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PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, INDORE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI K.N. PALSHIKAR, INDORE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/09/1968

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BACHAWAT, R.S. HEGDE, K.S.

CITATION:  1969 AIR  579            1969 SCR  (2)  13

ACT: Madhya Bharat Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, ss. 305, 387, 392-Application  for  fixation  of  compensation  for   land acquired   by   municipality-Solatium  whether  payable   in addition  to compensation-High Court in revision whether can consider question of sufficiency of compensation as fixed by District   Judge-Municipality  whether  can  withdraw   from acquisition proceedings.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  corporation in accordance  with   its   Road Widening Scheme sought to acquire some of the land belonging to  the respondent. The ’respondent was not  satisfied  with the compensation offered by the appellant or awarded by  the arbitrators,  and  under  8. 387(4) and (5)  of  the  Madhya Bharat   Municipal  Corporation  Act,  1956  he   filed   an application  for fixation of compensation  in the Court   of the  District  Judge, Indore.  The appellant  in  its  reply submitted   that the compensation awarded by the  arbitrator was  too  low.  The Additional District  Judge  rejected  an application  filed  by the appellant  for   withdrawing  its claim  over  a portion of the land in  question.   He  fixed compensation  for the land at the rate of Rs. 30/-  per  sq. ft.  with  interest  at 6% per annum from the  date  of  the delivery  of the possession, and also awarded a solatium  of 15%  to  the respondent.  The  ’revision  application  filed against  the judgment of the Additional  District Judge   by the  Corporation  was dismissed by the High  Court.  On  the question  of compensation the High Court held that it  could not  interfere  with the order of  the  Additional  District Judge as he had committed no irregularity in the exercise cf his jurisdiction.  By special leave the Corporation appealed to  this  Court. The questions that fell  for  consideration were  (i) whether the Corporation was entitled under law  to withdraw  from  acquisition proceedings,  (ii)  whether  the respondent  was  entitled  under the Act to  a  solatium  in addition  to the compensation, (iii) whether the High  Court was   right  in  ’refusing  to  go  into  the  question   of sufficiency of compensation.     HELD:  (i)  There  was  no  provision  in  the  Act  for enabling  the .Corporation to withdraw from the  acquisition

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proceedings.   In fact there  automatic vesting of  land  in the Corporation under s. 305 once  the requisite  conditions were satisfied. [17 B-C]     (ii) The Additional District Judge was right in awarding 15% solatium. [ 19 E]     The  Borough  Municipality  of  Ahmedabad  v.   Yavendra Vajubhai  Divatis,  I.L.R.  [1937] Bom.  632,  approved  and applied.     (iii)  The High Court could not in a revision  under  s. 392  go into questions of fact and determine the  amount  of compensation  and it was right in declining to go into.  the question.  Even  if the  powers under s. 392 are wider  than those  under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure  they  do not extend to determining questions of fact. [19 G]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Civil Appeals Nos. 1137  and 1138 of 1965. 14     Appeals  by special leave from the judgment  and  orders dated  October 12, 1962 and December 19, 1962 of the  Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench in Civil Revision Nos.  195 and 497 of 1962 respectively.     B.P. Jhanjharia,  and  P.C. Bhartari, for the  appellant (in both the appeals ).     P.K.  Saksena and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for  the  respondent (in both the appeals ). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by   Sikri,   J.  These appeals by special leave  are  directed against  the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh. High  Court  in two  Civil  Revisions, Civil Revision No. 195  of  1962  and Civil Revision No. 497 of 1962.  These revisions came to  be filed in the High Court in the following circumstances.     On    January   21,   1961,   the     respondent    K.N. Palshikarhereinafter  referred to as the applicant-filed  an application  under ss. 387(4) and (5) of the  Madhya  Bharat Municipal Corporation Act, 1956  hereinafter referred to  as the Act--in the Court of District Judge, Indore.  He alleged that  the  Municipal Corporation by its memo No.  816  dated October  30, 1959, had informed him that in accordance  with the  Road  Widening  Scheme  a set back of  total,  area  of 1455.1 sq. ft. had been cut down from his land comprised  in House  No. 1 (New No. 38) on Road No. 1, Choti Gwaltoli  No. 1,  Indore, and that the Municipal Corporation  proposed  to give  him  compensation  only at the rate of  Rs.  2-50  per sq .ft. which was not acceptable to him. He further  alleged that  the arbitrators appointed by the parties had given  an award which was also not acceptable to him.  The arbitrators had  given Rs. 50/- per sq. ft. while he demanded Rs.  145/- per  sq.  ft. The Municipal Corporation in its  reply  dated February 28, 1961, submitted that the compensation given  by the arbitrators was very much in excess of the actual  price of the land and prayed that the application be dismissed.      Various  issues were framed by the Additional  District Judge, Indore, but they were all directed to determining the fair amount of compensation including interest.      The  Municipal Corporation also applied on January  19, 1961, under s. 387(4) of the Act praying mat me price of the land  be  settled  as per s. 387(4).  In  para  10  of  this application it was alleged that the memo regarding set  back was  issued on October 30, 1959, and therefore the price  is to be settled at the rates prevailing on that date.      In  his  reply to this   application   the   applicant,

