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PETITIONER: MUKRI GOPALAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHEPPILAT PUTHANPURAYILABOOBACKER

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/07/1995

BENCH: MAJMUDAR S.B. (J) BENCH: MAJMUDAR S.B. (J) FAIZAN UDDIN (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 2272            1995 SCC  (5)   5  JT 1995 (5)   296        1995 SCALE  (4)438

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                  THE 12TH DAY OF JULY, 1995 Present:               Hon’ble Mr.Justice Faizan Uddin               Hon’ble Mr.Justice S.B.Majmudar Mr. G.V.Iyer, Sr. Adv. Mr.G. Prakash and Mr.B.V.Deepak, Advs. with him for the Appellant Mr. R.F.Nariman, Sr. Adv. Mr.E.M.S.Anam, Adv. with him for the Respondent.                       J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1305/95 Mukri Gopalan                           Versus. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker                       J U D G M E N T MAJMUDAR, J.      In  this  appeal  by  special  leave  a  short  but  an interesting question  falls for  determination. It is to the effect ‘whether  the appellate  authority constituted  under Section 18  of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965  (hereinafter referred  to as  the ‘Rent Act’) has power to condone the delay in the filing of appeal before it under the  said section’.  Majority of the Kerala High Court in the  case of  Jokkim Fernandez  Vs. Amina Kunhi Umma (AIR 1974 Kerala  162) has  taken the  view  that  the  appellate authority has  no  such power. Following the said decision a Division Bench  of the Kerala High Court by its judgment and order under  appeal has  dismissed the  revision application moved by  the  appellant  herein  whose  appeal  before  the appellate authority  was dismissed  as time  barred and  the application for  condonation of  delay was treated to be not maintainable before the appellate authority.      A few  relevant facts  leading to these proceedings may

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now be  looked at.  The appellant  is a tenant occupying the suit  premises   belonging   to   respondent-landlord.   The respondent filed Rent Control Petition No. 117/92 before the Rent Control  Court, Kannur,  Kerala State, seeking eviction of the  appellant-tenant under  Section 11(2)  (a)  (b)  and Section 11(3)  of the  Rent Act on the grounds of default in payment of  rent  and  bonafide  need  for  the  purpose  of conducting grocery  shop for  his son,  plaintiff no. 2. The Rent Control  Court exercising its power under Section 11 of the Rent  Act, passed  an order  for possession  against the appellant on  28th October,  1993. The appellant applied for certified copy  of the  said order  on 29.10.93. He obtained certified copy  of the  order on 23.11.93. It is the case of the appellant  that he entrusted on 4.12.93 all the relevant papers to  his counsel for filing appeal. His counsel called him in  the next  following week for signing vakalatnama and for completing  other formalities  relating to  filing    of appeal. It  is the  further case  of the  appellant that  he suffered paralytic  attack on  5.12.93 and  was  bed  ridden until 27.12.93.  On 28.12.93  he came  to know for the first time from  his counsel  that the  time for filing appeal had elapsed. It  may be  noted at this stage that as per Section 18(1) (b)  of the  Rent Act an appeal has to be filed within thirty days from the date of order of Rent Control Court. In computing thirty  days, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of  the order  appealed against  has  to  be  excluded. Ultimately the appeal was filed by the appellant on 31.12.93 before the  appellate  authority,  namely,  District  Judge, Thalassery under  Section 18 of the Act. The said appeal was also accompanied  by I.A.No.  56/94 for condonation of delay supported by  the affidavit  of the appellant. The appellate authority by  its order  dated 11th  January, 1994 dismissed the appeal  as barred  by time. The appellate authority took the view  that being  not a court but a persona designata it has no  power to  condone the  delay  in  filing  appeal  by invoking the  provisions  contained  in  Section  5  of  the Limitation Act, 1963. As noted earlier the said order of the appellate authority was confirmed by the High Court in Civil Revision Petition moved by the appellant and that is how the appellant is before us.      The learned  counsel  for  appellant-tenant  vehemently contended that  the majority  view of  Kerala High  Court in Jokkim Fernandez  Vs. Amina Kunhi Umma (supra) to the effect that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act cannot apply to the proceeding before  the appellate  authority under Section 18 of the  Rent Act  was not  correct and  that  the  appellate authority  had  full  powers  under  Section  29(2)  of  the Limitation  Act  to  consider  on  merits  the  question  of condonation of  delay in  filing appeal  as per Section 5 of the Limitation  Act. The  learned  counsel  for  respondent- landlord on  the other  hand supported the decision rendered by the High Court.      Before we deal with the majority decision of the Kerala High Court  in Jokkim Fernandez Vs. Amina Kunhi Umma (supra) it is necessary to note the relevant statutory provisions in the light  of  which  the  present  controversy  has  to  be resolved. The Rent Act is enacted to regulate the leasing of buildings and  to control the rent of buildings in the State of Kerala. Section 2(5) defines ‘Rent Control Court’ to mean the court constituted under Section 3. Section 3 of the Rent Act provides that the Government may by notification appoint a person  who is  or is qualified to be appointed a Munsiff, to be the Rent Control Court for such local areas. Section 5 of the  Act deals  with the  dertermination of  fair rent on application of  the tenant  or landlord  to the Rent Control

