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PETITIONER: MOHINDER KUMAR ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/09/1985

BENCH: SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J) BENCH: SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J) BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ) PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1986 AIR  244            1985 SCR  Supl. (2) 859  1985 SCC  (4) 221        1985 SCALE  (2)795  CITATOR INFO :  R          1987 SC2117  (28)

ACT:      Haryana Urban  (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1973, section 1(3) - Validity of.

HEADNOTE:      The Haryana  Urban (Control  of Rent  and Eviction) Act 1973 by  Section 1(3)  as amended  by the  Amending Act 1978 (Act 16  of 1978) provides: "Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the construction of which is completed on or after the commencement of this Act for a period of ten years from the date of its completion".      The petitioners  challenged the constitutional validity of Section  1(3) of  the Act  on the  grounds: (i)  that the provision seeks  to make  an invidious  distinction  between buildings constructed  before the  commencement of  this Act and buildings  the construction of which was completed on or after the  commencement of this Act and on the basis of this invidious distinction  this provision  discriminates between the landlords  and tenants  of buildings  constructed before the Act  and after  the Act inasmuch as a landlord enjoys in case of  buildings construction  of which is completed on or after the  commencement of  the Act  an exemption  from  the operation of  the Act  and the  tenant in  respect  of  such building is  denied the  protection and  the benefits of the Act for  a period of 10 years from the date of completion of the construction  of the  building, whereas  the landlord of any building  constructed before the commencement of the Act does not  enjoy any  such exemption  and the  tenant of such building enjoys  the protection  and all the benefits of the Act. Thus, the discrimination between one class of landlords and their tenants and the other class of landlords and their tenants on  the basis  of the  time  of  completion  of  the buildings is  clearly arbitrary  and is violative of Art. 14 of  the   Construction;  and  (ii)  that  the  retrospective operation of  the Act  has the  effect of  taking  away  the vested right  of the  tenant and must, therefore, be held to be illegal and bad.      Dismissing the writ petitions, 860

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^      HELD: 1(1)  Section 1(3)  of the  Act as amended by the Amending Act  of 1978  (Act 16  of 1978) is constitutionally valid. Any incentive offered for the purpose of construction of new  buildings with the object of easing the situation of scarcity of accommodation for ameliorating the conditions of the tenants, cannot be said to be unreasonable, provided the nature and  character of  the incentive  and the  measure of exemption  allowed   are  not   otherwise  unreasonable  and arbitrary. The  exemption  to  be  allowed  must  be  for  a reasonable and  a  definite  period.  An  exemption  for  an indefinite period  or  a  period  which  in  the  facts  and circumstances of any particular case may be considered to be unduly long, may be held to be arbitrary. The exemption must necessarily be  effective from a particular date and must be with the  object of  promoting  new  constructions.  In  the instant case, the provision for exemption from the operation of the  Rent Control  Legislation by  way  of  incentive  to persons with  means to construct new houses has been made in Section 1(3) of the Act by the Legislature in the legitimate hope that  construction of  new  buildings  will  ultimately result in  mitigation of  the hardship  of the tenants. Such incentive has  a clear  nexus with the object to be achieved and cannot  be considered  to be  unreasonable or arbitrary. With the commencement of the Act, the provisions of the Rent Act with  all the restrictions and rigours become effective. Buildings   which   have   been   constructed   before   the commencement of  the Act were already there and the question of any  kind of  impetus or incentive to such buildings does not arise.  The Legislature,  therefore, very  appropriately allowed the  benefit of  the exemption to the buildings, the construction of  which commenced  or was   completed  on  or after the commencement of the Act. This exemption in respect of buildings coming up or to come up on or after the date of commencement of  the Act  is likely  to serve the purpose of encouraging  new   buildings  to  be  contracted.  