12 March 1975
Supreme Court
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MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AMRITSAR Vs HAZARA SINGH


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PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AMRITSAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HAZARA SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/03/1975

BENCH: GUPTA, A.C. BENCH: GUPTA, A.C. BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 1083

ACT: Practice--Criminal     appeal    under    Art.    136     of Constitution--Improper invocation.

HEADNOTE: A  milk vendor was prosecuted for alleged  adulteration,  on the  ground  that  there  was a  minimal  shortfall  in  the percentage  of  "milk  solids not  fat"  prescribed  by  the Prevention  of  Food Adulteration Rules.   The  trial  court convicted  but on appeal, the Sessions Judge made a  passing reference  to  an obiter observation of this  Court  in  the Malwa  Cooperative-Milk  Union Ltd.,  lndore  v.  Biharlial, (Criminal Appeal No. 235 dated 14-8-1967) ignored the  minor deficiency   observing  that  it  was  in  the   nature   of permissible  error  and acquitted the  accused.   An  appeal against acquittal was dismissed by the High Court. Dismissing the appeal to, this Court, HELD : In the Malwa Cooperative Milk Union Ltd. v. Biharilal this  Court while holding that the revisional power  of  the High  Court  is reserved for setting  right  miscarriage  of justice  and not for being invoked by  private  prosecutors, made  an obiter observation, to drive home the  point,  that the case itself was so marginal that the difference from the set  standard  was  microscopic.   The  Sessions  Judge  was perhaps  wrong  in tearing that passage out of  context  and devising  a  new  defence  out of  it  in  respect  of  food adulteration cases.  But an appeal with special leave  under Art.  136  should  not  have been  filed  merely  to  get  a declaration  that  a casual statement in a judgment  of  the Court is not its ratio. [915 E-G, 916 E]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 228 of 1972. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated the  12th June, 1972 of the Punjab & Haryana High  Court  in Criminal Appeal No. 883 of 1972. Naunit Lal, for the appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA  IYER, J. We regret to begin this judgment with  the

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observation  that the high purpose of reserving the  Supreme Court’s jurisdiction for substantial legal issues  affecting the  nation,  should  not  be  taken  by  cases  of   lesser consequence.   The  present  criminal  appeal  is  a  signal instance  of  litigation  of little  public  interest  being brought up here, holding up other momentous causes. The facts A petty milk vendor was prosecuted for alleged adulteration, proof  of  which  rested  on  a  minimal  shortfall  in  the percentage of ’milk solids not fat’ going by the  prescribed standard  (Rule  5 of the Prevention  of  Food  Adulteration Rules).   The  plea of the accused that, if  at  all,  there might  have  been a marginal error, while the  analysis  was conducted was rightly rejected and the Magistrate  sentenced him to imprisonment and fine as laid down in s-7 and s.16(1) of the Prevention of Food  915 Adulteration  Act  (hereinafter called the Act).   The  milk vendor hopefully appealed and impressed by the fact that the milk  solids  were of the required standard  and  the  ’milk solids  not  fat’ were slightly sub-standard,  the  Sessions Judge ignored the minor deficiency which is in the nature of permissible error’ and acquitted the accused. The Municipal Committee pursued the matter to the High Court in appeal.  But a Division Bench of that Court dismissed  it in  limine, presumably as too trivial for an appeal  against acquittal.  However, the appellant has arrived in this Court claiming that this is a test case and making it appear  that some  important  question  of law hangs  on  the,  decision, although  it was represented, at the time special leave  was sought by the counsel, ’that his clients will not press  for the   conviction   of   the   respondent’.    This    latter representation  itself  is  suggestive  of  the  absence  of seriousness  surrounding this particular case.   Apart  from this tell-tale circumstance, the facts we have set out above show  that  nothing  grave  or  great  in  law,  by  way  of miscarriage  of  justice  or general  public  importance  is involved.  This is one of those routine cases, comparatively insignificant,  where one court has acquitted and  the  High Court has felt it unjustified for appellate reversal.  It is of paramount importance that this Court’s time should not be consumed by questions which are trifles. It is plain from submission of counsel that the  appellant’s grievance is not so much against the acquittal as against  a passing  reference  by  the  Sessions  Court  to  an  obiter observation  of  this Court in The  Malwa  Cooperative  Milk Union Ltd., Indore v. Biharilal(1).  Obviously, the Sessions Judge  had  concluded  that a minor error  in  the  chemical analysis  might have occurred: He was perhaps not  right  in saying so.  Anyway, a reading of his judgment-shows that the mention of this Court’s unreported ruling (supra) was  meant to fortify himself and not to apply the ratio of that  case. Indeed,  this  Court’s decision cited above  discloses  that Hidayatullah,  J. (as he then was) was not laying  down  the law that minimal deficiencies in the milk components  justi- fied  acquittal in food adulteration cases.  The point  that arose in that case was whether the High Court was  justified in upsetting an acquittal in revision, when the jurisdiction was  invoked  by a rival trader,  the  alleged  adulteration having  been so negligible that the State had withdrawn  the prosecution  resulting  in the  acquittal.   Certainly,  the revisional  power of the High Court is reserved for  setting right  miscarriage  of  justice, not for  being  invoked  by private persecutors.  Such was the ratio but, in the  course of  the  judgment, Hidayatullah J, to drive home  the  point

