http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8  

PETITIONER: MOLAR MAL (DEAD) THROUGH L.RS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S.  KAY IRON WORKS (P) LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       14/03/2000

BENCH: N.S.Hegde, S.S.M.Quadri

JUDGMENT:

     SANTOSH HEGDE, J.

     Respondent-landlord  had  filed an  eviction  petition before  the  Court of Rent Controller, Jagadhri in the  year 1979  seeking  eviction  of the appellant  herein  from  the petition  scheduled  land situated on Jagadhri Road,  Yamuna Nagar under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and  Eviction)  Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to  as  the Act)  claiming that the petition scheduled land is required by  it  for  its personal use and occupation.   As  required under that Act it also contended that it is not occupying in the urban area of Yamuna Nagar any other rented land for the purpose  of its business nor it has vacated any such  rented land  without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act.  It also alleged in the said petition that the premises already  in  its  possession  are  not  sufficient  for  its requirement.   Appellant-tenant opposed the said petition on a  number  of  grounds,  primarily on the  ground  that  the petition  scheduled premises was not a rented land but was a building  as contemplated under the Act and he also  alleged that  the  landlord  had not given material  particulars  in regard  to  its  requirement  of additional  space.   By  an amendment  of his objection, the tenant further pleaded that the  landlord  had filed several other applications  against other  tenants alleging personal requirement and during  the pendency  of  the  eviction  petition in  question,  it  had obtained  possession  of building and land from three  other tenants, hence, the landlords claim for his eviction is not bona fide.  In its rejoinder petition, the landlord admitted that  it  had obtained possession of three premises  through eviction  proceedings  and  the  same  along  with  petition scheduled  land was required for its extension of coal yard, the  foundry and for storage of foundry material like  sand, earth,  fire wood, fire-bricks etc.  The trial court  framed the  following issues for its consideration:  - 1.   Whether the  applicant  Company  is a private  limited  company  and whether  Ram  Avtar  is  a competent  to  file  the  present application  for ejectment ?  OPA.  2.  Whether the property in dispute is a rented land and if so its effect ?  OPA.  3. If  issues  No.2  is proved in the affirmative  whether  the applicant  company requires the premises in dispute for  its bonafide  use  and occupation ?  OPA.  4.  Whether the  suit land is a non-residential building and as such the ground of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8  

ejectment for personal use is not available to the applicant ?  OPP.  5.  Relief.  Additional issues framed on 15.10.1986 :-  4A.   Whether  the personal necessity of  the  applicant stands satisfied during the pendency of the present petition ?  OPP.

     Trial  Court  accepted  the case of the  landlord  and ordered eviction of the appellant.  In appeal, the Appellate Authority  remanded  the matter back to the Rent  Controller for  a  fresh  decision.  This order of remand  came  to  be challenged  before  the  High Court and the High  Court  was pleased  to accept this challenge and directed the appellate court to re-hear and decide the appeal itself.  It, however, restricted  the scope of re-hearing to be confined to  Issue Nos.   3  and  4A only.  On remand the  Appellate  Authority allowed the appeal of the tenant and decided the said issues in  favour  of the tenant.  Being aggrieved by the order  of the  Appellate Authority, the landlord preferred a  revision petition  before the High Court which came to be allowed  in favour  of  the landlord by the judgment of the  High  Court pronounced  on  26th of May, 1998.  The tenant  preferred  a review  petition  before  the High  Court  alleging  certain specific omissions in the judgment of the High Court and the said review petition being dismissed by an order of the High Court  dated 3rd of July, 1998, the tenant has preferred the above noted civil appeal.  Before us on behalf of the tenant Shri  M.L.Verma,  learned  senior  counsel  has  raised  the following  questions:-  (i)  That on the pleading  as  filed before  the original authority, no eviction could have  been ordered  because the said pleading on behalf of the landlord did  not contain material particulars as required under Rule 4  of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Rules (hereinafter  referred  to as the Rules);  (ii)  The  High Court  had  interfered  with  the   findings  given  by  the Appellate  Authority  on questions of fact while deciding  a revision  petition filed by the landlord which it could  not have  done;   (iii)  The courts below failed to  notice  the proviso  to Section 13(3)(i)(b) of the Act which creates  an embargo  on  the  landlord  from  seeking  eviction  of  the appellant  because  of the fact the respondent-landlord  had earlier  obtained  eviction of other tenants under the  very same  provision  of  law.  On behalf of the  landlord,  Shri Parag Tripathi, learned senior counsel pointed out that Rule 4  of the Rules is not mandatory and is only directory  even otherwise  the  combined  reading of the  eviction  petition along  with the averments in the rejoinder petition, a  case of  the  landlord is clearly made out and  necessary  issues having  been  struck  on this point and parties  having  led evidence  on  this point, there was sufficient  material  to decide  the claim of the landlord and no prejudice has  been caused  to the appellant.  Adverting to the second question, he  contended  that the power of the revisional court  under the  Act is much wider than the power conferred on the  High Court  under  Section  115 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure, therefore,  the court, under Section 15 of the Act, has  the jurisdiction  to  correct  any   illegality  or  impropriety committed by the Appellate Authority.  In reply to the third point,  he  contended  that the proviso relied upon  by  the appellant  did not apply to the facts of the case.  He  also argued  that this point of the applicability of the  proviso was  not raised specifically by the tenant and no issue  has been  framed in this regard.  Therefore, he argues that  the appellant should not be permitted to raise this question for the  first  time before this Court.  We are not inclined  to accept  the  first  two  points  raised  on  behalf  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 8  

