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PETITIONER: MUKUND LAL & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/10/1988

BENCH: THAKKAR, M.P. (J) BENCH: THAKKAR, M.P. (J) RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR  144            1988 SCR  Supl. (3) 524  1989 SCC  Supl.  (1) 622 JT 1988 (4)   143  1988 SCALE  (2)1001

ACT:     Criminal   Procedure   Code,  1973:   Section   172(3)-- Constitutional validity of--Case diary and entries therein-- Only  Court  entitled to call for and  examine--Accused  not entitled to call for diary. %     Constitution of India, 1950: Article  32--Constitutional validity of Section 172(3) Cr. P. C. 1973.

HEADNOTE:     Section  172(3)  of the Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973 provides  that neither the accused nor his agents  shall  be entitled  to  call  for the case diary, nor  shall  they  be entitled to see them merely because they are referred to  by the  Court, but if they are used by the Police  Officers  to refresh his memory or if the Court uses them for the purpose of  contradicting  such Police Officer,  the  provisions  of section 161 or 145 as the case may be of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 shall apply.     The  petitioners challenged the constitutional  validity of  the aforesaid provision in the High Court but  the  High Court  repelled  the  same on the ground  that  the  embargo placed by section 172(3) Cr.P.C. on the right of the accused or his representative in calling for the diary or seeing any part  of it is only a partial one and not absolute,  that  a safeguard  has already been provided in the .Section  itself to protect the right of the accused. that in the inquiry  or trial everything which may appear against the accused has to be  established  and brought before the  Court  by  evidence other  than the diary, and the accused can have the  benefit of  examining the witnesses and the Court has power to  call for  the diary and use it. It accordingly held that  Section 172(3) cannot, therefore, be said to be unconstitutional.     The  High  Court  having  repulsed  the  challenge,  the accused  who  were the petitioners in the High  Court  again approached  this  Court  in writ petitions  under  Art.  32, reiterating the challenge on the premise that the High Court had erred in sustaining the validity of the said provision.    Dismissing the petitions, the Court.                                                   PG NO 524                                                   PG NO 525

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   HELD:  1. Section 1-72 embodies a composite scheme.  The duty  cast under clauses (1) and the rider added  by  clause (3)  thereof  form integral part of the scheme.  Clause  (3) cannot  be struck down in isolation whilst retaining  clause (1). The legislature in its wisdom has cast this  obligation only  subject  to the rider clause (3) cannot be  viewed  in isolation. [530D-E]     2. The provision embodied in sub-section (3) of  section 172  of the Cr.P.C. cannot be characterised as  unreasonable or arbitrary. [528E-F]     3.  Under  sub-section (2) of section  172  Cr.P.C.  the Court itself has the unfettered power to examine the entries in  the  diaries. This is a very  important  safeguard.  The Legislature has reposed complete trust in the court which is conducting  the inquiry of the trial. It has  empowered  the court to call for any such relevant case diary, if there  is any inconsistency or contradiction arising in the context of the case diary the Court can use the entries for the purpose of  contradicting  the Police Officer as  provided  in  sub- section (3) of section 172 of the Cr.P.C. [528F-G]     4. The public interest requirement from the stand  point of  the need to ensure a fair trial for an accused  is  more than  sufficiently met by the power conferred on the  court, which  is the ultimate custodian of the interest of  justice and can always be trusted to be vigilant to ensure that  the interest  of  accused persons standing the trial,  is  fully safeguarded. [529H; 530A]     5. There would be no prejudice or failure of justice  to the  accused person since the court can be trusted  to  look into  the  police diary for the purpose  of  protecting  his interest.  Therefore. the public interest  requirement  from the perspective of safeguarding the interest of all  persons standing trial, is not compromised. [530B]     Mohinder  Singh  v.  Emperor,  AIR  1932  (Lahore)  page 103(104); Birajman Mandir v. Prem Narain Shukla  & Ors., AIR 1965  (Allahabad)  p. 494; Raj Narain’s, case [1975]  3  SCR p.333  and  S.P. Gupta’s, case [1982] 2 SCR p. 365  (at  pp. 622, 624), referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTlON: Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 49 and 129 of 1987. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India ) .                                                   PG NO 526     Nand Lal, Mrs. Bagga and S.K. Bagga for the Petitioner.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by    THAKKAR,  J.  Constitutional  validity of  a  part  of  a provision   enjoining  a  police  officer  engaged   in   an investigation  under  Chapter XII of the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure  (Cr.P.C.)  has  been called  into  question.  The provision  which  so  enjoins an  investigation  officer  is embodied  in  Section 172, Clause (1)  whereof  imposes  the duty. It is a part of this provision namely clause (3) which is  the  target  of the challenge made by  one  of  the  two accused  in a Criminal case. The High Court having  repulsed the  challenge, the accused have approached this   Court  by way  of  the  present petition in  order  to  reiterate  the challenge  on the premise that the High Court had  erred  in sustaining the validity of the impugned provision.     The  analysis  of Section 172, Clause  (3)  whereof  has given rise to the challenge to its constitutionally reveals:     (1)  That it embodies a complete scheme relating to  the matter of  maintaining a diary.