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that  the  case  itself was so  marginal,  referred  to  the microscopic  difference, from the set standard.  To  distort that  passage,  tear  it out of context  and  devise  a  new defence out of it in respect of food adulteration cases,  is to  be grossly unjust to the judgment.  Indeed,  the  Kerala case  cited  before us by counsel viz., State of  Kerala  v. Vasudevan  Nair(2) itself shows that such distortion of  the passage  in the judgment did not and could not pass  muster. When (1) Crl.  As Nos. 235 & 236 of 1964, decided on 14-8-1967. (2) Crl.  A. 89 of 1973 decided by the Kerala High Court  on 18-7-1974-All  India Prevention of Food  Adulteration  Cases Reporter, 1975 Part 1, p. 8. 916 pressed  with  such misuse of this ruling,  the  High  Court repelled it. ’The law    of  food adulterations as also  the right approach to decisions of this Court, have been set out correctly there,               "Judicial   propriety,  dignity  and   decorum               demand   that  being  the   highest   judicial               tribunal in the country even obiter dictum  of               the Supreme Court should be accepted as  bind-               ing.  Declaration of law by that Court even if               it  be  only by the way has to  be  respected.               But   all  that  does  not  mean  that   every               statement  contained  in a  judgment  of  that               Court   would  be  attracted  by   Art.   141.               Statements  on matters other than law have  no               binding  force.   Several  decisions  of   the               Supreme  Court  are on facts  and  that  Court               itself has pointed out in Gurcharan Singh  and               Anr.  v.  State of Punjab (1972 FAC  549)  and               Prakash  Chandra  Pathak  v.  State  of  Uttar               Pradesh (AIR 1960 SC 195) that as on facts  no               two cases could be similar, its own  decisions               which  were essentially on questions  of  fact               could  not  be relied upon as  precedents  for               decision of other cases."               *     *     *     *     *     *               "The standard fixed under the Act is one  that               is  certain.  If it is varied to  any  extent,               the  certainty of a general standard would  be               replaced  by  the vagaries  of  a  fluctuating               standard.  The disadvantages of the  resulting               unpredictability,       uncertainty        and               impossibility   of   arriving  at   fair   and               consistent decisions are great." It is extraordinary that an appeal with special leave  under Art. 136 should have been filed, to get a declaration that a casual statement in a judgment of this Court which ex  facie had no kinship with the question under decision, was not the ratio in the case. This.  appeal was ill-advised, misconceived and  unnecessary and merits dismissal. V.P.S.                         Appeal dismissed. 917