There  is therefore, nothing  arbitrary or  unreasonable in fixing the date of  commencement of the Act from which the exemption is to be operative. [866 D-H]      (ii) The  exemption for  a period  of 10 years from the operation of  the Act allowed to buildings, the construction of which  commenced or was completed on or after the date of commencement of the Act, is fair and reasonable. It is for a definite period  and that  period  of  exemption  cannot  be considered  to   be  too   long;  and  this  exemption,  the Legislature may  be of  the view,  will serve the purpose of encouraging the construction of new buildings. It is for the Legislature to  decide the  period of  exemption that may be allowed and to fix the date from which the period of 861 exemption should  run. This  will ordinarily  be a matter of Legislative  policy   and  this   Court  will  not  normally interfere unless the Court is of the opinion that the period of exemption  or the  date from  which the  exemption is  to operate is unreasonable and arbitrary. [867 A-C]      2. The  classification of  buildings with  reference to the date  of commencement  of  the  Act,  namely,  buildings constructed before the commencement of the Act and buildings the construction of which was completed on or after the date of the commencement of the Act, has a rational basis and has a  clear   nexus  with   the  object  to  be  achieved.  The classification of  the landlord  and the  tenant of  a house constructed before  the commencement  of  the  Act  and  the landlord and  tenant of  a  house,  constructed  before  the commencement  of   the  Act,   is  clearly   founded  on  an

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intelligible differentia  which has  a rational  relation to the object  and this  classification does  not result in any invidious discrimination  between the  classes of  landlords and  tenants  so  classified.  This  classification  is  not arbitrary  and   is  not   violative  of   Art.  14  of  the Constitution. [867 C-E]      3. The  Section  on  its  proper  construction  clearly indicates  that   the  section   is  not   retrospective  in operation. Merely  because the buildings the construction of which  commenced   or  was   completed  after  the  date  of commencement of  the Act in 1973, come within the purview of the  this  particular  provision  which  was  introduced  by amendment  in   1978,  the   provision   does   not   become retrospective. This  provision  operates  prospectively  and becomes effective  after its incorporation in the Act by the Amendment, though  the buildings  completed on  or after the commencement of  this Act  in 1973  are brought  within  the scope of  this Section.  The argument  that the tenants have acquired a vested right under the Act prior to its amendment is without  any substance. Prior to the amendment of Section 1(3) by  the Amending  Act of  1978,  the  provision  as  it originally stood cannot be said to have conferred any vested right on the tenants. [871 A-C]      Motor General  Traders and  Others v.  State of  Andhra Pradesh and ors., [1984] 1 S.C.C. 222, inapplicable.      M/s.  Punjab  Tin  Supply  Co.  Chandigarh  v.  Central Government and Ors., [1984] 1 S.C.C. 206, relied upon.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION  : Writ  Petitions Nos.  8367 and 3939 etc. of 1985.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.) 862      S.M. Ashri, Rakesh K. Khanna and Dr. Meera Aggarwal for the Petitioners.      G.K. Bansal and Prem Malhotra for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      AMARENDRA NATH  SEN, J.  The constitutional validity of S. 1(3)  of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973  has been challenged in these writ petitions. This question which  is common  to all  the writ petitions is the only question  which arises for consideration and these writ petitions are  accordingly being  disposed of by this common judgment.      The question  has been urged as a pure question of law. In that  view of  the matter it does not become necessary to refer the facts of any of the writ petitions.      S. 1(3)  as originally  enacted in  the  Haryana  Urban (Control  of  Rent  and  Eviction)  Act,  1973  (hereinafter referred to  for the  sake of brevity as the Act) was in the following terms:           "Nothing in this Act shall apply to           (i) any  residential building  the construction of           which is completed on or after the commencement of           this Act  for a  period of ten years from the date           of its completion;           (ii) any  non-residential building construction of           which is completed after the 31st March, 1962.           (iii) any  rented land  let out  on or  after 31st           March 1962.      This provision  was amended by the Amending Act of 1978 (Act 16 of 1978) to read as follows:           "(3) Nothing  in  this  Act  shall  apply  to  any