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Court. Section  11  deals  with  the  grounds  on  which  an application can  be  made  to  the  Rent  Control  Court  by landlord for  evicting his or her tenant. Proviso of Section 11 lays  down that  where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or  claims right  of permanent  tenancy,  the  Rent Control Court  shall decide  whether the  denial or claim is bona fide  and if  it records  a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a  Civil Court  and such  court may  pass  a  decree  for eviction on  any of  the grounds  mentioned in this Section, notwithstanding that  the Court  finds such  denial does not involve forfeiture  of  the  lease  or  that  the  claim  is unfounded. Section  14 deals with execution of orders passed by Rent  Control Court.  It provides  that such orders after the expiry  of the  time allowed  therein be executed by the Munsiff or  if there  are more  than  one  Munsiff,  by  the Principal Munsiff having original jurisdiction over the area in which  the building  is situated  as if  it were a decree passed by  him provided  that an  order passed  in execution under this  section shall  not be  subject to  an appeal but shall be  subject to  revision by the court to which appeals ordinarily lie  against the  decisions of  the said Munsiff. Section 16  lays down  that the orders of Rent Control Court shall be  pronounced in  the open  court on the day on which the case  is finally  heard, or  on some future day of which due notice  shall be  given to  the parties.  Next  relevant provision is  found in  Section 18  dealing with appeals. As the controversy  centres round  the powers  of the appellate authority under  Section 18 it will be useful to extract the said Section in extensio at this stage.      "18. Appeal.  - (1)  (a) The  Government      may,  by   general  or   special   order      notified in  the Gazette, confer on such      officers and  authorities not  below the      rank of  a Subordinate  Judge the powers      of appellate authorities for the purpose      of this  Act in  such areas  or in  such      classes of  cases as may be specified in      the order.      (b) Any  person aggrieved  by  an  order      passed by  the Rent  Control Court, may,      within thirty days from the date of such      order, prefer  an appeal  in writing  to      the    appellate     authority    having      jurisdiction. In  computing  the  thirty      days aforesaid, the time taken to obtain      a certified  copy of  the order appealed      against shall be excluded.      (2) On  such appeal being preferred, the      appellate authority  may order  stay  of      further  proceedings   in   the   matter      pending decision on the appeal.      (3) The  appellate authority  shall send      for the  records of  the case  from  the      Rent Control  Court and after giving the      parties an  opportunity of  being  heard      and, if  necessary,  after  making  such      further inquiry  as it thinks fit either      directly or  through  the  Rent  Control      Court, shall decide the appeal.           Explanation:-     The     appellate      authority  may,   while  confirming  the      order of  eviction passed  by  the  Rent      Control Court,  grant  an  extension  of      time  to  the  tenant  for  putting  the

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    landlord in possession of the building.      (4) The  appellate authority  shall have      all the powers of the Rent Control Court      including the fixing of arrears of rent.      (5)  The   decision  of   the  appellate      authority, and subject to such decision,      an order of the Rent Control Court shall      be final  and shall  not be liable to be      called in  question in any court of law,      except as provided in Section 20."      Section 19  deals with  power to  award costs.  It lays down that  subject to  such conditions  and limitations,  if any, as  may be prescribed, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before  the Rent  Control Court or the appellate authority shall  be in  the discretion  of the  Rent Control Court or  the appellate  authority. Section  20  deals  with revision. It  lays down  that in  cases where  the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District  Judge and in other cases the High Court may at any time,  on the  application of  any aggrieved party, call for and  examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken  under this  Act by such authority for the purpose of  satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety  of such  order proceedings,  and may pass such order in  reference thereto  as it thinks fit. Section 20(A) gives power  to remand  the proceedings and provides that in disposing of  an appeal  or application  for revision  under this Act, the appellate authority or the revising authority, as the  case may  be, may remand the case for fresh disposal according to  such directions  as it  may give.  Section  22 deals with  proceedings by or against legal representatives. As per  the said section provisions of Section 146 and order XXII of  the Code  of Civil  Procedure, 1908 shall as far as possible be  applicable to  the proceedings  under this Act. Then follows  Section 23  which  deals  with  procedure  and powers of  the Rent  Act and appellate authority and also of the Accommodation  Controller. It  provides  that  the  Rent Control Court  and the  appellate authority  shall have  the powers which  are vested  in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908  in respect  of listed matters which include discovery  and   inspection;  enforcing  the  attendance  of witnesses, and  requiring the  deposits of  their  expenses; compelling the  production of documents; examining witnesses on oath,  granting adjournments; reception of evidence taken on affidavit;  issuing commission  for  the  examination  of witnesses and  for local  inspection; setting aside ex parte orders; enlargement  of time  originally fixed  or  granted; power to  amend any defect or error in orders or proceedings and power to review its own order. As per sub-section (2) of Section 23  the Accommodation  Controller, the  Rent Control Court or  the appellate authority may summon and examine suo moto any  person whose evidence appears to it to be material and it  shall be  deemed to  be a  Civil  Court  within  the meaning of  sections 480  and  482  of  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure, 1908.  At this  stage it  will be  useful to note that the  Govt. of  Kerala in  exercise of  its power  under Section  18(1)  has  issued  a  notification  conferring  on District Judges  the powers  of appellate  authority for the purpose of  Kerala Rent  Act. The said notification reads as under:-      "BUILDINGS (LEASE  & RENT  CONTROL) ACT,      1965-NOTN. UNDER  S.18(1) CONFERRING  ON      DISTRICT  JUDGES   POWERS  OF  APPELLATE      AUTHORITIES.      (Published in Kerala Gazette No.38 dated

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    26th September, 1989: SRO:1631/89)                    NOTIFICATION           S.R.O.No.  1631/89-In  exercise  of      the powers  conferred by  clause (a)  of      sub-section (1)  of S.18  of the  Kerala      Buildings (Lease  and Rent Control) Act,      1965 (2  of 1965) and in supersession of      all  previous   notifications   on   the      subject, the Government of Kerala hereby      confer on  the  District  Judges  having      jurisdiction over the areas within which      the provisions of the said Act have been      extended, the  powers of  the  Appellate      Authorities for the purposes of the said      Act, in the said areas."      In the  background of  the aforesaid relevant statutory provisions and the notification issued thereunder we have to proceed to tackle the question posed for our consideration.      As noted  earlier the  appellate authority,  namely the District Judge, Thallassery has taken the view that since he is a  persona designata he cannot resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act  for condoning  the delay  in  filing  appeal before him.  So far  as  this  reasoning  of  the  appellate authority is  concerned Mr.  Nariman,  learned  counsel  for respondent fairly  stated that  he  does  not  support  this reasoning and it is not his say that the appellate authority exercising powers  under Section  18 of  the Rent  Act is  a persona designata.  In our view the said fair stand taken by learned counsel for respondent is fully justified. It is now well settled  that an  authority can be styled to be persona designata if  powers are  conferred on  a  named  person  or authority and  such powers  cannot be  exercised  by  anyone else. The  scheme of  the Act  to  which  we  have  referred earlier contra  indicates such  appellate authority  to be a persona designata.  It is clear that the appellate authority constituted under  Section 18(1)  has to  decide lis between parties in  a judicial manner and subject to the revision of its order,  the decision  would  remain  final  between  the parties. Such  an authority is constituted by designation as the District  Judge of the district having jurisdiction over the area  over which  the said  Act has  been  extended.  It becomes obvious  that even  though  the  concerned  District Judge might retire or get transferred or may otherwise cease to hold  the office  of the  District Judge his successor in office can  pick up  the thread  of the proceedings from the stage where  it was left by his predecessor and can function as an  appellate authority under Section 18. If the District Judge was  constituted as  an appellate  authority  being  a persona designata  or as  a named person being the appellate authority  as   assumed  in   the  present   case,  such   a consequence, on  the scheme  of the Act would not follow. In this connection, it is useful to refer to a decision of this court in the case of Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur Vs. Dwarka Prasad (AIR  1961 SC  606). In  that  case  Hidayatullah,  J speaking for  the court  had to  consider whether Additional District  Magistrate   empowered  under   Section  10(2)  of Criminal Procedure  Code  to  exercise  powers  of  District Magistrate was a persona designata. Repelling the contention that he  was a  persona designata the learned Judge made the following pertinent observations:      "......A  persona   designata  is  a  "a      person who  is pointed  out or described      as an individual, as opposed to a person      ascertained as  a member  of a class, or      as filling a particular character." (See

