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PETITIONER: MEWA RAM (DECEASED) BY HIS L.RS. AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA THROUGH THE LANDACQUISITION COLLECTOR, GURG

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/08/1986

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR   45            1986 SCR  (3) 660  1986 SCC  (4) 151        JT 1986   246  1986 SCALE  (2)350  CITATOR INFO :  R          1991 SC 730  (4,6)

ACT:      Limitation Act,  1963, section  5-Inordinate  delay  in filing S.L.P.-Delay not explained-Whether enhancement of the rate of  compensation by  the Court  in a  subsequent case a sufficient ground for condoning delay in filing a S. L. P.      Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894.  Sections  25  and  28A- Redetermination   of   the   amount   of   compensation-When permissible.

HEADNOTE:      The petitioners, after a lapse of more than three years from the  date of the High Court Judgment, filed the present petitions for  enhancement of  the rate  of compensation  to 17.50 per  square yard  on the ground that the Supreme Court in two  cases decided on April 1, 1982 had enhanced the rate of compensation to Rs.17.50 per square yard for the adjacent land acquired.  Counsel for the petitioners’ con tended that the Court  should not  be unduly  technical and  deprive the citizens of their legitimate claims in view of the change in law by  the introduction  of sections 25 and 28A in the Land Acquisition Act  by the  Land Acquisition  (Amendment)  Act, 1984.      Dismissing the petitions,      HELD: There  is no  reason to  grant special  leave  in these cases  which are  hopelessly barred  by  time.  Merely because the Supreme Court in the two cases enhanced the rate of compensation  to Rs.17.50  per  square  yard,  could  not furnish a ground for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. [663D-E]      2.1 Section  28A of  the Act in terms does not apply to the case of the petitioners for more than one reason. In the first place, they do not belong to that class of society for whose benefit  the provision  is intended  and  meant,  i.e. inarticulate and poor people who by reason of their 661 poverty and  ignorance have  failed to take advantage of the right of  A reference to the civil court under section 18 of the Land  Acquisition Act,  1894. The  petitioners  had  all applied for  reference under  section 18  of the Act and the

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civil court  by adopting  a different basis for computation, namely, treating  the land  to be  potential building  site, substantially  enhanced   the  amount  of  compensation.  On appeal, there  was further enhancement by the High Court and the petitioners  have withdrawn  large sums of money at each stage. Evidently,  the petitioners  felt satisfied  with the enhanced amount of compensation as awarded by the High Court @ Rs.  12.25 per  square yard because they did not apply for grant of  special leave  under Art.  136 of the Constitution for more than three years. [662H; 663A-E]      2.2 There  is also  no provision  in the Act apart from section 28A for reopening of an award which has become final and conclusive.  If the  conditions laid down in the section were satisfied,  the petitioners  could have  availed of the remedy provided under section 28A of the Act. In that event, section 25  would ensure  to their  benefit. Any  other view would lead  to disasterous  consequences not intended by the Legislature. [663E-G]      Madras Port  Trust v.  Hymanshu  International  by  its Proprietor v.Venkatadri  (dead) by  Lrs., [1979]  4 SCC 176, distinguished.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  J URlSDICTION:  Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.13379 of 1983 etc.      From the  judgment and  order  dated  8.5.1980  of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.F.A. No.2030 of 1978.      S.N. Kacker and S.K. Sabharwal for the Petitioners. F      K.G. Bhagat,  I.S. Goel  and C.V.  Subba  Rao  for  the Respondents.      The order of the Court was delivered by      SEN, J. In these special leave petitions which are much belated the  only question  was  whether  the  Court  should entertain the  petitions despite the delay and grant special leave merely  because this  Court in  Paltu Singh  & Anr. v. State of  Haryana and Nand Kishore & ors. v.State of Haryana & Ors.(Civil  Appeals Nos.  1251  and  1252  of  1982,  both decided on  April 1, 1982) enhanced the rate of compensation for 662 the adjacent  land acquired to Rs.17.50 per square yard. The petition of Mewa Ram is barred by l079 days, that of Pat Ram by 1146  days and  of Ram  Sarup by  1098 days. We heard the matter  thrice   on  the  question  whether  there  was  any sufficient cause  for condonation  of delay under s.5 of the Limitation Act,  1963. We  were not satisfied that there was any cause  much less  sufficient cause within the meaning of s.5 of  the Limitation  Act for  condonation of  delay.  The petitioners then  took  time  to  file  further  and  better affidavits explaining  the unexplained,  inordinate delay in moving the Court.      At  the  resumed  hearing  Shri  S.N.  Kacker,  learned counsel for  the petitioners, confines his submission to the change in  law by  the introduction of ss. 25 and 28A by the Land Acquisition  (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act 68 of 1984) and places particular  emphasis to  Para (ix) of the objects and Reasons, to the effect:           "Considering that  the right  of reference  to the           civil court  under s. 18 of the Act is not usually           taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor people           and is usually exercised only by the comparatively           affluent   landowners   and   that   this   causes           considerable inequality  in the payment of compen-

