the  learned single Judge. In this Court the view taken in Raj Kumar’s case (supra) was sought  to  be  supported by the learned  counsel  for  the, respondent.   The provisions of the Fruit Order and  of  the Adulteration  Act, it was contended, could not  harmoniously co-exist on the statute book, as compliance with one  would, in  certain contingencies, result in violation of the  other some respects.  With respect to the particular charges tried in  the  cases in appeal, however, no attempt  was  made  on behalf  of the respondents to show that there was any  fatal conflict  or inconsistency between the two provisions.   The question  before  us accordingly lies within a  very  narrow compass.   The  appellant  urged that there  is  no  implied repeal of the Adulteration Act by the Fruit Order in so  far as the sale of vinegar is concerned, whereas the case of the respondent  is  that  there is an  implied  repeal  and  the respondents  are  not  liable to  be  prosecuted  under  the Adulteration Act for violating its provisions.  Shri  Bishan Narain  sought  support for his submission from  Om  Prakash Gupta  v.  State  of  U.P. (1) and T. S.  Baliah  v.  T.  S. Rangachari  (2).   In the former case S. 5 (1 ) (c)  of  the Prevention  of Corruption Act was held not to repeal s.  409 I.P.C.  The  decision of the Punjab High Court  (Khosla  and Falshaw, JJ.) in State v. Gurcharan Singh(3) holding to  the contrary  was  overruled.  In the latter case s. 52  of  the Income tax Act, 1922 was held not to repeal s. 177, T.P.C. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the facts of all the eight  cases  separately as no such reference  was  made  by either  side  at  the  bar.   Shri  Bishan  Narain  for  the appellant, by way of illustra- (1) [1957] S.C.R. 423           (2) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 65. (3) A.I.R. 1952 Punjab 89. 610 tion  made a passing reference to the facts of Crl.   Appeal No.  155  of 1966.  From the record of that appeal  we  find that  samples  of (i) sugar cane juice  vinegar,  (ii)  vine (pure) vinegar and (iii) pure jaman vinegar, were takes by a Food  Inspector from the shop of the respondent  on  October 17,  1960  and  on  the  ’same  having  been  found   highly adulterated  and unfit for human consumption because of  the presence  of sulphuric acid which is prohibited,  complaints under  ss. 7/16 of the Adulteration Act were  instituted  by the  Municipal  Prosecutor  in December,  1960.   After  the prosecution evidence was recorded, the respondent Shiv Shan- ker applied to the trial magistrate in October, 1963 praying

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that the prosecution be dropped.  In this application it was admitted that the prosecution had arisen out of a raid dated October  17,  1960  at the promises  of  the  accused  "when allegedly samples of vinegar were taken which are stated  to be  adulterated because of the presence of sulphuric  acid". It  was pleaded that-the petitioning accused had secured  in 1960  a  licence under the Fruit Order and  vinegar  whether brewed  or  synthetic  being a  food  product  and  standard specification  for such vinegar being tabulated in Part  XIV attached  to  the  Second  Schedule  of  the  Fruit   Order, prosecution without the, previous sanction of the  Licensing Officer  as  required  by  cl. 15  of  the  said  Order  was unauthorised.  Prosecution under the Adulteration Act was on this  ground pleaded to be incompetent.  In the  application reliance  in  support  of  this  plea  was  placed  on   the unreported  Bench decision of the Punjab High Court  in  Raj Kumar’s  case in which according to the accused it had  been held  that  a licensee under the Fruit Order  could  not  be prosecuted  for  any contravention of that Order or  of  the Adulteration  Act  without  the  previous  sanction  of  the Licensing  Authority appointed under the Fruit  Order.   The trial  magistrate  basing himself on  an  unreported  single Bench decision of the Punjab High Court and on s. 26 of  the General Clauses Act rejected this application.  On revision, the Additional Sessions Judge relying on the decision in Raj Kumar’s,  case  (supra) made a reference to the  High  Court recommending  that the proceedings be quashed.  J. S.  Bedi, J.,  relying  on Raj Kumar’s case (supra) quashed  the  pro- ceedings.  S. K. Kapur J., who certified the case to be  fit for  appeal  after quoting a passage from Raj  Kumar’s  case (supra)  considered  the  question raised  to  be  important enough for appeal to this Court. The general principles governing implied repeal appear to us to have long since been settled.  The difficulty is normally experienced in their application to a given case.  