http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION FOR THE CITY OF POONA ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BIJLEE PRODUCTS (INDIA) LTD. ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/09/1978

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA SHINGAL, P.N. KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1979 AIR  304            1979 SCR  (1) 765  1978 SCC  (4) 214  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1981 SC2022  (15)

ACT:      Bombay Provisional  Municipal  Corporation  Act,  1949, Sections 127(1),  (2),(3) r/w  S. 149  of the  Act-Exemption from payment  of octroi duty quashed-Whether proposed repeal of  rule   5(8)   contrary   to   the   exemption   granted- Interpretation of Govt. Resolution dated 30-7-68.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  Corporation sometime  in the  year  1957 invited  applications   for  allotment   of  plots   in  the industrial estate guaranteeing that for a period of 12 years no octori  duty will  be levied as provided in rule 62-B and also specifically  inserted a  clause at  item  (B)  of  the conveyances executed by the respondents to that effect. Some years later, the appellant passed a resolution dated 30-5-68 recommending to  the Govt.  to bring  about an  amendment in rule 62-B which, inter alia, contained: "octroi rule 5(8) is hereby repealed.  Provided that  notwithstanding such repeal the exemption  already  granted  shall  continue  until  the expiry of  the respective periods of their grants". However, the State  Government, while accepting the recommendation of the corporation,  in para  2 of its resolution dated 30-7-78 specified 1st  September 1968  as  the  date  on  which  its sanction shall  become operative.  The respondents  who felt that  they  were  adversely  affected  filed  separate  writ petitions in the Bombay High Court, which were allowed.      Allowing the appeals by certificate, the Court ^      HELD: 1.  Sub-section (2)  of Section 149 of the Bombay Provincial  Municipal  Corporation  Act.  1949  gives  three alternative courses  to the  Government. After the matter is submitted by  the Corporation  to the  Government (1) it may refuse to  sanction the  rules recommended,  or (2)  it  may refer  back   to  the   Corporation  any  rule  for  further consideration or (3) it may sanction the rule as recommended or with certain modifications as it thinks fit. There can be no  doubt   that  the  Government  had  the  power  to  make modifications  in   the  recommendation   submitted  by  the Corporation,  but   the  express   provision  by  which  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

Government could refer the matter back to the Corporation is clearly suggestive  of the  fact that  the Government  would refer the  matter to  the Corporation if it wanted to modify the proposal. [774A-C]      In the instant case :      (a) While  exercising its power to delete rule 5(8) the Government had  the following  materials before  it, (1)  It knew that Rule 5(8) had granted exemption for a period of 10 years to  some industrialists,  who  on  the  basis  of  the representation made  by the  Corporation had  set up  their. industries;  (2)  the  Municipal  Corporation  had  made  an express recommendation  that while  deleting rule  5(8)  the previous concessions  regarding exemption  from octroi  duty must 766 continue, (3)  the Government  could delete rule 5(8) in the exercise of  the powers  conferred on it by sub-sections (2) and (5) of section 149 and sub section (1) of section 455 of the Act. [773E-F]      (b) The  Government has  done nothing  of the  sort  as required by S. 149(2) of the Act, but has clearly passed the order purely  in terms of the recommendation. Therefore, the Government never  intended to  make any  changes in the rule recommended by  the  Corporation  particularly  because  the question of  not accepting  the condition recommended by the Corporation, namely,  that  the  existing  concessions  must continue would  entail taking  away of vested rights and put the Corporation  in a  wrong box  inasmuch as  it would than have to go back from its own assurance. [774B-D]      2. The  Government order  dated 30th July, 1968 must be so interpreted  as to include the proviso recommended by the Corporation while  deleting  rule  5(8),  namely,  that  the concessions already  granted  to  the  industrialists  would continue. It is true that the Government resolution does not say so  in so  many words, but having regard to the language in which  it was couched and express reference to the letter dated 2nd July, 1968 of the Municipal Commissioner contained in the  order itself  which clearly  mentions that rule 5(8) should be  repealed provided  the exemption  already granted shall continue until the expiry of the respective periods of their grants,  the aforesaid condition would be deemed to be included  in   the  order   dated  30-7-1968   by  necessary intendment.  Such   an  interpretation   will  be  fully  in consonance with  the well  settled rule of interpretation of statutes that any amendment to a statute affecting the legal rights of  an individual  must be presumed to be prospective unless it  is made  expressly or is impliedly retrospective. This principle  is contained  in section  7  of  the  Bombay General Clauses Act. [774E-G]      In the  instant case,  the result  of a  different view would be that a valuable right vested in the respondents and others would  be taken  away and  there no  evidence in  the language of  the  Government  order  to  indicate  any  such intention. [774G-H]      (b) Even  assuming that  the order  of  the  Government deleted  rule   5(8)  without   any  condition  and  without retaining the  exemption granted  to  the  respondents,  the order would  suffer from  a very  serious  legal  infirmity. Section 149(2)  of the Act empowers the Government to modify the recommendation  of the  Corporation provided it does not involve any increase in the rate or rates of the levy or the extent thereof. There can be no doubt that if the concession of exemption  from octori  duty given  to the respondents is unconditionally withdrawn  with effect  from  1-9-1968  then this would  have the  effect of extending the application of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