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         building the construction of which is completed on           or after the commencement of this Act for a period           of ten years from the date of its completion."      It is  the validity of this amended provision which has been questioned in these writ petitions. 863      The validity  is challenged  mainly  on  the  following grounds:           (1) The provision is arbitrary and is violative of           Art. 14 of the Constitution.           (2) In  any event  in so  far  as  this  provision           operates retrospectively  and seeks  to take  away           the vested rights of the petitioner under the Act,           prior to  this amendment, the same must be held to           be illegal and invalid.      The argument  is that  this provision  seeks to make an invidious distinction  between buildings  constructed before the commencement  of this  Act and building the construction of which  was completed on or after the commencement of this Act and  on the  basis of  this invidious  distinction  this provision discriminates between the landlords and tenants of buildings constructed  before the  Act and after the Act. It is urged  that on  the basis  of  this  distinction  between building constructed  before and  after the  commencement of the  Act,  a  landlord  enjoys  in  case  of  the  buildings construction  of   which  is   completed  on  or  after  the commencement of  the Act  an exemption from the operation of the Act and the tenant in respect of such building is denied the protection  and the  benefits of the Act for a period of 10 years  from the date of completion of the construction of the  building,   whereas  the   landlord  of   any  building constructed before  the commencement  of the  Act  does  not enjoy any  such exemption  and the  tenant of  such building enjoys the protection and all the benefits of the Act. It is submitted that  this discrimination  between  one  class  of landlords and their tenants and the other class of landlords and their  tenants on the basis of the time of completion of the buildings  is clearly arbitrary and is violative of Art. 14 of  the Constitution. The submission is that Rent Control Legislation  is   enacted  for   the  purpose  of  affording protection to  the tenants  and the Act in question has also been passed for achieving the same object. Reference in this connection is  made to  the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the  passing of  the Act and to the Preamble of the Act. It is contended that this classification of buildings on the basis of  the time  of completion  of  construction  has  no reasonable nexus  with the  object to be achieved and may on the contrary  frustrate the  purpose for  which the  Act has been passed  inasmuch as  in respect  of the  buildings  the construction  of   which  was  completed  on  or  after  the commencement of  the Act,  the tenants are denied the entire benefit and  protection of  the Act. It is further contended that there can be no rational basis 864 in fixing  the period of the completion of the building with reference to  the date  of commencement  of  the  Act  which received the  assent of  the Governor  on the 25th of April, 1973 and was published in the Haryana Gazette on the 27th of April, 1973 and also in prescribing a period of 10 years for exemption from  the operation  of the Act for the buildings, the construction  of which  was completed  on or  after  the commencement  of   the  Act.   This  discrimination,  it  is submitted, is  arbitrary and  violative of  Art. 14  of  the Constitution and  in this connection reference has been made to the  decision of  this Court in the case of Motor General

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Traders and  Others v.  State of  Andhra  Pradesh  and  Ors. [1984] 1  S.C.C. 222, and also to the decision of this Court in the  case of  M/s. Punjab  Tin Supply  Co. Chandigarh  v. Central Government and Ors. [1984] 1 S.C.C. 206.      The next  contention is  that the amended provision has been given  retrospective effect  inasmuch as  the amendment which was introduced in 1978 has been made applicable to any building construction of which was completed on or after the date  of   commencement  of   the  Act   in  1973   and  the retrospective operation of the Act has been effect of taking away the  vested right of the tenant and must, therefore, be held to be illegal and bad. It is argued that S. 3(1) of the Act, as  originally enacted  was void  and  unconstitutional inasmuch as no period of exemption of any building which may qualify for  exemption had been fixed and it is well settled that an  indefinite or  unlimited immunity  to any  building from   the   purview   of   the   Act   is   arbitrary   and unconstitutional. The  argument  is  that  as  the  original provision contained  in S.  1(3) of  the Act,  prior to  its amendment,  was   void  and  unconstitutional,  no  building enjoyed any  exemption from the operation of the Act and the tenants of the buildings were entitled to the protection and the benefit of the Act and had acquired a vested right to be governed by  the provision  of the Act. It is submitted that this vested right of the tenants is sought to be interferred with by  the amended S. 1 (3) which has been made applicable to all  the buildings construction of which was completed on or after the date of commencement of the Act.      