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    Osborn’s  Concise  Law  Dictionary,  4th      Edn., p.253).  In the  words of Schwabe,      C.J.   in    Parthasaradhi   Naidu   Vs.      Koteswara Rao, ILR 47 Mad 369: (AIR 1924      Mad 561)  (FB), personae  designatae are      "persons  selected   to  act   in  their      private  capacity   and  not   in  their      capacity   as    Judges."    The    same      consideration applies  also  to  a  well      known   officer    like   the   District      Magistrate  named   by  virtue   of  his      office, and  whose powers the Additional      District Magistrate  can  also  exercise      and who  can create other officers equal      to  himself  for  the  purposes  of  the      Eviction Act.  The decision of Sapru, J.      in the Allahabad case, with respect, was      erroneous." Applying the  said test  to the facts of the present case it becomes obvious  that appellate  authorities as  constituted under Section  18 of  the Rent Act being the District Judges they constituted  a class  and cannot  be considered  to  be persona designata.  It is  true that in this connection, the majority decision  of the High Court in Jokkim Fernandez Vs. Amina Kunhi  Umma (supra) also took a contrary view. But the said view  also does  not stand scrutiny in the light of the statutory  scheme   regarding  constitution   of   appellate authority under  the Act and the powers conferred on and the decisions rendered by it.      Once it is heldthat the appellate authority functioning under Section 18 of the Rent Act is not a persona designata, it becomes  obvious that  it functions  as a  court. In  the present case  all the  District Judges  having  jurisdiction over the  areas within  which the provisions of the Rent Act have been  extended are constituted as appellate authorities under Section  18 by  the Govt.  notification noted earlier. These District  Judges have been conferred the powers of the appellate authorities.  It becomes  therefore, obvious  that while adjudicating upon the dispute between the landlord and tenant and  while deciding  the question  whether  the  Rent Control Court’s  order is  justified or  not such  appellate authorities would  be functioning  as courts.  The test  for determining whether  the authority is functioning as a court or not  has been  laid down by a series of decisions of this court. We  may refer  to one  of them, in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore  Sinha Vs. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. &  Anr. (1967(3)  SCR 163). In that case this court was concerned with  the question whether the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative  Societies functioning  under Section  48 of the Bihar  and Orissa  Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 was a court subordinate  to the  High Court  for  the  purpose  of Contempt of  Courts Act,  1952. While answering the question in the  affirmative, a division bench of this court speaking through Mitter,  J placed  reliance amongst  others  on  the observations found in the case of Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain (1955 (2) SCR 955) wherein it was observed as under:           "It is  clear, therefore,  that  in      order  to  constitute  a  court  in  the      strict sense  of the  term, an essential      condition is that the court should have,      apart from  having some of the trappings      of a  judicial tribunal, power to give a      decision or  a definitive judgment which      has finality and authoritativeness which      are the  essential tests  of a  judicial

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    pronouncement." Reliance was  also placed  on another decision of this court in the  case of  Virindar Kumar  Satyawadi Vs.  The State of Punjab (1955  (2) SCR 1013). Following observations found at page 1018 therein were pressed in service.      "It may  be  stated  broadly  that  what      distinguishes    a    court    from    a      quasijudicial tribunal  is  that  it  is      charged with  a duty  to decide disputes      in a  judicial manner  and declares  the      rights  of   parties  in   a  definitive      judgment. To decide in a judicial manner      involves that  the parties  are entitled      as a  matter of  right to  be  heard  in      support of  their claim  and  to  adduce      evidence in  proof of  it. And  it  also      imports an obligation on the part of the      authority to  decide  the  matter  on  a      consideration of  the  evidence  adduced      and  in  accordance  with  law.  When  a      question therefore  arises as to whether      an authority  created by  an  Act  is  a      court as  distinguished  from  a  quasi-      judicial  tribunal,   what  has   to  be      decided is  whether having regard to the      provisions of  the Act  it possesses all      the attributes of a court." When   the aforesaid well settled tests for deciding whether an authority is a court or not are applied to the powers and functions  of  the  appellate  authority  constituted  under Section 18  of the Rent Act, it becomes obvious that all the aforesaid  essential   trappings  to   constitute  such   an authority as  a court  are found to be present. In fact, Mr. Nariman learned  counsel for  respondent also  fairly stated that these  appellate authorities  would be courts and would not be  persona designata. But in his submission as they are not civil courts constituted and functioning under the Civil Procedure Code  as such,  they  are  outside  the  sweep  of Section 29(2)  of  the  Limitation  Act.  It  is  therefore, necessary for  us to  turn to the aforesaid provision of the Limitation Act. It reads as under:           "S.29(2) Where any special or local      law prescribes  for any  suit, appeal or      application  a   period  of   limitation      different from  the period prescribed by      the Schedule,  the provisions of Section      3 shall apply as if such period were the      period prescribed  by the  Schedule  and      for  the   purpose  of  determining  any      period of  limitation prescribed for any      suit,  appeal   or  application  by  any      special or  local  law,  the  provisions      contained   in    Sections   4   to   24      (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as,      and to the extent to which, they are not      expressly excluded  by such  special  or      local law." A mere  look  at  the  aforesaid  provision  shows  for  its applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing the machinery  of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision. (i)  There must  be a  provision for  period  of  limitation      under any  special or  local law in connection with any      suit, appeal or application.

