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PETITIONER: MOHAN KUMAR SINGHANIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/09/1991

BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) FATHIMA BEEVI, M. (J) REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)

CITATION:  1992 AIR    1            1991 SCR  Supl. (1)  46  1992 SCC  Supl.  (1) 594 JT 1991 (6)   261  1991 SCALE  (2)565

ACT: Civil Services Examination Rules: Rules 4,8 and 17     Rule  4-Second proviso-Nature, scope and  constitutional validity  of--Held proviso carves out an exception  to  Rule 4--It does not travel beyond Rule 4---Proviso held not ultra vires  to clause (iii-a) of Regulation 4 of I.A.S  (Appoint- ment by competitive Examination) Regulations, 1955--There is dynamic  and  rational  nexus between the  proviso  and  the object to be achieved--Proviso held applicable to candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.       Rule 8--Purpose  of the Rule---Explained.       Rule 17  Proviso--Validity of-Proviso held valid.     Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14 and  16---Civil Services--Classification  of  services---Validity   of--Held classification  is not based on artificial inequalities  but is  founded on substantial differences---Group ’A’  and  ’B’ Services held distinct and separate--Classification of group ’A’ and ’B’ services held reasonable--Second proviso to Rule 4  of Civil Services Examination Rules held not ultra  vires of Article 14 or Article 16.     Part  IV-A Article 51-A  (j)--Fundamental   duties-Civil Services-Training    Programme   of    selectees---Rationale of--Training  programme held in consonance with the  Article 51-A (j).     Interpretation   of  Statute:  Statute---Principles   of construction---Legislative    intention--Ascertainment    of --Should  be ascertained by reading the statute as  a  whole and  in the backdrop of dominant purpose--When the  language is clear and plain court should construe it in the  ordinary sense    and   give   effect   to   it    irrespective    of consequences--Consideration of hardship 47 and inconvenience should be avoided.     Section-Rule/proviso  to--Nature and scope  of--Rule  of interpretation  of proviso--What is--Proviso is expected  to except or qualify the enacting part.

HEADNOTE:     Rule  4 of the Civil Services Examination Rules  provide that  every candidate appearing at the examination,  who  is

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otherwise eligible, shall be permitted three attempts at the examination. (The attempts are now increased to four). Under Proviso  to the said Rule the restriction on the  number  of attempts  is not applicable in the case of Scheduled  Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates who are otherwise  eligible. By  a  notification dated 13.12.1986 the  Central  Executive Authority inserted second proviso to Rule 4. The said second proviso  provided that a candidate who on the basis  of  the results of the previous Civil Services Examination, had been allocated  to the I.P.S. or Central Services, Group ’A’  but who  expressed  his intention to appear in  the  next  Civil Services Main Examination for competing for IAS, IFS, IPS or Central Services, Group ’A’ and who was permitted to abstain from  the probationary training in order to so appear  shall be  eligible to do so, subject to the provisions of Rule  17 and  that the said candidate when allocated to a service  on the basis of the next Civil Services (Main) Examination  can either  join  that service or the service to  which  he  has already been allocated on the basis of the previous CSE  and that if he fails to join either of the services, his alloca- tion based on one or both the examinations, as the case  may be, will stand cancelled. Further, notwithstanding  anything contained in Rule 8, a candidate who accepts allocation to a service and is appointed to that service shall not be eligi- ble to appear again in the CSE unless he has first  resigned from the service. In other words, a candidate failing within the ambit of this proviso can appear in the CSE for all  the permitted attempts subject to his age limit if he intends to appear  again in the CSE provided he first resigns from  the service  which he accepts on allocation and to which  he  is appointed.     Rule 8 of the Civil Services Examination Rules precludes the  candidate  who have been appointed to the IAS,  or  IFS from  sitting in the ensuing examination while  in  service. The  said rule provide that a candidate who is appointed  to the  Indian Administrative Service (IAS) or the Indian  For- eign  Service  (IFS) on the basis of result  of  an  earlier examination before the commencement of the ensuing  examina- tion and 48 continues to be a member of that service will not be  eligi- ble to compete at the sub sequent examination, even if he is disillusioned  and wants to switch over. Further, this  rule states  that in case, a candidate has been appointed to  the IAS or IFS on the basis of the earlier examination and after the subsequent preliminary examination, but before the  main examination,  the candidate, if continues to be a member  of that service, shall not be eligible to appear in  the  ensu- ing main examination notwithstanding that the said candidate has qualified himself in the preliminary examination.  Simi- larly  if a candidate is appointed to the IAS or  IFS  after the  commencement  of the Main examination  but  before  the announcement  of the result and continues to be a member  of that service, the said candidate shall not be considered for appointment  to any service/post on the basis of the  result of this examination.     Rule 17 of the Civil Services Examination Rules  provide that if a candidate has been approved for appointment to IPS and expresses his intention to appear in the CSE (Main)  for higher civil service, the services for which he is  eligible to  compete  are IAS, IFS and Central  Services  Group  ’A’. Similarly, a candidate who has been approved for appointment to  the Central Services Group ’A’ and expresses his  inten- tion to appear in the next CSE (Main) the services to  which he  will  be eligible to compete are IAS, IFS and  IPS.  The

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second  proviso to Rule 17 provides that a candidate who  is appointed  to a Central Services Group ’B’ on the result  of an earlier examination will be considered for appointment to IAS, IFS, IPS and Central Services Group ’A’.     The  eligibility of a candidate to appear in  the  Civil Services  Examination  with regard to nationality,  age  and qualifications  is  given  under Regulation  4  of  the  IAS (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Regulations,  1955. Clause  (iii-a) of the said Regulation provides that  unless covered by any of the exceptions that may from time to  time be notified by the Central Government in this behalf,  every candidate  appearing for the examination after 1st  January, 1979,  who is otherwise eligible, shall be  permitted  three attempts at the examination, and the appearance of a  candi- date  at the examination will be deemed to be an attempt  at the  examination  irrespective of  his  disqualification  or cancellation as the case may be, of his candidature. The legality and constitutionality of second proviso to Rule 4 and 49 Rule  17  was challenged before the  Central  Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the second proviso to  Rule 4 and Rule 17 were valid and were not hit by Article 14  and 16 of the Constitution.     In appeals to this court, it was contended on behalf  of the appellants (1) that second proviso to Rule 4 of the  CSE Rules  was invalid because: (a) it puts embargo  restricting the  candidates  who are seeking to improve  their  position vis-a-vis their career in government service; (b) it travels beyond  the  intent  of main rule viz. Rule  4;  (c)  it  is ultra-vires  to clause (iii-a) of regulation 4 of the  I.A.S (Appointment by competitive Examination) Regulation, 1955 in as much as the power to notify exceptions do not include the power to make candidates ineligible who are otherwise eligi- ble in terms of clause (i) to (iii) of Regulation 4; (d)  it is bad since the authorities have stepped out of the consti- tutional  limits in issuing the notification  inserting  the impugned proviso and that it has not been placed before  the House  of  Parliament; (e) it is  arbitrary  and  irrational having  no nexus with the object of recruitment to the  post of civil services; (f) it is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of  the Constitution because it discriminates between  group ’A’  and group ’B’ services i.e. it excludes the  candidates appointed  to group ’A’ services from competition  while  no such  embargo is placed restricting the candidates to  Group ’B’ services; (2) that the second proviso is not  applicable to the candidates belonging to SC or ST; (3) Proviso to Rule 17  of  the Civil Services Examination is invalid  since  it places restriction on candidates who are seeking to  improve their position vis-a-vis their career. DismiSsing the appeals, this Court,     HELD:  1. If Rule 4 of Civil Services Examination  Rules is examined in juxtaposition of clause (iii-a) of Regulation 4,  it  is clear that both Rule 4 of CSE  Rules  and  Clause (iii-a) of the Regulation 4 show that every eligible  candi- date  appearing at the Civil Services Examination should  be permitted  three attempts at the examination which  are  now increased to four under Rule 4 of the CSE Rules. The  eligi- bility  of a candidate to appear in the CSE with  regard  to nationality,  age  and educational qualifications  is  given under  clauses (i) to (iii) of Regulation 4 but the  Govern- ment by exercise of its executive power has imposed  certain restrictions under some specified circumstances. A plain and grammatical reading of clause (iii-a) of Regulation 4  shows that if the number of

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50 attempts are covered by any of the exceptions that may  from time  to time be notified by the Central Government in  this behalf,  then the notification will become  enforceable  and only  in the absence of such notification,  every  candidate normally  can  appear  for all  permitted  attempts  at  the examination  whether  three  or four.  The  impugned  second proviso does not restrict or put an embargo on the number of attempts  in the normal course. But the restriction is  only when  the conditions enumerated in the impugned proviso  are satisfied.  The restriction imposed by the impugned  proviso cannot  be said to be unjust, unreasonable or  arbitrary  or change of any policy. Moreover, the spirit of the main  rule is not in any way disturbed. [80 B-F, 92 D]     1.1 The restriction or embargo, as the one under consid- eration  is  not only placed on the candidates  who  on  the basis  of the result of the previous CSE had been  allocated and appointed to IPS or Central Services Group ’A’ but  also on  the candidates appointed in the higher echelon of  civil service. There is a far more restrictive rule in  existence, namely  Rule 8 of the CSE Rules which precludes  the  candi- dates  who have been appointed to the IAS or IFS, from  sit- ting  in the ensuing examination while in service.  Further, this rule states that in case, a candidate has been appoint- ed to the IAS or IFS on the basis of the earlier examination and after the subsequent preliminary examination, but before the  Main examination, that candidate if continues to  be  a member  of that service, shall not be eligible to appear  in the  ensuing main examination notwithstanding that the  said candidate has qualified himself in the preliminary  examina- tion.  Similarly if a candidate is appointed to the  IAS  or IFS  after  the  commencement of the  main  examination  but before the announcement of the result and continues to be  a member  of  that service, the said candidate  shall  not  be considered for appointment to any service/post on the  basis of the result of this examination. But there is no bar for a candidate  who  is appointed to the IAS/IFS  resigning  from that  service and sitting in the examination for IPS or  any Central Service Group ’A’. [86 B-F, 86 G-H]     Under  Rule  4  of CSE  Rules  notwithstanding  anything contained in Rule 8, a candidate who accepts allocation to a service and appointed to that service shall not be  eligible to appear again in the CSE unless he first resigns from that service.  In other words, a candidate who is  allocated  and appointed  to a service can sit in the  ensuing  examination provided  he first resigns from that service. This  restric- tion, is a reasonable one in order to 51 achieve the desired result. Thus the second proviso to  Rule 4 of the CSE Rules does not travel beyond the intent of  the main rule putting any unjustifiable embargo and  the proviso is  not ultra-vires Regulation 4(iii-a) of Regulations  1955 on  the ground that it makes the candidates  ineligible  who are  otherwise eligible in terms of clauses (i) to (iii)  of the  said Regulation and the proviso to Rule 17 is  not  in- valid. [86H, 87 A-C]     2.  An enactment is never to be held invalid  unless  it be,  beyond  question,  plainly and palpably  in  excess  of legislative power or it is ultra-vires or inconsistent  with the  statutory or constitutional provisions or it  does  not conform  to the statutory or constitutional requirements  or is  made  arbitrarily with bad faith or oblique  motives  or opposed to public policy. [87 C-D]     2.1  While interpreting a statute the  consideration  of inconvenience and hardships should be avoided and that  when

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the  language is clear and explicit and the words  used  are plain  and unambiguous, the court is bound to construe  them in  their ordinary sense with reference to other clauses  to the Act or Rules as the case may be, so far as possible,  to make  a consistent enactment of the whole statute or  series of  statutes/Rules/Regulations relating to the subject  mat- ter.  Added to this, in construing a statute, the court  has to  ascertain the intention of the law making  authority  in the  backdrop  of the dominant purpose  and  the  underlying intendment of the said statute and that every statute is  to be  interpreted  without any violence to  its  language  and applied  as far as its explicit language  admits  consistent with the established rule of interpretation. [83 F-G]     Maxwell  on the "Interpretation of statutes"  10th  Edn. page 7; Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn.; 6th Edn., page  89; referred to.     King  Emperor  v. Benoari Lal Sharma, AIR  1945  PC  48; Wardurton  v. Loveland, [1832] 2 D & CH. (H.L.)  480;Suffers v.  Briggs,  [1982] 1 A.C. 1,8; Commissioner of  Income  Tax v.S.  Teja  Singh, [1959] 1 Suppl. SCR 394; M.  Pentiah  and Ors.  v. Muddala Veeramallappa and Ors., AIR 1961  SC  1107; It.  Col.  Prithi Pal Singh Bedi etc. v. Union  of  India  & Ors., [1983] 1 SCR 393; A.R. Auntlay v.R.S. Nayak, [1984]  2 SCR  914;  Maharashtra State Board of Secondary  and  Higher Secondary  Education and Anr. v. Paritosh  Bhupesh   Kurmar- sheth etc., [1985] I S.C.R. 29; Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court,  Madras and Ors., [1985] 3 SCC 103; Balasinor  Nagrik Cooperative  Bank  Ltd. v. Babubhai  Shankerlal  Pandya  and Ors., [1987] 1 SCC 608; 52 Dr.Ajay Pradhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.,  [1988] 4 SCC 514; LIC v. Escorts, AIR 1986 SC 1370, referred to.     2.2 A Proviso to a Section/Rule is expected to except or qualify  something in the enacting part and presumed  to  be necessary. When the impugned second proviso to Rule 4 of the CSE  Rules  is interpreted in its  grammatical  meaning  and cognate  expressions  and construed  harmoniously  with  the substantive rule, it is pellucid that the said proviso  only carves out an exception to Rule 4 of the CSE Rules in  given circumstances and under specified conditions and, therefore, the  second proviso cannot be read in isolation  and  inter- preted  literally. On the other hand the substantive Rule  4 is  be  read in conjunction with the two  provisos  appended thereto so as to have a correct interpretation. [83H, 85  E- F]     2.3  In the Proviso, in dispute, there are  no  positive words  or  indications which would  completely  exclude  the operation  of  the substantive rule the spirit of  which  is reflected  in  Regulation 4 of the  Regulations,  1955.  The restriction  imposed  by the second proviso  is  only  under certain circumstances. Although the notification introducing the  impugned  proviso, has to be  strictly  construed,  the Court cannot overlook the very aim and object of the proviso thereby either defeating its purpose or rendering it  redun- dant or inane or making it otiose. Judged from any angle, it is  not possible to hold that there is a violent  breach  of the  provisions of the substantive Rule 4 of CSE  Rules  and Regulation  4  (iii-a) and it cannot. be held that  the  im- pugned  second  proviso either subverts  or  destroys  basic objectives of Rule 4 and that it is ultra-vires. [85F-H,  86 A-B]     Maxwell  on "The Interpretation of statute",  11th  edn. page 155; Kent’s Commentary on American Law, 12th Edn.  vol. 1 463, referred to.     Att. Gen. v. Chelsea Waterworks Co., [1731] Fitzg.  195;

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Piper v. Harvey,[1958] I Q.B. 439: R. v. Leeds Priso (Gover- nor),  [1964] 2 Q.B. 625; Ram Narain Sons Ltd. and  Ors.  v. Assit. Commissioner of Sales Tax and Ors, [1955] 2 SCR  483; Abdul  Jabar  Butt & lint. v. State of  Jammu  and  Kashmir, [1957] SCR 51; Commissioner of Income Tax v. S. Teja  Singh, [1959]  1  Suppl. SCR 394; The Commissioner  of  Income  Tax Mysore  Travancore-Cochin and Coorg., Bangalore v. The  Indo Mercantile  Bank  Ltd., [1959] 2 Suppl. SCR  256;  Madras  & Southern  Mahratta  Railway  Co.  v.  Bezwada  Municipality, [1944]  L.R. 71 I.A. 113, Corpn. of the City of  Toronto  v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1946]A.C. 32; Mackinnon  Mack- enzie  & Co. Ltd. v. Audrey D’ Cost and Anr., [1987]  2  SCC 469, referred to. 53     3. The argument that the second proviso is bad since the authorities have stepped out of the constitutional limits in issuing the notification inserting the impugned proviso  and that it has not been placed before the Houses of the Parlia- ment, has to be rejected because the proviso has been intro- duced  by the Central Executive Authority under  the  powers flowing from Article 73(1) (a) of the Constitution,  accord- ing to which the executive power of the Union subject to the provisions  of the Constitution shall extend to the  matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws, but of  course subject to the proviso made thereunder.  Needless to point out that whilst by virtue of clause 1 (a) of  Arti- cle 73, the executive power of the Union which is  co-exten- sive with the legislative power of Parliament can make  laws on  matters  enumerated in List I (Union List) and  List  II (Concurrent  list) to the Seventh Schedule of the  Constitu- tion,  under Article 162 of the Constitution, the  executive power of the State Executive which is coextensive with  that of the State legislature can make laws in respect of matters enumerated in List III ( State List) and also in respect  of matters enumerated in List II (Concurrent List), subject  to the provisions of the Constitution. [77 D-G]     3.1 In the instant case, the Central executive authority has not either expressly or impliedly changed the policy  of the  Government  by exercising  unreasonable  and  arbitrary discretion  and  the  present Rule 4 with  its  newly  added second proviso does not repeal the essential features of the pre-existing Rule 4 but only limits the ambit of the  opera- tion of the price 4 under a given situation. Hence, there is no  substance in the contention that the second  proviso  is bad  and  that the central executive  authority  has  trans- gressed the constitutional limits. [77 H, 78 A]     4. Article 14 declares that the State shall not deny  to any  person equality before the law or the equal  protection of  the  laws within the territory of India.  The  cherished principle underlying the above Article is that there  should be  no discrimination between one person and another  if  as regards  the subject matter of the legislation, their  posi- tion is the same. [103 H, 104 A]      4.1  Differential treatment does not per se  constitute violation of Article 14 and it denies equal protection  only when  there is no rational or reasonable basis for the  dif- ferentiation.  Thus Article 14 condemns  discrimination  and forbids class legislation but permits classification 54 founded on intelligible differentia having a rational  rela- tionship  with  the  object sought to  be  achieved  by  the Act/Rule/Regulation  in question. The Government is  legiti- mately empowered to frame rules of classification for secur- ing the requisite standard of efficiency in services and the classification  need not scientifically be perfect or  logi-

