REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  810  OF 2003

Mohindra Hire Purchase …Appellant

Versus

Jarnail Singh  …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the

Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court  dismissing  the  application  filed  by  the

appellant  in terms of Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (in short the ‘Code’). Appellant had lodged a complaint alleging that

cheques issued by the respondents were not honoured by the Bank and in

spite of service of notice to the respondent demanding repayment of loan

amount, the respondent failed to pay the amount. A complaint under Section

138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short the ‘Act’) was filed

before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalandhar, in Complaint Case

no.61 of 1998. The said Complaint Case was dismissed by the learned Chief

Judicial Magistrate. As noted above, petition in terms of Section 378 (3) of

the  Code  was  filed,  seeking  leave  to  file  appeal  before  the  High  Court,

which by the impugned judgment dismissed the same.  

2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the order passed was

a cryptic one and no reasons have been indicated for not granting leave to

file an appeal.   

3. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent in spite of service

of notice.

4. According to learned counsel for the appellant it was imperative on

the High Court to indicate reasons as to why the prayer for grant of leave

was found untenable. In the absence of any such reasons the order of the

High  Court  is  indefensible.   Section  378(3)  of  the  Code  deals  with  the

2

power of the High Court to grant leave in case of acquittal. Section 378 of

the Code reads as follows:

“378. Appeal in case of acquittal. (1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5) –  

(a) the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the Public  Prosecutor  to  present  an appeal  to  the Court  of Session from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence;          

(b) the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any court other than a High Court [not being an order under clause (a)] or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.

(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which  the  offence  has  been  investigated  by  the  Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946) or by any other  agency empowered to  make investigation into  an  offence  under  any  Central  Act  other  than  this Code,  the  Central  Government  may,  subject  to  the provisions  of  sub-section  (3),  also  direct  the  Public Prosecutor to present an appeal –

(a)  to  the  Court  of  Session,  from  an  order  of acquittal  passed  by a  Magistrate,  in  respect  of  a cognizable and non-bailable offence;

3

(b) to  the  High  Court  from  an  original  or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court [not being an order under clause (a)] or an order of acquittal  passed by the Court of Session in revision.

(3) No appeal to the High Court under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court.

(4)  If  such an order  of  acquittal  is  passed  in  any case instituted  upon  Complaint  and  the  High  Court,  on  an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants,  special  leave  to  appeal  from  the  order  of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.

(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained  by  the  High  Court  after  the  expiry  of  six months, where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal.

(6) If in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal  is  refused,  no  appeal  from  that  order  of acquittal  shall  lie  under  sub-section  (1)  or  under  sub- section (2).”

5. The Trial Court was required to carefully appraise the entire evidence

and then come to a conclusion. If the Trial Court was at lapse in this regard

4

the High Court was obliged to undertake such an exercise by entertaining

the appeal.  The High Court  ought to have in such circumstances granted

leave  and  thereafter  as  a  first  court  of  appeal,  re-appreciated  the  entire

evidence on the record independently and returned its findings objectively,

as  regards  guilt  or  otherwise  of  the accused.  It  has  failed  to  do  so.  The

questions  involved  were  not  trivial.  The  High  Court  has  not  given  any

reasons for refusing to grant leave to file appeal against acquittal, and seems

to have been completely oblivious to the fact that by such refusal, a close

scrutiny of the order of acquittal, by the appellate forum, has been lost once

and for all.  The manner in which appeal  against  acquittal  has been dealt

with by the High Court leaves much to be desired. Reasons introduce clarity

in an order. On the plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to

have  set  forth  its  reasons,  howsoever  brief,  in  its  order  indicative  of  an

application of its mind, all the more when its order is amenable to further

avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Court

order not sustainable. Similar view was expressed in State of U.P. v. Battan

and  Ors (2001  (10)  SCC  607).  About  two  decades  back,  in  State  of

Maharashtra v.  Vithal  Rao  Pritirao  Chawan (AIR  1982  SC  1215)  the

desirability of a speaking order while dealing with an application for grant

of  leave  was  highlighted.  The  requirement  of  indicating  reasons  in  such

5

cases has been judicially recognized as imperative. The view was re-iterated

in  Jawahar  Lal  Singh v.  Naresh  Singh  and  Ors. (1987  (2)  SCC  222).

Judicial discipline to abide by declaration of law by this Court, cannot be

forsaken, under any pretext by any authority or Court, be it even the Highest

Court in a State, oblivious to Article 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950

(in short the ‘Constitution’).    

6. Even in respect of administrative orders, Lord Denning M.R. in Breen

v.  Amalgamated  Engineering  Union (1971  (1)  All  E.R.  1148)  observed

“The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration”.

In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v.  Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was

observed: “Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice”. Reasons

are live links between the mind of the decision taker and the controversy in

question  and  the  decision  or  conclusion  arrived  at”.  Reasons  substitute

subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the

decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence,

render  it  virtually  impossible  for  the  Courts  to  perform  their  appellate

function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of

the decision. Right  to reason is  an indispensable  part  of a sound judicial

system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the

matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know

why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of

6

natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a

speaking out. The “inscrutable face of a sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous

with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.  

7. The above position was highlighted in State of Punjab v. Bhag Singh

(2004 (1) SCC 547).

8. In the instant case, the High Court ought to have granted leave. The

High Court shall hear the appeal on merits. The appeal is allowed. However,

we have expressed no opinion on the merits of the case.   

……………………………………..J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…………………………………….J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

New Delhi, December 1, 2008

7