15 December 1978
Supreme Court
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MOHD RASHID AHMAD ETC. Vs STATE OF U.P. & ANR.

Bench: SEN,A.P. (J)
Case number: Appeal Civil 1724 of 1969


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PETITIONER: MOHD RASHID AHMAD ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P. & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/12/1978

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH TULZAPURKAR, V.D.

CITATION:  1979 AIR  592            1979 SCR  (2) 826  1979 SCC  (1) 596  CITATOR INFO :  F          1979 SC1237  (20,24)  D          1988 SC1737  (8,7)

ACT:      U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959-Act abolished all municipal boards and other local authorities-Empowered State Government  to   constitute  Centralised   Palika   Services prescribing method  of recruitment and conditions of service of  persons   appointed  to  services-Rule  6-Scope  of-Rule 6(2)(iv) provided  that if  no orders  of  final  absorption passed  before   a  certain  date  the  officer  or  servant concerned  deemed   to  have   been  finally   absorbed-Rule retrospectively amended  from time  to time on two occasions extending the  date of  final absorption to rectify mistakes in dates-State  Legislature, if had power to confer power on State Government to amend rule retrospectively.

HEADNOTE:      Rule 6(2)(iii)-If imposed a duty on State Government to act in  a quasi-judicial  manner. Rules  of natural justice- Applicability of.      The U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam 1959 as well as the U.P. Municipalities  Act, 1916 empowered local bodies in the State  to   appoint  their   employees  subject  to  certain regulatory control  by the State Government. In 1964 s. 112A was  added  to  the  1959  Adhiniyam  empowering  the  State Government to  make rules  for the  creation of  one or more services to  be known  as Centralised Palika Services common to all  the municipal  corporations and municipal boards and prescribe the  method  for  recruitment  and  conditions  of service of  persons appointed  to any  such service. Section 69B which was added to the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 was in identical  terms  as  s.  112A.  Section  577(e)  of  the Adhiniyam provided  for provisional  absorption of  officers and servants  of the erstwhile municipalities till they were finally absorbed  in any  centralised services created under the Act.  By s.  577(ee) the  Administrators of Boards etc., were authorised  to make  temporary appointments of officers and servants  till substantive  appointments were  made  and such officers  and servants  were treated  as on  deputation with the municipal corporations.

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    In exercise  of the  powers conferred under s. 112A the State Government  made the U.P. Palika (Centralised) Service Rules, 1966  which came into force on July 9, 1966. Since r. 6 of the Rules was found to be contrary to the provisions of s.  112A   and  s.   69B,  the  U.P.  Local  Self-Government (Amendment) Ordinance,  1966 (which later became an Act) was promulgated to  validate the  1966 Rules.  Section 19 of the Act provided  that the amendments made to the Rules might be given retrospective  effect, limited to a period of one year from the  commencement of the Ordinance. Thereafter the U.P. Palika (Centralised)  Services (Amendment)  Rules, 1966 were passed by  which r.  6  was  repealed  and  re-enacted  with retrospective effect  from July  9, 1966.  Clause (ii) of r. 6(2) empowered the State Government to pass a final order of absorption in respect of particular officers and servants of the erstwhile  municipal boards if they were found suitable. Clause (iii)  provided that such orders had to be made on or before March 31, 1967. 827      Since  the  work  of  final  absorption  could  not  be completed by  March 31,  1967, r.  6(2)  (iii)  was  amended shifting the  date to  June 30,  1967.  But  this  amendment having been  made to come into effect from April 1, 1967 the legal fiction  created by cl. (iv) of r. 6 that if no orders of final  absorption were  passed till  March 31,  1967  the officer or  servant concerned  was to be deemed to have been finally  absorbed,   came  into   play.  Clause  (iii)  was, therefore, again  amended shifting  the date  of passing the order from  March 31,  1967 to August 31, 1967. The rule was made with retrospective effect from July 9, 1966.      For the purpose of final absorption of all officers and servants who were found suitable in the two categories viz., those appointed  under s.  577(e)  and  s.  577(ee)  of  the Adhiniyam, the  State Government  laid down  a procedure. It constituted  Divisional   Committees  for  making  necessary recommendations to the State Government. On January 11, 1967 the State  Government issued the first Circular stating that all officers and servants whose services were proposed to be determined on  the ground of unsuitability might be given an opportunity  of   personal  interview   by  the   Divisional Committees. The Government divided the officers and servants into two  categories, those  getting salary  above Rs. 500/_ and those  getting salary  below Rs. 500/- and provided that cases of  each category  were to  be dealt with at different levels. By  this circular  the Government re-constituted the composition of  the divisional Committees so far as the five municipal corporations  which were  created under  the  1959 Adhiniyam were  concerned and directed that these Divisional Committees  should   make  selections  for  all  Centralised Services except  those whose  starting salary  was Rs. 500/- and above. The selection for this category was to be made by the State Selection Committee.      With a  view to  secure a  reasonable uniformity in the standards to  be applied  by the  Divisional  Committees  in making the  selection, the third Circular dated February 23, 1967 provided  that  the  Committees  should  interview  the official concerned  to judge  his suitability for absorption in the  Centralised Services  and that if it was proposed to declare an  official to  be unsuitable for absorption on the basis of  adverse entries,  the Divisional Committees should afford an  opportunity to  the official  concerned to appear before it and clear up his position. It was further provided that only  those adverse  remarks which  were found  to have been duly  communicated to  the official  concerned might be considered against him.