appellant  before  us.  It is true in the original  eviction petition  all the material particulars of the requirement of the  landlord were not mentioned in detail, but then in  the rejoinder  application  all  the necessary  particulars  are given by the landlord, notice of which the appellant had and the  original  authority had struck a proper issue  on  this question  and  parties understood each others case  and  led evidence  on  this  issue, though Rule 4 of the  Rules  does require  the  landlord  to give material  particulars,  this Court  has held with reference to the same rule in the  case of M/s.  Rubber House vs.  M/s.  Excelsior Needle Industries Pvt.   Ltd.   (1989  2 SCC 413) that the said  rule  is  not mandatory  and is only directory.  Therefore, the fact  that the  landlord  did not give all the material particulars  of his  requirement  in  the first instance cannot  be  made  a ground  for rejection of the application.  Similarly, we are of the opinion, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the  argument of the tenant that the High Court exceeded  in its jurisdiction by interfering on a finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority is also to be rejected.  It is to  be  noticed that under sub-section (6) of Section 15  of the  Act,  the High Court as a revisional authority has  the power  to  call for and examine the records relating to  any order  passed  or proceedings taken under this Act  for  the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of  such order and is entitled to pass such order as it  may deem  fit.   The power vested in the High Court  under  this provision  of law is much wider than the power conferred  on the  High  Court  under Section 115 of the  C.P.C.   In  the process of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of  an impugned order, the High Court in a given case can go into the finding of fact arrived at by the courts below and, if  found  necessary,  reverse such a finding of  fact.   Of course,  this  Court has in many cases cautioned  that  this power  is not to be used as a revisional court in a  routine manner  but to be used only when the revisional court  comes to the conclusion that the last court of fact has arrived at a  conclusion  which  is  not perverse  or  possible  to  be accepted on the materials placed before it.  In other words, if  the High Court comes to the conclusion that the  finding of the first Appellate Court is based on no evidence then in a  given case it is open to the High Court to interfere with such  finding  of  fact.  In the instant case,  we  are  not convinced   that  the  High  Court   has  exceeded  in   its jurisdiction  while allowing the revision of the landlord on this count.  Therefore, this question urged on behalf of the appellant  is also rejected.  This leaves us to consider the third point raised on behalf of the appellant.  The argument is  based on the first proviso to Section 13(3)(i)(b) of the Act which reads as follows :

     (b) in the case of rented land, if he requires it for his  own  use, is not occupying in the urban area  concerned for  the  purpose of his business any other rented land  and has  not  vacated such rented land without sufficient  cause after the commencement of the 1949 Act;

     Based  on this proviso and relying upon the fact  that before  the eviction was ordered in this case, the  landlord had  obtained possession of three other rented lands through eviction  petitions  filed under Section 13(3)(i)(b) of  the Act,  it is contended, by virtue of the above proviso,  that the  landlord is statutorily prevented from seeking eviction of  the  appellant  from the tenanted land.   Opposing  this