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cally  complete.  Every  classification is  likely  in  some degree to produce some inequality. [104 B-D]     R.K. Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, [1959] SCR 279; Budhan Choudhry  v.  State  of Bihar,  [1955] 1  SCR  1045;  Kumari Chitra  Ghosh and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors,  [1969]  2 SCC  228; State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath  Khosa  & Ors.,  [1974]  1 SCR 771; A.S. Sangwan v.  Union  of  India, [1980]  Suppl.  SCC 559; Akhil  Bhartiya  Soshit  Karamchari Sangh  (Railway) v. Union of India & Ors., v. [1981]  1  SCC 246;  Deepak  Sibal v. Punjab University [1989] 2  SCC  145; Chiranjit  Lal v. Union of India [1950] 1 SCR 869:  Ameeroo- nissa v. Mahboob, [1953] SCR 405; Gopi Chand v. Delhi Admin- istration,  AIR 1959 SC 609; E.P. Royappe v. Stale of  Tamil Nadu,  [1974]  2 SCR 348; Maneka Gandhi v.  Union  of  India [1978] 1 SCC 248; Ramana v. International Airport  Authority of  India,  AIR [1979] SC 1628; Union of India  v.  Tulsiram Patel,  [1985] 3 SCC 398; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union  of India,[1981]  2  SCR  533; Central  Inland  Water  Transport Corporation  v. Brojo Nath, AIR 1986 SC 1571;  Devadasan  v. Union  of India, [1964] 4 SCR 680; Birendra Kumar Nigam  and 0rs. v. Union of India, W.P. Nos. 220-222 of 1963 decided on 133.64, referred to     4.2  The  selections  for IAS, IFS, and  IPS  Group  ’A’ services  and group ’B’ service are made by a combined  com- petitive examination and viva voce test. There cannot be any dispute that each service is a distinct and separate  cadre, having  its  separate  field of  operation,  with  different status,  prospects,  pay scales, the nature of  duties,  the responsibilities  to he post and conditions of service  etc. Each of the services is founded on intelligible  differentia which  on  rational grounds  distinguishes  persons  grouped together  from those left out and that the  differences  are real and substantial having a rational and reasonable  nexus to  the  objects sought to be achieved.  Therefore,  once  a candidate is selected and appointed to a particular cadre he cannot  be allowed to say that he is at par with the  others on the ground that all of them appeared and were selected by a  combined competitive examination and viva voce  test  and that  the  qualifications  prescribed  are  comparable.  The classification  of services is not based on  artificial  in- equalities but is hedged within the salient features 55 and  truly founded on substantial differences.  Judged  from this  point  of view, it is not possible to  hold  that  the classification rests on an unreal and unreasonable basis and that it is arbitrary or absurd. [103C, 106C, 103 D-E]     43   It  cannot  also be disputed  that  the  candidates allocated  to Group ’A’ services are more  meritorious  com- pared  to candidates allocated to Group’B’ services.  Conse- quently,  those  allocated to Group’ B’ services  get  lower position  compared to those allocated to Group A’  services. The pay scales in Group ’B’ services are comparatively  less than  those meant for IAS, IFS and IPS and Central  Services Group  ’A’. There is a clear cut separation on the basis  of ranking  and merit and, therefore, it cannot be said by  any stretch  of  imagination that both Group ’A’ and  Group  ’B’ services  fail  under one and the same category but  on  the other  these services are two distinct and separate  catego- ries falling under two different classifications. Therefore, there is no discrimination whatsoever involved on account of the  introduction of the second proviso in question and  the said proviso is not ultra-vires of Article 14 or Article  16 of the Constitution of India. [97 B-C, 106G]     5. In the normal course, a candidate belonging to  SC/ST category  can  enjoy all the benefits under  the  rules  and

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regulations.  But the restriction imposed under  the  second proviso  is only for a specified category of  candidates  by treating  all such candidates at par and without making  any exception to the candidates belonging to SC/ST. The  submis- sion that the second proviso is an independent one does  not merit  consideration  because the second proviso to  Rule  4 begins  with  the words ’provided further   .....   "  which expression would mean that a strict compliance of the second proviso is an additional requirement to that of the substan- tive rule 4 and the first proviso. The expression  "provided further" spells out that the first proviso cannot be read in isolation  or independent of the second proviso but it  must be read in conjunction with the second proviso. [89 C-E]     5.1  Once  the  candidates belonging to  SC  or  ST  get through  one common examination and interview test  and  are allocated  and appointed to a service based on  their  ranks and  performance,  and brought under the one  and  the  same stream  of category, then they too have to be treated  among all  other  regularly and lawfully selected  candidates  and there 56 cannot  be any preferential treatment at that stage  on  the ground  that  they belong to SC or ST, though  they  may  be entitled  for  all other statutory benefits such as  to  the relaxation  of  age, the reservation etc.  The  unrestricted number  of  attempts,  subject to the upper  age  limit,  is available  to the SC/ST candidates in the normal course  but that is subject to the second proviso because when once they are allocated and appointed along with other candidates to a category/post,  they are treated alike. Therefore, there  is no  merit in the submission that the second proviso  is  not applicable  to the candidates belonging to SC or ST. [89  E- G,91H, 92 A]     5.2  There  may be some hard cases, but the  hard  cases cannot  be  allowed to make bad law. As long as  the  second proviso  does  not suffer from any vice, it has to  be  con- strued,  uniformly giving effect to all those falling  under one  category in the absence of any specific  provision  ex- empting  any particular class or classes of candidates  from the  operation of the impugned proviso and no one can  steal march over others failing under the same category. Hence the right of candidates belonging to SC and ST competing further to  improve  their career opportunities is  limited  to  the extent  permissible under the second proviso 10 Rule 4  read with Rule 17 of the C.S.E. Rules. [91 F-G]     C.A.  Rajendran v. Union of India & Ors’., [1968] 1  SCR 721; State of Kerala v. N.N. Thomas, [1976] 2 SCC 310; Akhil Bharriya Soshit Karamchari Sangh/Railway) v. Union of  India JUDGMENT: [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 439; Triloki Nath v. State of J&K [1969] 1 SCR 103; T. Devadasan v. Union of India, [1964] 4 SCR 680; Comptroller  and Auditor-General of India v.  K.S.  Jaganna- than,  [1986] 2 SCC 679; Janki Prasad v. State of  J&K,  AIR 1973  SC 930; General Manager v. Rangachan, AIR  [1962]  SC. 36, referred to.     6.  There is no denying the fact that the civil  service being the top most service in the country has got to be kept at  height,  distinct from other services  since  these  top echelons  have  to  govern a wide  variety  of  departments. Therefore,  the  person joining this higher  service  should have  breadth of interest and ability to acquire new  knowl- edge  and skill since those joining the service have  to  be engaged in multiple and multifarious activities. In order to achieve  this  object, the selectees of  this  higher  civil services   have   to  undergo  training  in   the   National

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Academy/Training  institutes  wherein they have  to  undergo careful programme of specialized 57 training  as probationers. The various schemes  of  training are based on the conviction that splendid active  experience is the real training and the selectees are to be trained  in the  academies  in  all kinds of work they  have  to  handle afterwards with a band of senior chosen officers. [92 H,  93 A-B]     6.1 The rationale underlying the course at the  training centres is that the officers of civil services must  acquire an understanding of the constitutional, social, economic and administrative framework within which they have to  function and  also must have a complete sense of involvement  in  the training  and thereafter in the service to which he  is  ap- pointed. The initial training is in the nature of  providing young probationers an opportunity to counter-act their  weak points  and at the same time develop their social  abilities and as such the aspect of training is the most important  of all. [93 C-D]      Hermer Fines, the Theory and Practice of Modern Govern- ment;  United  Nations Handbook on Civil  Service  Laws  and Practice, referred to.       Lila  Dhar v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1981] 4  SCC 159, referred to.     6.2    The  effort  taken by the  Government  in  giving utmost importance to the training programme of the selectees so that this higher civil service being the top most service of  the country is not wasted and does not become  fruitless during the training period is in consonance with the  provi- sions of Article 51-A (j) of the Constitution. [77-A]     63  There  is a dynamic and rational nexus  between  the impugned  second  proviso  and the object  to  be  achieved. [106-F]

&     CIVIL   APPELLATE   JURISDICTION:  Civil   Appeal   Nos. 5439-52 of 1990 etc. etc.     From the Judgments and Orders dated 20.8.1990/4.10.1990/ 15.10.1990 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench,  Delhi in O.A. Nos. 1023, 309, 1705, 1058 &  1054  of 1989  and 1072, 1074, 1162, 1161, 1122, 1064, 536,  1230  of 1990 and M.P. No. 1354 of 1990 in O.A. No. 309 of 1989.      P.P. Rao, A.K. Behere, A.K. Sahu, C.N. Sreekumar, Gopal Subramanium,  Madhan  Panikhar,  Mrs.  Vimla  Sinha,   Gopal ,Singh,  Salman Khurshid, Mrs. C.M. Chopra, A.M.  Khanwilkar and Mrs. V.D. Khanna for 58 the Appellants.     Kapil  Sibal, Additional Solicitor General,  Ms.  Kamini Jaiswal and C.V.S. Rao for the Respondents.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. The above batch of Civil Appeals in  which  common questions of law arise,  is  preferred  by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against   the  judgments  dated  20.8.1990,  4.10.1990   and 5.10.1990 of the Central Administrative Tribunal,  Principal Bench,  New  Delhi  (hereinafter referred  to  as  Tribunal) rendered  in various affiliated groups of original  applica- tions (O.As) upholding the validity of the second proviso to Rule 4 of the Civil Services Examination Rules  (hereinafter referred  to as ’C.S.E. Rules’) introduced  by  Notification No.  13016/4/86-AIS(1)  dated 13.12.1986 (Published  in  the

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Gazette  of  India Extraordinary, Part 1 Section 1).  Be  it noted  that  similar notification has been/is  being  issued each  year  for the general information  of  the  candidates setting  down the terms and conditions, eligibility etc.  to sit for the Civil Service Examination of the concerned year.     While  a  substantial number of O.As  filed  before  the Tribunal  at Delhi were pending, a similar number of  analo- gous O.As filed before the Benches of Administrative  Tribu- nals  at Patna, Allahabad, Chandigarh, Jabalpur,  Hyderabad, Jodhpur  and Eranakulam were transferred to the Tribunal  at Delhi since common questions of law arose for  determination in all the O.As.     The  Tribunal  rendered  its main  judgment  in  O.A.No. 206/89 Alok Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. and 61 other O.As in which the facts appear to be common. The other  judgments were passed on the basis of the conclusions arrived in  O.A. No. 206/89 and the connected batch of OAs. Since the  Tribu- nal  has set out only the facts in the case of  Alok  Kurnar (O.A.  No.  206/89) treating it as a  main  application  and illustrative  of  the  questions raised, we  would  like  to briefly indicate the facts of A1ok kumar’s case so that  the impelling  circumstances  which led to the filing  of  these appeals  and  the common questions of law  involved  may  be understood  in  the proper perspective in the light  of  the judgment of the Tribunal.     In  this context, it may be noted that though no  appeal has  been filed against the Order in O.A.No. 206/89, we  are given to understand that Alok Kumar who agitated his similar claim along with two others who were all allocated to  Group ’A’ Services (I.R.P.S.) in O.A.No. 1071/1990 has          59 preferred Civil Appeal No. 5469 of 1990 against the judgment in the said O.A. No. 1072 of 1990.     Shri  Alok Kumar filed his application in December  1986 to sit for the preliminary examination in 1987. The prelimi- nary  examination was held by the Union Public Service  Com- mission  (’UPSC for short’) in June 1987 and the result  was declared  in  July 1987. The C.S.E. (Main)  Examination  was held by the UPSC in November 1987. The interviews took place in’  April 1988 and the final results were declared  by  the UPSC  in June, 1988. The applicant, Alok Kumar was  selected for appointment to Central Service Group ’A’ post. A  commu- nication to this effect was sent to him on 30.8.88 in  which Alok  Kumar’s  attention was drawn to Rule 4 of  the  C.S.E. Rules 1987 pointing out that if he intended to appear in the Civil  Services (Main) Examination in 1988 he would  not  be allowed  to join the Probationary Training, along  with  the candidates  of 1987 group but would only be allowed to  join the  Probationary  Training along with  the  candidates  who would  be appointed on the basis of the CSE 1988.  The  said letter  also indicated that in the matter of  seniority,  he would  be  placed below all the candidates  who  would  join training without postponement. Therefore, he was required to furnish  the  information  about his appearing  in  the  CSE (Main) 1988 to the concerned cadre controlling  authorities. He  was further informed that only on receipt of  the  above information, the concerned cadre controlling authority would permit  him to abstrain from the Probationary Training.  The Joint  Director, Estt. G (R), Ministry of Railways  (Railway Board) informed Alok Kumar about his selection for  appoint- ment  to the Indian Railway Personnel Service and  that  the training  would  commence from 6.3.1989 and that  he  should report for training at the Railway Staff College,  Vadodara. Further he was informed that he once joined the Probationary Training along with 1987 batch, he would not be eligible for

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consideration of appointment on the basis of subsequent  CSE conducted by the UPSC.     The  case  of Alok Kumar was that he did not  intend  to appear  in the next CSE and he had already appeared for  the CSE  1988 even before he received the offer  of  appointment dated 2.1.1989. He was then intimated that if he had already joined  the Probationary Training along with 1987 batch,  he would  not be eligible for consideration for appointment  on the  basis of subsequent CSE conducted by the UPSC.  Besides the main reliefs, Alok Kumar had prayed for an interim order to  join  and  complete the  current  Probationary  Training without being compelled to sign the undertaking sought to be obtained  from him subject to final orders in the  O.A.  The Division Bench  of the Tribunal issued an interim order,  as prayed for by Alok Kumar, allowing him to join the requisite training for 60 the  service to which he had been allocated and allowed  him to appear in the interview as and when he was called by  the UPSC on the basis of 1988 Examination.     The respondents filed their reply explaining the circum- stances  under  which the second proviso was  introduced  to rule 4 of CSE Rules, its scope and ambit and refuted all the intentions raised by Alok Kumar challenging the legality and constitutionality of the impugned proviso.     The Tribunal by its detailed and considered judgment has rendered its conclusions thus:               "Having  considered  the matter in  the  above               bunch of cases, we have come to the  following               conclusions:-               1.  The  2nd proviso to Rule 4  of  the  Civil               Services Examination Rules is valid.               2.  The  provisions of Rule 17  of  the  above               Rules are also valid.               3.  The  above provisions are not hit  by  the               provisions of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitu-               tion of India.               4. The restrictions imposed by the 2nd proviso               to  Rule 4 of the Civil  Services  Examination               Rules are not bad in law.               5.  (i) The letter issued by the  Ministry  of               Personnel,  Public  Grievances  and   Pensions               dated  30th  August, 1988 and  in  particular,               paragraph  3  thereof and paragraph 4  of  the               letter  dated  2.1.1989, issued by  the  Cadre               Controlling  Authority, Ministry  of  Railways               (Railway Board) are held to be bad in law  and               unenforceable.   Similar  letters  issued   on               different  dates  by other  Cadre  controlling               Authorities are also unenforceable.               (ii) A candidate who has been allocated to the               I.P.S. or to a Central Services, Group ’A’ may               be  allowed to sit at the next Civil  Services               Examination, provided he is within the permis-               sible age limit, without having to resign from               the  service to which he has  been  allocated,               nor  would he lose his original  seniority  in               the service to which he is allocated if he  is               unable to take training with his own Batch.               6. Those applicants who have been allcoated to               the I.P.S. or any Central Services, Group ’A’,               can  have one more attempt in  the  subsequent               Civil  Services Examination, for the  Services               in-               61

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             dicated  in rule 17 of the C.S.E.  Rules.  The               Cadre  Controlling Authorities can  grant  one               opportunity to such candidates.               7. All those candidates who have been allocat-               ed to any of the Central Services, Group  ’A’,               or  I.P.S.  and  who have  appeared  in  Civil               Services Main Examination of a subsequent year               under  the interim orders of the Tribunal  for               the  Civil Services Examinations 1988 or  1989               and have succeeded, are to be given benefit of               their  success  subject to the  provisions  of               Rule 17 of the C.S.E. Rules. But this examina-               tion will not be available for any  subsequent               Civil Services Examination.               In  the  result, therefore,  the  Applications               succeed  only in part- viz., quashing  of  the               3rd  paragraph of the letter  dated  30.8.1988               and  4th  paragraph of the  letter  dated  2nd               January,  1989 and similar paragraphs  in  the               letters  issued  to the  applicants  by  other               cadre  controlling  authorities.  Further,   a               direction is given to the respondents that all               those  candidates who have been  allocated  to               any  of  the Central Services,  Group  ’A’  or               I.P.S. and who have appeared in Civil Services               Main  Examination,  1988 or  1989   under  the               interim orders of the Tribunal and are  within               the  permissible age limit and have  succeeded               are  to  be  given benefit  of  their  success               subject  to the provisions of Rule 17  of  the               C.S.E.  Rules. The O.As are dismissed  on  all               other counts."     On the basis of the above directions given in paragraphs 5(ii), 6 and 7, we gave some interim directions on 7.12.1990 which are annexed to this judgment as Annexure ‘A’.     Several  learned  counsel appeared  for  the  respective parties  and  advanced their  submissions  interpreting  the rules and cited a plethora of decisions in support of  their respective  cases. Whilst Mr. P.P. Rao, senior  counsel  as- sisted by Mr. C.N. Sreekumar and others, Mr. Gopal  Subrama- niam,  Mrs. C.M. Chopra, Mr. Gopal Singh and Mr. A.M.  Khan- wilkar appeared for the appellants in the various batches of cases,  the learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr.  Kapil Sibal assisted by Ms Kamini Jaiswal and Mr. CVS Rao appeared on behalf of the respondents/Union of India & Others.     The common substantial questions of law, propounded  and posed for consideration in all the above appeals are:               (1)  Whether the second proviso to Rule  4  of               the  CSE Rules 1986 is invalid for the  reason               that it puts an embargo restricting the candi-               dates  who are seeking to improve their  posi-               tion vis-a-               62               vis their career in Government service?               (2)   Whether the second proviso  under  chal-               lenge  travels beyond the intent of  the  main               rule namely, Rule 4 of the CSE Rules?               (3) Whether the proviso to Rule 17 of the  CSE               Rules is invalid on the ground that it  places               restriction  on candidates who are seeking  to               improve their position vis-a-vis their career?               (4) Whether the said second proviso to Rule  4               of CSE Rules is ultra-vires to clause  (iii-a)               of  Regulation 4 of the Indian  Administrative               Service  (Appointment by Competitive  Examina-