We do not see any force in any of the contentions.      It is  true that  Rent Control  Legislation is  usually enacted, and  the present  Act was  also passed, taking into account the  conditions prevailing in the State, to regulate the relationship  between the landlord and the tenant in the larger interest  of the  society and or affording protection to tenants against exploita- 865 tion by  landlords on  account of shortage of accommodation. The statement  of Objects  and Reasons  for passing  the Act recites -           "Certain provisions  of the  existing law  are not           conclusive   to    harmonious   landlord    tenant           relationship   and   also   hamper   rapid   urban           development. In  order to remedy these defects and           to entitle  the tenants  to the amenities of Water           supply, electricity  and  sewerage,  necessity  of           fresh legislation  has been  felt. Opportunity has           also been  taken  to  rationalise  the  basis  for           determination of  fair rent  and  to  provide  for           eviction of these tenants, who construct their own           houses in  the urban area concerned sufficient for           their requirement."      The Preamble to the Act reads:      "An Act  to control  the increase  of rent  of  certain buildings and  rented land  situated within  the  limits  of urban areas, and the eviction of tenants therefrom."      There cannot  be any doubt that the paramount object of every Rent Control Legislation including the present Act, is to provide  safeguards for  tenants against  exploitation by landlords who  seek to  take undue advantage of the pressing need for  accommodation of  a large number of people looking for a  house on  rent  for  residence  or  business  in  the background of acute scarcity of accommodation is at the very root of  the problem  and if houses were freely available at reasonable rent,  there would  hardly be  any need  for Rent Control Legislation.  It is  entirely for the Legislature to

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decide whether any measures, are to be adopted for remedying the situation  and for ameliorating the hardship of tenants. The Legislature  may very  well come to a conclusion that it is the  shortage of buildings which has resulted in scarcity of accommodation  and has  created  a  situation  where  the demand for  accommodation is  far in excess of the requisite supply,  and  it  is  because  of  such  acute  scarcity  of accommodation the landlords are in a position to exploit the situation to  the serious  detriment  of  the  tenants.  The Legislature in  its wisdom  may properly  consider  that  in effecting an improvement of the situation and for mitigating the hardship  of the  tenanted class  caused mainly  due  to shortage of  buildings,  it  will  be  proper  to  encourage construction  of  new  buildings,  as  construction  of  new buildings  will   provide  more  accommodation,  easing  the situation to a large 866 extent,  and  will  ultimately  result  in  benefitting  the tenants.  As   in  view  of  the  rigours  of  Rent  Control Legislation, persons  with means  may  not  be  inclined  to invest in  construction of  new houses,  the Legislature  to attract  investment   in  construction  of  new  houses  may consider it reasonable to provide for adequate incentives so that new  constructions may come up. It is an elementary law of economics  that anybody  who wants to invest his money in any venture  will expect  a fair  return on  the  investment made. As  acute scarcity  of accommodation  is to  an extent responsible for  the landlord  and tenant problem, a measure adopted by the Legislature for seeking to meet the situation by encouraging  the construction  of new  buildings for  the purpose of  mitigating  the  hardship  of  tenants  must  be considered  to  be  a  step  in  the  right  direction.  The provision for  exemption from  the  operation  of  the  Rent Control Legislation  by way  of incentive  to  persons  with means to  construct new houses has been made in Sec. 1(3) of the Act  by the  Legislature in  the  legitimate  hope  that construction of  new buildings  will  ultimately  result  in mitigation of  the hardship  of the  tenants. Such incentive has a  clear nexus with the object to be achieved and cannot be considered  to be  unreasonable or  arbitrary.  Any  such incentive offered  for the  purpose of  construction of  new buildings  with  the  object  of  easing  the  situation  of scarcity of accommodation for ameliorating the conditions of the tenants, cannot be said to be unreasonable, provided the nature and  character of  the incentive  and the  measure of exemption  allowed   are  not   otherwise  unreasonable  and arbitrary. The  exemption  to  be  allowed  must  be  for  a reasonable and  a  definite  period.  