the rules  to an  area where they did not apply. This is yet another reason why the Government’s impugned order should be read down  so as  to provide  for deletion of rule 5(8) with the exception  that  the  concession  already  granted  will continue. The  deletion of  Rule 5(8) has not taken away the concession already granted to the respondents. [775A-D]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Civil Appeal Nos. 2009 and 2081 of 1969.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  18-3-1969  of  the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 541/69 and 483/69 and 767            CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 355 and 356 of 1970      From the  Judgments and Order dated 18-3-1969 and 12-3- 1969 of  Bombay High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 542/69 and 2149/68 respectively and                 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 94 Of 1971      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 21-12-1970  of the  Bombay High  Court in  S.C.A.  No. 2081/70.      Y. S.  Chitale, J.  L. Nain  (In  C.A.  94/71),  C.  K. Ratanparkhi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Appellants in C.As Nos. 2009,  2081/69, 355,  356/70 and  Respondents  in  C.A. 94/71.      A. K.  Sen, (In  C.A. 2009/69) V. S. Desai (C.A. 94/71) A. B. Devan (in C.A. 356 of 1970 and also intervener in C.A. 94/71) V.  M. Tarkunde,  A. K.  Sen, S.  M. Thakore,  I.  N. Shroff, H.  S.Parihar and R. P. Kapur; for the Respondent in CAs. Nos.  2009, 2081/69,  355, 356/70 and Appellant in C.A. 94/71 and Interveners in C.As. 2009, 2081/69 and 355-356/70.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL  ALI,  J.-These  appeals  have  been  brought  by certificate of  fitness granted  by the  Bombay  High  Court against the  order of  the High  Court in  S.C.A. No.2149 of 1968 dated  12th March,  1969. By  an order  dated 12-7-1970 this Court  directed the  four appeals  to  be  consolidated because the  points involved were the same. The appeals have been filed  by the  Municipal Corporation  for the  City  of Poona (hereinafter  called the  Corporation) against  whom a writ filed  before the Bombay High Court was allowed and the orders demanding  the octroi  duty from the respondents were quashed.      The facts  of the case insofar as they are pertinent to the decision of the points in issue lie within a very narrow compass. The  entire case  turns upon  the interpretation of some of  the provisions  of the  Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation  Act  1949  (hereinafter  called  the  Act)  and certain notifications  issued thereunder.  It  appears  that under section  127(1) of the Act the Corporation has got the power to  impose property taxes and taxes on vehicles, boats and animals.  By sub-section (2) it has the option to impose other kinds  of taxes  one of  which is octroi with which we are primarily  concerned in  these appeals  Sub-section  (3) provides that  the Municipal  taxes shall  be  assessed  and levied in  accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules. Section  149 sub-section  (1) enjoins the Corporation to  make   detailed  provisions   in  connection   with  the assessment and 15-549 SCI/78 768 collection of  any of  the  taxes  and  sub-section  (2)  of section 149  enables the  Government  either  to  refuse  to sanction  the   rules  and   refer  the  same  back  to  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