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             tion)  Regulations, 1955 (for  short  ’Regula-               tions’) inasmuch as the power to notify excep-               tions  does  not  include the  power  to  make               candidates ineligible who are otherwise eligi-               ble in terms of clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of               Regulation 4?               (5)  Whether  the  said proviso  which  is  an               administrative  instruction introduced by  the               impugned  Notification is arbitrary and  irra-               tional  having  no nexus with  the  object  of               recruitment to the post of Civil Services?               (6)  Whether  the impugned second  proviso  is               illegal  since it makes a  discrimination  be-               tween  the  successful candidates  of  Central               Service Group ’A’ and Group ’B’ as no  embargo               is placed restricting the candidates of  Group               ’B’  service,  as  in the case  of  Group  ’A’               service  and whether the reasons given by  the               Government to justify the introduction of  the               impugned  proviso have any rational  nexus  to               the object of the scheme of recruitment to the               All India Services or/and whether such reasons               are arbitrary, unfair and unjust?               (7)  Whether  the restriction imposed  on  the               number  of  attempts in pursuance of  the  im-               pugned  proviso,  in  the  case  of  Scheduled               Castes/Scheduled  Tribes candidates  who  were               since  then  availing any number  of  attempts               subject  to  the eligibility of age  limit  is               unjustifiable  and  illegal  and  amounts   to               deprivation of the right conferred on them  by               the Constitution of India?               (8)  Whether the reasons given by the  Govern-               ment  to justify the introduction of  the  im-               pugned proviso have any rational                        63               nexus to the object of the scheme of  recruit-               ment to the All lndia Services or/and  whether               such   reasons  are  arbitrary,   unfair   and               unjust?-               (9)  Whether  the impugned second  proviso  is               suffering from the vice of hostile discrimina-               tion and as such violative of Articles 14  and               16 of the Constitution of India. Recruitment to All India and Central Services - Brief Histo- ry and Present position:     Before  entering  into an  extensive  investigation  and fullfledged discussion on the questions formulated above, we feel that in order to have a more comprehensive study of the development of the civil service in India a brief history of the  past  system of recruitment to All  India  and  Central Services  based on the then existing mode of  selection  and the  development  of the present scheme of  examination  and method of recruitment till the introduction of the  impugned proviso  to rule 4 of CSE Rules, is necessary so as to  have the  background of the entire system and to  assimilate  the compelling necessity warranting the introduction of the  new proviso.     The Indian Civil Service (ICS) Examination was held only in England by the British Civil Service Commission till 1922 and thereafter in India. Four years later, the newly  formed Public  Service Commission (India) began to conduct the  ICS Examination  on behalf of British Civil  Service  Commission and  this  position  continued until 1937  when  the  Public Service  Commission  (India)  was replaced  by  the  Federal

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Public Service Commission under the Government of India Act, 1935.  Thereafter, the Indian Civil Service  Examination  in India  was  held by the Federal  Public  Service  Commission independent  of the British Civil Service Commission.  After 1943,  recruitments  to  the Indian  Civil  Service,  Indian Police  besides  the Indian Audit and Accounts  Service  and allied services were suspended. In 1947 a combined  examina- tion  was introduced for recruitment to the Indian  Adminis- trative  Service,  Indian Police Service  and  non-technical Central  Services.  Between  the years  1947-50  a  combined competitive examination was held once a year for recruitment for IAS, IFS, IPS and non-technical Central Services.  After independence,  new services known as the Indian  Administra- tive  Services  (IAS) and Indian Police Service  (IPS)  were established  as  All India Services. In order  to  meet  the country’s  requirement  for  diplomatic  personnel   another service  known  as Indian Foreign Service (IFS)  was  estab- lished. The Service Commission was redesignated as the Union Public Service Commission in 1950 when the Constitution came into force. 64     While  it was so, the U.P.S.C. appointed a Committee  in February 1974 under the chairmanship of Dr. D.S. Kothari  to make  recommendations for further improvement in the  system having  regard to the needs of various services and  accord- ingly  the said Committee undertook a  painstaking  research and  carried  on a comprehensive and  analytical  study  and thorough examination of the various aspects of the  problems connected  with the reform in the existing  examination  and selection  by going in great depth and detail and  submitted its report on March 20, 1976 after taking into consideration of  the  fact  of frequent receipt of  complaints  from  the training centres and the data collected and made its  recom- mendations  in  evaluating the scheme of civil  services  by tracing  its  birth and breadth of the upper  tier  of  this administrative machinery covering its entire field.     On  the  recommendations of the  Kothari  Committee  the current scheme of Civil Services Examination was  introduced from  1979,  as  per which the  Civil  Services  Examination conducted  by the U.P.S.C. has been and is catering  to  the All  India  Services viz. IAS, IFS and IPS; and  16  Central Group ’A’ Services and 8 Group ’B’ Services.     In order to be eligible to compete at the examination, a candidate must satisfy the conditions of eligibility,  name- ly, nationality, age and requisite qualifications as  envis- aged  under  Regulation  4 of  the  I.A.S.  (Appointment  by Competitive Examination) Regulation 1955. In addition to the above  qualifications, one more condition of eligibility  is added under Regulation 4 (iii-a) substituted vide Department of Personnel and A.R. notification No. 11028/1/78-A1S (1)--A dated  30.12.1978, according to which unless covered by  any of the exceptions that may from time to time be notified  by the  Central  Government  in this  behalf,  every  candidate appearing  for the examination after 1st January, 1979,  who is  otherwise eligible shall be permitted three attempts  at the  examination. In other words, the number of attempts,  a candidate can appear, is also made as one of the  conditions of  eligibility to sit for the IAS competitive  examination. It  may be pointed out in this connection that by  a  subse- quent  notification dated 23.11.1981, Regulation  4  (iii-a) was further clarified that the appearance of a candidate  at the  examination  will  be deemed to be an  attempt  at  the examination irrespective of his disqualification or  cancel- lation as the case may be of his candidature. An explanation is  added to this, explaining "an attempt at  a  preliminary

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examination shall be deemed to be an attempt at the examina- tion, within the meaning of this rule". 65 Civil Services Examination - Present Scheme     From  the CSE held in 1979, each eligible  candidate  is permitted  three attempts at the examination. This  restric- tion on the number of attempts does not apply to the  candi- dates  belonging to SC/ST and other specified categories  as may be notified by the Central Government from time to  time under Rule 6(b) of the CSE Rules but subject to the  relaxa- tion in the upper age limit of those candidates. The  scheme of  selection of candidates for the Civil Services  consists of  three sequential stages, each making a  significant  and specific contribution to the total process. They are:                (1)  Preliminary  examination  serving  as  a               screening test;                (2)  The main examination which  intended  to               assess  the  overall intellectual  traits  and               depth of understanding of candidates; and               (3) The interview (viva voce test).     Hermer  Finer  in his text book under the  caption.  The Theory and Practice of Modern Government states:               "The  problem  of selection for  character  is               still the pons asinorum of recruitment to  the               public services everywhere. The British  Civil               Service experiments with the interview."     The purpose of viva-voce test for the ICS Examination in 1935 could be best understood from the following extract  of the Civil Service Commission’s pamphlet:               "Viva-voce  - the examination will be in  mat-               ters  of general interest; it is  intended  to               test  the candidate’s alertness,  intelligence               and  intellectual outlook. The candidate  will               be  accorded an opportunity of furnishing  the               record of his life and education ."     It is apposite, in this connection, to have reference to an excerpt from the United Nations Handbook on Civil Service Laws and Practice, which reads thus:               "  ....  the written papers permit an  assess-               ment  of culture and intellectual  competence.               This interview permits an assessment of quali-               ties of character which written papers ignore;               it attempts to assess the man himself and  not               his intellectual abilities." 66     This  Court in Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan and  Oth- ers,  [1981] 4, SCC 159 while expressing its view about  the importance  and significance of the two tests,  namely,  the written and interview has observed thus:               "The  written  examination  assess  the  man’s               intellect  and  the  interview  test  the  man               himself  and  ’the  twain shall  meet’  for  a               proper selection". AGE LIMIT     Coming to the eligibility of age, it was initially fixed at  21  to  26 years and then reduced in 1948 to  21  to  25 years.  In  the following year, the age  range  was  further reduced  to  21 to 24 years except for  the  Indian  Railway Traffic Service for which it continued to be 21 to 25  years upto  1955.  The lower age limit for IPS was reduced  to  20 years  in  the year 1951 keeping the upper age limit  at  24 years.  The upper age limit for the Indian  Railway  Traffic Service  was reduced to 24 in 1955. The age limits  for  all other  services  remained  at 21 to  24  years.  Thereafter, though  the Public Services (Qualification for  Recruitment)

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Committee  appointed  by  the Government of  India  in  1955 recommended  the  reduction of the age range from  21-24  to 21-23  years, the Government did not agree with that  recom- mendation  and kept the prescribed age limit of 20/21 to  24 years  unaltered. The Kothari Committee recommended  that  a candidate  should not be less than 21 years of age  and  not more than 26 years on the 1st July of the year in which  the candidate appears at the examination, with the usual relaxa- tion  of upper age limit for SC/ST and other  categories  as may be notified by the Government from time to time.  Howev- er,  the Committee did not recommend lower age limit  of  20 years  for the IPS, as was permitted. The  Government  while not completely agreeing with Kothari’s Committee recommenda- tions in regard to some aspects inclusive of age limit while implementing the recommendations, increased upper age  limit to  28 years keeping the lower age limit of 21  years  unal- tered.  Thus, the age limit of 21-28 years was in  operation from  1979 to 1987. Then the Government  re-considered  this issue  and reduced the upper age limit to 26  years.  During the  course  of the hearing of these appeals,  it  has  been stated   at  the  bar  that  the  Government  of  India   in February/March 1990 amended the CSE Rules and increased  the upper age limit from 26 years to 28 and then to 31 years for the CSE to be conducted by the UPSC. Now by notification No. 13018/10/90-AIS  (I) dated 5th January 1991, issued  by  the Ministry  of  Personnel,  Public  Grievances  and   Pensions (Deptt. of Personnel and Training) published in the  Gazette of India in Part I, Sec. I the age eligibility for appearing at  the examination in 1991 is that the candidate must  have attained the age of 21        67 years and must not have attained 28 years on 1st August 1991 i.e.  he  must have been born not earlier than  2nd  August, 1963 and not later than 1st August, 1970 but subject to  the relaxation in the upper age limit to SC/ST and other catego- ries specified under Rule 6(b) of the CSE Rules. Number of Permissible Attempts     Regarding  the  number of attempts,  a  candidate  could make,  the Public Services (Qualifications for  Recruitment) Committee in 1955 recommended that in order to identify  the best  candidates  the  number of attempts  at  the  combined examination  should  be limited to two by reducing  the  age limit to 21-23 years. The Government accepted the  recommen- dation  regarding restriction of the number of  attempts  to two  instead  of three, but provided that these were  to  be counted separately for the following categories of services               Category I - IAS and IFS               Category II - IPS and Police Service Class  II               of the Union Territories               Category  III - Central Services Class  I  and               Class II     In view of the acceptance of the above  recommendations, from 1961 onwards, the IAS etc. examination became in effect three  examinations. Since the restriction on the number  of chances were related not to the examination as a whole,  but individual categories, theoretically a candidate could  take as many chances as the age limit would permit. Thereafter in 1972 the age limit was raised to 26 years and the  reduction of attempts from three to two was not implemented  following the  recommendations of the Administrative  Reforms  Commis- sion. In fact since 1973, candidates were permitted to  make three attempts for each of the three categories of  services within  the permissible age range. It may be stated in  this connection  that the Kothari Committee had recommended  only two attempts for the Civil Services Examination for not only

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the general candidates but also candidates belonging to  the SC/ST but the Government did not agree with these  recommen- dations  and permitted three attempts to general  candidates and did not impose any restriction on the number of attempts on the candidates belonging to SC/ST but of course,  subject to  their  upper age limit. It will be worthwhile,  in  this context,  to refer to the Report of the Committee to  review the Scheme of Civil Services Examination under the 68 chairmanship of Dr. Satish Chandra, appointed by the UPSC on 12.9.1988 to review and evaluate the scheme of selection  to the higher civil services introduced from 1979 in  pursuance of  the  recommendations  of the  Committee  on  Recruitment Policy  and  Selection under the Chairmanship  of  Dr.  D.S. Kothari and to make recommendations for further  improvement of the system and the relevant excerpt of the report  touch- ing on this aspect is as follows:-               "We, therefore, recommend that for the general               candidates the permissible number of  attempts               for  the  Civil  Services  Examination  should               continue  to be three. For the members of  the               Scheduled  Castes  and the  Scheduled  tribes,               these should be limited to six."     We are referring to the report of the committee  chaired by  Dr. Satish Chandra only for the purpose of  showing  the views  expressed by it regarding the permissible  number  of attempts for the CSE that a candidate could make though this report was not available at the time of introduction of  the impugned  proviso. It may be stated that the  Government  of India has decided to increase the number of attempts from  3 to 4 for the Civil Services Examination 1990. Reference  may also  be  made to the notification dated 5th  January,  1991 issued by the Department of Personnel and Training by  which Rule  4  was  amended  to the  fact  that  "every  candidate appearing at the examination who is otherwise eligible shall be permitted attempts at the examination." Salient Features of the New Scheme:     Thus, the entire framework of the Civil services  system have  under  gone a metamorphosis under  the  Government  of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 and thereafter under our present Constitution of India. Further, pursuant to the  recommenda- tions  made by various Committees as seen earlier there  has been radical change in the system of recruitment to the  CSE regard to the scheme of examination, mode of selection,  the number  of attempts and the eligibility of age  limit  since such a system was introduced     It is clear from the discussion that the totality of the above  review on the entire system which system is a  legacy of and modelled on the Bri one and a comprehensive survey on the  different  aspects of the recruitment  for  the  higher civil  services  manifestly show that this  system  did  not appear  suddenly  like a ’dues ex machina’  created  by  the legislative test, but 69 evolved in the direction of political objectivity and under- went  a long process of gradual transformation and the  role and  functions of this higher civil services in India  after the  advent of independence irrefragably play  an  important and crucial role not only in providing an element of common- ality  in administration in our parliamentary democracy  but also  in  accelerating  socio-economic  development  of  our country  in the context of our constitutional  objective  of growth with the social justice.     The present time cycle of the CSE is such that it  takes almost  a year from the date of the preliminary  examination

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to the commencement of the final results in that the prelim- inary  examination  is  held in the month of  June  and  the result  of the preliminary examination is announced  by  the UPSC at the end of July. The Main examination is held in the first  week  of  November, the result of  which  is  usually announced  by  the third week of March  and  the  interviews begin  in the third week of April to the end of May and  the results are announced in the month of June.     The  merit list of successful candidates is prepared  on the  basis of their aggregate marks in the Main  Examination and  interview test and then the successful  candidates  are selected  and allotted to different services based on  their ranks and preference. The top rankers in the merit list join the IAS or IFS and then the IPS. The candidates who get into the merit list with low position are brought and  classified either under Group ’A’ or Group ’B’ as the case may be,  but having  regard to their ranks in the order of merit and  the selection  of candidates in Group ’A’ or Group ’B’ is  based within the zone of eligibility.     It may be noted that out of total 27 services/posts,  as per notification dated 30.12.1989, the first three,  namely, IAS,  IFS and IPS are All India Services. Of the rest,  from IV  to XIX are Central Services Group ’A’ and the  remaining XX to XXVII are Group ’B’ services. For all these  services, the recruitment is made by combined competitive CSE.     Since the pleadings in all the appeals are substantially of  the same paradigm and the issues of considerable  impor- tance raised are homogeneous and as the principal  arguments were  advanced  in  the same line except  with  some  slight variation with regard to some particular issues relating  to certain  appeals  and also the reply was commonly  made,  we propose  to dispose of all the appeals by this common  judg- ment. 70     We may now in the above background of the history of the scheme  of the Civil Services, proceed to consider the  var- ious  contentions advanced by the respective parties on  the validity  of  the impugned second proviso to Rule 4  of  the C.S.E.  Rules  and for that purpose we, in order to  have  a proper understanding and appreciation of the scope,  object, ambit  and intent of the impugned proviso, shall  re-produce the  relevant Rules 4, 8 and 17 and Regulation  4(iii-a)  of the I.A.S. (Appointment by Competitive Examination)  Regula- tions, 1955. CSE RULES               Rule  4:  "Every candidate  appearing  at  the               examination, who is otherwise eligible,  shall               be  permitted three attempts at  the  examina-               tion,  irrespective of the number of  attempts               he  has  already availed of at  the  IAS  etc.               Examination  held  in previous year.  The  re-               striction  shall be effective from  the  Civil               Services  Examination  held in 1979.  Any  at-               tempts  made at the Civil  Services  (Prelimi-               nary)  Examination  held in 1979  and  onwards               will count as attempts for this purpose:               Provided  that this restriction on the  number               of  attempts  will not apply in  the  case  of               Scheduled  Castes and Scheduled Tribes  candi-               dates who are otherwise eligible:               Provided  further that a candidate who on  the               basis  of  the results of the  previous  Civil               Services  Examination, had been  allocated  to               the I.P.S. or Central Services, Group ’A’  but               who  expressed his intention to appear in  the