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    Thus  the   procedure   laid   down   was   this:   The recommendations of  the Divisional  Committees in respect of persons  drawing   salary  less   than  Rs.   500/-would  be scrutinised by  the State  Government  in  the  Local  Self- Government  Department   and  the  necessary  orders  passed thereon while  in respect  of the  second category  officers drawing a  salary above  Rs. 500/- p.m. the Secretary to the Government Local Self-Government Department would obtain the orders of  the  Minister  concerned  in  passing  the  final orders.      The appellant  RA was a permanent Assistant Engineer in the Development  Board, Kanpur. Before the coming into force of the  Adhiniyam he  was appointed as officiating Executive Engineer and  since then  he continued  to function  in that capacity on a purely temporary arrangement under s. 577(ee). The appellant  AH was  a Sanitary Inspector in the Municipal Board, Kanpur and 828 continued  to   hold  that   post.  He  was  later  promoted temporarily as Assistant Engineer and he stood provisionally absorbed under s. 577(e).      Writ Petitions  filed  by  the  appellants  and  others challenging the  vires of  the Rules  were dismissed  by the High Court.      On appeal  to this  Court it  was  contended  that  the appellants must be deemed to have been absorbed on March 31, 1967 by  virtue of  the fiction  contained in Cl. (iv) of r. 6(2), as  originally enacted,  because the amendment made to the Rule  shifting the  date of  final absorption first from March 31,  1967 to  June 30, 1967 and subsequently to August 31, 1967  were legally ineffective and (2) that the impugned orders were  vitiated on account of the failure of the State Government to  afford to  the appellants  an opportunity  of being heard. ^      HELD: 1. (a) The validity of the two amendments made by the State  Government  in  r.  6(2)  cannot  be  questioned. Although a  rule cannot  be made  with retrospective effect, the Legislature  by enacting  s. 19  of the  U.P. Local Self Government (Amendment)  Act, 1966 expressly conferred powers on the  State Government  to make  retrospective rules. [837 D].      (b) It is well established that retrospective operation is not  to be  given to  a statute  so  as  to  impain  that existing right or obligation other than as regards matter of procedure. If the enactment is expressed in a language which is fairly  capable of  either interpretation, it ought to be construed as  prospective only.  But where  it is  expressly stated that an enactment shall be retrospective, courts will give it  such operation. It is competent for the Legislature by retrospective legislation to make the provision contained in an carrier enactment ineffective. [838 F-G]      Quinn v. Prairiedate [1958] 25 WWR 241; referred to.      (c) In considering the effect of repeal of an enactment followed by  reenactment in the light of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act,  1897 the  line of enquiry would be not whether the  new   Act  expressly   keeps  alive   old  rights   and liabilities,  but  whether  it  manifests  an  intention  to destroy them. Any incompatibility in the provision has to be ascertained  from   a  consideration  of  all  the  relevant provisions of  the new  law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not conclusive. [839 B-C]      In the  instant case  by the  introduction of  the  new fictional date  of absorption as August 31, 1967 there was a clear intention  to destroy  the earlier  fictional date  of

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March  31,  1967.  It  would  clearly  be  incompatible,  on consideration  of   subsequent  amendments   for  both   the provisions i.e.  the original  clause (iii) fixing March 31, 1967 and  the new  clause (iii)  fixing August  31, 1967  to operate simultaneously.  The effect  of introduction  of the new fictional  date was  to annihilate the earlier fictional date. The appellants, therefore, did not stand automatically absorbed by  the failure of the State Government to pass the necessary orders  by March  31, 1967,  as its  powers  stood extended by  the subsequent  amendment to  August 31,  1967. Before that  date expired  the  State  Government,  in  both cases, passed  the necessary orders terminating the services of the appellants as they were not found fit for absorption. [839 D-F]. 829      2. (a)  The entrustment  to the State Government of the work of determining the suitability or otherwise of officers and servants  of the  erstwhile Municipal  Boards and  other local  authorities  for  absorption  in  the  newly  created Centralised Services  under s. 112A, imposed a corresponding duty or  obligation on  the Government  to hear the officers and servants  concerned. All  such officers were, therefore, entitled to  be heard  in the  matter  of  final  absorption irrespective of their salary. [841 A; 843 F].      (b) By  virtue of  the repealing provision contained in s. 581  of the  Adhiniyam, 1959 the various Municipal Boards and other  local authorities  constituted under the relevant Acts ceased to exist as a result of which the existing posts held by  the officers  and servants  in these  bodies  stood abolished. Consequent  upon the  abolition of the posts, all the officers and servants of the erstwhile local bodies lost their right  to hold  their posts.  The Adhiniyam,  however, provided by s. 577(e) and (ee) for provisional absorption or temporary appointment  of these  officers and  servants till substantive appointments  were made  and these  officers and servants were  treated as  on deputation  with the Municipal Corporations. Therefore,  in the  very nature  of things the officers and  servants provisionally  absorbed  under  these sections could  not be  automatically absorbed  in the newly created Centralised  Services. There  had to be screening of all of  them for  determining their  suitability  for  final absorption in the Centralised Services. [840 A; B-F]      (c) The  very nature  of the functions entrusted to the State Government  under r. 6(2) (iii) of the Rules implies a duty to  act in  a quasi-judicial  manner. Unless  the State Government’s  orders  conformed  to  the  rules  of  natural justice, the  orders  were  liable  to  be  struck  down  as invalid. [840 G 841 B].      (d) It  is not correct to say that it is incumbent only on the  Divisional Committees  to  give  an  opportunity  of personal hearing  and that the State Government was absolved of the duty to hear in respect of officers drawing Rs. 500/- and above. The first Circular dated January 11, 1967 was all pervasive and  the Government’s  policy was made quite clear in it.  The second  Circular  dated  January  31,  1967  was equally subject  to the  Government policy. All the officers and servants  of the  erstwhile Municipal  Boards and  other local authorities  were, therefore,  entitled to be heard in the matter of final absorption irrespective of their salary. [843 E, A, D].      In the  case of AH on an overall view of the records it cannot be  said that  the Divisional  Committee was wrong in recommending to  the Government  to terminate  his services. The Government  was within its right in passing the impugned order of termination in regard to him. [844 C]

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    In regard  to RA  before passing  the impugned order of termination  of  services,  the  Minister  for  Local  Self- Government did not give him an opportunity of a hearing. The procedure laid  down in  the Centralised  Services Rules was not followed.  The State  Government  could  decide  on  the question of  his absorption  only after he was found fit but that has  not been  done. The  order  passed  by  the  State Government,  therefore,   suffers  from   a  serious   legal infirmity. [844 D-F]. 830