From  the passage  quoted  by  Kapur J.,  from  the  unreported  Bench decision in Raj’ Kumar’s case (supra) upholding the  implied repeal  of the Adulteration Act by the Fruit Order it  seems to  us that the Division Bench did not correctly  and  fully grasp them.  We accordingly,  611 consider it proper to broadly restate the general rule.   It was  laid  in  Paine v. Stater(1) that  when  two  Acts  are inconsistent  or repugnant the later will be read as  having impliedly repealed the earlier.  As the legislature must  be presumed in deference to the rule of law to intend to  enact consistent  and  harmonious  body  of  laws,  a   subsequent legislation may not be too readily presumed to effectuate  a repeal of existing statutory laws in the absence of  express or at least clear and unambiguous indication to that effect. This   is  essential  in  the  interest  of  certainty   and consistency in the laws which the citizens are enjoined  and expected to. obey.  The legislature, which may generally  be presumed to know the existing law, is not expected to intend to create confusion by its omission to express its intent to repeal  in. clear terms.  The courts, therefore, as a  rule, lean against implying a repeal unless the two provisions are so  plainly repugnant to each other that they  cannot  stand together and it is not possible on any reasonable hypothesis to  give effect to both at the same time.  The repeal  must, if not express, flow from necessary implication as the  only intendment.  The provisions must be wholly incompatible with each  other  so that the two provisions  operating  together would lead to absurd consequences, which intention could not reasonably be imputed to the legislature.  It is only when a

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consistent   body  of  law  cannot  be  maintained   without abrogation  of  the previous law that the  plea  of  implied repeal  should  be  sustained.   To  determine  if  a  later statutory provision repeals by implication an earlier one it is accordingly necessary to closely scrutinise and  consider the  true  meaning and effect both of the  earlier  and  the later   statute.    Until  this  is  done   it   cannot   be satisfactorily ascertained if any fatal inconsistency exists between  them.   The meaning, scope and effect  of  the  two statutes,   as  discovered  on  scrutiny,   determines   the legislative intent as to whether the earlier law shall cease or  shall only be supplemented.  If the objects of  the  two statutory provisions are different and the language of  each statute  is restricted to its own objects or  subject,  then they are generally intended to run in parallel lines without meeting   and  there  would  be  no  real  conflict   though apparently it may appear to be so on the surface.   Statutes in pari materia although in apparent conflict should also so far  ,is reasonably possible, be construed to be in  harmony with   each  other  and  it  is  only  when  there   is   an irreconcilable  conflict between the new provision  and  the prior statute relating to the same subject matter, that  the former,  being the later expression of the legislature,  may be held to prevail, the prior law yielding to the extent  of the  conflict.  The same rule of  irreconcilable  repugnancy controls implied repeal of ’a general by a special  statute. The subsequent provision treating a phase of the same genera subject matter in a more minute way may be intended to imply repeal pro-tanto of the (1)  [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 120. 612 Repugnant general provision with which it cannot  reasonably co,exist.   When  there  is  no  inconsistency  between  the general  and  the  special statute the latter  may  well  be construed as supplementary. In  the light of these broad guidelines we may  now  examine the  two  statutes as they stood in 1960 because  the  cases with  which  we  are concerned relate  to  that  year.   The history and the scheme of the two statutory provisions would be  helpful  in discovering the legislative  intent  on  the question   of   implied  repeal.   Turning  first   to   the Adulteration  Act, it was enacted by the Parliament to  make provision for the prevention of adulteration of food and  it came  into force on June 1, 1955.  Previously  corresponding laws  on  adulteration  of  foodstuffs  were  in  force   in different  States, having been enacted by  their  respective legislatures.  All those laws were repealed by s. 25 of  the Adulteration  Act.   It may be pointed ,out that  under  the Government  of India Act, 1935 "adulteration  of  foodstuffs and other goods" was a provincial subject whereas under  the Constitution it is included in the Concurrent List.  