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             next  Civil  Services  Main  Examination   for               competing  for IAS, IFS, IPS or Central  Serv-               ices,  Group  ’A’  and who  was  permitted  to               abstain  from  the  probationary  training  in               order  to so appear, shall be eligible  to  do               so,  subject to the provisions of Rule 17.  If               the candidate is allocated to a service on the               basis of the next Civil Services Main Examina-               tion he shall join either that Service or  the               Service to which he was allocated on the basis               of  the  previous Civil  Services  Examination               failing  which his allocation to  the  service               based on one or both examination, as the  case               may  be,  shall stand cancelled  and  notwith-               standing  anything  contained  in  Rule  8,  a               candidate who accepts allocation to a  Service               and  is  appointed to a service shall  not  be               eligible to appear again in the Civil Services               Examination unless he has first resigned  from               the Service.               71               NOTE:-               1.  An  attempt at a  preliminary  examination               shall be deemed to be in attempt of the Exami-               nation.               2. If a candidate actually appears in any  one               paper in the preliminary Examination he  shall               be  deemed  to  have made an  attempt  at  the               examination.               3.  Notwithstanding the  disqualification/can-               cellation  of candidature the fact of  appear-               ance of the candidate at the examination  will               count as an attempt.               Rule  8: A candidate who is appointed  to  the               Indian  Administrative Service or  the  Indian               Foreign  Service  on  results  of  an  earlier               examination  before the commencement  of  this               examination  and continues to be a  member  of               that  service will not be eligible to  compete               at this examination.               In case a candidate has been appointed to  the               IAS/IFS  after the Preliminary Examination  of               this examination but before the Main  Examina-               tion of this examination and he/she shall also               not be eligible to appear in the Main Examina-               tion of this examination notwithstanding  that               he/she has qualified in the Preliminary Exami-               nation.               Also provided that if a candidate is appointed               to IAS/IFS after the commencement of the  Main               Examination but before the result thereof  and               continues  to  be a member  of  that  service,               he/she shall not be considered for appointment               to  any service/post on the basis of  the  re-               sults of this examination.               Rule  17: Due consideration will be  given  at               the time of making appointments on the results               of  the  examination to  the  preferences  ex-               pressed by a candidate for various services at               the  time of his application. The  appointment               to  various services will also be governed  by               the  Rules/Regulations in force as  applicable               to  the  respective Services at  the  time  of               appointment.               72

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             Provided  that  a candidate who has  been  ap-               proved for appointment to Indian Police  Serv-               ice/Central  Service, Group ’A’  mentioned  in               Col.  2  below on the results  of  an  earlier               examination  will be considered only  for  ap-               pointment  in services mentioned against  that               service in Col. 3 below on the results of this               examination. SI.   Service to which approved      Service  for  which No.   for appointment                eligible to compete 1           2                              3 1.   Indian Police Service.        I.A.S.,  I.F.S.,  and                                    Central Services, Group 2.  Central Services, Group ’A’    I.A.S.,I.F.S. and I.P.S.               Provided  further  that  a  candidate  who  is               appointed  to a Central Service, Group ’B’  on               the results of an earlier examination will  be               considered  only  for appointment  to  I.A.S.,               I.F.S.,  I.P.S.  and Central  Services,  Group               ’A’.               IAS  (Appointment by Competitive  Examination)               Regulations, 1955                Regulation 4:                Conditions of Eligibility: -               In  order  to be eligible to  compete  at  the               examination,  a  candidate  must  satisfy  the               following conditions, namely:-               (i)   Nationality.........................               (ii)  Age  ................................               (iii) Educational Qualifications...........                (iii-a) Attempts at the examination -  Unless               covered by any of the exceptions that may from               time  to time be notified by the Central  Gov-               ernment  in this behalf, every  candidate  ap-               pearing for the examination after 1st  January               1979,  who  is otherwise  eligible,  shall  be               permitted three attempts at the examination;.                      73               and  the  appearance  of a  candidate  at  the               examination will be deemed to be an attempt at               the examination irrespective of his  disquali-               fication or cancellation, as the case may  be,               of his candidature.               Explanation  -  An attempt  at  a  preliminary               examination  shall be deemed to be an  attempt               at the examination, within the meaning of this               rule.               Reg. questions 1 to 6:    At the threshold we will take up the main question  about the  validity of the second proviso to Rule 4 of the  C.S.E. Rules  of  1986, which proviso is an additional one  to  the first  proviso to Rule No. 4 and which applies only  to  the I.P.S and Central Services, Group ’A’ selectees. This provi- so consists of two parts of which the first part  enumerates certain  conditions  on the fulfillment of which  alone,  an allottee to IPS or Central Services  Group ’A’ on the  basis of  the results of the previous CSE will become eligible  to re-appear  in  the next CSE (Main) to improve  his  prospect with  the  hope  of getting better position  next  year  and joining in one of the more preferred services, namely,  IAS, IFS, IPS or Central Services Group ’A’ subject to the condi- tions, enumerated in Rule 17 of CSE Rules.     As  per the first part of the proviso, the  prerequisite conditions which are sine qua non are as follows:               A Candidate who on the basis of the results of

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             the previous CSE;               i)  should have been allocated to the  IPS  or               Central Services Group ’A’;               ii)  The said candidate should have  expressed               his  intention  to appear in  the  next  Civil               Service  Main  Examination for  competing  for               IAS,  IFS, IPS or Central Services  Group  ’A’               subject to the provisions of Rule 17; iii) The               said  candidate should have been permitted  to               abstain  from  the  Probationary  Training  in               order to so appear. The  conditions  in the second part of the  proviso  are  as follows:               1) If a candidate (who is permitted to  appear               in  the next CSE (Main) on fulfillment of  the               conditions,  enumerated in the first  part  of               this proviso) is allocated to a service on the               basis of the next Civil Service (Main)  Exami-               nation, he should either join               74               that  service or the service to which  he  has               already  been  allocated on the basis  of  the               previous CSE;               2)  If the candidate fails to join  either  of               the services as mentioned in the first  condi-               tion  of this second part then his  allocation               to  the service based on one or both  examina-               tions,  as the case may be, shall  stand  can-               celled; and               3) Notwithstanding anything contained in  Rule               8,  a candidate a) who accepts  allocation  to               the  service  and  b) who is  appointed  to  a               service shall not be eligible to appear  again               in  CSE unless he has first resigned from  the               service.     The  sum  and substance of the above proviso is  that  a candidate who has already been allocated to the  IPS/Central Services Group ’A’ and who in order to improve his  efficacy of  selection to higher civil service, expresses his  inten- tion to appear in the next CSE (Main) for competing for IAS, IFS,  IPS  or Central Services Group ’A’ and  who  has  been permitted to abstain from the Probationary Training in order to  do  so, will become eligible to appear in the  next  CSE (Main)  but subject to the provisions of Rule 17,  and  that the said candidate when allocated to a service on the  basis of  the  next Civil Services (Main) Examination  can  either join  that  service or the service to which he  has  already been allocated on the basis of the previous CSE and that  if he  fails  to join either of the  services,  his  allocation based  on one or both the examinations, as the case may  be, will  stand  cancelled.  Further,  notwithstanding  anything contained in Rule 8, a candidate who accepts allocation to a service and is appointed to that service shall not be eligi- ble to appear again in the CSE unless he has first  resigned from the service. In other words, a candidate failing within the ambit of this proviso can appear in the CSE for all  the permitted attempts subject to his age limit if he intends to appear  again in the CSE provided he first resigns from  the service  which he accepts on allocation and to which  he  is appointed. The restriction/embargo contained in Rule 17  is, if a candidate has been approved for appointment to IPS, and expresses  his  intention to appear in the  CSE  (Main)  for higher civil service, the services for which he is  eligible to  compete  are IAS, IFS and Central  Services  Group  ’A’. Similarly, a candidate who has been approved for appointment

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to  the Central Services Group ’A’ and expresses his  inten- tion to appear in the next CSE (Main), the services to which he  will be eligible to compete are IAS, IFS and  IPS.   The second  proviso to Rule 17 provides that a candidate who  is appointed to a Central Services Group ’B’ on the results  of an earlier examination will be considered for appointment to IAS, IFS,           75 IPS and Central Services Group ’A’.     The  impugned second proviso to Rule 4, as we  have  al- ready pointed out, has  been introduced by notification  No. 13016/4/86-AIS (I) dated 13.12.1986.               The   circumstances  which  necessitated   and               compelled the introduction of the above second               ’proviso to Rule 4 was due to the receipts  of               various  representations  and  frequent   com-               plaints from the Academies and Training Insti-               tutes  by  the Government informing  that  the               candidates who, taking advantage of the oppor-               tunity of mobility from one service to  anoth-               er,  were intending to appear in the next  CSE               (Main)  in the hope of getting a better  posi-               tion  and  in a more  preferred  service  were               neglecting their required training  programmes               whereunder  they  had to  undergo  specialised               training  and acquire the necessary  potential               to perform their tasks in the service to which               they have been allocated and for which  train-               ing,  the Government incurs huge  expenditure.               Therefore, the Government in order to overcome               the problem of indiscipline amongst the proba-               tioners  undergoing  training,  requested  the               kothari  committee for making a  comprehensive               survey  on  the different aspects of  the  re-               cruitment  scheme and to submit a report  with               its recommendations on the recruitment  policy               and  selection methods so that the  candidates               who  are selected and allocated to  a  service               and  sent  for training may  not  take  enmass               leave for preparing and appearing in the  next               CSE  by  neglecting  and  pretermitting  their               training  programmes  and thereby  creating  a               vacuum  in the service for considerable  time.               The  said  kothari  committee,  after   deeply               examining this serious problem, submitted  its               report,  the  relevant  part of  which  is  as               follows:               "3.59.  It  may further be observed  that  the               existing system which permits that  candidates               qualifying  for and joining the police or  the               Central  Services, may appear the Civil  Serv-               ices  Examination  to  improve  their   career               opportunities, has come in for serious  criti-               cism from the National Academy of  Administra-               tion and the respective employing departments.               They  complain that such probationers  neglect               their  training  at both the Academy  and  the               Departmental Training Institutions until  they               exhaust the admissible number of chances.                3.60.  The present practice obviously is  not               desirable.  The               76               number of such cases would be very small  with               the  proposed restriction on the total  number               of attempts permitted to a candidate. Even so,

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             we think it wrong that the very first thing  a               young  person  should do  in  entering  public               service  is to ignore his obligations  to  the               service concerned, and instead spend his  time               and energy in preparation for re-appearing  at               the UPSC examination to improve his  prospect.               This sets a bad example and should be discour-               aged.  We recommend that commencing  from  the               1977 examination candidates once appointed  to               the  All India or Central Services  (Class  I)               should  not  be permitted to  re-appear  at  a               subsequent examination without resigning  from               service.  (On introduction of Phase II of  the               Civil Services Examination Scheme,  candidates               joining  the  Foundation Course  will  not  be               permitted  to re-appear at the  Main  Examina-               tion.)’’     The Thirteenth Report of the Estimates Committee  (1985- 86)  also submitted its report on this aspect of the  matter observing:               "The  committee  urge upon the  Government  to               review  their decision regarding allowing  the               probationers to reappear in the Civil Services               Examination to improve their prospects. If  it               is  still considered necessary to allow  this,               the  Committee suggest that it may be  limited               to  only  one chance after a person  enters  a               Civil service."     The Central Government after considering the recommenda- tions of the above Committees regarding allowing  probation- ers  allocated to Civil Services to appear in the  next  CSE (Main),  addressed the UPSC to initiate a review of the  new system  of  CSE in pursuance of the recommendations  of  the Estimates  Committee  and-thereafter, a meeting of  all  the cadre controlling authorities was convened by the Government and  based on the consensus arrived at the meeting, Rules  4 and 17 of the Civil Services Examination Rules were  amended by inserting the new provisos.     In this regard, it will be worthwhile to refer to  Arti- cle 51-A in Part IV-A under the caption ’Fundamental Duties’ added  by  the Constitution (42nd Amendment)  Act,  1976  in accordance  with  the recommendations of  the  Swaran  Singh Committee.  The said Article contains a mandate of the  Con- stitution  that  it shall be the duty of  every  citizen  of India  to do the various things specified in Clauses (a)  to (j)  of  which clause (j) commands that it is  the  duty  of every  citizen of India to strive towards excellence in  all spheres  of individual and collective activity so  that  the nation  constantly rises to higher levels of  endeavour  and achievement." 77     In  our  view,  the effort taken by  the  Government  in giving  utmost importance to the training programme  of  the selectees  so that this higher civil service being  the  top most  service  of  the country is not wasted  and  does  not become fruitless during the training period is in consonance with the provisions of Article 51-A (j).     The  Constitution  of  India has laid  down  some  basic principles relating to public services in Part XIV  entitled ’Services  under  the  Union and the State’  which  has  two Chapters,  namely chapter I on "Services" covering  Articles 308  to  314  of which Article 314 is now  repealed  by  the Twentyeighth  Amendment Act, 1972 and Chapter II on  "Public Service  Commissions" covering Articles 315 to 323. We  feel that  it  is not necessary to deal with  the  constitutional

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provisions  relating  to the executive power  of  the  Union under  Article 53 of the Constitution or the extent  of  the executive power of the Union under Article 73 of the Consti- tution  or recruitment and condition of service  of  persons serving the Union or the State as contemplated under Article 309 of the Constitution of India since it is not the case of the  appellants that either the introduction of the  proviso is in violation of any of the provisions of the constitution or  the proviso suffers for want of jurisdiction or  by  im- proper  and  irregular exercise of  jurisdiction.   However, incidentally  Mrs. Chopra urged that the second  proviso  is bad since the authorities have stepped out of the  constitu- tional  limits  in issuing the  notification  inserting  the impugned proviso and that it has not been placed before  the Houses  of the Parliament.  This argument has to  be  simply mentioned to be rejected because the proviso has been intro- duced  by the Central Executive Authority under  the  powers flowing from Article 73 (1) (a) of the Constitution, accord- ing to which the executive power of the Union subject to the provisions  of the Constitution shall extend to the  matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws, but of course subject to the proviso made thereunder and further this  submission  casually made was  neither  amplified  nor pursued.  Needless  to point out that whilst  by  virtue  of clause 1 (a) of Article 73, the Union executive whose  power which is co-extensive with the legislative power of  Parlia- ment  can make laws on matters enumerated in List  I  (Union List) and List II (Concurrent List) to the Seventh  Schedule of the Constitution, under Article 162 of the  Constitution, the  executive  power of the State executive  which  is  co- extensive  with that of the State legislature can make  laws in  respect of matters enumerated in List III  (State  List) and  also in respect of matters enumerated in List II  (Con- current  List), subject to the provisions of  the  Constitu- tion.  In the present case, the central executive  authority has not either expressly or impliedly changed the policy  of the  Government  by exercising  unreasonable  and  arbitrary discretion and the present Rule 4 78 with  its  newly added second proviso does  not  repeal  the essential  features  of  the pre-existing Rule  4  but  only limits  the ambit of the operation of Rule 4 under  a  given situation.  Hence, there is no substance in contending  that the  second  proviso is bad and that the  central  executive authority has transgressed the constitutional limits.                  However, the validity of second proviso  the               Rule 4 is challenged on Constitution about  is               violative  of Article 14 ground that which  we               will deal at the later part of the judgment.                    We feel that it would be appropriate,  in               this  context, to recall the  observations  of               this Court in L.I.C. of India v. Escorts Ltd.,               AIR  1986 SC 1370 at page 1403 = [1986] 1  SCC               264. The observation reads thus:               "When  construing  statutes  enacted  in   the               national interest, we have necessarily to take               the  broad factual situations contemplated  by               the Act and interpret its provisions so as  to               advance  and  not  to  thwart  the  particular               national  interest whose advancement  is  pro-               posed by the legislation."     In  the  above background, we shall now  advert  to  the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants.     Mr.  P.P. Rao, senior counsel appearing for  the  appel- lants  forcibly  and  fervently contended  that  the  second

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proviso  to  rule 4 of the impugned notification  is  ultra- vires  clause  (iii-a) of Regulation 4 of  the  Regulations, 1955  inasmuch  as the power to notify exceptions  does  not include the power to make ineligible the candidates who  are "otherwise eligible" in terms of Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Regulation 4.  In other words, all candidates, who satis- fy  the  requirements of nationality,  age  and  educational qualifications prescribed in clauses (i) to (iii) of Regula- tion  4,  are  entitled to the maximum  number  of  attempts prescribed  in  clause  (iii-a) which  initially  was  three attempts,  since raised to four attempts w.e.f.  1.2.90.  He further submits that the expression ’in this behalf’ appear- ing in the said clause (iii-a) refers only to the number  of attempts  of  candidates  otherwise  eligible  in  terms  of clauses  (i) to (iii) of Regulation 4 and that  the  obvious intention in conferring the power on the Central  Government to  ’notify exceptions ’in his behalf of candidates  ’other- wise eligible’ was to enable the Government to increase  the number  of attempts in deserving cases, such as-  candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other weaker  sections including physically  handicapped  category and that consequently the Central Government has no power to add  more conditions of eligibility to those  stipulated  in Regulation 4 itself. 79 According to him, the second part of the impugned proviso to Rule  4 of CSE Rules which insists that a candidate who  was permitted to abstain from probationary training in order  to appear at the next Civil Services (Main) Examination and who accepted  the  allocation to a service subsequently  and  is appointed  to the service "shall not be eligible  to  appear again  in  the CSE (Main) unless he first resigns  from  the Service  and in other words it declares a candidate, who  is otherwise  eligible in terms of Regulation 4  as  ineligible unless  he first resigns from the service.  This  additional condition  of  eligibility,  according to  him,  is  clearly beyond the, scope of the limited power to notify  exceptions to  the number of attempts prescribed and, therefore  ultra- vires Regulation 4 (iii-a).     Mr. Kapil Sibal, the Learned Additional Solicitor Gener- al  presented a plausible argument countering the  pleadings of  Mr.  P.P. Rao and drew our attention to Rule  7  of  IAS (Recruitment) Rules of 1954 which deals with the recruitment by  competitive examination, and sub-rule (2)  which  states that an examination, namely, the competitive examination for recruitment to the service shall be conducted by the Commis- sion  in  accordance with such regulations  as  the  Central Government  may from time to time make in consultation  with the Commission and State Governments. According to him,  the permissible number of attempts that a candidate can avail is also a condition of eligibility because the object is for  a dual  purpose,  namely, ’to get the best and to  retain  the best’,  and  that Regulation 4 (iii-a) should be  read  with Rule 4 of CSE as its part. He continues to state that  under Article 73 of the Constitution, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Central Government in exercise of  its executive  power can regulate the manner in which the  right of a candidate in appearing for the competitive  examination is  to be exercised and, therefore, the restriction  imposed in  the second proviso to Rule 4 of CSE Rules is in  no  way ultra-vires  clause (iii-a) of Regulation 4 of  Regulations, 1955.     The  source  of  power for the  Central  Government  for making rules and regulations for ’Recruitment and the Condi- tions  of Services of Persons appointed to All  India  Serv-