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Palshikar, accepted para 10 of the application. 15     The  Additional  District  Judge on  February  6,  1962, disposed of both the applications by one order and he  fixed the compensation of land in question at the rate of Rs..30/- per  sq. ft. with interest at 6% per annum from the date  of the delivery of the possession.  He further ordered that the applicant  shall be entitled to 15% solatium as  decided  by the award.  He also valued the structure.     During   the   pendency  of  these   applications    the Municipal  Corporation  applied on August 1,  1961,  to  the Additional  District Judge for withdrawing the claim of  the Corporation  over  a portion of the land  in  question.   On February  2, 1962, the Additional District Judge passed  the following order                     "The  N.A. applied that the  Improvement               Board is going to acquire portion of the  land               in  question and hence the N.A. shall  not  be               compelled  to acquire this land.   At  present               there   is   nothing  to   show    that    the               Improvement  Trust  is going  to  acquire  the               land.    Moreover,   I   have   to   fix   the               compensation in the case.  The N.A. may or may               not  acquire  the land at its  own  risk.  The               application is rejected."     Against  the  common order of  the  Additional  District Judge three revisions, two by the Municipal Corporation  and one by the applicant, were filed.  Civil Revision No. 195 of 1962 was filed  the Municipal Corporation alleging  that the compensation  awarded  by the  learned  Additional  District Judge  was excessive and praying that fair  compensation  be fixed.     The  High Court held that the Additional District  Judge had  given opportunity to the parties to lead  evidence  and determined  the  amount of compensation  after  hearing  the parties and in these circumstances it could not be said that he was guilty of committing irregularity in the exercise  of his  jurisdiction, even assuming that the amount  determined as  payable was either too high or too low. The  High  Court then dealt with the point raised by the learned counsel  for the  Municipal  Corporation  that  the  Additional  District Judge had refused to permit the Corporation to withdraw  the acquisition  proceedings  and had thus refused  to  exercise jurisdiction.   The  High Court held  that in  a  proceeding under   s.  387 (4 ) of the Act there was  no  provision  to enable the Corporation to withdraw from any setback  already given  and  no  statutory provision  had  been  pointed  out entitling  the Court to permit the Corporation to  withdraw. In  the  result  the  High  Court  dismissed  the   revision petition.     In the meantime the applicant filed an application under s.  388  of  the  Act for execution  of  the  order  of  the Additional  District  Judge  dated February  6,  1962.   The Corporation objected to the 16 execution  on  the ground that the applicant had  not  given possession  of the disputed land to the Corporation nor  had he  executed a sale deed with respect to it in  its  favour. The  applicant controverted these objections  and  submitted that  demand of possession prior to deposit of the  decretal amount  was  illegal and contrary to s. 387(5) of  the  Act. lie  further  submitted  that under s. 305 of  the  Act  the vesting   of  the  property  occurs   immediately   when,the rebuilding  starts and, therefore, there is no necessity  of executing  the  sale deed.  The Corporation again  filed  an

