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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2851 of 2005

PETITIONER: Microwave Project, Kota & Anr

RESPONDENT: Ramesh Chand

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/07/2007

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.      Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a  Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench,  dismissing the special leave filed by the appellant.

2.      Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

       Respondent was engaged as a casual labourer by the  Assistant Engineer of the Microwave Project Borabas for the  job of fixing of nuts and bolts in the Microwave Tower.  After  completion of the work and commissioning of the Microwave  Towers, respondent was relieved from his job on 1.12.1987.   Office of the Microwave, Kota, was also abolished as there was  no need of work and in any event it was only of casual nature.   Respondent raised a dispute to the effect that there was  termination of his services which is illegal. The Labour  Ministry, Govt. of India vide order dated 30.9.1991 referred the  following dispute under Section 10(1) of the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ’Act’) to the Industrial  Tribunal (Central) Kota, Rajasthan.

"Whether the action of the AEN  Microwave Project, Kota & LET, Jaipur in  terminating the services of Shri Ramesh  Chand, S/o Shri Jankidas, Casual Labour  under AEN Microwave Project, Kota at  Lawatbhata w.e.f. 1.12. 1987 is justified?  If  not, to what relief the concerned workman is  entitled?"

3.      On behalf of the applicant it was pleaded that he had  been engaged as casual labourer on 8.12.1986 and, therefore,  he having worked for more than 240 days in 12 calendar  months could not have been terminated. The appellant took  the stand that the respondent was engaged for doing a  particular work on a casual labour basis. Since the  establishment itself was closed after completion of the work  there was no scope for accepting the prayer of the respondent.   The Tribunal held that since the respondent worked for 240  days in the establishment of the present appellant, his  termination will be bad as there was violation of the  mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the Act.  Removal  from service amounted to retrenchment under Section 2 (oo) of  the Act. With these conclusions it was held that the

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respondent was entitled to be re-employed to continue to be in  service along with the 30% back wages.  A writ petition was  filed before the High Court.  A learned Single Judge by a very  cryptic order held that the Labour Court has held that there  was violation of the requirements of Section 25-F of the Act  and, therefore, there was no legality. The Division Bench came  to the similar conclusions.

4.      In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant  submitted that there is no dispute that the engagement was  for a specific project. The Tribunal has categorically noted  about these aspects but granted relief to the respondent.  It  was noted that the office of the present appellant was under  the Jaipur Division and the new Kota Division has been  created after bifurcation of the Division.

5.      In response, learned counsel for the respondent  submitted that it should be accepted that the project has been  completed, yet in view of the fact that there was bifurcation,  the Tribunal was justified in its conclusion.

6.      We find that the Tribunal failed to consider the issues in  proper perspective. The effect of Section 2(oo)(bb) has been  completely lost sight of. There was no dispute that the  employment was for a specific project. There was no  discussion of the various materials produced before the  Tribunal.  The orders of the High Court proceeded on the basis  that because there was non-compliance with the requirements  of Section 25-F, the Award was justified.  The  question  of    the applicability of Section 25-F of the  Act  would be  dependent  upon  the  basic  question relating to applicability  of Section 2(oo)(bb) of  the  Act.  That  aspect has been lost  sight of. We, therefore, think it appropriate to remit the matter  to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. Parties will be  permitted to place material in support of their respective  stand. As the matter is pending since long, we request the  Tribunal to dispose of the matter within a period of four  months from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment.

7.      Appeal is allowed with no orders as to costs.