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ices’  in consultations with the Government of  States  con- cerned  as well making regulation under or in  pursuance  of any  such right is derived from Section 3 of the  All  India Services Act, 1951.     The Regulations, 1955 were made by Central Government in pursuance  of rule 7 of IAS (Recruitment) Rules of  1954  in consultation with the State Governments and the Union Public Service  Commission.  Clause  (iii-a) of  Regulation  4  was substituted vide Department of Personnel A & R  Notification No.  11028/1/78/AIS dated 13.12.1978 and the latter part  of which  by  another  notification dated  23.11.1988.  We  are concerned only 80 with the earlier part of the said clause as per which unless covered by any of the exceptions that may from time to  time be notified by the Central Government, in this behalf, every candidate  appearing for the examination after  1st  January 1979,  who is otherwise eligible, shall be  permitted  three attempts  at  the  examination. If Rule 4 of  CSE  Rules  is examined in juxtaposition of clause (iii-a) of Regulation 4, it is clear that both rule 4 of CSE Rules and Clause (iii-a) of  the  Regulation  4 show that  every  eligible  candidate appearing  at the CSE should be permitted three attempts  at the examination. As we have pointed out in the earlier  part of this judgment, the attempts are now increased to 4  under Rule  4  of the CSE Rules.This increase of attempts  by  the Government  is  by  virtue of its power  which  flows  under Article 73 of the Constitution of India. The eligibility  of a candidate to appear in the CSE with regard to nationality, age  and educational qualifications is given  under  clauses (i) to (iii) of Regulation 4 but the Government by  exercise of  its  executive power has  imposed  certain  restrictions under  some  specified  circumstances. Even  today,  in  the normal  course, every eligible candidate can appear  in  the examination  for  all the permissible attempts and  the  re- striction  of  attempts is not applicable in   the  case  of SC/ST who are otherwise eligible but subject to their  upper age limit. A plain and grammatical reading of clause (iii-a) of  Regulation  shows  that if the number  of  attempts  are covered  by any of the exception that may from time to  time be  notified by the Central Government in the  behalf,  then the notification will become enforceable and only in the ab- sence  of  such notification, every candidate  normally  can appear  for all the   permitted attempts at the  examination whether three or four.  The impugned second proviso does not restrict or put an embargo on the number of attempts in  the normal  course.   But  the  restriction  is  only  when  the conditions enumerated in the impugned proviso are satisfied. In  order  to    appreciate and understand  the  restriction imposed,  in its proper perspective, we shall refer to  cer- tain  decisions  of this Court cited by  both  the  parties, firstly with reference to the interpretation of statutes and second  with  regard  to the construction of  a  proviso  in relation  to the subject matter covered by the  section/rule to which the proviso is appended. Before  we cogitate and analyse this bone of  contention  in some  detail,  it will be convenient at this stage  to  pore over  some  of the well established  rules  of  construction which  would  assist  us  to  steer  clear  of  the  impasse entertained  by the learned counsel, according to whom  some complications are created by the impugned notification being ultra-vires clause   (iii-a) of Regulation 4 of Regulations, 1955.                      Maxwell   on  the  "Interpretation   of               Statutes" 10th Edition page 7 states thus:

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                        "   ...........  if the  choice  is               between two interpretations, the nar-                      81               rower  of  which  would fail  to  achieve  the               manifest purpose of the legislation, we should               avoid  a construction which would  reduce  the               legislation  to  futility  and  should  rather               accept  the bolder construction based  on  the               view that Parliament would legislate only  for               the  purpose  of bringing about  an  effective               result."     In  "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" by  Justice G.P.  Singh,  4th Edition (1988) at page 18,  it  is  stated thus:               "it is a rule now firmly established that  the               intention of the legislature must be found  by               reading the statute as a whole".               It  is  said in "Craies on  Statute  Law,  5th               Edition" as follows:               "Manifest  absurdity  or  futility,   palpable               injustice, or absurd inconvenience or  anomaly               to be avoided."     In  the  same  text book, 6th Edition at  page  89,  the following passage is found:               "The argument from inconvenience and  hardship               is  a dangerous one and is only admissible  in               construction where the meaning of the  statute               is  obscure and there are alternative  methods               of constructions."     Viscount  Simon in King Emperor v. Benoari  Lal  Sharma, AIR 1945 C 48 has said thus:               "In construing enacted words, the Court is not               concerned with the policy involved or with the               results,  injurious  or otherwise,  which  may               follow  from  giving effect  to  the  language               used."     In Wardurton v. Loveland, [1832] 2 D & CH. (H.L.)480  at 489, it is observed that:               "Where  the  Language of an Act is  Clear  and               explicit,  we must give effect to it  whatever               may  be the consequences for in that case  the               words  of the statute speak the  intention  of               the legislature".               82               See also Suffers v. Briggs, [1982] I A.C.1, 8.     This  Court  in  Commissioner of Income  Tax  v.S.  Teja Singh,  [1959]  1 Suppl. SCR 394 has expressed that  a  con- struction which would defeat the object of legislature must, if that is possible, be avoided.     See also M. Pentiah and others v. Muddala  Veeramallappa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 1107.     Desai,  J speaking for the bench in Lt. Col. Prithi  Pal Singh  Bedi etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1983] 1 SCR  393 at 404 has pointed out as follows:               "The dominant purpose in construing a  statute               is  to ascertain the intention of the  Parlia-               ment.  One  of the well recognised  canons  of               construction  is that the  legislature  speaks               its  mind  by use of  correct  expression  and               unless there is any ambiguity in the  language               of the provision the Court should adopt liter-               al  construction  if it does not  lead  to  an               absurdity."     The  Constitution  Bench of this court in  A.R.  Antulay v.R.S. Nayak, [1984] 2 SCR 914 at 936 has observed thus:

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             "It  is a well established canon of  construc-               tion that the Court should read the section as               it  is and cannot rewrite it to suit its  con-               venience;  nor does any canon of  construction               permit  the court to read the section in  such               manner as to render it to some extent otiose."     The Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Board of  Second- ary  and Higher Secondary Education and another v.  Paritosh Bhupesh  Kurmarsheti etc. etc., [1985] 1 SCR 29  ruled  that the well established doctrine of interpretation is "That the provisions   contained  in  a  statutory  enactment  or   in rules/regulations framed thereunder have to be so  construed as  to be in harmony with each other and that where under  a specific  section or rule a particular subject has  received special  treatment, such special provision will exclude  the applicability of any general provision which might otherwise cover the said topic."      In Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madras and Ors., [1985] 3 SCR 103, it is observed:               "No  canon of statutory construction  is  more               firmly established than that the statute  must               be read as a whole. This is a general rule  of               construction applicable to all statutes  alike               which               83                spoken  of  as  construction  ex   visceribus               actus."     It  has  been  held by this Court  in  Balasinor  Nagrik Cooperative  Bank  Ltd. v. Babubhai  Shankerlal  Pandya  and others. [1987] 1 SCC at 608 as follows:               "It is an elementary rule that construction of               a section is to be made of all parts together.               It is not permissible to omit any part of  it.               For,  the principle that the statute  must  be               read  as  a  whole is  equally  applicable  to               different parts of the same section".     In  Dr.  Ajay  Pradhan v. State of  Madhya  Pradesh  and Others,  [1988] 4 SCC 514 at 518, the Court  has  registered its view in the matter of construing a statute thus:               "If  the  precise  words used  are  plain  and               unambiguous, we are bound to construe them  in               their  ordinary sense and give them  full  ef-               fect. The argument of inconvenience and  hard-               ship is a dangerous one and is only admissible               in  construction  where  the  meaning  of  the               statute  is obscure and there arc  alternative               methods  of construction.  Where the  language               is  explicit its consequences are for  Parlia-               ment, and not for the courts, to consider."     We think, it is not necessary to proliferate this  judg- ment by citing all the judgments and extracting the  textual passages  from the various Text Books on the  principles  of Interpretation of statutes. However, it will suffice to  say that  while  interpreting  a statute  the  consideration  of inconvenience and hardships should be avoided and that  when the  language is clear and explicit and the words  used  are plain  and  unambiguous, we are bound to  construe  them  in their ordinary sense with reference to other clauses of  the Act or Rules as the case may be, so far as possible, to make a  consistent  enactment of the whole statute or  series  of statutes/Rules/ Regulations relating to the subject  matter. Added  to  this, in construing a statute, the Court  has  to ascertain  the intention of the law making authority in  the backdrop of the dominant purpose and the underlying  intend- ment  of  the said statute and that every statute is  to  be

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interpreted without any violence to its language and applied as  far as its explicit language admits consistent with  the established rule of interpretation.     A  proviso  to a Section/Rule is expected to  except  or qualify  something in the enacting part and presumed  to  be necessary. Coming to the 84 broad general rule of construction of the proviso Maxwell on "The Interpretation of statute" in the 11th edition at  page 155 has quoted a passage from Kent’s Commentary 0n  American Law, 12th Edn. Vol. 1, 463n, reading thus:               "The  true principle undoubtedly is, that  the               sound interpretation and meaning of the  stat-               ute, on a view of the enacting clause,  saving               clause  and proviso, taken and  construed  to-               gether is to prevail."     Maxwell  in his 12th Edition has quoted a  passage  from Att. Gen. v. Chelsea Waterworks Co., [1731] Fitzg. 195 which reads  that  if  a proviso cannot  reasonably  be  construed otherwise than as contradicting the main enactment, then the proviso  will prevail on the principle that "it speaks  that last intention of the makers".     It  is pointed out in Piper v. Harvey,  [1958]  10.B.439 that if, however, the language of the proviso makes it plain that  it  was intended to have an operation  more  extensive than that of the provision which it immediately follows,  it must be given such wider effect.     In R. v. Leeds Prison (Governor), Ex p. Stafford  [1964] 2 Q.B. 625 it is pointed out thus:               "The  main part of a section must not be  con-               strued in such a way as to render a proviso to               the section redundant."     A  Constitution Bench of this Court in Ram  Narain  Sons Ltd. and Ors. v. Asstt. Commissioner of Sales tax and  Ors., [1955] 2 SCR 483 has made the following observations:               "It is a cardinal rule of interpretation  that               a  proviso  to  a particular  provision  of  a               statute  only  embraces  the  field  which  is               covered  by the main provision. It carves  out               an exception to the main provision to which it               has been enacted as proviso and to no other."     Another Constitution Bench in Abdul Jabar Butt & Another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, [1957] SCR 51 held that it is a  fundamental rule of construction that a proviso  must  be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso.     See  also  Commissioner of Income Tax v.S.  Teja  Singh, [1959] 1 Suppl. SCR 394. 85     Kapur,  J  speaking for the bench of this Court  in  The Commissioner  of Income Tax; Mysore, Travancore  Cochin  and Coorg, Bangalore v. The Indo Mercantile Bank Limited, [1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 256 reiterated the view expressed by  Bhagwati, J  as he then was in Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Assistant  Com- missioner  of  Sales Tax; [1955] 2 SCR 483 at  493  and  the observations by Lord Macmillan in Madras & Southern Mahratta Railway  Co. v. Bezwada Municipality, 1944 L.R.71 I.A.  113, 122 and laid down the sphere of a proviso thus:               "The  territory of a proviso therefore  is  to               carve  out an exception to the main  enactment               and  exclude something which  otherwise  would               have  been  within  the section.   It  has  to               operate in the same field and if the  language               of  the main enactment is clear it  cannot  be               used for the purpose of interpreting the  main

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             enactment  or to exclude by  implication  what               the enactment clearly says unless the words of               the  proviso are such that that is its  neces-               sary  effect.  (Vide also Corporation  of  the               Ci.tV  of  Toronto  v.  Attorney-General   for               Canada, [1946] A.C. 32,37 ."     M/s Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Audrey D’Cost  and Another, [1987] 2 SCC 469 may also be referred to.     When  the impugned second proviso to Rule 4 of  the  CSE Rules is interpreted in its grammatical meaning and  cognate expressions and construed harmoniously with the  substantive rule  in the light of the above decisions of this  Court  as well as the views expressed by various authors in their Text Books on this subject, it is pellucid that the said  proviso only  carves out an exception to Rule 4 of the CSE Rules  in given  circumstances  and under  specified  conditions  and, therefore,  the second proviso cannot be read  in  isolation and interpreted literally. On the other hand the substantive Rule  4 is to be read in conjunction with the  two  provisos appended thereto so as to have a correct interpretation.     In the proviso, in dispute, there are no positive  words or indications which would completely exclude the  operation of the substantive rule the spirit of which is reflected  in Regulation  4 of the Regulations, 1955. In fact, Rule  4  as stood  till 1986, in its normal course, allowed a  candidate to appear for three attempts, since increased to 4 for  1990 and 1991 Examinations. But the restriction is imposed by the second proviso only under certain circumstances as repeated- ly  indicated  above.   Although the  notification  of  1986 introducing  the  impugned  proviso, no  doubt,  has  to  be strictly  construed, the Court cannot overlook the very  aim and  object  of  the proviso thereby  either  defeating  its purpose or rendering it redundant or 86 inane or making it otiose. Judged from any angle, we are not impressed by the contention of Mr. P.P. Rao that there is  a violent  breach of the provisions of the substantive Rule  4 of CSE Rules and Regulation 4 (iii-a) and we are not able to persuade ourselves to hold that the impugned second  proviso either  subverts or destroys the basic objectives of Rule  4 and that it is ultra-vires.      In  this connection, it may be noted that the  restric- tion or embargo, as the one under consideration is not  only placed  on the candidates who on the basis of the result  of the previous CSE had been allocated and appointed to IPS  or Central  Service  Group ’A’ but also on the  candidates  ap- pointed  in  the higher echelon of Civil Service,  which  we will  presently deal with. There is a far  more  restrictive rule in existence, namely Rule 8 of the CSE Rules  according to which a candidate who is appointed to the Indian Adminis- trative Service (IAS) or the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) on the result of an earlier examination before the commencement of  the ensuing examination and continues to be a member  of that  service will not be eligible to compete at the  subse- quent  examination,.  even if he/she  is  disillusioned  and wants  to switch over. In other words, this  rule  precludes the  candidates who have been appointed to the IAS  or  IFS, from  sitting in the ensuing examination while  in  service. Further, this rule states that in case, a candidate has been appointed  to  the IAS or IFS on the basis  of  the  earlier examination  and after the subsequent  preliminary  examina- tion,  but before the Main examination, that  candidate,  if continues  to  be  a member of that service,  shall  not  be eligible to appear in the ensuing main examination  notwith- standing  that the said candidate has qualified  himself  in

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the  preliminary  examination. Similarly if a  candidate  is appointed  to the IAS or IFS after the commencement  of  the Main  Examination but before the announcement of the  result and  continues  to  be a member of that  service,  the  said candidate  shall not be considered for appointments  to  any service/post on the basis of the result of this examination. The purpose for incorporating this uncompromising and strin- gent  provision is that the candidates appointed to the  IAS and  IFS are required to man the key positions both  in  the Central  and State Services wherein the appointees  have  to combine their intellectual capacity and the requisite traits of  personality  and  also to  exhibit  higher  intellectual proficiency  and leadership. Thus Rule 8 keeps up and  main- tains the phenomenon of the  upper civil service, run  under our  constitution with all enduring features and  facets  of the said service on All India basis. But there is no bar for a  candidate who is appointed to the lAS/FS  resigning  from that  service and sitting in the examination for IPS or  any Central  Service Group ’A’. Under Rule 4 of CSE  Rules  not- withstanding anything contained in Rule  8, a candidate  who accepts allocation to a service and appointed to that 87 service  shall  not be eligible to appear again in  the  CSE unless he first resigns from that service. In other words, a candidate  who is allocated and appointed to a  service  can sit  in  the ensuing examination provided he  first  resigns from  that  service.  This restriction, in our  view,  is  a reasonable one in order to achieve the desired result in the background of the situation and circumstances about which we have elaborately discussed albeit.     In conclusion, we hold that the second proviso to Rule 4 of  CSE Rules does not travel beyond the intent of the  main rule putting any unjustifiable embargo and that the  proviso is not ultra-vires Regulation 4 (iii-a) of Regulations  1955 on  the  ground it makes the candidates ineligible  who  are otherwise  eligible in terms of clauses (i) to (iii) of  the said  Regulation  and  that the proviso to Rule  17  is  not invalid.       An enactment is never to be held invalid unless it be, beyond question, plainly and palpably in excess of  legisla- tive  power  or it is ultra-vires or inconsistent  with  the statutory  or constitutional provisions or it does not  con- form  to the statutory or constitutional requirements or  is made  arbitrarily with bad faith of oblique motives  or  op- posed  to  public  policy. In our  considered  opinion,  the second  proviso to Rule 4 of CSE Rules cannot be held to  be invalid on any of the grounds mentioned above.     The next question that has arisen for consideration  is, how  far  the  principle of reasonable  restriction  can  be applied  in the formulation of the rules, keeping the  rele- vance  of the recruitment scheme to the civil service.  Nei- ther an omnibus answer or a simplistic solution would  carry us  far  to face the public service reality  in  the  modern state,  the governing consideration of which is the  context of actual situation, circumstances, resources and the socie- tal goals of the particular State/country.      The  further  argument advanced in  Civil  Appeal  Nos. 5506-5525  of 1990 (as appears from the  written  submission made by Mr. C.N. Sreekumar) is that on a correct interpreta- tion  of  the impugned second proviso, the  last  clause  of which  reads "such candidate who accepts the  service  shall not be eligible to appear again in the Civil Services Exami- nation  unless he first resigns from the service" refers  to only  candidates,  who  on the basis of the  result  of  the previous  CSE  had been allocated to  the  Central  Services