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application for permission to withdraw from the  acquisition proceedings  and in the alternative it was prayed  that  the money deposited in Court against this execution case may  be given to the applicant only when he gives vacant  possession of the land covered by the set back scheme.     The Additional District Judge by his order dated October 31,  1962,  repelled  these  contentions  and  allowed   the applicant    to   withdraw  the  money  deposited   by   the Corporation.  Against this order the Corporation filed Civil Revision No. 497 of 1962 to the High Court.  The High  Court by  its  judgment dated December  19, 1962, held  that  "the terms  of section 387(5) indicate that taking of  possession of the property has to. follow the payment of the amount  of compensation determined by the Court.  In view of the  terms of  this  provision it is not correct to  contend  that  the opponent (applicant) ought first to secure vacant possession of  the  property and then alone can claim to  withdraw  the compensation  amount."   The High Court noted in  the  order that  the applicant was willing to. give such possession  as he  himself could. This is the second judgment of  the  High Court against which the Court gave leave to appeal. The learned counsel for the Corporation contends:                      (1  )  that approval of the  site  plan               will not divest the applicant of the ownership               and,  therefore,  it  was  possible  for   the               Corporation to withdraw  from  the acquisition               proceedings;                      (2) when the projecting portion is  the               main  building  no  compensation  is   payable               unless the  rebuilding starts and the  portion               is cleared;                      (3)  that  the Act provides  only   for               compensation and not for solatium and               (4)   that  the  amount  of  compensation   is               excessive.     The learned counsel for the applicant,  palshikar,  made a  statement  before us that he was willing to  deposit  Rs. 6,000/- in the District Court,within ’four months in respect of  the area which is in possession of the tenants and  that he will be entitled to with- 17 draw  this  amount  once  the possession  is  given  to  the Corporation and not before.  In view of this undertaking  it is not necessary to determine point No. 2.  The point is not free from doubt and we hesitate to express our opinion  when the  point has  become academic in view of  the  undertaking given by the learned counsel for the applicant, Palshikar.      Regarding  point  No. 1, we agree with the  High  Court that  there  is  no provision in the Act  for  enabling  the Corporation  to withdraw from the  acquisition  proceedings. In  fact, it seems to us that there iS automatic vesting  of the land in the Corporation under s. 305 once the  requisite conditions  are satisfied Section 305 reads as follows:                "305. Power to regulate line of buildings.-                      (  1  )  If  any  part  of  a  building               projects  beyond the regular line of a  public               street,  either as existing or  as  determined               for   the  future  or  beyond  the  front   of               immediately     adjoining    buildings     the               Corporation may-                    (a) if the projecting part is a verandah,               step or   some other structure external to the               main building  then at any time, or               (b)  if  the  projecting  part  is  not   such               external     structure  as   aforesaid,   then

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             whenever the greater  portion of such building               or  whenever  any  material  portion  of  such               projecting  part  has  been  taken   down   or               burned down or has. fallen down,                require  by  notice either that the  part  or               some portion of the part projecting beyond the               regular  line  or  beyond  the  front  of  the               immediate   adjoining   building,   shall   be               removed,  or  that such  building  when  being               rebuilt  shall be set back to or  towards  the               said  line or front; and the portion  of  land               added  to the street, by such setting back  or               removal shall henceforth be deemed to be  part               of  the  public street and shall vest  in  the               Corporation:                 Provided  that  the Corporation  shall  make               reasonable  compensation to the owner for  any               damage  or loss he may sustain in  consequence               of his building or any part thereof being  set               back,                (2)  The Corporation  may, on such terms   as               it  thinks fit, allow any building to  be  set               forward for the improvement of the line of the               street."  In this case it is not necessary to determine whether  land affected by a notice vests when the notice is given or  when the  part or some portion of the part projecting beyond  the regular  line  or  beyond  the  front  of  the   immediately adjoining   building is removed, or when the  building  when being rebuilt is set back, 18 because  it  seems to have been common  ground  between  the parties that the date for the determination of  compensation in  this  case is the date of the memo,  i.e.,  October  30, 1959.     Coming  to the third point, the relevant  section  which requires interpretation is s. 387 ( 3 ) which reads:               "387.  Arbitration in cases of   compensation,               etc.                     (3)  In the event of the  Panchayat  not               giving   a decision within one month  or  such               other  longer  period as may be agreed  to  by               both   the  parties  from  the  date  of   the               selection of Sarpanch or of the appointment by               the  District Court of such members as may  be               necessary  to  constitute the  Panchayat,  the               matter  shall, on application by either  party               be  determined  by the  District  Court  which               shall,  in cases in which the compensation  is               claimed  in respect of land, follow as far  as               may  be  the procedure provided  by  the  Land               Acquisition  Act,  1894,  for  proceedings  in               matters referred for the determination of  the               Court;               Provided that--                     (a) no application to the Collector  for               a reference shall be necessary, and                     (b) the court shall have full power   to               give   and  apportion  the costs  of  all  the               proceedings in manner it The learned counsel for the applicant relies on the decision of  the  Bombay High Court in The  Borough  Municipality  of Ahmedabad  v.  Javendra Vaiubhai Divatia(1).  In  that  case Beaumont, C.J., interpreting s. 198 of the Bombay  Municipal Boroughs Act (Born. Act XVHI of 1925), which section is,  in