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 8  

contention, the landlord raised a preliminary objection that this objection was not specifically raised before the courts below.   Therefore,  the  appellant-tenant   should  not  be permitted  to raise it for the first time before this Court. We  will first deal with the above objection of the landlord in  regard to permitting the appellant-tenants to raise this question  before  us.   It  is  true  that  in  the  written statement  originally  filed, the tenant did not raise  this specific  contention.  However, by an amendment made to  the written statement the tenant did plead that the landlord has obtained  possession  of three other rented lands  measuring 18  x 45 from Atma Ram Jassa Ram;  16 x 40 from  Sakhuja Trunk House and 10 x 40 from Kehar Singh and, as such, the application  for  ejectment is liable to be dismissed.   The landlord  has  filed  a rejoinder to  this  amended  written statement  wherein he contended that the three premises were got  vacated by him and one of the grounds in those petition was personal necessity.  He also contended that the premises were  got  vacated  for extension of coal-yard as  the  open space  in  possession of the landlord was not sufficient  to meet  his  requirement for stocking coal, and he has  sought eviction  of the tenant in the present case for extension of its foundry and for storage of foundry material.  It is true that in spite of these pleadings, may be because of the fact that  the tenant did not specifically invoke the proviso  to Section  13(3)(i)(b),  no  issue  was  raised  by  the  Rent Controller.   Hence, the trial court did not advert to  this question.   Before  the  appellate authority,  however,  the tenant  raised  this  specific objection which  came  to  be rejected  on  the ground that these evictions were  obtained after filing of the instant eviction petition, consequently, the  proviso  in question did not apply to the facts of  the case.   It  is  also  contended  that  since  the  appellate authority  dismissed  the eviction petition, the tenant  did not  have an opportunity of challenging this finding  before the  High  Court,  but  while defending  the  order  of  the appellate  authority, a specific argument based on the  said proviso  was raised before the High Court but the High Court did  not consider this argument in its correct  perspective. Further,  it  was  pointed  out to us  that  in  the  review petition  filed before the High Court, specific grounds were raised  alleging that the argument based on the proviso  was addressed  and the court failed to consider the same,  still the  High Court while rejecting the review petition did  not consider  this point.  In this background, we are  convinced that  the  tenant did raise this question before the  courts below  which  ought  to have been considered by  the  courts below.  Therefore, we deem it appropriate that the tenant be permitted  to  raise  this  question.    On  behalf  of  the landlord,  it  is next contended that the proviso  does  not apply to the facts of this case, since on the date of filing of  the  present  eviction petition, the  landlord  had  not obtained   possession  of  any   other  tenanted   premises. Subsequent possession obtained by it would not be an embargo for the landlord to claim possession of the present petition scheduled  premises.  Elaborating this argument on behalf of the  landlord,  it is contended if on the date of filing  of the  eviction petition, a landlord has not by then  obtained possession of any other premises, then the proviso would not be  a bar for the landlord to file an eviction petition  and obtained  possession of another premises, even though during the pendency of the petition, he obtains possession of other premises.   The landlord wants us to give a literal  meaning to the words entitled to apply again found in the proviso. If  we  give such a meaning to the words entitled to  apply