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Group ’A’ but who expressed their intention to appear in the next  CSE (Main) for competing for IAS, IFS, IPS or  Central Services Group ’A’ and who are permitted to abstain from the probationary  training in order to so appear and who  joined Group  ’A’ service subsequently on allocation either on  the basis of the previous examination or the subsequent examina- tion.  According to him, in other words, the candidates  who did not avail the benefit of abstaining from the  probation- ary training 88 with the permission of the Government in order to appear  at the  next  Civil  Services (Main) Examination  do  not  fail within the scope of the impugned restriction and they cannot be asked to resign as a condition precedent to their appear- ing again in the CSE. This tenuous argument does not  appeal to us. Firstly the expression "such candidate", is not  used in  the  proviso, on the other hand, the words used  are  "a candidate"  (vide  publication  of Gazette  of  India  dated 13-12-86).  Secondly  the last part of the  proviso,  as  it stands,  reads  "a  candidate who accepts  allocation  to  a service and is appointed to a service shall not be  eligible to appear again in the Civil Services Examination unless  he has first resigned from the service." Thirdly a correct  and proper  reading  of  the last limb of  the  proviso  clearly demonstrates  that the expression "a candidate" refers  only to  the  candidate,  mentioned in the earlier  part  of  the proviso. Lastly, if such an interpretation is to be given on the  wrong reading of the proviso, then the whole object  of the proviso will be defeated. Reg. Question No. 7     Mrs. C.M. Chopra scathingly attacks the judgment of  the Tribunal  inter-alia contending that the protection  guaran- teed  to  the candidates belonging to Scheduled  Castes  and Scheduled Tribes under the Constitution - more  particularly under  Article  335 of the Constitution of India  cannot  be taken  away by an arbitrary executive action by  introducing the second proviso, thereby reducing the number of permissi- ble  attempts for appearing in the CSE hitherto  enjoyed  by such  candidates; that the right statutorily  and  constitu- tionally vested on the SC/ST candidates, permitting them  to make unlimited attempts, of course, subject to the upper age limit  cannot  be easily whittled down and that  the  second proviso is an independent proviso, having no relation to the first proviso and apriori it cannot control and prevail upon the  first proviso which declares "that this restriction  on the number of attempts will not apply in the case of  Sched- uled   Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  who   are   otherwise eligible." According to her, the reservation policy  guaran- teed  to  the SC/ST candidates cannot be obliterated  by  an unreasonable and arbitrary executive action.     No  doubt, it is true that while the substantive Rule  4 of the CSE Rules permits every candidate to appear for three attempts at the examination- which is now increased to four- the first proviso to this rule states that this  restriction on the number of attempts at the examination is not applica- ble in the case of SC/ST candidates who arc otherwise eligi- ble. However, even in the case of SC/ST candidates, there is a  specific  restriction so far as the upper  age  limit  is concerned  as envisaged under Rule 6 (b) of the  CSE  Rules. Regulation 7(2) of Regulation, 1955 states that the 89 candidates  belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or  the Scheduled Tribes may, to the extent of the number of  vacan- cies reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled  Tribes cannot be filled on the basis of the standard determined  by

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the  Commission under sub-regulation (1) be  recommended  by the  Commission by a relaxed standard to make up  the  defi- ciency  in  the reserved quota, subject to  the  fitness  of these candidates for selection to the Service,  irrespective of  their ranks in order to merit at the  examination.  Sub- Regulation  (1)  of Regulation 7 reads that subject  to  the provision  of Sub-Regulation (2) the  Commission  (U.P.S.C.) shall  forward to the Central Government a list arranged  in order of merit of the candidates who have qualified by  such standard as the Commission may determine.     In  the  normal course, a candidate belonging  to  SC/ST category  can  enjoy all the benefits under  the  rules  and regulations.  But the restriction imposed under  the  second proviso  is only for a specified category of  candidates  by treating  all such candidates at par and without making  any exception to the candidates belonging to SC/ST. The  submis- sion  made  by  Mrs. Chopra that the second  proviso  is  an independent  one  does not merit consideration  because  the second  proviso  to Rule 4 begins with the  words  ’provided timber...."  which expression would mean that a strict  com- pliance  of the second proviso is an additional  requirement to that of the substantive rule 4 and the first proviso. The expression  "provided  further" spells out  that  the  first proviso  cannot be read in isolation or independent  of  the second  proviso but it must be read in conjunction with  the second  proviso. To put in other words, once the  candidates belonging to SC or ST get through one common examination and interview test and are allocated and appointed to a  service based  on their ranks and performance and brought under  the one  and the same stream of category, then they too have  to be  treated among all other regularly and lawfully  selected candidates and there cannot be any preferential treatment at that  stage  on  the ground that they belong to  SC  or  ST, though they may be entitled for all other statutory benefits such  as to the relaxation of age, the reservation etc.  The unrestricted  number of attempts, subject to the  upper  age limit,  is available to the SC/ST candidates in  the  normal course  but  that is subject to the second  proviso  because when once they are allocated and appointed along with  other candidates to a category/post, they are treated alike.     Ramaswami, J speaking for the Constitution Bench in C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India & Ors., [1968] 1 SCR 721 at page 733 while interpreting Article 16(4) of the Constitution  of India observed thus: 90               "Our  conclusion therefore is that Art.  16(4)               does  not confer any right on  the  petitioner               and there is no constitutional duty imposed on               the  Government  to  make  a  reservation  for               Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,  either               at the initial stage of recruitment or at  the               stage of promotion. In other words,  Art.16(4)               is an enabling provision and confers a discre-               tionary power on the state to make a  reserva-               tion  of  appointments in favour  of  backward               class  of citizens which, in its  opinion,  is               not adequately represented in the Services  of               the  State. We are accordingly of the  opinion               that the petitioner is unable to make good his               submission on this aspect of the case."     A  seven-Judges Bench in State of Kerala v.N.M.  Thomas, [1976] 2 SCC 310 before which some important questions arose with regard to the intent of Article 16 of the Constitution, referred  to and relied upon the observation in  Rajendran’s case  holding that reservation is not a constitutional  com-

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pulsion,  but is a discretionary one. In that  case  Krishna lyer, J agreeing with the majority view expressed his  opin- ion thus:               "The  State has been obligated to promote  the               economic interests of harijans and like  back-               ward  classes,  Articles 46 and  335  being  a               testament  and  Articles 14 to  16  being  the               tool-kit, if one may put it that way. To blink               at  this  panchsheel is to be  unjust  to  the               Constitution."               Further, the learned Judge held:               "Indeed,  Article  335 is  more  specific  and               cannot  be brushed aside or truncated  in  the               operational ambit vis-a-vis Article 16(1)  and               (2) without hubristic aberration."     In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh (Railway)  v. Union  of India & Others, [1981]1 SCC 246, Krishna  lyer,  J observed that Article 16(4) is not a jarring note but auxil- iary  to fair fulfilment of Article 16(1) and further  said, "Article  16(4)  is  not in the nature of  an  exception  to Article 16(1). It is a facet of Article 16(1) which  fosters and  furthers the idea of equality of opportunity with  spe- cial  reference to an underprivileged and deprived class  of citizens to whom egalite de droit (formal or legal equality) is not egalite de fait (practical or factual equality).      See also M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439, Triloki Nath v. State of J&K, [1969] 1 SCR 103  and T.  Devadasan v. Union of India, [1964] 4 SCR 680 and  Comp- troller and Auditor-General of India v. 91 K.S. Jagannathan, [1986] 2 SCC 679 at 684 (para 6).     The Constitution, no doubt, has laid a special responsi- bility  on the Government to protect the claims of SC/ST  in the  matter of public appointments under  various  Constitu- tional  provisions  of which we shall presently refer  to  a few. Article 16(4), as manifested from the various decisions of  this  court  referred to hereinbefore,  is  an  enabling provision conferring a discretionary power on the State  for making any provision or reservation of appointments or posts in  favour of any backward class of citizens, which  in  the opinion  of the State, is not adequately represented in  the service  under  the State. The expression  ’backward  class’ obviously  takes within its fold people belonging to SC  and ST  (vide Janki Prasad v. State of J&K, AIR 1973 S.C.  930). Clause  4 of Article 16 has to be interpreted in  the  back- ground  of  Article 335 as ruled by this  Court  in  General Manager  v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 S.C. 36 and in  Rajendran’s case referred to above. Article 335 enjoins that the  claims of the members of the SC and ST shall be taken into  consid- eration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency  of administration, in the making of appointments to services or posts  in connection with the affairs of the Union or  of  a State. Article 320(4) makes it clear that the Public Service Commission  is not required to be consulted as respects  the manner in which any provision referred to in Art. 16(4)  may be  made  or as respects the manner in which effect  may  be given to Article 335.     The query before us is not in respect of the reservation of backward classes or in respect of the claims of SC and ST services/posts,  but it is whether the candidates  belonging to  SC and ST are entitled to any exception from the  opera- tion of the proviso. The answer to the above query would  be an negative as we have aforesaid.     It  may be true, as fervently submitted by  Mrs.  Chopra there  may be some hard cases, but the hard cases cannot  be

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allowed to make bad law. Therefore, in the case on hand,  as long as the second proviso does not suffer from any vice, it has  to be construed, uniformly giving effect to  all  those falling  under one category in the absence of  any  specific provision  exempting  any  particular class  or  classes  of candidates from the operation of the impugned proviso and no one  can  steal  march over others falling  under  the  same category. Hence, the right of candidates belonging to SC and ST  competing further to improve their career  opportunities is limited to the extent permissible under the second provi- so to Rule 4 read with Rule 17 of the C.S.E. Rules. For  the  aforementioned reasons, we find no merits  in  the submission. 92 of Mrs. Chopra that the second proviso is not applicable  to the candidates belonging to SC or ST.     Mr. Gopal Subramanian appearing on behalf of some of the appellants  supplemented by the arguments of other  counsel, stating that the very structure of the recruitment policy is itself disturbed to the great disadvantage of the candidates who since then have been enjoying the right to appear for  3 attempts as conferred by the substantive Rule 4 and that one of  the  present  restrictions that  the  candidates  should severe from the service, if intends to appear for the  third time, after he has been allocated and appointed to a service is unjust, unreasonable and it seriously transgresses on the main provision and virtually interdicts the candidates  from availing  their statutorily conferred and  protected  right. Therefore,  such a serverance of status from the service  is ex-facie wrong, even if one can understand losing of senior- ity. We have already discussed this interpellation in exten- so while dealing with similar contentions and our considered view  expressed albeit will clearly answer this  contention. Hence,  we  hold that there is no question of  severance  of status  as we have come to the conclusion that the  restric- tion  imposed by the impugned proviso cannot be said  to  be unjust,  unreasonable or arbitrary or change of  any  policy and moreover, the spirit of the main rule is not in any  way disturbed. In the result, we conclude that there is  neither any tenable reason nor any logic in the above submission. Reg. Question No. 8     Then  a  mordacious criticism was unleashed by  all  the learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellants inter-alia  contending that the second proviso which  is  an administrative instruction is highly arbitrary and irration- al  having no nexus to the object of the scheme of  recruit- ment to the post of civil services and that there was inade- quate attention paid to the nexus between the intent of  the proviso and the object to be achieved.     The  learned Additional Solicitor  General  controverted the  above argument stating that the working system  of  the civil  service  in relation to its logical  relationship  of recruitment rules on different aspects has been  exclusively investigated  bearing in mind the process of rapid  economic development  with  a democratic framework of  Government  on Indian scenario and the present proviso is having a dynamic, reasonable and relative nexus with the object to be achieved in  the  present  system of the civil  services  within  its administrative framework. No  denying  the fact that the civil service being  the  top most service in 93 the  country  has got to be kept at  height,  distinct  from other  services  since these top echelons have to  govern  a wide variety of departments. Therefore, the persons  joining

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this  higher  service should have breadth  of  interest  and ability  to  acquire  new knowledge and  skill  since  those joining  the  service  have to be engaged  in  multiple  and multifarious  activities as pointed out supra. In  order  to achieve  this  object, the selectees of  this  higher  civil services have to undergo .training in the National  Academy/ Training  institutes  wherein they have to  undergo  careful programme  of  specialized  training  as  probationers.  The various schemes of training are based on the conviction that splendid  active  experience is the real  training  and  the selectees are to be trained in the academies in all kinds of work  they have to handle afterwards with a band  of  senior chosen officers. Training at the academy comprises a founda- tion  course followed by another course of practical  train- ing.  The  rationale underlying the course at  the  training centres is that the officers of civil services must  acquire an understanding of the constitutional, social, economic and administrative framework within which they have to  function and  also must have a complete sense of involvement  in  the training  and  thereafter  in the service  to  which/she  is appointed.  It is apparent that initial training is  in  the nature  of  providing young probationers an  opportunity  to counter-act  their weak points and at the same time  develop their social abilities and as such the aspect of training is the most important of all.     It was brought to the notice of the Government that  the probationers  who have been allocated to the IPS  and  Group ’A’  service were more often than not completely  neglecting their training in the academies/Training Institutes and also have gone on enmass leave thereby creating a complete vacuum in  the academy and the Training Institutes for the  purpose of preparing for the next CSE (Main) in the hope of  getting a better position and a more preferred service like IAS, IFS etc. without having a sense of involvement with the  service to which they have been allocated and appointed on the basis of the earlier examination. It seems that the Government had been  facing  this  disturbed problem  of  indiscipline  and inattentiveness  among the probationers undergoing  training who were busy themselves with the preparation for the  ensu- ing  CSE. As a result of this, bent on preparation  for  the CSE  the training imparted was not seriously taken  and  the concentration  of the probationers was only in the  prepara- tion of the next CSE. Consequently, the standard of officers turned  out of the academy on completion of  their  training declined  very  much. Therefore, in order to  overcome  this problem it was suggested and considered that the  probation- ers selected and allocated to a service and sent for  train- ing should be debarred from appearing in the ensuing CSE  so that they can 94 fully  devote  themselves to the training and take  it  more seriously. Resultantly, the matter was considered in consul- tation with the Department of Personnel and Training and  it was  agreed that the relevant rules should be amended so  as to  prevent the IPS and Group ’A’ probationers from  joining training at the academy in case they intend to take  another CSE. These measures are taken for making probationers train- ing more effective and meaningful.     Hence for the aforementioned reasons, we hold that there is  a dynamic nexus between the impugned second proviso  and the object to be achieved. Reg. Question No. 9     We  shall now pass on to the real and pivotal  point  in issue which has been hotly debated and eloquently articulat- ed  by all the learned counsel contending that the  impugned

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proviso  is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14  and 16 of the Constitution resulting in a disastrous effect.     All the learned counsel appearing in all the batches  of the appeals amplified the above contention stating thus:-     In  all, there are 46 Group ’A’ Central Services  listed in  the CCS Rules of which only for 16 Group  ’A’  Services, recruitment  is made through the Civil Services  Examination conducted by UPSC annually and it is only in respect of  the candidates already allocated and appointed to the IPS or  to one  or other of these 16 Group ’A’ services,  the  impugned proviso  imposes  an onerous restriction  that  they  should first  resign in order to appear at the next  Civil  Service Examination  whereas there is no such restriction so far  as candidates  recruited through the same open  competition  to the  remaining Group ’B’ services are concerned despite  the fact  that the level of responsibility is the same  and  the qualifications  prescribed  are  comparable.  This  kind  of classification  between  these two groups  has  no  rational nexus  with the object of selection. The reasons  attributed for such a classification on the ground of neglect of train- ing, financial loss, unemployment situation, loss to service are  all common to all the Central Service Group ’A’  listed in the CCS Rules, and therefore, the impugned second proviso is held to be discriminatory against the candidates appoint- ed  to the IPS and 16 Group ’A’ services and as such  it  is violative  of  Article  14. The  impugned  proviso  makes  a further  discrimination  vis-a-vis candidates  appointed  to Group ’B’ services, in that the said proviso by placing  the onerous condition of resignation from service of  candidates appointed to the IPS and Group ’A’ service in substance  and effect and it         95 precludes them from competing for higher civil service  with the  candidates appointed to Group ’B’ service  and  thereby facilitates  the  selection of  candidates  with  relatively inferior  merit to posts of superior Group ’A’ services.  In other  words, the impugned proviso excludes  the  candidates appointed to group ’A’ services from competition on the  one hand  and  on the other facilitates selection  from  amongst less meritorious candidates appointed to Group ’B’  services to  the  highest and prestigious All  India  Services.  This defeats  the  very object of securing the services  of  most meritorious  candidates  to  the most  important  All  India Services  and  it is arbitrary for want  of  rational  nexus between  the  classification of candidates with  the  proven superior merit and those of inferior merit and  consequently the object of recruiting the most meritorious candidates  to the top-most All India Services is frustrated.     In addition to the above submission, reliance was placed on the dictum laid down in R.K. Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, [1959]  SCR 279 at pages 296-297 holding, "In order to  pass the test of permissible classifications two conditions  must be  fulfilled,  namely (i) that the classification  must  be founded  on an intelligible differentia  with  distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and, (ii) that that differentia must have a rational  relation to the object, sought to be  achieved  by the statute in question."     According  to Mr. P.P. Rao, the recommendations  of  the Kothari  Committee and the Estimates Committee are  not  en- forceable  proprio vigore and the executive authorities  who are expected to act justly and reasonably, cannot usurp  the functions  of the Parliament and arbitrarily put a  restric- tion  through  the  impugned proviso  which  restriction  is highly tainted with hostility and discrimination  subjecting