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1724/69 and 1732 of 1971.      Appeals by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 12-5-69  of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal Nos. 492 and 437 of 1968.      Naunit Lal and Faqir Chand for the Appellant in CA Nos. 1724/69.      G. N.  Dikshit, O.  P. Rana for Respondent No.1 in C.A. 1724/69      J. P.  Goyal, S.  M. Jain and S. K. Jain for Respondent No.2 in CA Nos. 1724/69      Miss Meera Bali for the Appellant in C.A. 1732/71      G. N.  Dikshit and  O.P. Rana for the Respondents in CA 1732/71      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SEN J.  These two  appeals by  special leave,  directed against the  judgment of  the Allahabad High Court dated May 12, 1969  raise common questions and therefore, are disposed of by this common judgment.      By separate notifications issued under section 3 of the U.P.  Mahapalika   Adhiniyam,  1959,  the  State  Government constituted Municipal  Corporations in  five cities  in  the State, namely  Kanpur, Agra, Varanasi, Allahabad and Lucknow w.e.f. February 1, 1960.      The appellant in the present appeal, Mohd. Rashid Ahmad was a permanent Assistant Engineer in the Development Board, Kanpur,  constituted   under   the   Cawnpore   Urban   Area Development  Act,   1945.  In  1953,  an  Administrator  was appointed of  both the  Development Board  and the Municipal Board, Kanpur,  constituted under  the  U.P.  Municipalities Act, 1916,  under the  U.P.  Local  Bodies  (Appointment  of Administrators) Act,  1953. The  two local  bodies, however, continued  to   have  separate  legal  existence  and  their officers and  servants continued  as the  employees  of  the respective bodies.  The appellant  Mohd.  Rashid  Ahmad  was appointed as  Offg. Executive  Engineer by the Administrator of the  Municipal Corporation,  Kanpur, for  a period of one year on  September 12,  1960. He has since then continued to function  in  the  same  capacity,  on  a  purely  temporary arrangement under  s.577(ee), that  is, for  so long  as  no substantive appointment  could be  made to  that post  under s.106. The Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission, however, considered that  he was not fit for appointment for the post of the Executive Engineer, Municipal Corporation, Kanpur. 831      The appellant  in the  connected appeal, Ashfaq Hussain was a  permanent Sanitary  Inspector in the Municipal Board, Kanpur. After the constitution of the Municipal Corporation, Kanpur, he  continued to  hold that post under s. 577(e). On July 24, 1967 he was transferred in the same capacity to the Municipal Corporation,  Allahabad,  where  he  was  promoted

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temporarily as  an Assistant  Engineer. He, therefore, stood provisionally absorbed under s.577(e).      Both the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, and the U.P. Municipalities  Act, 1916  empowered these local bodies to appoint  their employees  subject to  certain  regulatory control by  the State Government. By s. 12 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika   (Sanshodhan)   Adhiniyam,   1964,   the   State Legislature  added  s.  112A  to  the  U.P.  NagarMahapalika Adhiniyam,  1959.   Similarly,   by   s.37   of   the   U.P. Municipalities (Amendment) Act, 1964, s.698 was added to the U.P. Municipalities  Act, 1916, which was identical in terms to s.112A. Section 112A of the Adhiniyam empowered the State Government to  provide by  rules for  the creation of one or more services to be known as Centralised Palika Services, as it may  deem fit  and proper,  common to  all the  Municipal Corporations and  Municipal Boards, and prescribe the method for  recruitment   and  conditions  of  service  of  persons appointed to any such service.      Section 112A  of the  U.P. Nagar  Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, enacts:           "112A.     Centralization     of     services.-(1)      Notwithstanding anything  contained in  section 106  to      110, the  State Government  may at  any time  by  rules      provide for  the creation  of one  or more  services of      such officers  and servants as the State Government may      deem  fit,   common  to   the  Mahapalikas  or  to  the      Mahapalikas and  Municipal Boards,  of the  State,  and      prescribe the  method of  recruitment and conditions of      service of persons appointed to any such service.           (2) When any such service is created, officers and      servants serving  on the posts included in the service,      as well  as officers and servants performing the duties      and functions  of those  posts under  sub-clause (1) of      clause (ee)  of section  577 may, if found suitable, be      absorbed in  the service, provisionally or finally, and      the services  of others  shall stand determined, in the      prescribed manner.           (3) Without  prejudice to  the generality  of  the      provisions of  sub-sections (1) and (2), such rules may      also provide for 832      consultation with  the State  Public Service Commission      in respect  of any  of the  matters referred  to in the      said sub-sections."      The  State   Government  in   exercise  of  the  powers conferred by  section 112A  of  the  U.P.  Nagar  Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959  and s.69B  of the  U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, made  the U.P.  Palika (Centralised)  Services  Rules, 1966, which  came into force on July 9, 1966. Rule 3 created 19 Palika  (Centralised) Services, covering 76 posts, common to all  the Municipal Corporations and Municipal Boards. The rules provided for regulating the recruitment and conditions of service  of the  persons appointed to these newly created services. Rule  6 dealt  with recruitment to the Centralised Palika Services.  Due to inadvertence r.6 was not drafted in conformity with  the requirements  of s.112A and s.69B. That was because  cl.(1) provided  for automatic final absorption of  officers   and  servants  provisionally  absorbed  under s.577(e), contrary  to  the  provisions  of  s.112A  of  the Adhiniyam and s.69B of the Municipalities Act.      On September 5, 1966, the Governor promulgated the U.P. Local Self-Government (Amendment) Ordinance, 1966, which was replaced by  the U.P. Local Self-Government Laws (Amendment) Act 1966. Section 19 of the Act reads as follows:           "19. Deeming,  validation, etc.  The Uttar Pradesh