Section 2(i)  of this Act which defines the word "adulterated"  con- sists  of several sub-clauses.  One of these sub-clauses  is (1)  according to which "an article of food shall be  deemed to  be adulterated if the quality or purity of  the  article falls below the prescribed standard or its constituents  are present in quantities Which are in excess of the  prescribed limits  of variability".  Clause (v) of s. 2 defines  "food" to  mean  "any  article  used as food  or  drink  for  human consumption  other than drugs and water and includes  :  (a) any  article which ordinarily enters into or is used in  the composition  or  preparation  of human  food,  and  (b)  any flavouring  matter or condiments.  According to cl. (ix)  an article  of  food shall be deemed to be "misbranded"  if  it falls  within an) one of the sub-clauses (a) to (k).  It  is

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not  necessary to reproduce all these  sub-clauses.   "Pack- age"  has’ been defined in cl. (X) to mean "a  box,  bottle, casket, tin, barrel, case, receptacle, sack, bag, wrapper or other  thing  in  which  an article of  food  is  placed  or packed".    We   have  referred  to   the   definitions   of "misbranded" and " package" because one of the cases  before us (Crl.  A. 154 of 1966) is a case of alleged  misbranding, the  remaining seven cases being ,of  alleged  adulteration. Section  5 prohibits import of, inter alia, adulterated  and misbranded food and all articles of food in contravention of any  provision of the Act or of any rules  made  thereunder. Section  7 prohibits manufacture for sale or store and  also sale  and  distribution  of,  inter  alia,  adulterated  and misbranded  food land of articles of food, in  contravention of  the  Adulteration  Act and the  Rules  made  thereunder. Section 8 provides for appointment of Public Analysts and s. 9  for  the appointment of Food Inspectors.  The  powers  of Food  Inspectors are contained in S. 10.  He possesses  very wide powers for the purpose of effectively achiev-  613 ing the statutory object of preventing the manufacture, sale and distribution etc., of adulterated articles of food.  The procedure  for taking samples of food by the Food  Inspector for  analysis is prescribed in s. 11 and the report  of  the Public Analyst is made admissible by s. 13.  The proviso  to sub-s.  (5)  of s. 15 makes the certificate  signed  by  the Director  of  Central Food Laboratory final  and  conclusive proof  of  the  facts  stated  therein.   The  Central  Food Laboratory is established by the Central Government under s. 4  for the purpose of carrying on functions entrusted to  it by  the  Adulteration Act or by the Rules  made  thereunder. Section  16  provides for penalties for offences  under  the Adulteration  Act  and  cl. (a) of sub-s. (1)  makes  it  an offence for any person, whether by himself or by any  person on  his behalf to import into India or manufacture for  sale or  to  store,  sell or distribute any article  of  food  in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or of  any rules  made thereunder.  In the prosecution for  an  offence pertaining  to  the  sale of an  adulterated  or  misbranded article  of food s. 19 makes impermissible the defence  that the vendor was ignorant of the nature, substance or  quality of  the  food  sold  by him or  that  the  purchaser  having purchased an article for analysis was not prejudiced by  the sale.  Section 20 prohibits cognizance and trial of offences under  the Act except when prosecution is instituted  by  or with the written consent of the State Government or a  local authority  or  a person authorized in this  behalf  by  such Government or authority.  Under the proviso to this  section a purchaser referred to in s. 12, is, however, empowered  to institute  a prosecution if he produces in court a  copy  of the  report of the Public Analyst along with the  complaint. Section  21  overrides  s.  32, Cr.P.C.  in  the  matter  of sentence  to  be  passed under this Act  by  the  Presidency Magistrates or Magistrates of 1 Class, trying offences under the Act.  Section 23 confers on the Central Government  wide powers  to  make rules under the Act  after  consulting  the Central  Committee  for  Food  Standards  appointed  by  the Central Government under s. 3. Section 24 empowers the State Government,  (after consultation with the Central  Committee for  Food Standards and with previous publication)  to  make rules  for  giving effect to the provisions of  the  Act  in matters  not covered by s. 23. Various States have  actually framed rules under this section. We may now briefly refer to the Prevention of Food Adultera- tion Rules, 1955 (hereafter called the  Adulteration.Rules).