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the candidates allocated and appointed to the IPS and  Group ’A’ services to a harassing and oppressive treatment.     Mr.  Gopal  Singh appearing for some of  the  appellants besides stating that he is adopting the submissions made  by other learned counsel cited some decisions in support of his arguments  that the discrimination now  existing  consequent upon the introduction of the second proviso offends  Article 14 of the Constitution.     At  the risk of repetition, it may be stated that  under the  present  system of civil services, all  candidates  are selected  through  one common examination-  preliminary  and main  and interview test. A list of selected  candidates  in the order of merit is published and thereafter the  success- ful  candidates are allocated to different  services  namely IAS, IFS, IPS, Group 96 ’A’ and Group ’B’ services based on their ranks and  prefer- ences. Of the candidates, IAS and IFS are top rankers in the merit list.     In  the  notification  dated 13.12.1986  issued  by  the Ministry of Personnel, there were only 28 services/posts  of which  the  first  three were IAS, IFS and IPS  and  of  the remaining (iv) to (xviii) were Group ’A’ services and  (xix) to  (xxviii) were Group ’B’ services. In the list  of  Group ’A’ services, items (xvii) and (xviii) were Grade II and III respectively.  In notification dated 19.12.1987, there  were in total 27 services/posts of which the first three were the same  and  the services under (iv) to (xix) were  Group  ’A’ services and (xx) to (xxvii) were Group ’B’ services. In the nomenclature of Group ’A’ and Group ’B’ services, there  was slight  variation. In the subsequent notification issued  on 17.12.1988, besides the first three services being the same, the  total  number of services in group ’A’ was  16  and  in Group ’B’ the number of services was reduced to 7. In  1989, the  first three services remaining the same, there were  16 services under items (iv) to (xix) in Group ’A’ services and 8  services/posts in Group ’B’ Services under item  (xx)  to (xxvii). In the notification issued on 5th January 1991, the total  services were reduced from 27 to 26 and items (i)  to (iii)  remaining the same, there were 16 Group ’A’  services (iv to xix) and 7 services in Group ’B’ (xx to xxvi).  Thus, it  is  seen that there was inclusion or  exclusion  of  one service  or other besides the change of nomenclature in  one or two services in the notifications for the CSE every year.     As  envisaged in Rule 17, due consideration is given  at the  time of making appointments and on the results  of  the examination to the preferences expressed by a candidate  for various services at the time of his application and the said appointments  will be governed by the  rules/regulations  in force  as applicable to the respective Services at the  time of  appointment. As pointed out in detail in  the  preceding part of this judgment, under the first proviso to Rule 17, a candidate  who  has been approved and appointed  to  IPS  or Central  Services Group ’A’ will be eligible to compete  for appointment  in services mentioned against that  service  in column no. 3 of the table given in the said rule. As per the second proviso appended to the said rule, a candidate who is appointed  to a Central Service Group ’B’ on the results  of an earlier examination will be eligible to compete for  IAS, IFS, IPS and Central Services Group ’A’ and considered  only for  those  appointments. The intent of  the  above  proviso proceeds  on the footing that all Central Services of  Group ’A’ stand on equal footing and likewise all Group ’B’  serv- ices  also  stand on equal footing within  their  respective group  of services/posts and that there is no point in  com-

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peting for any one of the services by a candidate within the same Group ’A’ or Group ’B’ services as the 97 case may be when he has already been allocated and appointed to one of those services in either of the groups to which he has been selected on his merit.     It  cannot be disputed that the candidates allocated  to Group  ’A’ services are more meritorious compared to  candi- dates  allocated to Group ’B’ services. Consequently,  those allocated to Group ’B’ services get lower position  compared to those allocated to Group ’A’ services. The pay scales  in Group  ’B’ services are comparatively less than those  meant for  IAS, IFS and IFS and Central Services Group ’A’.  There is a clear cut separation on the basis of ranking and  merit and, therefore, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagina- tion  that both Group ’A’ and Group ’B’ services fall  under one  and the same category but on the other, these  services are  two distinct and separate categories failing under  two different classifications.     The Additional Solicitor General refuting the  arguments of Mr. P.P. Rao that there is a discrimination between Group ’A’  and Group ’B’ services, in that whilst an Under  Secre- tary, selected in Group ’A’ services, is not allowed to  sit for  examination  by availing his third  chance,  a  Section Officer coming under Group ’B’ services is permitted to  sit for  examination availing his chance without resigning  from service, emphatically stated that this argument has no merit since  in Group ’A’ services, there is a vertical  movement. The  learned ASG further clarified that Group ’A’ and  Group ’B’  services  are two separate services,  having  different status, prospects, conditions of services and pay scales and both  the  services under the two groups are  not  similarly situated,  besides  the  candidates in  Group  ’A’  services standing in higher rank and merit.     The  Tribunal after deeply considering the similar  con- tention raised before it has concluded as follows:                .......   We do not see any reasonable  basis               to urge that Group ’A’ and Group ’B’  Services               should  be  treated  at par.  Even  their  pay               scales and conditions of service not the  same               as  in the Group ’A’ Services. It  is,  there-               fore,  not a question of comparing  these  two               Services  and  placing  them at  par.  In  our               opinion,  there is no discrimination. It  will               be noticed that the alleged discrimination  is               not  on  the basis of religion,  race,  caste,               sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any               of  them.  The discrimination, if any,  has  a               reasonable nexus with the objective for  which               it  has been made. The objective is to  create               five categories of Services consisting of IAS,               IFS,  IFS,  Central  Services  Group  ’A’  and               Central Services Group ’B’. We are fur-               98               ther of the opinion that the Government having               come across certain difficulties and  problems               in the matter of probationary training and the               filling  up of the vacancies in various  Serv-               ices  made  these rules. We do  not  find  the               argument  of discrimination between Group  ’A’               and Group ’B’ Services to be valid. We, there-               fore, reject these arguments". One other argument advanced on behalf of the appellants  was that  ’he  candidates who have been allocated in  Group  ’A’ services  and  whose raining is postponed at  their  request

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have  to  loose their seniority whereas .he  candidates  who have been appointed to Group ’B’ services do not suffer such kind of disability and that they can even after their train- ing  retain their original seniority which they had  at  the time of initial selection. This serious setback suffered  by a candidate selected in Group ’A’ services, according to the counsel  for  the  appellants, indicates that  there  is  an apparent discrimination between the two sets of  candidates. This contention of the appellants, according to ASG,  cannot be  countenanced  because the services under Group  ’A’  and Group ’B’ are different services and, therefore, the  condi- tions of service of a particular service cannot be  compared with  other service especially when the services are not  at par  and more so when the other service, namely,  Group  ’B’ service  is  less  in rank and merit to that  of  Group  ’A’ Service.     In  passing,  all the learned counsel in  assailing  the validity  of the impugned second proviso drew our  attention to various Service Rules, such as Central Secretariat  Serv- ice  Rules, Indian Revenue Service Rules, 1988, Indian  Cus- toms  and  Central Excise Service  Group  ’A’  Rules,  1987, Department of Revenue (Customs Appraiser) Recruitment Rules, 1988, Indian Railway Personnel Service (Recruitment)  Rules, 1975 and Delhi and Andaman and Nicobar Islands Civil Service Rules, 1971 - all made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India - and attempted to show that various provisions  of those  rules relating to the recruitment and service  condi- tions  go  in support of their submissions that there  is  a hostile  discrimination between the candidates of Group  ’A’ services and Group ’B’ services. In our considered opinion,. this  abortive attempt made by the learned counsel does  not loom  large  and assume any significance  in  examining  the broad aspect of the main issues involved and in testing  the constitutionality of the said proviso.     Now,  it necessarily follows whether the  classification of  these  two  services, one falling under  Group  ’A’  and another  failing under Group ’B’ are based  on  intelligible differentia. 99     The  Constitution Bench of this Court in  R.K.  Dalmia’s case (supra) after reiterating the legal principle enunciat- ed by a Constitution Bench of Seven Judges of this Court  in Budhart  Choudhry v. State of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045,  has ruled thus:               "It is now well established that while Article               14  forbids  class legislation,  it  does  not               forbid   reasonable  classification  for   the               purposes of legislation."               Having  regard to the objective in that  case,               it has been held:               "In determining whether there is any  intelli-               gible  differentia on the basis of  which  the               petitioners  and  their  companies  have  been               grouped together it is permissible to look not               only  at the facts appearing in the  notifica-               tion but also the facts brought to the  notice               of the Court upon affidavits. The facts in the               present case afford sufficient support to  the               presumption of constitutionality of the  noti-               fication  and  the petitions  have  failed  to               discharge the onus which was on them to  prove               that  other  people  or  companies   similarly               situated  have  been  left out  and  that  the               petitioners  and  their  companies  have  been               singled  out  for discriminatory  and  hostile

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             treatment."     In Kumari Chitra Ghosh and Another v. Union of India and Others, [1969] 2 SCC 228, the facts were thus:     The  appellants filed a Writ Petition in the High  Court challenging  the  authority  of the  Central  Government  to select  candidates for certain reserved seats on the  ground that they having secured 62.5 per cent marks would have  got admission but for the reservation of seats which were filled by  nominations  by the Central Government. The  High  Court dismissed the Writ Petition as well as the Review  Petition. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the  appellants appealed to this Court. Grover, J speaking for the Constitu- tion Bench approved the dictum in R.K. Dalmia’s case  (cited above)  laying down the fulfilment of the two conditions  as the  test  of permissible classification and held  that  the classification  in that case was based on intelligible  dif- ferentia, observing thus:               "It is the Central Government which bears  the               financial  burden of running the medical  col-               lege. It is for h to lay down the criteria for               eligibility. From the very nature of things it               is not possible to throw the admission open to               students  from all over the country. The  Gov-               ernment cannot be denied the right to               100               decide from what sources the admission will be               made. That essentially is a question of policy               and  depends inter alia on an overall  assess-               ment  and survey of the requirements of  resi-               dents  of  particular  territories  and  other               categories of persons for whom it is necessary               to  provide facilities for medical  education.               If the sources are properly classified whether               on territorial, geographical or other reasona-               ble  basis it is not for the Courts to  inter-               fere with the manner and method of making  the               classification."     In  the  above  case, the Court  has  distinguished  the decision in Rajendran’s case (referred to above).     Y.V.  Chandrachud,  J as he then was  speaking  for  the Constitution  Bench in State of Jammu & Kashmir  v.  Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors., [1974] 1 SCR 771 in which it was contend- ed on behalf of the State that is always open to the Govern- ment to classify its employees so long as the classification is reasonable and has nexus with the object thereto,  stated as follows:               "Thus, it is no part of the appellants’ burden               to justify the classification or to  establish               its  constitutionality. Formal  education  may               not always produce excellence but a  classifi-               cation founded on variant educational qualifi-               cations  is for purposes of promotion  to  the               post  of  an Executive Engineer,  to  say  the               least,  not unjust on the fact of it  and  the               onus  therefore  cannot shift  from  where  it               originally               lay.......................................               Classification  is primarily for the  legisla-               ture  or for the statutory  authority  charged               with the duty of framing the terms and  condi-               tions  of service, and if, looked at from  the               standpoint  of  the authority making  it,  the               classification is found to rest on a  reasona-               ble basis, it has to be up held.............               Discrimination  is the essence of  classifica-

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             tion  and does violence to the  constitutional               guarantee  of  equality only it  rests  on  an               unreasonable  basis. ....... ...  Equality  is               for equals . That is to say that those who are               similarly  circumstanced are entitled   to  an               equal treatment............Judicial   scrutiny               can  therefore  extend only to the  considera-               tion  whether the  classification rests  on  a               reasonable  basis whether it bears nexus  with               the object in view. It cannot extend to em-               101               barking upon a nice or mathematical evaluation               of the basis of classification, for were  such               an inquiry permissible it would be open to the               courts  to substitute their own  judgment  for               that  of  the legislature or  the  rule-making               authority  on  the  need to  classify  or  the               desirability   of   achieving   a   particular               object."        P.N.  Bhagwati, J and Krishna lyer, J have  concurred with  the view expressed by chandrachud, J though they  have added some more concurring observations of their own.     It  will  be apposite to recall an observation  of  this Court  in A.S. Sangwan v. Union of India, [1980]  Supp.  SCC 559 at 561 reading as follows:               "A  policy  once formulated is  not  good  for               ever; it is perfectly within the competence of               the Union of India to change it, rechange  it,               adjust  it  and readjust it according  to  the               compulsions  of circumstances and the  impera-               tives  of national considerations. We  cannot,               as  Court, give directives as to how  the  De-               fence Ministry should function except to State               that the obligation not to act arbitrarily and               to  treat employees equally is binding on  the               Union of India because if functions under  the               Constitution  and not over it  ...............               It  is entirely within the reasonable  discre-               tion  of the Union of India. It may  stick  to               the  earlier  policy or give it  up.  But  one               imperative  of  the Constitution  implicit  in               Article  14  is  that if it  does  change  its               policy,  it must do so fairly and  should  not               give  the impression that it is acting by  any               ulterior criteria or arbitrarily.’’     See also Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh  (Rail- wav)’s case (already referred to).     In  Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University, [1989] 2 SCC  145 M.M. Dutt, J speaking for the Court has held thus:               "In  order to consider the question as to  the               reasonableness  of the classification,  it  is               necessary  to take into account the  objective               for  such classification. If the objective  be               illogical, unfair and unjust, necessarily  the               classification will have to be held as  unrea-               sonable.  Surrounding  circumstances  may   be               taken  into  consideration in support  of  the               constitutionality of a law which is  otherwise               hostile  or discriminatory in nature. But  the               circumstances  must be such as to justify  the               discriminatory treatment or the classification               subserving the object sought to be achieved. A               classification  by  the  identification  of  a               source must               102

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             not be arbitrary, but should be on a  reasona-               ble  basis  having  a nexus  with  the  object               sought  to be achieved by the rules  for  such               admission.  A classification need not be  made               with  mathematical precision but, if there  be               little or no difference between the person  or               things  which have been grouped  together  and               those  left out of the group, the  classifica-               tion  cannot  be  said  to  be  a   reasonable               one   ........... .................  ....   It               is true that a classification need not be made               with  mathematical precision but, if there  be               little or no difference between the persons or               things  which have been grouped  together  and               those left out of the group, in that case, the               classification  can  not be said to be a  rea-               sonable one ........ ........ ..... ......  It               is submitted that in making the classification               the  surrounding  circumstances may  be  taken               into  account ........ .......  .........  ...               follows from the observation that  surrounding               circumstances may be taken into  consideration               in support of the constitutionality  of a  law               which  is otherwise hostile or  discriminatory               in nature. But the circumstances must be  such               as to justify the discriminatory treatment  or               the   classification  subserving  the   object               sought  to be achieved. In the  instant  case,               the circumstances which have been relied on by               the  respondents, namely, the  possibility  of               production  by them of bogus certificates  and               insecurity  of their services are not, in  our               opinion,  such circumstances as  will  justify               the  exclusion  of the  employees  of  private               establishments from the evening classes."     What  falls instantly for determination is  whether  the differentia on which the classification is sought to be made has  a rational relation with the object to be achieved.  We have already discussed this question in detail when we  have separately  examined the question as to whether  the  second proviso is related to the purposes stated therein.     Whereas Mr. Kapil Sibal has urged that it is always open to  the Government to classify its employees as long as  the classification  is  reasonable and has nexus to  the  object thereto,  the  rival contention is that there  is  no  nexus between  the  classification and the object to  be  achieved thereby,  that  in  fact the  classification  defeated  that object,  that  if  chances of sitting  for  examination  are denied to a few with equals, there is inherent vice attached to  such classification and that in such circumstances,  the unreasonableness of the classification becomes patent. It is further urged 103 on behalf of the appellants that this classification foments frustration amongst the selectees of group ’A’ services  and produces inefficiency by placing men of lower efficiency  in a  very advantageous position. Mr. P.P. Rao would urge  that if  there  is a vertical movement in group ’A’  services  as stated  by Mr. Kapil Sibal, how can candidates in group  ’B’ services be permitted to sit for examination of IAS, IFS and IPS  by passing the meritorious candidates under  group  ’A’ and  therefore  the  classification is  per  se  irrational, unjust  and discriminatory and as such  ultra-vires  Article 14.     We  shall  now bestow out judicious  thought  over  this

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matter  and carefully examine the rival contentions  of  the rival parties in the light of the guiding principles, lucid- ly  laid down by this Court in a series of decisions, a  few of  which  we  have already referred  to  hereinbefore.  The selections for IAS. IFS and IPS group ’A’ services and group ’B’  service are made by a combined competitive  examination and  viva voce test. There cannot be any dispute  that  each service  is a distinct and separate cadre, having its  sepa- rate  field of operation, with different status,  prospects, pay  scales, the nature of duties, the  responsibilities  to the  post and conditions of service etc. Therefore,  once  a candidate  is selected and appointed to a particular  cadre, he  cannot  be  allowed to say that he is at  par  with  the others  on  the ground that all of them  appeared  and  were selected by a combined competitive examination and viva voce test and that the qualifications prescribed are  comparable. In  our considered view, the classification of  the  present case  is not based on artificial inequalities but is  hedged within the salient features and truly founded on substantial differences. Judged from this point of view, it seems to  us impossible to accept the submission that the  classification rests  on  an unreal and unreasonable basis and that  it  is arbitrary or absurd.     In  this  connection, it may be noted that in  fact  the civil  services  in foreign countries too,  such  as  United States of America, Great Britain, France and Canada grew  up by degrees from time to time in tune with the concept of new ideas  under the pressure of some necessity or influence  of particular  theories  linked  with  the  changing  political ideology  and social conditions and with a view to  trimming the civil service scheme and this process of development  is by way of evolution rather than revolution.     We may again hark-pack to the case of the appellants and examine whether this classification offends Articles 14  and 16 of the Constitution of India. Article  14  declares that the State shall not deny  to  any person 104 equality  before the law or the equal protection of the  law within  the  territory  of India.  The  cherished  principle underlying  the  above Article is that there  should  be  no discrimination between one person and another if as  regards the subject matter of the legislation, their position is the same. Vide Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, [1950] 1 SCR 869 or in other words its action must not be arbitrary, but must be  based on some valid principle, which in itself must  not be irrational or discriminatory (Vide Kasturi v. State of  J & K (albeit). As ruled by this Court in Ameeroonissa v. Mah- boob, [1953] SCR 405 and Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1959 SC 609 that differential treatment does not per  se constitute  violation  of  Article 14 and  it  denies  equal protection  only  when there is no  rational  or  reasonable basis  for  the differentiation. Thus  Article  14  condemns discrimination  and  forbids class legislation  but  permits classification founded on intelligible differentia having  a rational relationship with the object sought to be  achieved by  the Act/Rule/Regulation in question. The  Government  is legitimately empowered to frame rules of classification  for securing  the requisite standard of efficiency  in  services and the classification need not scientifically be perfect or logically  complete.  As observed by this  Court  more  than once,  every  classification  is likely in  some  degree  10 produce some inequality.     The  provisions of Article 14 of the  Constitution  have come  up  for discussion before this Court in  a  number  of