An  exemption  for  an indefinite period  or  a  period  which  in  the  facts  and circumstances of any particular case may be considered to be unduly long, may be held to be arbitrary. The exemption must necessarily be  effective from a particular date and must be with the  object of  promoting new  constructions. With  the commencement of the Act, the provisions of the Rent Act with all the restrictions and rigours become effective. Buildings which have  been constructed  before the commencement of the Act were  already there  and the  question of  any  kind  of impetus or  incentive to  such buildings does not arise. The Legislature,  therefore,   very  appropriately  allowed  the benefit of  the exemption to the buildings, the construction of  which  commenced  or  was  completed  on  or  after  the commencement of  the  Act.  This  exemption  in  respect  of buildings coming  up or  to come  up on or after the date of commencement of  the Act  is likely  to serve the purpose of encouraging  new  buildings  to  be  constructed.  There  is

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therefore nothing  arbitrary or  unreasonable in  fixing the date of  commencement of the Act from which the exemption is to be operative. 867      The exemption  for  a  period  of  10  years  from  the operation of  the Act allowed to buildings, the construction of which  commenced or was completed on or after the date of commencement of the Act, is fair and reasonable. It is for a definite period  and that  period  of  exemption  cannot  be considered  to   be  too   long;  and  this  exemption,  the Legislature may  be of  the view,  will serve the purpose of encouraging the construction of new buildings. It is for the Legislature to  decide the  period of  exemption that may be allowed and  to fix  the  date  from  which  the  period  of exemption should  run. This  will ordinarily  be a matter of Legislative  police   and  this   Court  will  not  normally interfere unless the Court is of the opinion that the period of exemption  or the  date from  which the  exemption is  to operate is unreasonable and arbitrary. The classification of buildings with  reference to the date of commencement of the Act namely, buildings constructed before the commencement of the  Act   and  buildings  the  construction  of  which  was completed on  or after  the date  of the  commencement of he Act, has  a rational  basis and  has a  clear nexus with the object to  be achieved.  For the  purpose of  achieving  the object and encouraging the construction of new houses with a view to  ameliorate the  hardship of the tenants by removing the scarcity  of accommodation,  the classification  of  the landlord and  the tenant  of a  house constructed before the commencement of  the Act  and the  landlord and  tenant of a house, the  construction of  which commences or is completed on or  after the commencement of the Act, is clearly founded on an intelligible differentia which has a rational relation to the object and this classification does not result in any invidious discrimination  between the  classes of  landlords and  tenants  so  classified.  This  classification  is  not arbitrary  and   is  not   violative  of   Art.  14  of  the Constitution.      The decisions  on which  reliance has  been  placed  on behalf of the petitioners is indeed of no assistance. In the case of  Motor General  Traders (supra),  this Court  had to consider the  constitutional validity  of S.  32 (b)  of the Andhra Pradesh  Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. This provision exempted all buildings constructed on or  after August  26, 1957 from the operation of the Act. No period  had been  fixed for  which this exemption will be enjoyed by  owners of buildings constructed on or after 26th August, 1957  and the exemption appeared to be in the nature of a  permanent one.  This Court  after referring to various authorities naturally  declared the  said  provision  to  be invalid, holding:           "After giving  our anxious  consideration  to  the           learned arguments  addressed before  us, we are of           the view that 868           clause (b)  of Section  32 of  the Act  should  be           declared  as   violative  of  Article  14  of  the           Constitution  because   the  continuance  of  that           provision on  the  statute  book  will  imply  the           creation of  a  privileged  class  of  land  lords           without any  rational basis  as the  incentive  of           build which  provided a  nexus  for  a  reasonable           classification  of  such  class  of  landlords  no           longer exists  by lapse of time in the case of the           majority of such landlords. There is no reason why