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    Palika (Centralised  Services  Rules,  1966,  shall  be      deemed to  have been  made under  the provisions of the      Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, and the      U.P. Municipalities  Act, 1916,  as if  the  amendments      made by  this Act to the said Acts were always in force      and be  deemed to  be and always to have been valid and      shall, subject to any amendments made thereto, continue      in force, and notwithstanding anything contained in the      said Acts,  the power  to make  amendments to  the said      rules may,  during the  period ending  on September  4,      1967, be exercised retrospectively."      It, in  effect, amended  section 112A  of the Adhiniyam and s.69B  of the  Municipalities Act.  Section 4 of the Act provided that  the U.P. Palika (Centralised) Services Rules, 1966 shall  be deemed  to be valid. The Act further provided that  the   amendments  made  to  the  rules  may  be  given retrospective effect.  The  power  of  making  retrospective rules was, however, limited to a period of one year from the commencement of the ordinance. 833      On October  10, 1966,  the State  Government passed the U.P. Palika  (Centralised) Services (Amendment) Rules, 1966. These rules  repealed and  re-enacted r.6 with retrospective effect from July 9, 1966. Under cl. (ii) of r.6(2) the State Government had  to pass  a final  order  of  absorption,  in respect of particular officers and servants of the erstwhile Municipal Boards, if they were found suitable, in accordance with s.112A  of the  Adhiniyam. Clause  (iii) provided  that such orders  had to  be made on or before March 31, 1967. By cl.(iv) if  no orders  of final  absorption were passed till then, the  officer or  servant concerned was to be deemed to have  been  finally  absorbed.  The  State  Government  was, however, constrained  to make  the U.P. Palika (Centralised) Services (Amendment) Rules, 1967 on March 30, 1967 and amend cl. (iii)  of r.6(2),  as the work of final absorption could not be  completed by March 31, 1967. The date of passing the necessary orders  in that behalf was sought to be shifted to June 30,  1967. A  new cl. (iii) was accordingly substituted by  this   amendment  effected  on  March,  30,  1967.  But, unfortunately the  amendment was  made to  come into  effect from April  1, 1967. This created a serious legal infirmity, as on  the expiry  of March,  31  1967,  the  legal  fiction embodied in cl. (iv) was brought into play.      Thereafter,  the   State  Government   made  the   last amendment  to   the  U.P.   Palika  (Centralised)   Services (Amendment) Rules, 1967 on June 26, 1967, in supersession of the U.P.  Palika (Centralised)  Services (Amendment)  Rules, 1967 made on March 30, 1967. This amendment introduced a new cl.(iii) to  r.6(2), in  place of  the existing  cl.(iii) of U.P. Palika (Centralised) Services Rules, 1966, by which the date of passing the order was shifted from March 31, 1967 to August 31,  1967, with  retrospective effect  from  July  9, 1966.      Having provided  for the creation of Centralised Palika Services, the  State Government  had, in the meanwhile, laid down  the   procedure  by   which  an   office  or   servant provisionally absorbed  under  s.  577  (e)  of  temporarily appointed under  s.577(ee), were  to be finally absorbed, if found suitable,  under s.112A.  By its three circulars dated January 11,  1967; January  31, 1967  and February 23, 1967, addressed to  the Divisional Commissioners, it intimated the constitution of  Divisional Committees  for making necessary recommendations to  the State Government in this behalf. The first circular  embodied  the  Government  policy  in  these terms:

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         "Government desire that all officers and servants,      whose services are proposed to be determined on grounds      of unsuita- 834      bility  may   be  given   an  opportunity  of  personal      interview by the Committee."      After such  interviews, the Committees were to finalise their  recommendations   and  furnish   the  same   to   the Government. In  view of  the limited  time available  to the Government, for  finalising action  in the  matter,  it  was desired that  the first  meeting of the Committees should be held in  the last  week of  January or  in the first week of February, 1967. The Divisional Commissioner were required to intimate the  date to the Secretary to the Government, Local Self-Government   Department,    so   that   all   necessary arrangements could  be made  to forward  the character rolls and service records of the Centralised Services officers and servants.      By  the  second  circular,  the  State  Government  re- constituted the  Committees, so  far as  the five  Municipal Corporations  were   concerned,  and   directed  that  these Divisional  Committees  were  to  make  selections  for  all Centralised Services  except those whose starting salary was Rs. 500/-  and above.  Selection for the posts in the latter category were  to be  made by the State Selection Committee. Thus, the  Government divided the officers and servants into two categories, and their cases were to be dealt with at two different levels  for purposes  of  final  absorption  under r.6(2)(iii) read with s.112A.      By its  third circular,  the State  Government  without disturbing  the   earlier  categorisation  of  officers  and servants into  two classes, laid down certain broad criteria with a  view  to  secure  a  reasonable  uniformity  in  the standards to  be applied  by the  Divisional  Committees  in making the  selection. It may, however, be observed that the Government reiterated  its declared  policy  that  all  such officers and  servants, whose  services were  proposed to be determined on  the  ground  of  unsuitability  be  given  an opportunity of personal interview by the Committees stating:           "..the committee  should  interview  the  official      concerned to  judge his  suitability or  otherwise  for      absorption in the centralised services.           ...When it  is proposed  to declare an official to      be unsuitable  for absorption  on the  basis of adverse      entries, the  divisional  committee  should  afford  an      opportunity to  the official concerned to appear before      it and clear up his position."      It was also desired that only those adverse remarks may be considered  against the  official concerned,  which  were found to have been duly communicated to him. 835      It must  at  once  be  stated  that  though  the  State Government had  by  its  circular  dated  January  31,  1967 entrusted  the   task  of  determining  the  suitability  or otherwise  of  officers  and  servants  holding  Centralised Services posts  drawing less  than Rs.  500/-, to Divisional Committees,  and   reserved  such  function  in  respect  of officers and servants drawing Rs 500/- or more, to the State Selection Committee,  and by  its subsequent  circular dated February 23,  1967 maintained  the  classification  of  such officers  and   servants  for   purposes  of  judging  their suitability  for   absorption  in   the  Centralised  Palika Services, the  final orders of absorption in each case under s.112A were  passed by  the State  Government. In the former class, the  recommendations of  Divisional  Committees  were