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(ii) The  said prescription  of period  of limitation  under      such special  or local law should be different from the      period prescribed  by the  schedule to  the  Limitation      Act.      If the  aforesaid two  requirements are  satisfied  the consequences     contemplated   by   Section   29(2)   would automatically follow. These consequences are as under: (i) In  such a  case Section  3 of  the Limitation Act would      apply as  if the  period prescribed  by the  special or      local law was the period prescribed by the schedule. (ii) For  determining any period of limitation prescribed by      such special  or  local  law  for  a  suit,  appeal  or      application all the provisions containing Sections 4 to      24(inclusive) would  apply insofar as and to the extent      to which  they  are  not  expressly  excluded  by  such      special or local law.      In the  light of the aforesaid analysis of the relevant clauses of  Section 29(2)  of the Limitation Act, let us see whether Section 18 of the Rent Act providing for a statutory appeal to  the appellate  authority satisfies  the aforesaid twin conditions  for attracting the applicability of Section 29(2) of  the Limitation  Act. It  cannot be  disputed  that Kerala Rent  Act is  a special  Act or  a local law. It also cannot be  disputed that  it  prescribes  for  appeal  under Section 18  a period  of limitation  which is different from the period prescribed by the schedule as the schedule to the Limitation Act does not contemplate any period of limitation for filing  appeal  before  the  appellate  authority  under Section 18  of the  Rent Act or in other words it prescribes nil period  of limitation for such an appeal. It is now well settled that  a situation  wherein a period of limitation is prescribed by  a special  or local  law  for  an  appeal  or application and for which there is no  provision made in the schedule to  the Act,  the second  condition for  attracting Section 29(2)  would  get  satisfied.  As  laid  down  by  a majority decision of the Constitution Bench of this court in the case of Vidyacharan Shukla Vs. Khubchand Baghel and Ors. (AIR  1964   SC  1099),  when  the  first  schedule  of  the Limitation Act  prescribes no  time limit  for a  particular appeal, but  the special law prescribes a time limit for it, it can  be  said  that  under  the  first  schedule  of  the Limitation Act all appeals can be filed at any time, but the special law  by limiting it provides for a different period. While the  former permits  the filing  of an  appeal at  any time, the latter limits it to be filed within the prescribed period. It  is therefore,  different from that prescribed in the former and thus Section 29(2) would apply even to a case where a  difference between  the special  law and Limitation Act arose  by the  omission to  provide for  limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act.      It  is   also  obvious  that  once  the  aforesaid  two conditions are satisfied Section 29(2) on its own force will get attracted  to appeals  filed before  appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Act. When Section 29(2) applies to appeals  under Section  18 of the Rent Act, for computing the period  of limitation  prescribed for appeals under that Section, all  the provisions  of Sections  4 to  24  of  the Limitation Act  would apply.  Section 5  being one  of  them would therefore get attracted. It is also obvious that there is no  express exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act taking out the applicability  of Section  5 of  the Limitation  Act  to appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18 of the  Act.  Consequently,  all  the  legal  requirements  for applicability of  Section 5  of the  Limitation Act  to such appeals in  the light of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act can

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be said  to have  been satisfied. That was the view taken by the minority  decision of the learned single Judge of Kerala High Court  in Jokkim Fernandez Vs. Amina Kunhi Umma(supra). The  majority   did  not  agree  on  account  of  its  wrong supposition  that   appellate  authority  functioning  under Section 18 of the Rent Act is a persona designata. Once that presumption is  found to  be erroneous  as discussed  by  us earlier, it  becomes at once clear that minority view in the said decision was the correct view and the majority view was an erroneous view.      It  is  also  necessary  to  note  the  change  in  the statutory settings  of Section  29(2) as earlier obtained in the Indian  Limitation Act,  1908 and the present Limitation Act of  1963. Section  29(2) as  found in  Indian Limitation Act, 1908 read as follows:-           "Where any  special  or  local  law      prescribes  for   any  suit,  appeal  or      application  a   period  of   limitation      different  from  the  period  prescribed      therefor  by  the  First  Schedule,  the      provisions of  Section 3 shall apply, as      if such period were prescribed therefor,      in that Schedule, and for the purpose of      determining  any  period  of  limitation      prescribed  for   any  suit,  appeal  or      application  by  any  special  or  local      law:-           (a)  the  provisions  contained  in      Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section      22 shall apply only in so far as, and to      the  extent   to  which,  they  are  not      expressly excluded  by such  special  or      local law; and           (b)  the  remaining  provisions  of      this Act shall not apply."      As per  this sub-section,  the provisions  contained in certain  sections   of  the   Limitation  Act  were  applied automatically to  determine the  periods under  the  special laws, and  the provisions  contained in  other sections were stated to  apply only if they were not expressly excluded by the special  law. The  provision (Section 5) relating to the power of  the court  to condone  delay in preferring appeals and making  applications came  under the latter category. So if the  power to condone delay contained in Section 5 had to be exercised by the appellate body it had to be conferred by the special  law. That is why we find in a number of special laws a  provision to the effect that the provision contained in Section  5 of  the Limitation  Act  shall  apply  to  the proceeding  under  the  special  law.  The  jurisdiction  to entertain proceedings  under the  special laws  is sometimes given  to  the  ordinary  courts,  and  sometimes  given  to separate tribunals  constituted under  the special law. When the special  law provides  that the  provision contained  in Section 5  shall apply  to the  proceedings under  it, it is really a  conferment of the power of the court under Section 5 to  the Tribunals  under  the  special  law-whether  these tribunals are  courts or  not. If  these tribunals under the special law  should be  courts  in  the  ordinary  sense  an express extension of the provision contained in Section 5 of the Limitation  Act will  become otiose  in cases  where the special law has created separate tribunals to adjudicate the rights of parties arising under the special law. That is not the intension of the legislature.      In view  of the aforesaid provision of Section 29(2) as found in  Indian Limitation  Act, 1908,  Section 5 would not