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These  rules  were made by the Central Government  under  s. 4(2) and s. 23(1) of the Adulteration Act and were published in the Official Gazette as per notification dated  September 12, 1955.  The rules other than those contained in Part III- Appendix  B-Item A.12 Margarine, Part VI and Part  VII  came into force on the date of 614 their  publication  in  the Official  Gazette  :  the  rules contained in Part III, Appendix B, Item A.12 Margarine  came into  force on June 1, 1956 and the rules contained in  Part VI  and Part VII came into force on December 1, 1956-:  vide r.  1(3).  Under S. 23(2) (prior to its amendment  in  1964) all  rules made under sub-s. (1) had to be laid as  soon  as possible before both Houses of Parliament. By Act 49 of 1964 sub-s. (2) was amended so as to provide for every rule  made under sub-s. (1) to be laid before each House of  Parliament while in session, for a total period of 30 days in order  to afford  an  opportunity to the two Houses to  study  and  to modify or annul it for, future if both Houses so agree.   We have  referred to this amendment as some of the  rules  were amended thereafter.  The effect of the subsequent  amendment of  some  of  the rules will be noticed  later.   The  Adul- teration  Rules  clearly  bring out  the  anxiety  of  their authors to see that wholesome food is sold to the  citizens. The duties and powers of Food Inspectors as contained, inter alia,  in  rr. 9 and 1 3, broadly illustrate  this  anxiety. These rules also indicate that the framers of the Rules were not unaware of the different provisions of the Fruit  Order. By way of illustration reference may be made to r. 50  which prescribes  conditions  of  licence  to  manufacture,  sell, stock,  distribute or exhibit certain articles of food.   In cl.  (1)  of  sub-r. (1) of  this  rule  the  fruit-products covered  under the Fruit Order and some other articles  have been excluded from the operation of this rule.  This  clause was  amended  twice,  once in November, 1956  and  again  in April,  1960.  Had the Adulteration Act been intended to  be impliedly repealed by the Fruit Order (which would also mean implied repeal of the rules) it would have been  unnecessary to expressly exclude such fruit-products from the  operation of  this  rule.  Rule 5 and Appendix B of these  Rules  came into force on December 1, 1956 after the promulgation of the Fruit  Order.  According to r. 5 the standard of quality  of the various articles of food specified in Appendix B are  as specified  therein.   In Appendix B item at  sl.  no.   A.16 deals  with  "fruit products".  But the  articles  of  fruit products  dealt  with in A. 16.01 to A. 16.12  clearly  show that  vinegar  is  not included  in  the  expression  "fruit products".   Vinegar  is dealt with in  A.20  and  synthetic vinegar  in A.20.01. Both these items were added  in  April, 1960. We may now turn to the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955 and  the  Fruit Order.  The Essential  Commodities  Act  was enacted  in  1955  with  the object  of  providing,  in  the interests  of  the general public, for the  control  of  the production,  supply  and  distribution  of,  and  trade  and commerce  in,  certain commodities.  It came into  force  on April 1, 1956 repealing the Essential Commodities Ordi-  615 nance No. 1 of 1955 which had been promulgated with the same object  and  enforced on January 26,1955, the  date  of  the expiry  of the Essential Supplies (Temporary) Powers Act  26 of  1946.   The last named Act had  replaced  the  Essential Supplies  (Temporary  Powers) Ordinance No.  XVIII  of  1946 which  had  come  into  force  on  October  1,  1946.   That Ordinance  was  promulgated with the object  of  continuing,

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during  a limited period, powers to control the  production, supply  and  distribution  of, and trade  and  commerce  in, foodstuffs  and certain other commodities.  To  empower  the Indian  Legislature to enact law on this subject matter  the British Parliament had passed India (Central Government  and Legislation) Act, 1946(9 and 10 Geo.  Vl, c.39). The  lndian Legislature   not  being  in  session  the   Ordinance   was promulgated  to meet the emergency and this was replaced  by Act 26 of 1946.  Reference has been made by us to this  past history for the purpose of indicating the different  objects and purposes intended to be achieved by the two  legislative measures.  Section 2 of the Essential Commodities Act  which is  the  definition section defines in  cl.  (a)  "essential commodity  to mean any of the classes of commodities  stated in   sub-cls.  (i)  to  (xi).   Sub-clause  (v)  refers   to "foodstuffs,  including edible oil-seeds and oils"  and  cl. (xi) confers power on the Central Government to declare by a notified  order  any  other  class of  commodity  to  be  an essential  commodity  for the purposes of the Act,  being  a commodity with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws  by virtue of Entry 33 in List III in the 7th  Schedule to  the Constitution.  