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scrutinised by  the State  Government  in  the  Local  Self- Government Department,  in the  light of the service records of the officials concerned, and the necessary orders thereon were  passed.   In  respect  of  the  latter  category,  the Secretary  to   the  Government,   Local   Self   Government Department prepared  a note  and put  it up for the Minister for passing the final orders.      It  is  also  worthy  of  mention  that  the  delay  in completing  the  work  of  final  absorption  by  the  State Government was  mainly due to three factors, namely; (1) due to shortness  of the time available at its disposal, (2) the number of  officers and  servants  holding  the  Centralised Services posts  under s.577(e) and (ee) was quite large, and (3) because  of delay on the part of the erstwhile Municipal Boards to forward the character rolls and service records of the officers and servants concerned. On account of this, the task of  absorption under  s.112A  could  not  be  completed before March  31, 1967  i.e., the  date originally  fixed by cl.(iii) of r.6(2) of the U.P. Palika (Centralised) Services Rules 1966. The period was, therefore, subsequently extended from March  31, 1967  to June  30, 1967, and thereafter from March 31, 1967 to August 31, 1967.      Eventually, the  State Government  in exercise  of  its powers  under   cl.(iii)  of   r.6(2)  of  the  U.P.  Palika (Centralised) Services  Rules, 1966  determined the services of the  appellant Mohd.  Rashid Ahmad  on July  18, 1967 and that of  Ashfaq Hussain  on August  27, 1967,  on the ground that they  were not found fit for absorption under s.112A of the Adhiniyam.      The two  appellants and  several other employees of the erstwhile Municipal  Boards and  District Boards  challenged the validity  of the  various orders  passed  by  the  State Government terminating  their services  before the Allahabad High  Court   on  several   grounds.  Amongst  others,  they challenged the  validity of  r.6(2) (iii),  framed under  s. 112A 836 of the  Adhiniyam, on the ground that it was ultra vires the State Government  as  it  brings  about  extinction  of  the relationship of  employer and employees between them and the erstwhile Municipal  Boards. It  was  also  urged  that  the impugned orders  were violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution because  the classification  made by  the State Government by its circular dated January 31, 1967 entrusting the task of determination of the suitability or otherwise of officers and  servants holding  Centralised  Services  posts drawing less  than Rs. 500/- to Divisional Committees, which were enjoined  to give  them the right of a personal hearing to have  their say  in the  matter of  final absorption, and entrusting of  such function  in  respect  of  officers  and servants drawing  Rs. 500/- and above to the State Selection Committee without  a corresponding  right  of  hearing,  was without any  rational basis.  It was  also  urged  that  the impugned orders  were vitiated  being in breach of the rules of natural  justice. A  Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, however, rejected all these contentions.      In view  of the  language of  Entry 5,  List II  of the Seventh Schedule,  the objection  regarding the  validity of r.6(2) (iii)  was rightly not pressed before us. On the view that we  take of  the various  circulars issued by the State Government laying  down the  procedure for  dealing with the question  of   suitability  or  otherwise  of  officers  and servants of the erstwhile Municipal Boards for absorption in the Centralised  Services under  r.6(2)(iii) the  contention based on  Articles 14  and 16  of the Constitution also does

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not arise.      Learned counsel  appearing for  the appellants assailed the impugned  orders of the State Government on two grounds, namely:           1. By  reason of  the legal  fiction contained  in      cl.(iii) of  r.6(2), the  services  of  the  appellants      stood finally  absorbed in  the U.P. Palika Centralised      Services on  March 31,  1967 due  to the failure of the      State Government  to pass  the necessary orders in that      behalf  before  that  date.  Under  the  legal  fiction      contained  in   cl.(iv)  thereof,  and  the  subsequent      amendment  made   by  the   U.P.  Palika  (Centralised)      Services (Amendment)  Rules, 1967 which came into force      on April 1, 1967, the vested rights acquired by them to      hold their  respective posts  could not  be affected to      their detriment; and           2. The orders of termination of services passed by      the State  Government were  vitiated due to its failure      to give to the appellants an opportunity of hearing. 837      With respect  to the  first contention it is urged that the appellants  stood provisionally absorbed under s. 577(e) read with  cl(i) of  r.6(2). It  is said  that they would be deemed to  have been  finally absorbed on March 31, 1967, if no orders  contemplated by  cl.(ii) thereof  were made  with respect to them on or before that date. The argument is that the two  subsequent amendments  made on  March 30,  1967 and June 26,  1967, by  which the  State Government purported to shift the  date first  from March  31, 1967 to June 30, 1967 and then  from March  31, 1967  to  August  31,  1967,  were legally ineffective, as the first amendment made to cl.(iii) of r.6(2) came into force on April 1, 1967 by which date the appellants  already   stood  finally  absorbed.  There  was, therefore, no  power in  the State Government to re-open the question  of  final  absorption  under  s.  112A(2)  of  the Adhiniyam.      There is a fallacy in the argument. The validity of the two amendments  made by  the State Government in r.6(2) from time to  time cannot  be questioned. While it is true that a rule  cannot   be  made   with  retrospective   effect,  the legislature  by  enacting  s.19  of  the  U.P.  Local  Self- Government (Amendment) Act, 1966, expressly conferred powers on the State Government to make retrospective rules. Indeed, the validity of the amendments was not questioned before us.      Even if  the first  amendment of  March  30,  1967  was ineffective because  it was brought into force from April 1, 1967,  the   second  amendment   of  June  26,  1967,  which introduced a  new clause  (iii) to r.6(2) with retrospective effect from  July 9,  1966, was  fully effective. It shifted the date  for passing  of the order of final absorption from March 31,  1967 to  August 31,  1967. Till the expiry of the date now  fixed, i.e.  August 31,  1967, the  legal  fiction contained in  cl. (iv)  of r.6(2)  would not be brought into play. That  is  the  inevitable  legal  consequence  of  the subsequent amendment made on June 26, 1967.      It would be clear that cl. (iii) of r. 6(2), as amended on October  10, 1966,  gave power to the State Government to pass an  order of absorption under s. 112A of the Adhiniyam, of an  officer or  servant  of  the  Municipal  Corporations provisionally absorbed under s. 577(e) if found suitable, on or before March 31, 1967. If there was a failure on the part of the  State Government to pass such an order in respect of a particular  officer or  servant by  that date,  it  would, unless there  was a  provision to  the contrary,  bring into play the  legal fiction  contained therein, and he would, by