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   (2)  Clause  (1)  imposes the obligation to  do  so  and provides for    the contents thereof.     (3)  The Court is empowered to call for such diaries  to aid it in     (1) Section 172(3)--"Neither the accused nor his  agents shall be entitled to  call for such diaries, nor shall he or the  be  entitled  to  see them  merely   because  they  are referred  to  by  the Court: but, if they are  used  by  the police  officer who made them to refresh his memory,  or  if the  Court  uses them for the urpose of  contradicting  such police  officer. the provision of Section 161 or 145 as  the case may be. of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 shall apply."     (2)  Section  161--"Any writing referred  to  under  the provisions  of  the  two last  preceding  sections  must  be produced  and shown to the adverse party if he requires  it; such  party  may, if he pleases, cross-examine  the  witness thereupon".     (3) Section 145--"A witness may be cross-examined as  to previous  statements made by him in writing or reduced  into writing,  and relevant to matters in question, without  such writing  being shown to him, or being  proved; but if it  is intended  to  contradict him by the writing,  his  attention must,  before  the writing can be proved,  called  to  those parts  of  it  which  are to be  used  for  the  purpose  of contradicting him."                                                   PG NO 527 inquiry  or  trial subject to the rider that it can  not  be used as evidence thereat.     (4)  Merely because the Court calls for the  diary,  the accused (or his agent) can not claim the right to peruse it.     (5) The accused can peruse that particular part 2 of the diary  in the context of Section 161 of the Indian  Evidence Act or Section 145 thereof in case:     (a)  if  it is used by the police officer  concerned  to refresh his memory;                              or     (b)  if the Court uses it for contradicting  the  police official concerned.     The High Court has repelled the plea by recourse to  the reasoning  reflected  in  the  relevant  passage   extracted hereinbelow:     "So  far as Section 172(3) iS concerned, the embargo  on the  right of the accused or his representative  in  calling for the diary or seeing any part of it is only a partial one and  not  absolute because if a part of the diary  has  been used  by  the police officer to refresh his  memory  or  the court  uses it for the purpose of contradicting such  police officer,  the  provisions   of Section 161 and  145  of  the Indian Evidence Act,will be applicable. So far as the  other parts are concerned, the accused need not necessarily have a right  of  access  to them because in a  criminal  trial  or enquiry,  whatever  is  sought  to  be  proved  against  the accused,  will have to be proved by the evidence other  than the  diary itself and the diary can only be used for a  very limited purpose by the Court or the police officer as stated above.  Even then, a safeguard has already been provided  in the Section itself to protect the right of the accused.  The investigating Officer deposes before the Court on the  basis of  the entries in the diary. If the accused or his  counsel thinks that he is stating something against the diary or  is trying  to hide something which may be in the diary  he  can put  question in that respect to the Investigating  Officer, and  if the accused or his counsel has any doubt  about  the veracity of the statement made by the Investigation Officer,                                                   PG NO 528