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 8  

again  without  taking  into consideration the  object  and scheme  of the Act, the proviso may give an impression  that the embargo incorporated in that proviso would be applicable only  at the stage of filing of the eviction petition.   But such  an interpretation will run counter to the very  scheme of  the Act.  It goes without saying that the Haryana  Urban (Control  of  Rent  and Eviction) Act, 1973 like  any  other similar  Acts in other States in India is an enactment which controls  the fixation of rent and evictions of the  tenants from  rented premises to which the Act is applicable.   This Act  controls  the right of a landlord to seek  eviction  of tenanted  premises, it restricts the right of a landlord  to seek  eviction on those grounds mentioned in the Act.  As  a matter  of  fact, a landlord can seek eviction only  on  the grounds  enumerated  under the Act and on no other  grounds. This  is clear from the language of Section 13(1) of the Act which  in specific terms says that a tenant in possession of a  building  or rented land shall not be  evicted  therefrom except  in accordance with the provisions of this Section. Section  13  enumerates various grounds on which a  landlord can  seek  possession.  This right is further restricted  if the  landlord  has obtained possession of  similar  premises under  the  same provisions of law by the proviso.  Now  the question  is whether the bar under the proviso is applicable only  to the filing of an application or is it a bar on  the right  of the landlord.  If the interpretation suggested  by the  landlord  is  accepted  then the bar  will  be  on  the application  by the landlord and not on his right to  evict. This, in our opinion, will not be the correct interpretation of  the proviso.  A careful perusal of the various  provisos found  in  sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act  clearly shows  that the Legislature intended to further restrict the right  of  a  landlord to seek eviction  under  the  clauses mentioned  in  that sub-section apart from the  restrictions imposed  in  Section  13 of the Act.  For  example,  if  the landlord  is seeking eviction of a tenant on the ground that the same is required for the use of his son then, in view of the  proviso  applicable  to that sub-section, he  can  seek eviction  of  the  premises only once.   Similarly,  if  the landlord  is  seeking eviction for his own occupation  under Section  13(3)(b)  of the Act then by virtue of the  proviso applicable  to that sub-section, the landlord can seek  such eviction  only  once in regard to the premises of  the  same nature.   Therefore, in our opinion, the bar imposed by  the proviso  is  in fact a bar on the right of the  landlord  to seek  actual eviction and not confined to the filing of  the application  for eviction.  On behalf of the landlord, it is contended  that  while  interpreting a  Statute  the  courts should  apply the rule of literal construction and if it  is so  interpreted then the wordings of the proviso would  show that the restriction imposed by the proviso is restricted to the  stage  of filing of the application for eviction  only. We  agree with this contention of the landlord that normally the  courts  will  have  to   follow  the  rule  of  literal construction  which rule enjoins the court to take the words as  used by the Legislature and to give it the meaning which naturally implies.  But, there is an exception to this rule. That  exception comes into play when application of  literal construction of the words in the Statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency  or when it is shown that the legal context in which  the  words  are used or by reading the Statute  as  a whole,  it requires a different meaning.  In our opinion, if the  expression  entitled  to  apply again  is  given  its literal  meaning, it would defeat the very object for  which the  Legislature  has incorporated that proviso in  the  Act

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 8  

inasmuch  as the object of that proviso can be defeated by a landlord  who has more than one tenanted premises by  filing multiple   applications  simultaneously   for  eviction  and thereafter  obtain possession of all those premises  without the  bar of the proviso being applicable to him.  We are  of the  opinion  that this could not have been the purpose  for which  the  proviso  is  included in the Act.   If  such  an interpretation  is given then the various provisos found  in clause  (3)  of Section 13 would become otiose and the  very object  of  the  enactment  would  be  defeated.   Any  such interpretation,  in  our opinion, would lead  to  absurdity. Therefore, we have no hesitation in interpreting the proviso to mean that the restriction contemplated under that proviso extends  even up to the stage when the court or the tribunal is  considering the case of the landlord for actual eviction and  is  not  confined to the stage of  filing  of  eviction petition  only.   This takes us to the another limb  of  the landlords  argument  in regard to the applicability of  the proviso.   This  argument  of the landlord is based  on  two judgments of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in the cases of  (i)  Shri  Brij Lal Puri & Anr.  v.  Smt.   Muni  Tandon alias  Urmala  (1979 1 Rent Law Reporter 58) (which case  is followed  by  the High Court in Jagir Singh v.  Jagdish  Pal Sagar  (1980 1 RLR 494).  In Puris case (supra),  rejecting the  contention of the tenant based on the said proviso, the learned Single Judge of the High Court held thus :- A plain reading of the proviso mentioned above shows that a landlord after  getting  one building vacated, which  can  reasonably meet  his  needs, cannot get another building vacated.   The proviso does not lay down that if the entire building, which is needed by a landlord for his personal use, is occupied by more  than  one tenants, he or she cannot take out  eviction proceedings  against  the other tenant after having  evicted one.   The object of this proviso is that a landlord  should not  be  allowed to seek unreasonable ejectments of  tenants from  independent  buildings if he has already succeeded  in evicting  a  tenant from a building which is sufficient  for his personal occupation.