Corporation for  consideration or  to sanction the same with or without  modifications. We  shall  extract  the  relevant sections in a later part of our judgment.      It  appears  that  some  time  in  the  year  1957  the Corporation in  order to boost industrial development and to encourage the  industrialists  to  establish  an  industrial estate in  the city  had decided to give certain concessions in the  nature  of  exemption  of  octroi  duty  on  certain products under  certain conditions.  In  pursuance  of  this objective the Corporation made the following rule 62B:           "62-B :  ’Industrial Estate  or  Area"  means  the      areas which Corporation may from time to time demarcate      for the  purposes of  the rule  as the  area  in  which      industries can  be suitably  located in the interest of      industrialisation of the city of Poona.           In respect  of  any  raw  materials  or  machinery      imported  by   any  industrial   manufacturing  concern      established or  to be  established  in  the  industrial      estate solely for the purpose of manufacturing finished      articles   in   the   said   Industrial   Estate,   the      commissioner shall  not, for  a period  of twelve years      only, from  the date  on which  this  rule  comes  into      force, levy octroi .. "      The Corporation  invited applications  for allotment of plots in  the industrial  estate  guaranteeing  that  for  a period of  12 years  no octroi will be levied as provided in rule  62-B.   Acting  on  the  representation  made  by  the Corporation, the  respondents, namely,  the  Bijli  Products (India) Ltd., Henley Cables India Ltd., Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. and  Kirloskar  Pneumatic  Co.  Ltd.  applied  for  the allotment of plots and sale deeds were executed as mentioned below:- Sum  for Name  of the Area purchased which area Date of Company was purchase Purchased Rs. ------------------------------------------------------------ Name of the       Area purchased     sum for       date of Company                              which area    purchase                                        was                                      purchased ------------------------------------------------------------                                          Rs. Bijlee Products      86064           34,425.60      10. 9.65 India Pvt. Ltd Henley Cables      1566006           399331.53      29. 6.60 India Ltd. Bombay   164960            42064.88      10.10.69 India Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. Bombay      55795           134838.71      16. 1.59 Kirloskar Pneu-     754436           112093.53       23.5.58 matic Poona-3 ------------------------------------------------------------ 769 The conveyances  executed by  the respondents  contained the following clause at item (B) :           "(B)  Octroi   will  be   excused  following   and      according to  the rule made by the Poona City Municipal      Corporation from  the  date  1-11-1957  in  respect  of      Octroi for  Hadapsar Industrial  Colony Scheme. We have      agreed and  hereby assure  that we  will not rescind or      alter the octroi rule made by the Poonam City Municipal      Corporation during the period upto 10-10-1969 in such a      way as  to reduce the facilities given to you according      to the said rule".      The Corporation  however  made  rule  5(8)  which  runs      thus:-           "In respect  of any  new  materials  or  machinery      belonging  to   and   imported   by   any   industrial,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

    manufacturing,   processing   or   assembling   concern      established or  to be  established  in  the  Industrial      Estate  or   Area  for  the  purpose  of  manufacturing      processing or  assembling finished articles in the said      Industrial Estate  or Area  the Commissioner  shall not      levy octroi  for a  period of 10 years from the date of      demarcation of  such area  as an  industrial estate  or      area; provided  that this  exemption shall not be given      in respect  of  any  raw  materials  imported  for  the      purpose of refilling packing or repacking only.           Provided that  no exemption  from octroi  shall be      given or  claimable unless the importer produces at the      time of  import but not afterwards a certificate in the      form  prescribed   in  Schedule   ’P’  signed   by  the      proprietor  or  the  manager  of  the  said  industrial      concern  certifying  that  the  raw  materials  or  the      machinery that  are being  imported are the property of      the ownership  of the  said industrial concern and that      the said  materials or  machinery are to be used or are      intended to  be used by the said industrial concern for      the purpose  of manufacturing  processing or assembling      finished articles  in the  said  Industrial  Estate  or      Area". The combined effect therefore of rule 62-B and rule 5(8) was that the  industrialists who were allotted plots in the City of Poona  were to  be exempted  from octroi  duty on any new materials or  machinery belonging  to them  and imported  by them in  the industrial  estate or  Area for  manufacturing, processing or  assembling articles  in the  said  area.  The exemption was to last for a period of 10 years from the date of demarcation of such area. 770      Some years  later the Corporation by a resolution dated 30-5-1968 recommended  to the  Government to  bring about an amendment in  rule 62-B.  This resolution  may be  extracted thus:-           "Considering the reasons and recommendations given      by the  Municipal  Commissioner  in  his  letter  under      reference   and    considering   the   objections   and      suggestions received  from citizens  in response to the      notification, it  is resolved  that concessions already      granted by the Corporation should not be stopped before      deletion  of   the  Octroi   Rule  5(8).  However,  new      demarcation of industrial areas should not hereafter be      made on  the ground  of octroi  Rule 5(8)  and  no  new      concession of  Octroi Rule  5(8) hence forth be granted      to any  industry. Hence, the Octroi Rule 5(8) should be      deleted and  instead the  following amendment is hereby      sanctioned.           Sanction of  the Maharashtra  State Government  to      this amendment  should be  obtained  by  the  Municipal      Commissioner as  required under  section 455(1)  of the      Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949.      Proposed octroi Rule 5(8).           Octroi Rule 5(8) is hereby repealed. Provided that      not withstanding  such  repeal  the  exemption  already      granted  shall   continue  until   the  expiry  of  the      respective periods of their grants"- It  appears   that  this   resolution  was   passed  on  the recommendation of  the Municipal Commissioner as the purpose of giving  initial concessions had already been achieved and rule 5(8)  had become  superfluous. The  resolution  however took care  to keep  the commitment of the Corporation intact and it  was therefore  recommended that  there should  be  a proviso to  the effect  that the  exemptions already granted