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terms, similar to s. 387 of the Act, observed as follows:                     "There  is no express provision  in  the               Bombay  Municipal  Boroughs Act  allowing  for               such  addition to the compensation, but  under               the  Land Acquisition Act fifteen per cent  is               allowed  in respect of the  compulsory  nature               ,of  the  acquisition, and  the  question   is               whether that provision in the Land Acquisition               Act  can  be  treated  as  incorporated   into               section  198 of the Bombay Municipal  Boroughs               Act as being part of  the  procedure  provided               by  the Land Acquisition Act.  I  agree  that,               prima facie, a provision of this sort,  adding               to   the  compensation to be payable  for  the               value  of the land, is not aptly described  as               Procedure,  but still one has to look  at  the               Land Acquisition Act and note the phraseo- (1) I.L.R. [1937] Borg. 632. 19 logy adopted.  One finds Part Iii headed "Reference to Court and Procedure thereon..." Then  he  referred  to  as.  23,  24  and  25  of  the  Land Acquisition Act and concluded:                      "It  seems to me that sections  23,  24               and  25  of the Act constitute a  code  laying               down  the  principles on  which  the  District               Court    is   to  act  in  arriving   at   the               compensation  to  be  paid, and  it  is  quite               impossible  to  leave out of  that  code  sub-               section  (2)  of section 23, as Mr.  Shah  has               invited me to do.  His contention is that  the               fifteen per cent is an allowance of  something               in  addition to the value of the  land,  which               has  to be paid for under the  Municipal  Act.               But  the truth is that the sections  determine               the basis on which the value of the land is to               be ascertained on compulsory purchase and  the               allowance of the fifteen per cent must be  set               off  against matters disallowed under               section  24.  Those pro.visions  in  the  Land               Acquisition  Act  are contained in  a  Chapter               entitled  "Reference to Court  and   Procedure               thereon" and I think that they must be treated               as  applicable to proceedings in the  District               Court   under  section  198  of   the   Bombay               Municipal Boroughs Act."      The learned counsel for the Corporation was not able to cite  any authority which has dissented from this view.   We agree with   the reasoning of the learned Chief Justice  and hold  that  the  Additional  District  Judge.was  right   in awarding 15 per cent solatium.      Coming  to the fourth point, the revision to  the  High Court was filed under s. 392 of the Act which provides  that "notwithstanding  anything to the contrary in any other  law for  the  time  being in force,  the  District  Court  shall exercise all the powers and jurisdiction expressly conferred on or vested in it by the provisions of this Act, and unless it is otherwise expressly provided by this Act, its decision shall  be subject to revision by the High Court."’ The  High Court  could  not,  in  a revision under  s.  392,  go  into questions of fact and determine the amount of  compensation, and the High Court was right in declining to deal with  this question.  It  is  not necessary to  determine  whether  the powers  of  revision under s. 392 are the same as  under  s. 115, C.P.C., because even  if the powers under s. 392 of the

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Act  are wider than that under  s. 115, C.P.C., they do  not extend  to  determining  questions fact.  In  view  of  this conclusion this. point cannot  be agitated  before us.    In  the result the appeals fail, but the  applicant--Shri Palshikar--shall  deposit the amount of Rs. 6,000/-  in  the Court  of the Additional District judge within four  months, as stated by his 20 counsel.,  and he shall be entitled to withdraw this  amount once  vacant possession is given of the land in  dispute  to the  Corporation.   If so requested by the  applicant,  Shri Palshikar, the Corporation should join as co-plaintiff in  a suit  or proceeding to be filed by him against  the  tenants for  Securing possession.  If it refuses to do so  within  3 months from the date  the  applicant requires it to join  as co-plaintiff  the respondent may withdraw this  Rs.  6,000/- deposited  by  him.  The Corporation shall  also  give  such further  assistance  as may be required  by   the  applicant in .accordance with law. The applicant shall be entitled to costs; one hearing fee. G.C.                                      Appeals dismissed. 21