     Based  on  the above-cited two judgments of  the  High Court, it is contended that the landlord in the instant case is  seeking  eviction of a part of the premises owned by  it which  is leased to the present appellant.  Eviction of  the three  other  tenants referred to herein above was from  the premises which are parts of the same premises, therefore, in view  of the above judgment the bar under the proviso is not applicable.  We find it difficult to accept this argument of the  landlord also.  From the language of the proviso we  do not  find any support for this argument of the appellant  or to  the  conclusions  arrived at by the High  Court  in  the above-referred  judgments.   The proviso does not  make  any such  distinction  between a landlord seeking possession  of the premises held by more than one tenant occupying the same building  or  the  tenants occupying  different  independent buildings under the same landlord.  As we have observed, the object  of the proviso like any other provisions of the Act, is  to  further restrict the right of the landlord  to  seek eviction, if that be so, we do not find any justification in reading  into  the proviso something as conferring a  larger right on the landlord to evict more than one tenant if those tenants  are occupying different parts of the same premises. Therefore,  we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the  High Court in the above referred case does not lay down the correct law.  Consequently, the argument of the landlord based  on  the said judgment is also rejected.  It  is  next

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 8  

contended on behalf of the landlord that the decisions cited above have stood the test of time since 1978 onwards, if not earlier,  because of which the law is so understood in  that part of the country, therefore, we should not interfere with the ratio laid down by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in those  cases  so  as not to create uncertainty  in  judicial thinking.  We are unable to accept this argument advanced on behalf   of   the  landlord.   When   we   find   that   the interpretation  of  the proviso by the High Court is  wholly contrary to the object of the Statute, merely because it had remained  to  be the interpretation of the High Court for  a considerable length of time, the same cannot be permitted to continue  to be so when it is erroneous and it is so brought to  our notice.  We will be failing in our duty if we do not declare an erroneous interpretation of law by the High Court to be so, solely on the ground that it has stood the test of time.    Since,   in  our  opinion,   in   regard   to   the interpretation  of  the  above  proviso, no  two  views  are possible,  we are constrained to hold that the law  declared by  the  Punjab & Haryana High Court with reference  to  the proviso  is not the correct interpretation and hold that the said  judgment  is  no more a good law.  On  behalf  of  the landlord,  another  argument based on equity  was  addressed before us giving various examples of the hardship that could be caused to the landlords by the interpretation we have now given  to the said proviso.  We do find that the proviso, as interpreted  by us, may cause some hardship to the landlords in  some cases but that is the intention of the  Legislature which  the courts have to take to its logical end so long as it remains in the Statute book.  Merely because a law causes hardship,  it  cannot  be interpreted in a manner so  as  to defeat  its  object.   We  may notice  at  this  stage  that constitutional  validity of the proviso is not in  challenge before us, therefore, we will have to proceed on the footing that the proviso, as it stands, is intra vires and interpret the  same  as  such.  This leaves us to  consider  the  last argument  of  the  landlord that the applicability  of  this proviso  being  a mixed question of law and fact  and  there being  no issues before the courts below, the same cannot be applied in abstract.  We see force in this contention before refusing  eviction based on the ground of the bar imposed by the  proviso.  The Court will have to come to the conclusion that the premises/land eviction whereof has been obtained by the  landlord,  belong  to  the same class  of  building  or tenanted  land.  This finding of the Court will be dependent upon  the  facts which are not available on records of  this case.   The absence of this evidence will cause prejudice to the  landlord if the said question is to be decided in these appeals.   Though  in the earlier part of this judgment,  we have  held  that the parties in this case have  pleaded  the facts  necessary  for invoking the proviso, still  since  no issue  has  been framed on this point, the parties have  not led  evidence in regard to the nature of the  building/land. Therefore,  we agree with the argument of the landlord  that in order to apply the proviso, certain factual matrix has to be established absence of which, in appropriate cases, might necessitate  a  remand to the trial court.  On the  peculiar facts  of  this case and taking into consideration the  fact that  this litigation has been going on since 1979 and there has  already  been  one remand from the High  Court  to  the appellate  authority,  we  find it just and proper  that  we frame  the following issue in regard to this point and remit the  case  to the trial court for the purpose  of  recording evidence  and  its decision:  - Does the  respondent  prove that   the  applicant  has   obtained  possession  of  other

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 8  

residential  building or rented land of the same class under the  provisions of sub- clause (i) of clause (b) of  Section 13(3) of the Act so as to disentitle it to obtain possession of the petition scheduled premises ?

     We direct the original authority, namely, the Court of the  Rent  Controller,  Jagadhari, to allow the  parties  to adduce  evidence,  if  necessary, to the limited  extent  of deciding the above issue framed by us.  The Rent Controller, Jagadhari,  shall  decide the case within a period of  three months  from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The  appeals  are, accordingly, allowed duly  modifying  the orders under appeal.  No costs.