Section 3 of the Act confers  on  the Central  Government  power to  control  production,  supply, distribution etc., of essential commodities by providing, by an  order,  for regulating or  prohibiting  the  production, supply  and distribution of those commodities and trade  and commerce  therein.  Every order made under this section  has to  be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon as  may be after it is made.  By virtue of s. 6 Orders made under s. 3  have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent  there- ,with  contained in any enactment other than  the  Essential Commodities  Act.   Section  7 provides  for  penalties  for contravention of orders made under s. 3. Under s. 11  courts are prohibited from taking cognizance of offences punishable under  this Act except on a report in writing of  the  facts constituting  such  an  offence made by a person  who  is  a public  servant  as defined in s. 21, I.P.C. Section  12  of this Act vests in the Presidency Magistrates and Magistrates of  1 Class power to pass sentences of fines  exceeding  Rs. 1,000/- on convicted persons notwithstanding the restriction in this respect imposed on their powers by s. 32, Cr.P.C. As already noticed earlier, an ordinance called the,  Essential Corn  modifies Ordinance, 1 of 1955 had been promulgated  on the  expiry of the Essential Commodities (Temporary  Powers) Act  and  the  present  Act  was  passed  to  replace   that Ordinance. 6 16 It  may appropriately be pointed out at this stage  that  it was not the respondent’s case that the Essential Commodities Act  had the effect of impliedly repealing the  Adulteration Act  for  the purposes of these cases.   The  only  argument urged  was  that  the Fruit Order had that  effect  and  its overriding effect by virtue of S. 3 of the Act was  strongly emphasised.  We may now turn to the Fruit Order (S.R.O. 1052 dated 3rd May, 1955 published in the Gazette of India  dated 14th May, 1955) which was made by the Central Government  in exercise  of  the  powers, conferred on it by s.  3  of  the Essential Commodities Act.  Clause (2) of this Order,  which is  the  definition clause, defines  the  expression  "fruit product"  in  sub-cl. (d) and "vinegar,  another  brewed  or synthetic"  is included in this expression as per item  (ii) of this sub-clause.  "Licensing Officer" as defined in  sub- cl.  (g)  means the Agricultural Marketing  Adviser  to  the Government  of  India  and it  includes  any  other  Officer empowered  in  this behalf by him with the approval  of  the

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Central  Government.  "Manufacturer" as defined  in  sub-cl. (h)   means   a  licensee  engaged  in   the   business   of manufacturing  in  fruit products for sale  and  includes  a person purchasing such fruit products in bulk and  repacking them  for  sale either by himself or through  someone  else. Clause 4 prohibits all persons from carrying on business  of manufacture  except and in accordance with the terms  of  an effective  licence granted to him under this Order  in  Form "B".  Clause 5 prescribes procedure for applications for the grant  of  a  licence  under cl. 4.  Clause  7  enjoins  the manufacturers  to manufacture fruit products  in  conformity with the sanitary requirements and the appropriate  standard of quality and composition specified in the Second  Schedule to  the  Order and cl. 8 lays down the  requirements  to  be complied with by the manufacturers in regard to the packing, marketing  and labelling of containers, of  fruit  products. Clause  10  prohibits sale, exposure for sale,  despatch  or delivery to any agent or broker for the purpose of sale, any fruit  products  which  do not conform to  the  standard  of quality and composition specified in the Second Schedule  or which  are  not ,packed, marked and labelled in  the  manner laid down in the Order: ,the proviso to this clause contains directions  for fruit products imported into India.   Clause 12 contains a mandate for every manufacturer to comply  with the directions and orders issued to him and failure to do so is  to be deemed to be a contravention of the provisions  of the   Order.   According  to  cl.  15  no  prosecution   for contravention  of any of the provisions of this Order is  to be instituted without the previous sanction of the Licensing Officer. The  object  and  purpose  of the  Adulteration  Apt  is  to eliminate the danger to human life and health from the  sale of unwholesome articles of food.  It is covered by Entry 18, List  III  of  the 7th Schedule to  the  Constitution.   The Essential Commodi-                             617 ties  Act on the other hand has for its object the,  control of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in,. essential commodities and is covered by  Entry 33  of List III.  In spite of this difference in their  main objects, control of production and distribution of essential commodities may, to an extent from a. broader point of  view include control of the quality of the essential articles  of food  and, thus considered, it may reasonably be urged  that to some extent it covers the same field as is covered by the provisions of the Adulteration Act.  