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its force, be deemed to be finally absorbed in the post held by him. 838      The State  Government in  their  return  have  candidly stated that  due to  inadvertence, the  subsequent amendment effected on March 30, 1967, was made to take effect on April 1, 1967,  by which date the legal fiction under cl. (iv) had already taken  effect. It,  therefore, became  necessary  to correct the  serious legal infirmity. It was for that reason that the  subsequent amendment  was made on June 26, 1967 by which a  new cl.  (iii) was  substituted  in  place  of  the existing cl.  (iii) to r.6(2). The amendment substituted new cl. (iii)  to r.  6(2) with  effect from  July 9, 1966 i.e., from the very inception.      It was  legitimately within  the powers  of  the  State Government to  give to  the  amended  rule  a  retrospective effect. As a result of the amendment, the original cl. (iii) was substituted  by a  new cl.  (iii) by  which the date for passing an  order of  absorption by the State Government was shifted to  August 31,  1967, which again introduced another legal fiction.  It provided  that if  there was a failure on the part  of the  State  Government  to  pass  an  order  of absorption by  August  31,  1967,  the  officer  or  servant concerned shall be deemed to be finally absorbed. This legal fiction was  brought into  force with  effect from  July  9, 1966.      It is  needless for  us to  stress that  both the legal fictions, one  created by  the original cl. (iii) fixing the fictional date  of absorption  as March  31,  1967  and  the subsequent legal fiction providing for the fictional date of absorption as  August 31, 1967, could not co-exist. With the subsequent amendment  effected on June 26, 1967, the earlier legal fiction  was never  brought into play, as by reason of the amendment,  the State  Government had  the power to pass the necessary  orders till August 31, 1967. The introduction of the  second fictional  date i.e., August 31, 1967, was to "eclipse" the earlier fictional date of absorption.      Perhaps  no   rule  of   construction  is  more  firmly established than this-that retrospective operation is not to be given  to a  statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation other  than as  regards the  matter of procedure, unless that  effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the  language of  the  enactment.  If  the  enactment  is expressed in  a language  which is  fairly capable of either interpretation, it  ought to  be  construed  as  prospective only. But  where, as  here, it  is expressly  stated that an enactment shall  be retrospective,  the courts  will give it such  an  operation.  It  is  obviously  competent  for  the legislature, in its wisdom, to make the provisions of an Act of Parliament  retrospective.. That  is precisely  the  case here. In  Quinn v.  Prairiedale where a subsequent enactment provided that the relevant section should be 839 deemed never  to have been contained in the earlier statute, it was  held to  be  sufficient  to  rebut  the  presumption against retrospectivity.      In State  of Punjab  v. Mohar  Singh and in Inder Sohan Lal v.  Custodian of  Evacuee Property  Delhi & Ors.(3) this Court had  to consider  the effect of repeal of an enactment followed by  re-enactment in the light of s.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The line of enquiry, as observed in Mohar Singh’s case,  would be  not whether  the new  Act expressly keeps alive  old rights  and  liabilities,  but  whether  it ’manifests an  intention to  destroy them’. It was held that s. 6  of the  General Clauses Act was not entirely ruled out

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when there was a repeal of the enactment followed by a fresh legislation  unless   the  new   legislation  manifested  an intention to  the contrary.  Such incompatibility  had to be ascertained  from   a  consideration  of  all  the  relevant provisions of  the new  law and the mere absence of a saving clause was, by itself, not conclusive.      In the  present case,  however, there  can be  no doubt that by  the introduction  of  the  new  fictional  date  of absorption as  August 31,  1967, there was a clear intention to destroy  the earlier fictional date of March 31, 1967. It would  clearly   be  incompatible,   on   consideration   of subsequent amendment,  for both  the provisions,  i.e.,  the original cl.  (iii) fixing  March 31,  1967 and  the new cl. (iii) fixing  August 31,  1967 to  be the fictional date, to operate simultaneously.  The effect  of introduction  of the new fictional  date was  to annihilate the earlier fictional date. The appellants, therefore, did not stand automatically absorbed by  the failure of the State Government to pass the necessary orders  by March  31, 1967,  as its  powers  stood extended by  the subsequent  amendment to  August 31,  1967. Before that date expired, the State Government in both these cases, passed  the necessary orders terminating the services of the  appellants as they were not found fit for absorption under  s.  112A  (2)  of  the  Act.  The  first  contention, therefore, fails.      That takes us to the second contention, namely, whether the impugned  orders are  vitiated on account of the failure of the  State Government  to afford  to  the  appellants  an opportunity of a hearing.      With the  establishment of  Municipal  Corporations  in five cities  in the  State, namely,  Kanpur, Agra, Varanasi, Allahabad  and   Lucknow,  w.e.f.   February  1,  1960,  the Municipal Boards,  Improvement  Trusts,  Development  Boards etc. in these cities, ceased to exist with the 840 repeal, by  s.581 of  the U.P.  Nagar Mahapalika  Adhiniyam, 1959, of  the U.P.  Municipalities Act,  1916, the U.P. Town Improvement Act,  1919, the  U.P. District Boards Act, 1922, the Cawnpore Urban Area Development Act 1945, the U.P. Local Bodies (Appointment  of Administrator) Act 1953, with effect from that  date, in relation to these cities. In consequence thereof,  the  existing  posts  held  by  the  officers  and servants of  these bodies  stood abolished.  Consequent upon the abolition of the posts, all officers and servants of the erstwhile local bodies lost their right to hold their posts.      The   Adhiniyam,   however,   provided   by   s.577(e), notwithstanding anything  contained in  ss.106 and  107, for the provisional absorption of these officers and servants in the Municipal  Corporations, till they were finally absorbed in any  Centralised Services  created by  rules  made  under s.112A, or  their  services  did  not  stand  determined  in accordance with  such rules.  By s.577(ee) the Administrator was authorised  to make  temporary appointments  of officers and servants  against the  posts  mentioned  in  s.106  till substantive appointments  were not  made thereto as provided in the  Adhiniyam,  and  they  were  to  be  treated  as  on deputation with the Municipal Corporations.      This was,  not doubt,  an ad  interim arrangement until the  State   Government  by  rules  framed  under  s.112A(1) provided  for   the  creation   of  the  Centralised  Palika Services, common  to  all  the  Municipal  Corporations  and Municipal Boards,  and made final absorption of officers and servants serving  on the  posts included in such Centralised Services under  s.112A(2). In the very nature of things, the officers and  servants provisionally absorbed under s.577(e)