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have applied  to  appellate  authorities  constituted  under Section 18  as Section  5 would not get attracted as per the then existing  Section 29(2)  of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 which did  not include Section 5 as one of the provisions to be applied  to such  special or  local laws. That appears to the reason  why during the time when the Limitation Act,1908 was in  force, the  Rent Act of 1959 which is the forerunner of present Rent Act of 1965 contained a provision in Section 31 of that Act which read as under:-           "31. Application  of the Limitation      Act:- The provisions of Section 5 of the      Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908),      shall apply  to  all  proceedings  under      this Act;"      After repealing  of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and its replacement  by   the  present  Limitation  Act  of  1963  a fundamental change  was made  in Section  29(2). The present Section 29(2) as already extracted earlier clearly indicates that once  the requisite conditions for its applicability to given proceedings  under special or local law are attracted, the provisions  contained in Sections 4 to 24 both inclusive would get attracted which obviously would bring in Section 5 which  also   shall  apply   to  such   proceedings   unless applicability of  any  of  the  aforesaid  Sections  of  the Limitation Act  is expressly  excluded by  such  special  or local law.  By this  change it is not necessary to expressly state in  a special  law that  the provisions  contained  in Section  5   of  the  Limitation  Act  shall  apply  to  the determination of  the  periods  under  it.  By  the  general provision contained  in Section 29(2) this provision is made applicable to the periods prescribed under the special laws. An express  mention in the special law is necessary only for any exclusion.  It is  on this  basis that when the new Rent Act was  passed in  1965  the  provision  contained  in  old Section 31  was omitted.  It becomes therefore apparent that on a  conjoint reading of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act of 1963 and  Section 18  of the Rent Act of 1965, provisions of Section  5   would  automatically  get  attracted  to  those proceedings, as  there is  nothing in  the Rent  Act of 1965 expressly excluding  the applicability  of Section  5 of the Limitation Act to appeals under Section 18 of the Rent Act.      Mr. Nariman,  learned counsel  for respondent  tried to salvage the  situation by submitting that even if conditions for applicability  of Section  29(2) get  satisfied, Section 29(2) itself  will not  apply to them unless it is held that the  appellate   authority  functioning   as  a   court  was constituted under  the Civil  Procedure Code.  He  contended that unless  such courts  functioning under  special law  or local law  are constituted  under the  Civil Procedure Code, Section 29(a)  cannot apply  to  them.  This  submission  is required to  be stated  to be rejected as it would amount to moving in  a circle.  If according  to Mr.  Nariman  Section 29(2) can  apply to  only those courts which are constituted under the  Civil Procedure  Code then  the entire  scheme of Limitation Act  from Sections 3 to 24 onwards would apply to proceedings of  such courts  on its  own force  and in  that eventuality  provisions   contained  in  Section  29(2)  for applying Sections  4 to  24 of  Limitation Act, 1963 to such court proceedings  would be  rendered otiose  and redundant. Mr. Nariman tried to get out of this situation by submitting that because  of provisions  of first part of Section 29(2). Section 3  of the  Limitation Act,  1963 is  treated to have applied to  the periods  of limitation  prescribed  by  such special or  local law  by a  deeming fiction.  There may  be situations wherein  even courts constituted under special or

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local law  which are  governed by  Civil Procedure  Code may have prescribed  period of  limitation for  suit, appeal  or application under  such special  or local  law and for which provision might  not have  been made  under schedule  to the Limitation Act and only for such courts an express provision has to  be made  for  applying  Sections  4  to  24  of  the Limitation Act  as found in second part of Section 29(2) but for  which  such  a  machinery  may  not  be  available  for computing such  periods of  limitation eventhough by a legal fiction Section  3 of  the Limitation Act would apply. It is difficult  to   countenance  this  submission.  The  express language  of  Section  29(2)  clearly  indicates  that  such special or  local law  must provide for period of limitation for suit,  appeal or  application entertainable  under  such laws and  for computing  period  of  limitation  under  such special or  local law the Legislature has made available the machinery  of  Sections  4  to  24  inclusive  as  found  in Limitation Act.  Nowhere it is indicated that as per Section 29(2) the courts functioning under such special or local law must be governed whole hog by Civil Procedure Code.      In order  to support his contention Mr. Nariman invited our attention  to the  relevant provisions  of the Rent Act, namely, Sections  20, 22,  23 as  well as  second proviso to Section 11(1)  and contended  that a  Rent Court functioning under the Rent Control Act is not a fullfledged civil court. If it  was a  full-fledged civil court there would have been no occasion  for the  Legislature to  provide  that  certain provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 will govern such proceedings. To  that extent  Mr. Nariman  is right. We will proceed on  the basis  that Rent Court functioning under the Rent  Act   or  for  that  matter  the  appellate  authority adjudicating disputes  between landlords  and tenants  in  a judicial manner  may not  be considered  strictly  as  civil courts fully  governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Still the question  remains whether  only because  of  that  their proceedings will go out of the provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Mr. Nariman submitted that Section 29(2) will  apply   only  to   the  proceedings  of  those  courts constituted under  special or  local  law  which  are  civil courts, stricto  sensu. In  order to  buttress his aforesaid submission he  invited our  attention to  four judgments  of this court.  We will  therefore turn to the consideration of these judgments.  The first  judgment on  which reliance was placed by  Mr. Nariman  is rendered  in  the  case  of  Town Municipal Council,  Athani  Vs.  Presiding  Officer,  Labour Court, Hubli  & Ors.  (1970(1) SCR 51). In that case a bench of two  learned Judges  of this court was concerned with the short question  whether any period of limitation governed an application under  Section 33(c)  (2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  The High  Court had taken the view agreeing with the Labour  Court that  Article 137  of the  Limitation Act, 1963 would  govern such applications. Reversing that view it was held  that Labour  Court exercising powers under Section 33 (C) (2) of Industrial Disputes Act may be acting as quasi judicial authority or even a court but as it was not a civil court contemplated  by the Civil Procedure Code, Article 137 of  the  schedule  to  the  Limitation  Act  could  not  get attracted. Bhargava.  J. speaking  for this  court held that Article  137  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963  governs  only applications  presented   to  courts  under  the  Civil  and Criminal Procedure Codes. The use of the word ‘other’ in the first column  of the  article giving  the description of the application as ‘any other application for which no period of limitation  is   provided  elsewhere   in  this   decision’, indicates that  the Legislature wanted to make it clear that