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cases but we feel that in the present case, it is not neces- sary  to go in for any lengthy discussion as 10 the  origin, meaning and the gradual development of the concept of  prin- ciples  and  enlargement  of the scope and  effect  of  this Article.  Suffice to mention a few decisions of  this  court relating to the issue under consideration, namely- Chiranjit Lal  Chowdhury v. The Union of India; Budhart  Choudhry  and Others v. The State of Bihar; R.K. Dalmia v. Justice Tendol- kar (all cited above); E.P. Royappe v. State of Tamil  Nadu, [1974] 2 SCR 348; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978]  1 SCC  248;  Ramana  v. International  Airport  Authority   of India,  AIR 1979 SC 1928; Union of India v. Tulsiram  Patel, [1985]  3 SCC 398; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of  India, [1981] 2 SCR 533; and Central Inland Water Transport  Corpo- ration v. Brojo Nath, AIR 1986 SC 1971.     In Devadasan v. Union of India, [1964] 4 SCR 680 wherein Subba Rao, J as he then was, has dissented from the majority and pointed out that the expression "equality before the law or  the equal protection of the laws’* means equality  among equals and that Article 14 does not provide for an  absolute equality  of treatment to all persons in utter disregard  in every conceivable circumstance of the differences. 105     In   Birendra  Kumar  Nigam  and  Others  v.  Union   of India,Writ   Petition  Nos.  220-222  of  1963  decided   on 13.3.1964, three writ petitions were filed under Article  32 of the Constitution raising a common question regarding  the constitutional validity of certain rules framed by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and certain directions issued by it relative  to  the appearance of Assistants employed  in  the Central  Secretariat Service in the competitive  examination held by the Union Public Service Commission for  recruitment to  certain All India Services. In each of the  above  three petitions,  grounds  of challenge was same  viz.,  that  the impugned rules and directions were violative of Articles  14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution.     The  facts  in  relation to  the  three  petitions  were slightly  different.  Therefore, by way of  illustration  we will  tersely  state the facts in Writ Petition No.  220  of 1963.     The petitioner in that case was appointed to the post of an  Assistant in the Central Secretariat Service  from  1956 and  he  joined the same on 29.8.56. But in  March  of  that year, he had already submitted his application to be includ- ed as a candidate for competing in the combined  examination for  the several All India Services- IAS, IFS, IPS  and  the several  categories of the All India Central  Services,  the Examination for which was held in September 1956 but  before that date he received an information from the Home  Ministry that he could not appear for that examination because he was still on probation. prior to the date on which he  completed his probation and was confirmed as an Assistant, the  Minis- try  of  Home Affairs issued the  impugned  notification  on 14.3.1957  pointing out that there was an acute shortage  of Grade IV Assistants in the Secretariat Service and that  the Assistants would not be permitted to compete at the examina- tion to be held in 1957 and that those who were desirous  of competing  their candidature would be restricted to  an  ap- pointment to Grade III of the Central Secretariat alone.     We are not giving the facts of other two writ  petitions since the common question decided was the same.     Rajagopala Ayyangar, J while speaking for the  Constitu- tion Bench in that case has held:               "If, as must must be, it is conceded that  the               existencies,  convenience, or necessity  or  a

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             particular department might justify the  impo-               sition of a total ban on the employees in that               department,  from seeking employment in  other               departments, a partial ban which permits  them               to seek only certain posts in the               106               same  department  cannot be  characterised  as               illegal as being discriminatory. The mere fact               therefore  that  under the rules  officers  in               certain  other  departments are  permitted  to               compete  for  a Class I post is no  ground  by               itself for considering such a variation as  an               unreasonable   discrimination,  violative   of               Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution  as               not based on a classification having a ration-               al and reasonable relation to the object to be               attained. Of course, no rule imposes a’ ban on               these  employees  resigning  their  posts  and               competing  for posts in the  open  competition               along with ’open market ’candidates."                   As  we have repeatedly held that  each  of               the  civil  services, namely  IAS,  IFS,  IPS,               Group ’A’ Services and Group ’B’ Services is a               separate  and  determinate service  forming  a               distinct  cadre and that each of the  services               is  founded on intelligible differentia  which               on  rational  grounds  distinguishes   persons               grouped together from those left out and  that               the  differences  are  real  and   substantial               having a rational and reasonable nexus to  the               objects  sought to be achieved and that  there               is no question of unfairness or  arbitrariness               in  the executive action in adding the  second               proviso  to  the  substantive rule  4  of  CSE               Rules.  When  the submission  of  the  learned               counsel for the appellants is carefully  exam-               ined  in the backdrop of the legal  principles               and  the  factual  position, we  are  in  full               agreement  with conclusion arrived at  by  the               Tribunal  that the impugned second proviso  to               Rule  4 is not violative of Articles 14 or  16               of the Constitution of India.               In Summation:                   The  impugned second proviso to Rule 4  of               the CSE Rules introduced by Notification  llll               No.  13016/4/86-  AIS(1) dated  13.12.1986  is               legally  and constitutionally valid  and  sus-               tainable  in law and the said proviso  neither               travels  beyond the intent of the  main  rule,               namely,  Rule  4 of the CSE Rules  nor  it  is               ultra-vires  Regulation 4 (iii-a)  of  Regula-               tions,  1955 that it is neither arbitrary  nor               unreasonable  and that there is a dynamic  and               rational  nexus  between the  impugned  second               proviso  and the object to be achieved.  There               is  no discrimination whatsoever  involved  on               account  of  the introduction  of  the  second               proviso  in question and the said  proviso  is               not  ultra-vires Article 14 or Article  16  of               the Constitution of India.                   Before parting with the judgment, we  feel               that it has become necessary to give a specif-               ic  direction to the respondents inclusive  of               the Union Public Service Commission in  pursu-               ance  of the earlier directions given  in  our

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             order  dated  7.12.1990  (vide  Annexure  ’A’)               which  directions were given in  pursuance  of               various  interim orders passed by the  Central               Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench,  New               Delhi and thereafter finally in its final               107               judgments dated 20.8.90, 4.10.90 and  5.10.90.               For  ready  reference  and to  have  a  proper               perspective, we would like to proliferate  the               following passage from our earlier order dated               7.12.1990:               "Hence we permit all those candidates  failing               under Para Nos. 5 (ii), 6 and 7 to sit for the               main examination subject to the condition that               each candidate satisfies the Secretary,  Union               Public Service Commission. that’ he/she  falls               within  these categories and that the  concern               candidates have passed the preliminary  exami-               nation  of 1990 and have also applied for  the               main  examination  within the due  date.  This               permission  is only for the  ensuing  examina-               tion. As we are now permitting those who  have               passed the preliminary examination of 1990 and               have  applied for the main examination on  the               basis  of  the unquestioned  and  unchallenged               directions given under paras 5(ii), 6 and 7 of               the judgment of the CAT, Principal Bench,  New               Delhi,  the  same benefit is extended  to  the               other appellants also who satisfy those condi-               tions  as mentioned under paras 5(ii),  6  and               7."     On  the strength of the above order, we direct  the  re- spondents  inclusive of the Union Public Service  Commission that  all those candidates who have appeared for  the  Civil Services  (Main) Examination, 1990, pursuant to our  permis- sion given in the order dated 7.12.90 and who have come  out successfully in the said examination and thereby have quali- fied themselves for the intervieW, that if those  candidates completely and satisfactorily qualify themselves by  getting through  the written examinations as well as  the  interview shall  be  given proper allocation and  appointment  on  the basis  of their rank in the merit list, notwithstanding  the restriction  imposed by the second proviso and  our  present judgment  upholding the validity of the said  proviso  since the  respondents  have  not questioned  and  challenged  the directions  given  by CAT, Principal Bench, Delhi  in  para- graphs  5(ii), 6 and 7 of its judgment dated  20.8.1990.  We would like to make it clear that the unchallenged  direction given by the CAT in its judgment as well as directions given by  us in our order dated 7.12.90 are not controlled by  any rider in the sense that the said directions were subject  to the result of the cases and hence those directions would  be confined only to those candidates who appeared for CSE, 1990 and no further. The seniority of those successful candidates in CSE, 1990 would depend on the service to which they  have qualified. The seniority of the left-out candidates would be maintained  in  case they have joined the service  to  which they  have been allocated on the result of previous CSE  and such  candidates  will not be subjected to  suffer  loss  of seniority as held by the CAT, Delhi in its judgment. 108     In  the result for the reasons aforementioned the  judg- ments  of  the Tribunal are confirmed subject to  the  above directions and all the appeals are dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs.

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ORDER     We have heard all the learned counsel appearing in their respective appeals and also the learned Additional Solicitor for respondents for a very considerable length of time.  The main  thrust of the argument advanced on behalf of  all  the appellants is that the second proviso to Rule 4 of the Civil Services  Examination  Rules (published in  the  Gazette  of India,  Extraordinary,  Part-I Section, dated  December  17, 1988)  is offending Article 14 of the Constitution of  India and  is  contrary to law. As the above question  requires  a careful  examination  with regard to  the  individual  cases listed  for  consideration and as we are informed  that  the Central Services Examination Commences on 17.12.1990, we arc constrained to give the following directions on the basis of the  conclusions  arrived at by the  Central  Administrative Tribunal,  Principal Bench, New Delhi in its judgment  dated 20th  August 1990. The relevant conclusions as  they  appear from the concluding portion of the judgment of the  Tribunal are as follows:-               5(ii).     A candidate who has been  allocated               to the I.P.S. or to a Central Services,  Group               ’A’  May be allowed to sit at the  next  Civil               Service Examination, provided he is within the               permissible  age  limit,  without  having   to               resign  from the service to which he has  been               allocated,  nor  would he  lose  his  original               seniority in the service to which he is  allo-               cated  if he is unable to take  training  with               his own Batch.               6.   Those applicants who have been  allocated               to  the I.P.S. or any Central Services,  Group               ’A’,  can have one more attempt in the  subse-               quent  Civil  Services  Examination  for   the               services  indicated in Rule 17 of  the  C.S.E.               Rules.  The Cadre Controlling Authorities  can               grant one opportunity to such candidates.                7.  All these candidates who have been  allo-               cated  to any of the Central  Services,  Group               ’A’, or I.P.S. and who have appeared in  Civil               Services Main Examination of a subsequent year               under  the interim orders of the Tribunal  for               the Civil Services Examination in 1988 or 1989               and have succeeded, are to be given benefit of               their  success  subject to the  provisions  of               Rule  17 of the C.S.E. Rules. But this  exemp-               tion will not be available for any  subsequent               Civil Services Examination. 109     It  is  pertinent to note that the  respondent  has  not challenged the above directions given in the concluding part of the judgment. So far as the conclusions under para Nos. 6 and  7  reproduced above, the learned  Additional  Solicitor General states that the respondent has no objection to  have them  sustained. So far as the directions under para  No.  5 (ii)  is concerned, the Tribunal has allowed the  candidates who  have been allocated to the I.P.S or the  Central  Serv- ices, Group ’A’ to sit at the next Civil Service Examination subject  to the condition that they must be within the  per- missible  age  limit and without having to resign  from  the service  to  which they have been allocated nor  would  they lose  their original seniority in the service to which  they are allocated if they are unable to take training with their own  Batch. The Tribunal has used their expression  "may  be allowed to sit at the next Civil Service Examination but  it did  not  restrict it only with regard  to  the  preliminary

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examination  as  now  contended by  the  learned  Additional Solicitor, according to whom those candidates are not eligi- ble  to sit for the main examination since the Tribunal  has upheld  the validity of the second proviso to Rule 4 of  the CSE Rules.     In  order  to  properly understand  and  appreciate  the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal under para 5(ii),  we shall  reproduce  some interim orders made by  the  Tribunal during the hearing of the O.As.     In  M.P. No. 1269/90 in OA No. 1074/90  dated  31.5.1990 which  has given rise to SLP (Civil) Nos.  13525-38/90,  the C.A.T., New Delhi has passed the following order:-               "We  have  heard the learned counsel  for  the               parties  and  considered the  matter.  In  our               opinion,  a direction should be issued to  the               respondents to permit the applicants to appear               in the preliminary C.S.E. 1990 without  press-               ing  for their resignations from  the  service               and respondents may also grant them  necessary               leave etc. This interim order will be  subject               to  the order in O.A. 206/1989  and  connected               cases."     Interim order passed on 4.6.1990 in Regn. No.  0A/160/90 by  CAT, New Delhi which has given rise to Civil Appeal  No. 5470/90 reads thus:-               "The learned counsel for the applicant  states               that  the applicant has applied for  the  1990               Civil Services Preliminary Examination well in               time  and has also received Roll  Number  from               the  Union Public Service Commission and  that               he  is  not  being allowed to  appear  in  the               Examination in view of the power conferred  by               the  second  proviso to Rule 4  of  the  Civil               Services Examination 1987. The examination  is               going  to  be held on 10.6.1990.  In  view  of               this,  we direct that if it is convenient  and               administratively  possible,  the   respondents               shall allow the ap-               110               plicant  provisionally to appear in  the  said               examination.  Respondents  may  also  consider               granting  him  necessary leave  etc.  for  the               purpose. Issue dasti."     In M.P. No. 1251/90 in O.A. No.944/1989 which has  given rise to Civil Appeal No. 5471/90, CAT, New Delhi has  passed the  following order:-               "We have heard learned counsel for the parties               and  we  think it will be in the  interest  of               justice to allow the prayer for interim  order               to enable the petitioner to sit in the prelim-               inary  C.S.E.  1990. Learned counsel  for  the               petitioner  states  that  the  petitioner  has               received the admission card. He is directed to               give  the  Registration No./Roll  No.  to  the               Secretary,  UPSC  by 4.6.1990. We  direct  the               respondents to permit the petitioner to appear               in the preliminary C.S.E. 1990 without  press-               ing  for his resignation from the service  and               also  grant him necessary leave etc.  for  ap-               pearing in the said examination. This  interim               order  will  be subject to the  order  in  OA.               944/1989.  The Misc. Petition  is  accordingly               disposed of.               Order dasti."

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   In  OA  913/90  (MP  1133/90)  and  CA  No.  914/90  (MP 1134/90),  which have given rise to Civil Appeal Nos.  5506- 5525/90  the  Tribunal  has passed the  following  order  on 17.5.1990:-                         "As  regards  interim  relief,   the               respondents are directed to permit the  appli-               cants to appear in the Civil Services Examina-               tion 1990 and to provide necessary  facilities               like  leave etc. to enable them to  appear  in               the  ensuing Civil Services Examination,  1990               subject to the decisions in the Bunch of eases               including O.A.No. 206/89 Alok Kurnar& Ors.  v.               U.O.I.               List the matter on 29.5.1990.               Orders (Dasti)"     It  seems no clarification has been sought for from  the Tribunal  by  the respondents as to whether  the  expression "next  Civil  Service Examination" is confined only  to  the preliminary  or  whether it includes  the  main  examination also.  Though  some  of the interim orders  passed  by   the Tribunal  which we have extracted above show that  the  said interim orders were passed permitting the candidates to  sit for  the  preliminary Central Service  Examination  of  1990 subject to the decisions of the O.As, in the final judgment, no  restriction  is shown. In other  words,  the  conclusion under para 5(ii) is          111 not  limited  subject to any contingency; but on  the  other hand, it is absolute.     Therefore, that expression in the absence of any specif- ic restriction, has to include both the preliminary as  well as the main examinations. Hence in the absence of any  chal- lenge  to the directions embodied in the impugned  judgment, we  hold  that all those candidates falling under  para  No. 5(ii)  can sit both for the preliminary as well as the  main examinations  Subject  to their eligibility  otherwise.  The condition  incorporated  in the later part of  the  impugned proviso  that they should resign from the service  to  which they have been allocated would not operate against them  for the  main examination of 1990 lest that direction  would  be meaningless.        Hence  we permit all those candidates  falling  under Para  Nos.5(ii),  6 and 7 to sit for  the  main  examination subject  to the condition that each candidate satisfies  the Secretary, Union Public Service Commission that he/she falls within  these categories and that the  concerned  candidates have  passed  the preliminary examination of 1990  and  have also  applied for the main examination within the due  date. This  permission is only for the ensuing examination. As  we are  now  permitting those who have passed  the  preliminary examination  of 1990 and have applied for the main  examina- tion  on  the  basis of the  unquestioned  and  unchallenged directions given under paras 5(ii), 6 and 7 of the  judgment of the CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi, the same benefit  is extended  to  the other appellants also  who  satisfy  those conditions as mentioned under paras 5(ii), 6 and 7.     The Secretary, Union Public Service Commission will make the  necessary arrangements enabling the candidates  to  sit for the main examination of 1990.      We will give the judgment touching on the constitution- ality of the second proviso to Rule 4 of CSE Rules later. We would once again like to state that the above directions are given  only  on the basis of  the  unchallenged  conclusions arrived at by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi.

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T.N.A                                  Appeals dismissed. 112