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         after all  these years  they should not be brought           at par with other landlords who are subject to the           restrictions imposed  by the  Act in the matter of           eviction of tenants and control of rents."      It is,  however, to  be noted  that this  Court in this very case observed at pp. 243 & 244 as follows:-           "We do  relize the adverse effect of this decision           on many  who may  have recently  built  houses  by           spending their  life savings or by borrowing large           funds during these inflationary days at high rates           of interest,  on the  expectation and  belief that           they would  not be  subjected to  the restrictions           imposed  by   the  Act.  The  incentive  to  build           provides a  rational basis  for classification and           it is  necessary, to  the national  interest, that           there should  be freedom  from restrictions  for a           limited period  of time.  It is always open to the           State Legislature  or the State Government to take           action by amending the Act itself or under Section           26 of  the Act,  as the  case may  be, not only to           provide incentive  to persons  who are desirous of           building new  houses,  as  it  serves  a  definite           social purpose  but also to mitigate the rigour to           such class  of landlords  who  may  have  recently           built their  houses for a limited period as it has           been done  in the Union Territory of Chandigarh as           brought out  in our  recent judgment in Punjab Tin           Supply Co.  Chandigarh v.  Central Government. The           question  whether   new  legislation   should   be           initiated to  exempt newly  constructed  buildings           for a  limited period  of time  on the  pattern of           similar legislation undertaken by different States           or to  exempt such  class of buildings for a given           number of  years from the provisions of the Act by           the issue  of a  notification under  Section 26 of           the  Act  is  one  for  the  State  Government  to           decide." 869      In the  other decision,  namely Punjab  Tin Supply  Co. Chandigarh (supra),  the validity of S. 3 of the East Punjab Rent Restrictions  Act, 1949  and  all  three  notifications issued under  the said  section provided  for  exemption  of every building  constructed in  the urban area of Chandigarh for a  period of 5 years from the respective date applicable to it  from the  operation of the Act came to be challenged. This Court  upheld the  validity of  S. 3 of the Act and the notifications impugned observing:-           In the result we declare that Section 3 of the Act           and the  notification dated  January 31,  1973 and           the other  notifications impugned  in these  cases           are valid  and effective.  We further declare that           the exemption  granted by  the notification  dated           January 31,  1973 applies  only to those buildings           which are  given sewerage  connection or  electric           connection or  which are occupied, as the case may           be on  or after  January 31, 1973 and not to those           buildings  which   satisfied  any   of  the   said           conditions before January 31, 1973." The following observations of the Court at pp. 216-17 may be usefully noted:-           "The Preamble  and the  provisions of a statute no           doubt assist  the Court  in finding out its object           and policy  but its  object and  policy  need  not           always be  strictly confined  to its  preamble and           the provisions  contained therein.  The object and

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         policy of  the Act  which is now before us appears           to  be   slightly  wider  than  some  of  the  key           provisions of the Act namely fixation of fair rent           and  prevention   of  unreasonable   eviction   of           tenants. The  acute problem  of shortage  of urban           housing as  we all  know has  become  a  permanent           feature throughout  India. It is on account of the           shortage of the number of houses in urban area, as           landlords get  an opportunity  to exploit  tenants           who  are  in  need  of  housing  accommodation  by           compelling  them   to  enter  into  unconscionable           bargains. The Act is passed as one of the measures           taken to  mitigate  the  hardship  caused  to  the           tenants.  The   policy  and   object  of  the  Act           generally  is   mitigation  of   the  hardship  of           tenants.  Such   mitigation  can  be  attained  by           several measures,  one of  them being  creation of           incentive to persons with 870           capital who  are otherwise  reluctant to invest in           the construction  of new  buildings in view of the           chilling effect  of the rent control laws. As part           of the  said scheme  in order  to persuade them to           invest  in   the  construction  of  new  buildings           exemption is granted to them from the operation of           the Act  for a  short period of five years so that           whatever may be the hardship for the time being to           the  tenants   of  the   new  buildings,  the  new           buildings so  constructed may  after the expiry of           the period  of exemption be available for the pool           of housing  accommodation controlled  by the  Act.           