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the interpretation  put by  this court in Mulchand & Co. Vs. Jawahar Mills  (1953 SCR  351) and  Bombay Gas Co. Vs. Gopal Bhiva (1964  (3) SCR  709, 722-723)  on Article  181 of  the 1908-Act on  the basis  of ejusdem generis should be applied to Article  137 of  1963-Act also, the language of which, is only slightly  different from  that of  Article 181  of  the 1908-Act. That  is, in interpreting Article 137 of the 1963- Act regard  must be  had to  the provisions contained in the earlier articles. These articles refer to applications under the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  except  in  two  cases  of applications under  the Arbitration  Act, in  two  cases  of applications under  the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.  This court in  Mulchand & Co. Ltd. Vs. Jawahar Mills (supra) case held  that   the  reference   to  applications   under   the Arbitration Act  had no  effect  on  the  interpretation  of Article 181  of the  1908-Act and that, that article applied only to  applications under  the Code of Civil Procedure. On the same  principle, the  further  alteration  made  in  the articles in  1963-Act containing  reference to  applications under the  Code of  Criminal Procedure  could not  alter the scope of  Article 137  of the  1963-Act. Moreover  even  the applications under  the Arbitration Act were to be presented to courts  whose proceedings  are governed  by the  Code  of Civil   Procedure.    The   further    amendment   including applications governed  by the  Criminal Procedure Code still shows  that   the  applications   must  be  to  courts.  The alterations in  the 1963-Act,  namely, the  inclusion of the words ‘other proceedings’ in the long title to the 1963-Act, the omission of the preamble and change in the definition so as to  include ‘petition’ in word ‘application’, do not show an intention  to make  Article 137 applicable to proceedings before bodies  other  than  courts  such  as  quasi-judicial tribunals and executive bodies.      We fail  to appreciate how the aforesaid decision is of any avail  to Mr.  Nariman on the facts of the present case. It is  obvious that schedule to the Limitation Act is a part and parcel  of the  Limitation Act.  It has  therefore to be read in  conjunction with  Section  3.  Sub-section  (1)  of Section 3  of Limitation  Act lays  down that subject to the provisions contained  in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. It becomes therefore clear that the Act as such governs period of limitation prescribed for suit,  appeal or  application under the schedule and the schedule to  the Limitation  Act which consists of different divisions relates  to proceedings  which  are  to  be  filed before full-fledged civil or criminal courts as the case may be. First division deals with suits. Part I deals with suits relating to  accounts. Part  II deals with suits relating to contracts.  Part   III  deals   with   suits   relating   to declarations. Part  IV deals  with suits relating to decrees and  instruments.  Part  V  deals  with  suits  relating  to immovable property.  Part VI  deals with  suits relating  to movable property.  Part VII  deals with  suits  relating  to tort. Part  VIII deals  with suits  relating to  trusts  and trust  property.  Part  IX  deals  with  suits  relating  to miscellaneous matters.  Part X  deals with  suits for  which there is no prescribed period. It is obvious that provisions of these  parts in  first division  will govern  suits to be filed  before   regular  courts   functioning  under   Civil Procedure Code. When we turn to the second division it deals with appeals  which may  be filed under Civil Procedure Code or Criminal  Procedure Code or from a decree or order of any High Court  to the same Court. They would obviously refer to

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appeals before  regular Civil  or Criminal  Courts  or  High Courts as  the case  may be.  The third  division deals with applications. These  applications  also  have  to  be  filed before regular  civil courts  or High Court or Supreme Court as the  case may  be. To  all  these  proceedings  of  these courts, the  entire machinery  of the  Civil Procedure  Code would get  attracted and  they can be considered to be full- fledged civil  courts before whom applications can be moved. Consequently, it  has to be held that the entire schedule to the Limitation  Act prescribes various periods of limitation for suit,  appeal or  application to  be moved  before full- fledged civil  or criminal courts. As Article 137 deals with one of  such applications  as found  in third  division this court held in the case of Town Municipal Council, Athani Vs. Presiding Officer,  Labour Court, Hubli & Ors. (supra), that the said  Article could  apply only  to  application  before full-fledged civil court and as the labour court was not one of such  courts though  established under  special or  local law, Article  137 could  not  apply  to  govern  proceedings before it.  Such is  not the  case before  us.  We  are  not concerned with  applicability of  any of the Articles of the schedule  for   governing  the   period  of   limitation  as prescribed by  Section 18  of the  Rent  Control  Act.  That period of limitation is prescribed not by Article 137 or any other article  under the  schedule but  by Section 18 itself which is  a part  and parcel of special or local law. So far as that  period of  limitation is concerned Section 29(2) is the only  Section which  can apply. For interpreting Section 29(2) the decision rendered by this court in connection with applicability of  any of the Articles to the schedule to the Limitation Act would be totally irrelevant. Mr. Nariman then invited our  attention to  the decision of this court in the case of  Nityananda M.  Joshi  &  Ors.  Vs.  Life  Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. (1971(1) SCR 396). That decision also was  concerned with the applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation  Act of the schedule to the Limitation Act of 1963 to  proceedings before Labour Court under Section 33(C) (2) of  Industrial Disputes  Act. The  reasons given  by  us while  dealing  with  Town  Municipal  Council,  Athani  Vs. Presiding Officer,  Labour Court, Hubli & Ors. (supra) would squarely get  attracted so far as this decision is concerned and would  make it  inapplicable to the facts of the present case. The  third decision to which our attention was invited was rendered  in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum Vs.  T.P.K.K. Amsom  and Besom,  Kerala (1977 (1) SCR 996).  In that  decision this  court was  concerned with similar question  whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could  be made  applicable to  petitions  under  Indian Telegraph Act,  1885. Under  the said  Act petition could be filed under  Section  16(5)  by  anyone  claiming  financial compensation against Electricity Board which tried to put up electricity poles  in  the  land  of  such  a  person.  Such application would lie before District Judge of the District. The question  was whether to such applications under special or local  law, Article 137 would apply. It was held that the District Judge under the Telegraph Act acts as a Civil Court in  dealing  with  applications  under  Section  16  of  the Telegraph Act  and therefore  Article 137  of  the  1963-Act applies to  applications under  Section 16  as filed  before such courts.  In our view even this decision is in line with earlier decisions  of  this  court  in  the  cases  of  Town Municipal Council,  Athani  Vs.  Presiding  Officer,  Labour Court, Hubli  & Ors.  (supra) and Nityananda M. Joshi & Ors. Vs. Life  Insurance Corporation  of India & Ors. (supra) and cannot be  of any  assistance to  Mr. Nariman in the present