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or  temporarily  appointed  under  s.577(ee)  could  not  be automatically absorbed  in  the  newly  created  Centralised Services. There  had to  be a screening of all such officers and servants  with a  view to determine their suitability or otherwise for  final absorption  in Centralised Services. It was particularly  necessary to  weed out  the  dead-wood  to bring  about   an  overall   improvement  in  the  municipal administration in these cities.      The very nature of the functions entrusted to the State Government  under   r.6(2)  (iii)   of   the   U.P.   Palika (Centralised) Services  Rules, 1966  for purposes  of  final absorption under  s.112A of the Adhiniyam, implies a duty to act in  a quasi-judicial manner. It cannot be denied that an officer or  servant provisionally absorbed under s.577(e) or temporarily appointed  under s.577(ee)  had the  right to be considered for  purposes of  final absorption. Such officers or servants,  particularly those in permanent employment who had put  in 20  to 25  years of  service  in  the  erstwhile Municipal Boards or Development Boards were vitally affected in the matter of final absorption. 841      By  s.112A  of  the  Act,  the  legislature  created  a machinery for  determining the  suitability or  otherwise of such officers  or  servants  for  absorption  in  the  newly created Centralised  Services. The  entrustment of this work to  the   State   Government   under   s.112A,   imposed   a corresponding duty  or obligation  on the Government to hear the officers  and servants concerned. In view of this, it is rightly urged  that the impugned orders, unless they conform to the  rules of  natural justice,  were liable to be struck down as invalid.      It is  a fundamental  rule of law that no decision must be taken  which will affect the rights of any person without first giving him an opportunity of putting forward his case. In Local  Government Board  v. Arlidge  Lord Haldane,  L. C. tried to  reconcile the procedure of a Government department with the  legal standards  of natural  justice. In  Ridge v. Baldwin & Ors. Lord Reid stated:      "It is  not suggested  that he  holds the position of a      judge or  that the  appellant is  entitled to insist on      the forms  used in  ordinary judicial procedure, but he      had ’a  duty of  giving to  any person against whom the      complaint is  made  a  fair  opportunity  to  make  any      relevant statement which he may desire to bring forward      and a  fair opportunity  to correct  or controvert  any      relevant statement brought forward to his prejudice."      These decisions  rest on  the classical  formulation of the "duty  to hear"  evolved by  Lord Loreburn  in Board  of Education v.  Rice. The  main requirements of a fair hearing are two:      (1) a  person must know the case he is to meet, and (2) he must have an adequate opportunity of meeting that case.      There has,  ever since  the judgment  of Lord  Reid  in Ridge v.  Baldwin (supra),  been considerable fluctuation of judicial opinion  in England  as to the degree of strictness with which  the rules of natural justice should be extended, and there  is growing  awareness of  the problems created by the extended  application of natural justice, or the duty to act fairly,  which tends  to  sacrifice  the  administrative efficiency and despatch, or frustrates the object of the law in question.  Since this Court has held Lord Reid’s judgment in Ridge  v. Baldwin  would be  of  assistance  in  deciding questions relating  to natural justice, there is always "the duty to act judicially". There is, therefore, the insistence upon the requirement of a "fair hearing".

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842      In A.  K.  Kraipak  v.  Union  of  India  there  was  a reiteration of  the principles,  albeit in a different form, laid down by this Court in Dr. (Miss) Binapani Devi v. State of Orissa  and by the House of Lords in Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture,  Fisheries &  Food that the executive should not arbitrarily  or capriciously  act and  that the  myth of executive  discretion   is  no   longer  there.  Indeed,  in Kraipak’s case (supra) it was observed:      "The dividing  line between an administrative power and      a quasi-judicial  power is  quite  thin  and  is  being      gradually obliterated....  Under our  Constitution  the      rule  of   law  pervades   over  the  entire  field  of      administration. Every  organ of  the  State  under  our      Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of      law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that      the  jurisdiction   of  the  administrative  bodies  is      increasing at  a rapid rate. The concept of the rule of      law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of      the State  are not charged with the duty of discharging      their  function   in  a   fair  and  just  manner.  The      requirement of  acting judicially in essence is nothing      but a  requirement to  act justly  and fairly  and  not      arbitrarily or  capriciously. The  procedures which are      considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power      are merely  those which facilitate if not ensure a just      and fair  decision. In  recent  years  the  concept  of      quasi-judicial power  has  been  undergoing  a  radical      change. What  was considered as an administrative power      some years  back is  now being  considered as  a quasi-      judicial power."      This Court  pertinently drew  attention  to  the  basic concept of  natural  justice  vis-a-vis  administrative  and quasi-judicial enquiries,  and  stated  that  any  decision, whether executive,  administrative  or  judicial  or  quasi- judicial, is  no decision  if it  cannot be  "just", i.e. an impartial and  objective assessment of all the pros and cons of a case, after due hearing of the parties concerned.      In the  light of  these  principles,  we  have  to  see whether the State Government acted in breach of the rules of natural justice in passing the impugned orders.      It is,  however, strenuously  urged on  behalf  of  the State Government  that on  a true  construction of  the  two circulars  in  question,  while  it  was  incumbent  on  the Divisional Committees to give all officers 843 and servants  whose services  were proposed to be determined on the ground of unsuitability, an opportunity of a personal hearing, no  such duty  was cast on the State Government. We are unable  to agree  with this line of reasoning. The first circular dated  January 11,  1967 was  all pervasive, and it covered all  categories  of  officers  and  servants  either provisionally  absorbed   under  s.577(e)   or   temporarily appointed under s.577(ee), irrespective of their salary. The Government policy  was made  quite clear  in that  circular, which we have quoted earlier.      At  this   stage,  the   functions  of  the  Divisional Committees were  to be  purely recommendatory in nature. The Committees had  to make  their  selection  of  officers  and servants suitable  for absorption  after an interview of all such   officers    and   servants,    and   forward    their recommendations to  the Government, for finalising action in the matter  of final absorption under s.112A. The subsequent circular dated  January 31, 1967, making a categorisation of the  officers  and  servants  concerned,  into  two  groups,