The impugned notification is not, therefore, ultra           vires Section  3 of the Act as in its true effect,           it advances the scheme, object and purposes of the           Act which  are articulated in the preamble and the           substantive provisions  of the  Act. Moreover  the           classification   of    buildings   into   exempted           buildings and  unexempted buildings  brought about           by the  notification bears  a just  and reasonable           nexus to  the object  to be  achieved  namely  the           creation of  additional housing  accommodation  to           meet the  growing needs  of persons  who  have  no           accommodation to  reside or  to carry  on business           and it  cannot be  considered as discriminatory or           arbitrary or unreasonable in view of the shortness           of the  period of  exemption available in the case           of each  exempted building.  The exemption granted           for a  period of  five years  only  serves  as  an           incentive as  stated above  and does  not create a           class of  landlords who  are for ever kept outside           the scope  of the  Act. The  notification tries to           balance the  interests of the landlords on the one           hand  and  of  the  tenants  on  the  other  in  a           reasonable way.  We do  not, therefore, agree with           the submission  that the notification either falls           outside the object and policy of the statute or is           discriminatory."      The  aforesaid   observations,  in  our  view,  clearly negative the  contentions  raised  by  the  petitioners  and conclude the question against them in so far as the validity of S.  1(3) of  the Act  on the grounds of arbitrariness and illegal discrimination is concerned.      The other  contention that  this provision must be held to   be    bad   inasmuch   as   this   provision   operates retrospectively and  seeks to take away the vested rights of

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the petitioners under the Act 871 is equally  without any  merit. The  section on  its  proper construction clearly  indicates  that  the  section  is  not retrospective in operation. Merely because the buildings the construction of  which commenced  or was completed after the date of  commencement of  the Act  in 1973,  come within the purview of this particular provision which was introduced by amendment  in   1978,  the   provision   does   not   become retrospective. Thus  provision  operates  prospectively  and becomes effective  after its incorporation in the Act by the amendment, though  the buildings  completed on  or after the commencement of  this Act  in 1973  are brought  within  the scope of  this Section.  The argument  that the tenants have acquired a vested right under the Act prior to its amendment is without  any substance. Prior to the amendment of Section 1(3) by  the Amending  Act of  1978,  the  provision  as  it originally stood cannot be said to have conferred any vested right on  the tenants. The provision, as it originally stood prior to its amendment, might not have been constitutionally valid as  the exemption  sought to  be granted  was  for  an indefinite period.  That does not necessarily imply that any vested right  in any  tenant was  thereby created. The right claimed is  the right to be governed by the Act prior to its amendment. If  the Legislature  had thought it fit to repeal the entire Act could the tenant have claimed any such right? Obviously, they could not have the question of acquiring any vested rights  really does  not arise.  Even if  it could be said that  the tenants had acquired any right because of any invalidity of  the earlier provision before amendment, it is always open  to the Legislature to remove any defect to make it valid.  It is  well settled that if any provision made by the legislature  is found  constitutionally invalid for some lacunae or  otherwise such provision can always be validated by removing  the defect  or lacuna  by passing  a validating Act. Validating Acts may be passed and, in fact, are usually passed with  retrospective effect  to remedy  any  situation which might  have brought  about as a result of the original provision  being  declared  invalid,  provided  however  the Validating Act  sought to be passed is within the competence of the Legislature.      In the  result, these writ petitions are all dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. M.L.A.                                  Petitions dismissed. 872