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

under rule  5(8) were  to continue  until the  expiry of the respective periods  of the  grants. Thus, the recommendation for maintaining the exemption from octroi duty to industrial areas which  had already  been demarcated  and allotted, was made  by  the  Corporation.  When  the  matter  reached  the Government of Maharashtra it passed a resolution dated 30-7- 1968 to be effective from 1-9-1968 which runs thus:-           "Government Resolution,  Urban Development, Public      Health and  House, Department  No. PMC/2862/15/C  dated      28th January, 1963. 771           Government  Circular,  Urban  Development,  Public      Health  and  Housing  Department  No.  MUN/1164/58163/A      dated 25th February, 1966.           Letter No.  MC/101 dated  2nd June,  1968 from the      Municipal Commissioner, Poona Municipal Corporation.           "Resolution: In  exercise of  the powers conferred      by sub-sections  (2) and  (5) of  section 149  and sub-      section (1)  of section  455 of  the Bombay  Provincial      Municipal Corporation  Act, 1949  Government is pleased      to accord  sanction to  the deletion  of Clause  (8) of      Rule 5  of the  Octroi Rules  of  the  Poona  Municipal      Corporation.           2. In  exercise of  the powers  conferred by  sub-      section (3)  of section  149 of  the Bombay  Provincial      Municipal Corporation  Act, 1949  Government is pleased      to specify  1st September,  1968 as  the date  on which      this sanction shall be come operative. By order and in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra Sd./ C.F. Mathias                                       Under Secretary to the Government                           of Maharashtra, Urban Development,                       Public Health and Housing Department". Thus, the  Government accepted  the  recommendation  of  the Corporation and  granted sanction  to the deletion of clause (8) of  rule 5  of the  octroi Rules of the Corporation. The Corporation in  pursuance of  the Government sanction sought to realise  the octroi  duty from  the respondents and other industrialists. The  respondents  therefore  filed  separate writ petitions  in the  Bombay High  Court for  quashing the order on the ground that the Corporation having allotted the plots to  the respondents  on  the  distinct  assurance  and representation that  the octroi duty will not be levied, was estopped from  realising the  octroi duty on the doctrine of promissory estoppel.      It was  also argued  before the  High  Court  that  the Government order  in question could not take away the vested rights of the respondents. The plea taken by the respondents in the High Court found favour 772 with the  Court which  allowed the petitions and quashed the Government  order   and  injuncted   the  Corporation   from realising any  amount from  the respondents by way of octroi duty. The  High Court, however, gave certificates of fitness and hence these appeals before us.      Dr. Y.  S. Chitale,  learned counsel  appearing for the Corporation, raised  two main points before us. In the first place, it  was argued  that the  High Court  erred in law in giving effect  to the  doctrine of  promissory estoppel when there could be no estoppel against a statute. The Government order deleting  rule 5(8)  being of  a  statutory  character could not  estop the  Corporation from realising octroi duty which it  was bound to realise under the mandate of the law.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