The two provisions may, therefore,  have  within  these  narrow  limits  co-terminus fields of operation.  On this premise we have to see if  the two  provisions can stand together having cumulative  effect and in case they cannot, which provision has the  overriding or  controlling  effect.  It is needless to point  out  that they  can  stand together if the powers are intended  to  be exercised for different purposes without fatal inconsistency or repugnancy. At  the  bar Shri Daphtary in his  usual  persuasive  manner argued that there is an irreconcilable conflict between  the two statutory provisions and the Fruit Order being, not only of  a date later than the Adulteration Act but also  having, by  virtue  of  s. 3(6) of the  Essential  Commodities  Act, overriding effect over all other laws, it must prevail  over the  Adulteration Act and Rules.  He pointed out that  under the Fruit Order the prosecution can be instituted only  with the previous sanction of the Licensing Officer whereas under the Adulteration Act even a purchaser may, without any  such sanction, institute a prosecution merely by producing  along

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with  his complaint a certificate from the  Public  Analyst. He  also drew our attention to s. 20-A of  the  Adulteration Act  according to which, unlike the Fruit Order,  the  Court trying an offence under that Act is empowered to implead the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of  food, it  is  satisfied  that  he is  also  concerned  with,  that offence,  and proceed against him as though the  prosecution had  been  instituted-against him under s. 20.   We  do  not think  this  section  in any way  reflects  the  legislative intention  of implied repeal of the Adulteration Act by  the Fruit  Order.   The  two statutory  provisions  can  operate within  their respective spheres without giving rise to  any absurdity  or  such grave inconvenience as would  impel  the court  to sustain the plea of implied repeal.,  Incidentally it  may also be pointed out that this section was  added  by Act  49 of 1964 which came into force on March 1, 1965  long after  1960  when  the present  cases  were  started.   Shri Daphtary  developed  his  argument by  adding  that  if  the respondents have manufactured for sale and have sold vinegar in accordance with the terms of the licence granted to  them under   the   Fruit  Order  then   imposition   of   further restrictions  under  the Adulteration Act and Rules  with  a threat  of severe penal consequences for violation of  those provisions would 618 be  in direct conflict with the mandate or directions  under the  Fruit Order.  The counsel contended that at  least  the freedom to manufacture and sell vinegar as permitted by  the Fruit  Order  is curtailed or further circumscribed  by  the Adulteration  Act  and Rules and this must  necessarily  cut across  the provisions of the Fruit Order.   He  illustrated his  point by submitting that under the Fruit Order  use  of colouring matter is more liberal than under the Adulteration Act and Rules.  In view of these conflicting provisions  the Adulteration Act and Rules, according to Shri Daphtary  must be held to have been impliedly repealed by the Fruit  Order. We  are  unable  to agree with  this  submission.   The  two statutory provisions, for the purpose of effectuating  their respective objects, have imposed ,different restrictions  on the  respondents  when  they manufacture  and  sell  vinegar whether brewed or synthetic.  We are, however, ’.Informed at the  bar  that in the present case the disputed  vinegar  is synthetic.  In the interest of public health the respondents have  to comply with the provisions of Adulteration Act  and Rules  and  in the interests of  equitable  distribution  of essential commodities including the articles of food covered by  Essential Commodities Act and the Fruit Order they  have to  comply  with  the provisions of the  Fruit  Order.   The provisions of the Adulteration Act and of the Fruit Order to which  our attention was drawn seem to be supplementary  and cumulative in their operation and no provision of the  Fruit Order  is  shown  to  be destructive  of  or  fatal  to  any ,provision  of  the  Adulteration  Act  or  the  Rules  made thereunder  So  as  to compel the court to  hold  that  they cannot  stand  together.  If the Adulteration Act  or  Rules impose  some restrictions on. the manufacturer,  dealer  and seller  of  vinegar  then  they have  to  comply  with  them irrespective of the fact that the Fruit Order imposes lesser number  of  restrictions in respect of these  matters.   The former do not render compliance with. the latter impossible, nor   does  compliance  with  the  former  necessarily   and automatically involve violation of the latter.  Indeed,  our attention was not drawn to any provision of the Adulteration Act and Rules, compliance with which would result in  breach of  any  mandate, whether affirmative or  negative,  of  the