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reserving the power of selection for final absorption to the State  Selection   Committee  in  case  of  all  Centralised Services whose  starting salary  was Rs. 500/- and more, and entrusting the function to the Divisional Committees in case of those  whose starting  salary was less than Rs.500/-, was still subject to the Government policy already laid down. It is,  therefore,   not  right   to  suggest  that  the  State Government was  absolved of  the "duty to hear" the officers and servants  of the  erstwhile Municipal  Boards and  other local authorities drawing Rs. 500/- and above      All  the   officers  and   servants  of  the  erstwhile Municipal Boards  and other  local authorities provisionally absorbed under s.577(e) or temporarily appointed under s.577 (ee) were  therefore, entitled  to be heard in the matter of their final  absorption under s.112A read with r.6(2) (iii), irrespective of their salary.      The requirements of a fair hearing are fulfilled in the case of  officers and  servants of  the erstwhile  Municipal Boards and  other local authorities drawing a salary of less than Rs.  500/- but  not in  the case  of those  drawing Rs. 500/- or more.      It is  accepted before  us that  the  appellant  Ashfaq Hussain was  called  for  an  interview  by  the  Divisional Committee. The  State Government  in its  return has  placed material showing  that he  had a  uniformly bad  record  and there were  adverse  entries  in  his  character  rolls  for several years.  It is  not disputed  that Ashfaq Hussain had been called for an interview by the Divisional Committee. We are not impressed by the submission that the adverse remarks were not  put to  him when he appeared before the Divisional Committee. It is clear 844 from the two circulars of the State Government dated January 11, 1967  and February  23, 1967  that in all cases in which the services  of an officer or servant were to be determined on the ground of his unsuitability, they were to be given an opportunity of  personal interview  by  the  Committee.  The whole purpose of the personal interview was that when it was proposed  to   declare  such   an  official  unsuitable  for absorption, the  Committee had  to afford  an opportunity to appear before it and clear up his position. It is reasonable to presume  that when  the appellant,  Ashfaq  Hussain,  was called  for   that  purpose,  the  adverse  remarks  in  his character rolls  must have  been put  to him.  On an overall view of  the  record  of  service  of  Ashfaq  Hussain,  the Divisional Committee  was not  wrong in  recommending to the Government to terminate his services, and the Government was within  its   rights  in   passing  the  impugned  order  of termination in regard to him.      In the  case of  the appellant  Mohd. Rashid  Ahmad, it however  appears   from  the   return  filed  by  the  State Government that  no such  opportunity was  afforded  to  him before the  State Government passed the impugned order dated July 18,  1967 terminating  his services.  It is evident, no doubt, from  the return  filed by  the State Government that the  service   record  of   the  appellant  was  before  the Government, on  the basis whereof it was decided that he was unsuitable for  being finally  absorbed and  also  that  the Secretary for  Local Self-Government in his note of July 10, 1967  recommended   that  he  was  not  suitable  for  final absorption in the Centralised Services, but it is clear that the Minister  for Local  Self-Government before  passing the impugned order  of termination  dated July  11, 1967 did not give to the appellant an opportunity of a hearing. The order of  termination   of  his   services  passed  by  the  State

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Government,  therefore,   suffers  from   a  serious   legal infirmity.      It was said, however, on behalf of the State Government that under  s.107(1) of  the Adhiniyam  no appointment  to a post carrying  an initial  salary of not less than Rs. 500/- per mensem, could be made except after consultation with the Public Service  Commission, and  that the Commission did not find  the   appellant  fit   for  appointment  as  Executive Engineer, Municipal Corporation, Kanpur. It was also pointed out that  under s. 108 the appellant could not hold the post beyond the period of one year. It was, therefore, urged that the  State  Government  was  justified  in  terminating  the services of  the  appellant  as  he  could  not  be  finally absorbed in  the  post  of  an  Executive  Engineer  in  the Centralised Services.  It was  said that  the post had to be advertised for  filling up  the vacancy as required under s. 107 of  the Adhiniyam.  We are afraid, the contention cannot be accepted. 845      Under  s.   112A  (1)   of  the  Adhiniyam,  the  State Government having  by  U.P.  Palika  (Centralised)  Services Rules, 1966,  constituted the  Centralised Palika  Services, the appellant  Mohd. Rashid  Ahmad, who  was performing  the duties and functions of the post of Executive Engineer under s.  577(ee),   was  entitled  to  be  considered,  if  found suitable, for  absorption under  s.112A(2). Admittedly,  the appellant  was   not  heard  in  the  matter  of  his  final absorption. It  is also  not in  dispute that  the procedure laid down  in the  U.P. Palika (Centralised) Services Rules, 1966, was  not followed.  If the  appellant was at all found fit for  absorption, it was for the State Government next to decide the  suitable post on which he could be absorbed. The method of  recruitment provided by r. 20 had to be followed. Evidently, this has not been done.      In view  of the  fore-going reasons,  Civil Appeal  No. 1724 of 1969 succeeds and is allowed, while Civil Appeal No. 1732 of 1971 fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. P.B.R.      C.A. 1724/69 allowed.      C.A. 1732/71 dismissed. 846