Secondly, it  was submitted  that there could be no question of taking  away vested  rights because  the Government order must be  deemed to have been passed on the recommendation of the Corporation. As against this, counsel for the respondent submitted that  so far  as the  Corporation is  concerned it will be  bound by the doctrine of promissory estoppel and it can refuse  to  realise  octroi  duty  as  enjoined  by  the Government order  or if  it realises the same, it would have to refund  the same  in order  to keep  up  its  commitment. Thirdly, it  was submitted by the respondents as also by the intervener  that  having  regard  to  the  history  and  the circumstances in  which rule  5(8) and  62-B were introduced the order  of the  Government dated  30-7-1968 was  to be so read  as   to  incorporate  the  proviso  suggested  by  the Corporation, namely, that the concessions already granted to the  industrialists   would  not  be  disturbed.  Mr.  Dewan submitted that  even if the Government order dated 30-7-1968 sought to  take away  the exemption,  the order  itself  was without jurisdiction  inasmuch as the conditions required by section 149(2) of the Act had not been complied with.      We  have   given  our   anxious  consideration  to  the arguments advanced  before us by counsel for the parties. We feel that  in the circumstances of this case and in the view that we  take, it  is not  at all necessary for us to travel into the  domain of  promissory estoppel.  We are clearly of the opinion  that reading  the order dated 30-7-1968 against the history  and background  of the  recommendation  of  the Corporation, the  first contention  of the  respondents must prevail.      It  is   not  disputed  that  the  Corporation  in  its resolution  dated   30-5-1968  while   recommending  to  the Government to  delete rule  5(8) expressly  recommended that the exemption  already  granted  would  continue.  The  last paragraph of the resolution runs thus:-           "Octroi Rule No. 5(8) is hereby repealed. Provided      that notwithstanding such repeal the exemption already 773      granted  shall   continue  until   the  expiry  of  the      respective periods of their grants". Before this,  the Corporation  itself  had  taken  a  policy decision  that   the  industrialists   choosing  to  set  up industries in  the demarcated  area would be given exemption from octroi  duty as  contained in  rule 62B. It was on this representation that the respondents applied for allotment of the plots  and spent huge amounts of money for the import of machinery and the materials and set up industries.      The resolution  of the  Government deleting  rule  5(B) read as  a whole  also clearly  indicates that  it  did  not intend  to  depart  from  the  recommendation  made  by  the Corporation or  to modify  the same  in any  manner. On  the other hand,  the resolution  clearly indicates  that it  was being passed  on the  basis of  the letter  of the Municipal Commissioner dated  2nd June,  1968 as  would be  manifestly clear from  the citations  in the  resolution which  may  be extracted thus:           "Read: Government  Resolution, Urban  Development,      Public Health  and House  Department No.  PMC/2862/15/C      dated 28th January, 1963.           Government  Circular,   Urban  Development  Public      Health  and  Housing  Department  No.  MUN/1164/58163/A      dated 25th February, 1966.           Letter No.  MC/101 dated  2nd June,  1968 from the      Municipal Commissioner, Poona Municipal Corporation". It is, therefore, evident that while exercising its power to delete rule  5(8) the Government had the following materials

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

before it,  (1) It knew that Rule 5(8) had granted exemption for a  period of 10 years to some industrialists, who on the basis of  the representation made by the Corporation had set up their  industries; (2) the Municipal Corporation had made an express  recommendation that while deleting rule 5(8) the previous concessions  regarding exemption  from octroi  duty must continue,  (3) the Government could delete rule 5(8) in the exercise  of the  powers conferred on it by sub-sections (2) and  (5) of  section 149  and sub-section (1) of section 455 of the Act.      Section 149(2) runs thus :           "The rules  shall be  submitted by the Corporation      to  the   Provincial  Government   and  the  Provincial      Government may either refuse them or refer them back to      the Corporation  for further  consideration or sanction      them either as they stand or with such modifications as      it thinks  fit, not,  however, involving an increase in      the rate or rates of the levy or the extent thereof". 774 This sub-section  gives three  alternative  courses  to  the Government. After the matter is submitted by the Corporation to the  Government (1)  it may  refuse to sanction the rules recommended, or (2) it may refer back to the Corporation any rule for  further consideration  or (3)  it may sanction the rule as  recommended, or  with certain  modifications as  it thinks fit.  There can  be no  doubt that the Government had the  power  to  make  modifications  in  the  recommendation submitted by  the Corporation,  but the express provision by which the  Government could  refer the  matter back  to  the Corporation is  clearly suggestive  of  the  fact  that  the Government would  refer the  matter to the Corporation if it wants to  modify the  proposal. In  the  instant  case,  the Government has  done nothing  of the  sort but  has  clearly passed the  order purely  in terms of the recommendation. In these   circumstances,    therefore,   the    inference   is irresistible that  the Government never intended to make any changes  in   the  rule   recommended  by   the  Corporation particularly because  the  question  of  not  accepting  the condition recommended  by the  Corporation, namely, that the existing concessions  must continue would entail taking away of vested  rights and  put the  Corporation in  a wrong  box inasmuch as  it would  then have  to go  back from  its  own assurance. The  Government must certainly have been aware of these complications  and if  it thought that in spite of all this rule  5(8) should  be deleted unconditionally, it would have referred the matter back to the Corporation in order to get its  revised views in the matter. But that was not done. In these  circumstances, therefore,  we are  of the  opinion that the  Government order  dated 30th July, 1968 must be so read  as   to  include   the  proviso   recommended  by  the Corporation while  deleting  rule  5(8),  namely,  that  the concessions already  granted  to  the  industrialists  would continue. It is true that the Government resolution does not say so  in so  many words, but having regard to the language in which  it was couched and to the express reference to the letter dated  2nd July,  1968 of  the Municipal Commissioner contained in  the order  itself which  clearly mentions that rule 5(8)  should be repealed provided the exemption already granted shall  continue until  the expiry  of the respective periods of  their grants,  the aforesaid  condition would be deemed to  be included  in  the  order  dated  30-7-1968  by necessary intendment.  Such an  interpretation will be fully in consonance  with the  well settled rule of interpretation of statutes  that any  amendment to  a statute affecting the legal rights  of  an  individual  must  be  presumed  to  be