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Fruit  Order.  We are, therefore, unable to find any  cogent or  convincing  reason  for  holding  that  the   Parliament intended  by enacting the Essential Commodities Act  or  the Fruit  Order  to  implidely repeal  the  provisions  of  the adulteration  Act and the Rules in respect the statutes  can function  with  full the provisions of the Adultera  of  the vinegar  in dispute.  Both vigour side by side in their  own parallel  channels.  Even if they happen to some  extent  to overlap. s. 26 of the General Clauses Act fully protects the guilty  parties against double jeopardy or  double  penalty. This  section  lays  down  that where  an  Act  or  omission constitutes  an,’ offence under two or more enactments  then the  offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and  punished under either or any of those enactments but shall not  619 be  liable to be punished twice for the same  offence.   If, therefore, the provisions of the Adulteration Act and  those of  Fruit Order happen to constitute offences  covering  the same  acts  or  omissions  then it would  be,  open  to  the prosecuting authorities to punish the offender under  either of  them subject to the only condition that a guilty  person should not be punished twice over. There  is also another aspect which has to be kept in  view. Both the Adulteration Act and the Essential Commodities  Act have  been amended from time to time after their  enactment. Being  governed by Entries in List III of the  7th  Schedule even  the  States have power to amend these  enactments  and indeed  they  have  been so amended  in  some  States.   The subsequent  amendments  of the Adulteration Act and  of  the Essential   Commodities  Act  by  the  Parliament  and   the amendment  of  the  Adulteration Rules would  also  tend  to negative any legislative intendment of implied repeal of the Adulteration  Act  by the Essential Commodities Act  or  the Fruit Order.  It may be recalled that cl. (1) of sub-r.  (1) of  r. 50 of the Adulteration Rules was amended in 1956  and again  in 1960 and the amended clause is indicative  of  the rule making authority being conscious of both the  statutory provisions being operative in their respective fields at the same time, thereby negativing implied repeal.  A.20  dealing with  "vinegar"  was  also  added  in  Appendix  B  of   the Adulteration  Rules  in  1956 and A. 20.01  dealing  with  " synthetic  vinegar"  was added in April,  1960.   A  passing reference  may  also  be  made  to  some  of  the   relevant amendments in some rules made subsequent to the  enforcement of  the  amended section 23 (2).  In r. 55 in items  at  sl. nos. 19 and 20, dealing with pickles and chutnies made  from fruit  or  vegetables  and with  tomato  and  other  sauces, respectively,  the  preservatives mentioned in  cl.  2  were amended.   Similarly  in  r.  51(2)  the  table   containing articles  like fruit and vegetable juices including  tomato- juice  was amended.  Both the above amendments were made  in December,  1965.  It may here be pointed out  that  pickles, chutnies,  tomato products, kutchups, sauces and also  other unspecified  items  relating  to fruits  or  vegetables  are included  in  the definition of "fruit  product"  under  the Fruit  Products Order.  These amendments, though made  after 1960, do seem to further negative the intendment of  implied repeal  as argued on behalf of the respondent.  In  view  of the  foregoing  discussion  it  seems to  us  that  the  two statutory   provisions  can  harmoniously  operate   without causing  confusion or resulting in absurd consequences’  and the  scheme  of the Adulteration Act and Rules  can  without difficulty fit into the scheme of the Fruit Order under  the Essential  Commodities Act.  The challenge on the ground  of implied repeal must, therefore, be rejected.

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Incidentally we may note that the view taken by the  learned single  Judge  in this case was later overruled  by  a  Full Bench of the 918 Sup.  C.I./71 620 Delhi High Court in Municipal corporation v. Harnarain (Crl. A. No. 163 of 1967 decided in May, 1969). Shri Daphtary, as a last resort, tried to press into service Art.  14  in  his  challenge  to  the  prosecution  of   the respondent.   According to him the  prosecuting  authorities have an unguided licence to prosecute his clients under  one or  the  other  statute  and since  the  penalty  under  the Adulteration  Act is more severe than that under  the  Fruit Order  the principle of equality before the law is  violated As  this point was not taken in any of the courts  below  we did  not  permit him to raise it in this Court.   It  would, however, be open to the respondent, if so advised, to  raise this  point  in  accordance with law  in  the  court  below, because  the  cases have not yet been finally  disposed  of. The competence of the prosecution having been challenged  at an intermediate stage, the cases will have to go back to the trial  court.  As these cases have been pending  since  1962 the trial court should dispose them of with due dispatch and without any further avoidable delay. The  appeals are accordingly allowed and the cases  remitted to the trial court for further proceedings according. to law in the light of the observations made above. R.K.P.S.                               Appeals allowed. 621