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he may always request the court  to look into the diary  and verify  the facts and, this right of the accused can  always be  safeguarded.  It  is true that it is for  the  court  to decide  whether the facts stated are borne out by the  diary or not, but then this much reliance has always to be  placed on  the court and it has to be trusted as it is  trusted  in the  case under Section 123 of the Evidence Act in order  to decide whether any privilege can be claimed with respect  to the documents in question. Even according to the authorities relied  upon  by  the learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner pertaining  to  Section 123 of the Evidence Act, it  is  the right  of  the  court  to  decide  whether  the   privileged document contains any material affecting the public interest or  a  particular affair of the State, which  need  not   be disclosed.     When  in  the  enquiry or trial,  everything  which  may appear against the accused has to be established and brought before  the Court by evidence other than the diary  and  the accused can have the benefit of cross-examining he witnesses and the court has power to call for the diary and use it, of course not as evidence but in aid of the enquiry or trial, I am  clearly  of  the opinion,  that  the  provisions   under Section    172(3)   Cr.P.C.   cannot   be   said    to    be unconstitutional."     We  fully  endorse the reasoning of the High  Court  and concur  with its conclusion. We are of the opinion that  the provision embodied in sub-section (3) of Section 172 of  the Cr.P.C.   cannot   be  characterised  as   unreasonable   or arbitrary. Under sub-section(2) of section 172  Cr.P.C.  the Court itself has the unfettered power to examine the entries in  the  diaries. This is a very  important  safeguard.  The Legislature   has reposed complete trust in the court  which is conducting the inquiry or the trial. It has empowered the court to call for any such relevant case diary, if there  is any  inconsistency or contradiction arising  in the  context of  the  case dairy the Court can use the  entries  for  the purpose  of contradicting the Police Officer as provided  in sub-section  (3)  of Section 172 of the  Cr.P.C.  Ultimately there can be no better custodian or guardian of the interest of  justice  than the Court trying the case. No  court  will deny to itself the power to make use of the  entries in  the diary  to the advantage of the accused by contradicting  the police  officer  with  reference  to  the  contents  of  the diaries.   In  view  of  this  safeguard,  the   charge   of unreasonableness or arbitrariness cannot stand scrutiny. The                                                   PG NO 529 petitioners  claim  an  unfetterred  right  to  make  roving inspection  of the entries in the case diary  regardless  of whether  these  entries  are  used  by  the  police  officer concerned  to refresh his memory or regardless of  the  fact whether the court has used these entries for the purpose  of contradicting  such police-officer. It cannot be  said  that unless  such unfetterred right is conferred and  recognised, the  embargo engrafted in sub-section(3) of section  172  of the  Cr.P.C. would fail to meet the test of  reasonableness. For  instance  in the case diary there might be  a  note  as regards  the  identity  of  the  informant  who  gave   some information   which   resulted  in  investigation   into   a particular  aspect.  Public Interest demands  that  such  an entry  is  not made available to the accused  for  it  might endanger the safety of the informants and it might deter the informants  from  giving  any  information  to  assist   the investigating  agency,  as  observed in  Mohinder  Singh  v. Emperor, AIR 1932 (Lahore) page 103 (104):     "The  accused  has  no right to  insist  upon  a  police

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witness   referring  to  his  diary  in  order   to   elicit information  which is privileged. The contents of the  diary are  not at the disposal of the defence and cannot  be  used except  strictly  in  accordance   with  the  provisions  of Sections  162  and 172. Section 172 shows that  witness  may refresh his memory by reference  to them but such use is  at the  discretion of the witness and the Judge, whose duty  it is to ensure that the privilege attaching to them by statute is strictly enforced." and  also  as observed in Mahabirji Birajman Mandir  v  Prem Narain Shukla & Ors, A.I.R. 1965 (Allahabad) p. 494.     "The  case  diary contains not only  the  statements  of witnesses  recorded under s. 161 Cr. P.C. and the site  plan or  other documents prepared by the  Investigating  Officer, but  also  reports  or  observations  of  the  Investigating Officer   or   his  superiors.  These  reports  are   of   a confidential  nature and privilege can he  claimed  thereof. Further,  the  disclosure of the contents  of  such  reports cannot  help any of the parties to the litigation .  as  the report invariably contains the opinion of such officers  and their opinion is inadmissible in evidence."     The public interest requirement from the stand point  of the need to ensure a fair trial for an accused is more  than sufficiently met by the power conferred on the court,  which is the ultimate custodian of the interest of justice and can                                                   PG NO 530 always be trusted to be vigilant to ensure that the interest of accused persons standing the trial, is fully safeguarded. This  is  a factor which must be accorded  its  due  weight. There  would  be no prejudice or failure of justice  to  the accused  person since the court can be trusted to look  into the police diary for the purpose of protecting his interest. Therefore,   the  public  interest  requirement   from   the perspective  of  safeguarding the interest  of  all  persons standing   trial, is not compromised. On the other hand  the public interest requirement from the perspective of enabling the  investigation agency to investigate the  crime  against the  society in order that the interest of the community  to ensure that a culprit is traced and brought to book is  also safeguarded.  The argument inspired by the  observations  in Raj  Narain ’s case [1975] 3 S.C.R. p. 333 and S  P  Gupta’s case [1982] 2 S.C.R. p. 365 (at pp. 622, 624) in the context of claim for privilege in regard to section 123 of  Evidence Act,  which  have  no direct bearing,  is  also  effectively answered  in  the  light  of  the  foregoing  discussion  as the‘Public  Interest’ aspect is also taken care of.  In  the ultimate  analysis, it  is not possible to sustain the  plea of  the petitioners, which is rooted in the mistrust of  the court  itself,  that  the  provision  is  unreasonable   and arbitrary.  There  is also another dimension of  the  issue. Section 172 embodies a composite scheme. The duty cast under Clause  (1) and the rider added by Clause 1(3) thereof  from integral  part  of the scheme. Clause (3) cannot  be  struck down   in  isolation  whilst  retaining  Clause   (1).   The legislature  in  its wisdom has cast  this  obligation  only subject  to  the  rider.  Clause (3)  cannot  be  viewed  in isolation. Under the circumstances, we concur with the  view of  the High Court and repulse the challenge. These are  the reasons which impelled us to dismiss the petitions. N.V.K.                                  Petitions dismissed.