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

prospective unless  it is  made expressly  or  is  impliedly retrospective. This  principle is  contained in section 7 of the Bombay  General Clauses  Act. In the instant case, if we were to  take a  different view  the result  would be that a valuable right vested in the respondents and others would be taken away  and we  are unable  to find  any evidence in the language of  the  Government  order  to  indicate  any  such intention. 775      Even assuming  that the order of the Government deleted rule 5(8)  without any  condition and  without retaining the exemption granted to the respondents, the order would suffer from a  very serious  legal infirmity. Section 149(2) of the Act empowers  the Government to modify the recommendation of the Corporation provided it does not involve any increase in the rate  or rates  of the levy or the extent thereof. There can be  no doubt  that if  the concession  of exemption from octroi duty  given to  the  respondents  is  unconditionally withdrawn with effect from 1-9-1968 then this would have the effect of  extending the application of the rules to an area where they did not apply. This is yet another reason why the Government impugned  order should  be read  down  so  as  to provide for  deletion of  rule 5(8)  with the exception that the concession already granted will continue.      For  the   reasons  given   above,  we   interpret  the Government order mentioned above in the manner aforesaid and hold that  the deletion  of rule 5(8) has not taken away the concession  already   granted  to   the   respondents   and, therefore, the respondents are not affected by the order. In view of  this, it is not necessary to quash the order of the Government because  the  respondents  get  the  relief  they wanted if  we interpret the Government order as we have. The order of  the High  Court quashing  the Government order is, therefore, set  aside  and  the  appeals  are  disposed  off accordingly, in  the circumstances  without any  order as to costs. S.R. Appeals allowed.                      C.A.No. 94 of 1971      FAZAL ALI,  J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the  order of  the High  Court dated  21st December, 1970 dismissing  the petition  in limine.  In  view  of  the findings given  and the  decision rendered  by us  in  Civil Appeals No.  2009 and  2081 of 1969 and 355 & 356 of 1970 it is not  necessary for us to go into the details of the facts of this  case as  we have  already held  that the Government order dated  30-7-1968 must be read to this effect that rule 5(8) is  deleted but  the previous  concessions given to the industrialists concerned will continue. It appears, however, that so  far as  the appellant  is  concerned,  it  has  not executed any  sale-deed though  it was allotted a plot which was also  demarcated. Apart  from the point which we decided in the  other appeals  there being  additional points of law involved in  this case,  we do not think that this was a fit case which  should have  been dismissed  in  limine  by  the Bombay High  Court. We,  therefore, allow  this  appeal  and remit the  case to  the  High  Court  for  re-admitting  and disposal of  the writ  petition according  to law. The point regarding the 776 interpretation  of  Government  order  dated  30-7-1968  has already been  decided by  us in  Civil Appeals  No. 2009 and 2081 of  1969 and  355 &  356 of  1970 referred to above and will apply  to the  present case  also, if  the appellant is able to  prove that  it falls within the four corners of the Government order.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

S.R.                              Appeal allowed & remitted. 777