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case as  we are  not concerned with applicability of Article 137 to  the proceedings of appellate authority under Section 18 of  the Rent Act. Mr. Nariman then peached his faith on a later decision  of this  court rendered  in the  case of The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Vs. Parson Tools and  Plants, Kanpur (1975 (3) SCR 743). In that case a Bench of  three learned  Judges of  this court was concerned with  the   question  whether   the   revisional   authority functioning under  U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 could extend the period of  limitation beyond  six months  even on sufficient cause being shown and whether the principle of Section 14(2) of the  1963 Act could be imported into Section 10(3) (B) of that Act by analogy. Section 10(3) (B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act provided for filing revisions under the Act. As per sub- section 3(B)  of Section 10 such applications had to be made within one  year from  the date  of service of order but the revising  authority   may  on   proof  of  sufficient  casue entertain an  application within  a further  period  of  six months. In view of this express provision in the special Act it was  held by  this court  that the  general provisions of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act could not get attracted. It is  trite to  observe that  as per  Section 14(2)  of the Limitation Act  if the  applicant  was  persuing  any  civil proceedings with  due diligence  in a  first  court  or  any higher court  therein against  the same  party for  the same relief  the   period  spent   shall  be   included  if  such proceedings were found to have been filed in good faith in a court which  from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature  was unable  to entertain  it. The entire period spent in  such fruitless  proceedings had to be excluded for computing the  period of  limitation for  any application as laid down by Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. It is easy to visualise  that if  Section 14(2) applied to applications for revisions under Section 10 (3) (B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, then even if such fruitless proceedings had lingered on for one or two years or even more the entire period spent in such proceedings would get excluded for computing the period of limitation  for filing such revisions under Section 10(3) (B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. However, there was an express provision in  sub-section (3)  (B) of Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax  Act putting  a  ceiling  on  the  powers  of  the revisional authority  even on  proof of  sufficient cause to entertain such applications and that was only upto a further period  of   six  months  beyond  one  year  as  prescribed. Consequently, this  express provision  to  the  contrary  as found in  Section 10(3)  (B) of  the U.P. Sales Tax Act made the general  provisions of  Section 14(2) inapplicable as it was an express provision to the contrary to what is provided by Section  14(2). It is precisely for that reason that this court in  the aforesaid  decision speaking through Sarkaria, J. held  that the object, the scheme and language of Section 10 of  the Sales  Tax Act  do not  permit the  invocation of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, either, in terms, or in principle, for  excluding  the  time  spent  in  prosecuting proceedings for  setting aside  the dismissal  of appeals in default  for   computation  of   the  period  of  limitation prescribed for filing a revision under the Sales Tax Act. It is true  that in the decision under appeal before this court learned single  Judge, Hari  Swarup, J.  had taken  the view that the  Judge (Revisions)  Sales  Tax  while  hearing  the revisions under  Section 10  of the  U.P. Sales Tax Act does not act  as a court but only as a revenue tribunal and hence the provisions  of the Indian Limitation Act cannot apply to proceedings before him. If the Limitation Act does not apply then  neither   Section  29(2)  nor  Section  14(2)  of  the

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Limitation Act would apply to proceedings before him. But so far as  this court  is concerned  it did  not  go  into  the question whether  Section  29(2)  would  not  get  attracted because the  U.P. Sales  Tax Act Judge (Revisions) was not a court but  it took  the view  that because  of  the  express provision in  Section 10  (3) (B)  applicability of  Section 14(2) of  the Sales  Tax Act was ruled out. Implicit in this reasoning is  the assumption  that but  for such  an express conflict or contrary intention emanating from Section 10 (3) (B) of  the U.P.  Sales Tax  Act which  was a  special  law, Section  29(2)  would  have  brought  in  Section  14(2)  of Limitation Act  even for  governing period of limitation for such revision  applications.  In  any  case,  the  scope  of Section 29(2)  was not  considered by the aforesaid decision of the  three learned  Judges and  consequently it cannot be held  to  be  an  authority  for  the  proposition  that  in revisional proceedings  before  the  Sales  Tax  authorities functioning under  the U.P.  Sales  Tax  Act  Section  29(2) cannot apply as Mr. Nariman would like to have it.      On the  other hand,  there are  two decisions  of  this court which  have directly spoken on the point, and on which reliance was  rightly placed  by the  counsel for appellant. The first  decision rendered  in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax,  U.P. Vs. Madan Lal Dan & Sons. Bareilly(1977 (1) SCR 683)  by a  bench of  three learned Judges of this court was concerned with the question whether Section 12(2) of the Limitation  Act,   1963  would  be  applicable  to  revision petitions filed  under Section 10 of the same U.P. Sales Tax Act. The  appellant had contended that the time spent by him in obtaining  certified copy  of  the  order  of  the  lower authority was  required to  be excluded for computing period of limitation  for filing  revision under Section 10, as per provisions of  Section 12  of the Limitation Act. Khanna, J. speaking for  this  court  held  that  for  the  purpose  of determining any  period of  limitation  prescribed  for  any application by  any special  or local  law,  the  provisions contained in  Section 12(2),  inter alia,  shall apply in so far as,  and to  the extent  to which they are not expressly excluded by  such special or local law, and there is nothing in  the   U.P.  Sales   Tax  Act   expressly  excluding  the application  of   Section  12(2)   of  the  Limitation  Act. Consequently, the  said provision was held applicable to the filing of revision applications under Section 10 of the U.P. Sales  Tax  Act.  It  becomes  therefore  obvious  that  the aforesaid decision  clearly applied  Section  29(2)  to  the revision petitions filed before revision authorities under a special law  like U.P.  Sales Tax  Act and via Section 29(2) applied  Section   12(2)  of  the  Limitation  Act  to  such revisional proceedings.  Mr. Nariman contended that the said decision was  per incurium  as the earlier decision of three learned Judges  in  The  Commissioner  of  Sales  Tax  Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Vs. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur (supra) was not  cited before  them. As we have already held earlier the said decision proceeded on the language of Section 10(3) (B)  of   the  U.P.   Sales  Tax   Act  for   excluding  the applicability of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. It had no relevance for deciding the question whether Section 12(2) of the  Limitation Act  could be  applied to such revisional proceedings when  there was  no express exclusion of Section 12(2) by  the special  law, namely,  the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Consequently, it  cannot be  said that the decision rendered by this  court in  Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Vs. Madan Lal Dan  & Sons,  Bareilly (supra)  was per incurium. On the other hand,  it is  a direct  decision on the point, namely, applicability of  Section 29(2)  of the  Limitation Act  for

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computing periods  of  limitation  prescribed  by  local  or special law  even though  the authority  before  which  such proceeding may  be filed  under the local or special law may not be full-fledged civil courts.      Our attention  was also  invited  by  counsel  for  the appellant to  a later  decision of this court in the case of The Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti Ltd., Vs. Mahabir Sugar Mills (P) Ltd.,  (AIR 1982  SC 119).  In that  case a bench of two learned Judges  was  concerned  with  the  question  whether Divisional Commissioner  acting  under  the  U.P.  Sugarcane (Regulation of  Supply and  Purchase) Act,  1953 acted  as a revenue court  or whether he was a persona designata. It was held that  the Divisional  Commissioner had been constituted as appellate  authority under  the Act. That showed that the Divisional Commissioner  was made  an appellate court not as persona designata  but as  a revenue court. That being so it was obvious  that Section  5 of  the Act  applied to appeals before Divisional  Commissioner and  he  could  condone  the delay in  filing appeals. It becomes obvious that this court in the  aforesaid decision  was dealing  with revenue  court constituted under  U.P. Sugarcane  (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act  which was a special law. It was in terms held that Section  5 of  the Limitation  Act  was  applicable  to revisional proceedings  before such Revenue Courts. It is of course true  as pointed  out by Mr. Nariman that in the said decision no  other decision  of this  court  was  cited  and Section 29(2) was not expressly referred to but the ratio of the decision  is necessarily  and implicitly  based  on  the applicability of  Section 29(2)  but for  which Section 5 of the Limitation  Act would  not have  been made applicable to such revision  proceedings before  revenue court functioning under the special law. Before parting with the discussion on this question  we may  also refer  to one submission of Shri Nariman.  He   submitted  that  Sections  4  to  24  of  the Limitation  Act   would  apply   to  civil  courts  as  duly constituted under the Civil Procedure Code and if that is so even if  they are  to be  made applicable to suit, appeal or application governed  by periods of limitation prescribed by any special  or local  law, they  necessarily  require  such suit, appeal  or application  to be  filed under  special or local law  before full-fledged  civil  courts  as  otherwise Sections 4  to 24  by themselves would not apply to them. It is difficult  to agree.  It has  to be  kept  in  view  that Section 29(2)  gets attracted  for computing  the period  of limitation for  any suit,  appeal or application to be filed before  authorities  under  special  or  local  law  if  the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied and once they get satisfied the provisions contained in Sections 4 to  24 shall apply to such proceedings meaning thereby the procedural scheme  contemplated by  these  Sections  of  the Limitation Act  would get telescoped into such provisions of special or local law. It amounts to a legislative shorthand. Consequently, even this contention of Shri Nariman cannot be countenanced.      Before parting  with the  discussion we  may also  note that a  division bench  of Madras  High Court in the case of Rethinasamy Vs.  Komalavalli and  Anr. (AIR  1983 Madras 45) took the  view that the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act  was a  special  and  local  enactment  and  as Sections 4  to 24 of the 1963 Act were not excluded in their application to  the appeals  filed under  Section 23  of the Rent Control  Act, Section  29(2) enabled the application of Sections 4  to 24  to  Rent  Control  Courts.  Consequently, Section 5  of the  Limitation Act is applicable to an appeal preferred before  the appellate authority, constituted under

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Section 23(1)(b)  of the Rent Control Act. We entirely agree with the  aforesaid view.  In the said decision the majority view of  the Full  Bench of  Kerala  High  Court  in  Jokkim Fernandez Vs.  Amina Kunhi  Umma (supra)  was dissented from and the  minority view  as found  therein was  accepted. The said decision of the Madras High Court lays down the correct law and  has rightly dissented from the majority view of the full bench of the Kerala High Court and has rightly accepted the minority  view as discussed by us earlier. Our attention was also invited by learned counsel for the appellant to the decision of  a learned  single Judge  of the  Andhra Pradesh High Court  in  the  case  of  G.  Bulliswamy  Vs.  Smt.  C. Annapurnamma (AIR 1976 Andhra Pradesh 270). In that decision the learned  Judge held  relying on  Section 3  as found  in Evidence Act,  1872 that  Rent Controller  acting under  the A.P. Buildings  (Lease, Rent  & Eviction) Control Act who is authorised to  record evidence  of the parties before him by virtue of  Rule 8(2) of the Rules framed under the Act, is a court within the meaning of Section 3 and therefore revision application   against   order   of   Rent   Controller   was maintainable under  Section 18 before the High Court. In the case of  Smt. Vidya Devi, widow of Ramji Dass Vs. Firm Madan Lal Prem  Kumar (AIR 1971 Punjab & Haryana 150) a full bench of the  Punjab &  Haryana High  Court was concerned with the question whether  Rent Controller  and  appellate  authority under Punjab Rent Restriction Act are courts or civil courts for  purposes  of  Sections  195(1)(b),  476  and  479-A  of Criminial Procedure  Code. Tuli,  J speaking  for  the  full bench held  that they  were such courts and could issue show cause notice  why complaint  under Section 193 should not be filed  against   persons  committing   perjury  before  Rent Controller and  to file complaint under Section 195(1)(b) of Criminal Procedure  Code if  it is  found expedient  in  the interest of justice.      As a result of the aforesaid discussion it must be held that appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Rent Act, 1965 functions as a court and the period of limitation prescribed  therein under  Section  18  governing appeals by  aggrieved parties  will be  computed keeping  in view the  provisions of  Sections 4  to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 such proceedings will attract Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act  and consequently Section 5 of the Limitation Act would  also be applicable to such proceedings. Appellate authority will  have  ample  jurisdiction  to  consider  the question whether  delay in  filing  such  appeals  could  be condoned on sufficient cause being made out by the concerned applicant for the delay in filing such appeals. The decision rendered by the High Court in the present case as well as by the appellate authority taking contrary view are quashed and set aside.  The proceedings are remanded to the court of the appellate authority,  that is,  District Judge,  Thalassery. Rent Control  Appeal No.9/94 filed before the said authority by the  appellant is  restored to  its file with a direction that the  appellate authority shall consider I.A.56/94 filed by the  applicant for condonation of delay on its own merits and then  proceed further  in accordance with law. Appeal is allowed accordingly.  In the  facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.