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         sation for  the same or similar quality of land to           different interested  parties, it  is proposed  to           provide an  opportunity to  all aggrieved  parties           whose land  is covered under the same notification           to seek re-determination of compensation, once any           one of  them has  obtained orders  for payment  of           higher compensation  from the  reference court un-           der s. 18 of the Act. "      The learned  counsel contends  on the  strength of  the provisions contained in ss. 25 and 28A that the Court should not be  unduly technical  and deprive  the citizens of their legitimate claims. In support of his submission he relies on certain observations made by this Court in Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu  International by  its Proprietor  V. Venkatadri (dead) by  Lrs., [1979] 4 SCC 176 to the effect that plea of limitation by  the  Government  to  defeat  just  claims  of citizens should  not be  countenanced. We  are  afraid,  the contention cannot prevail.      Shri Kacker,  learned counsel for the petitioners, with his usual  fairness, accepts  that s.  28A in terms does not apply to  the case  of the  petitioners for  more  than  one reason. In the first place, they do not belong to that class of society for whose benefit the provision is in- 663 tended and  meant i.e.  inarticulate and  poor people who by reason of  their poverty  and ignorance  have failed to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under s.18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. On the contrary, the petitioners belong  to an  affluent class,  and they are not persons who  have been  deprived of property without payment of compensation.  The petitioners had all applied for refer- ence under s.18 of the Act and the civil court by adopting a different basis  for computation,  namely. treating the land to be  potential building  site, substantially  enhanced the amount  of   compensation.  On  appeal.  there  was  further enhancement  by   the  High   Court.  The  petitioners  have withdrawn large  sums of  money at each stage. For instance, the  petitioner  Mewa  Ram  withdrew  on  February  6,  1976 consequent upon  the award of the Land Acquisition Collector Rs.1,19,000, an  additional sum  of Rs.28,938.20p.  On March 23, 1978  after  the  judgment  of  the  learned  Additional District Judge,  and Rs.2,75, l05.42p. after the judgment of the High  Court between  December 11,  1981 and February 13, 1982. The  judgment  of  the  High  Court  not  having  been appealed from  has admittedly  become final.  Evidently, the petitioners felt  satisfied  with  the  enhanced  amount  of compensation as  awarded by  the High  Court @  Rs.12.25 per square yard  because they did not apply for grant of special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution for more than three years. Merely  because this  Court in the two cases of Paltu Singh and  Nand Kishore enhanced the rate of compensation to Rs.17.50 per  square yard,  could not  furnish a  ground for condonation of delay under s. 5 of the Limitation Act.      Furthermore, there  is no  provision in  the Act  apart from s. 28A for reopening of an award which has become final and conclusive.  No  doubt  s.  28A  now  provides  for  the redetermination of  the amount  of compensation provided the conditions  laid   down  therein  are  fulfilled.  For  such redetermination,  the   forum  is   the  Collector  and  the application has  to be  made before  him within  thirty days from the  date of  the award, and the right is restricted to persons who had not applied for reference under s. 18 of the Act. If  these conditions  were satisfied,  the  petitioners could have  availed of  the remedy  provided under s. 28A of the Act. In that event, s. 25 would ensure to their benefit.

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Any other  view would  lead to  disasterous consequences not intended by the Legislature.      The decision  in Madras  Port Trust’s  case is  clearly distinguishable. The  question involved  there was as to the right of  refund of  the amount  of wharfage,  demurrage and transit charges which admittedly 664 became exigible.  The Court  granted special  leave  on  the condition that the Madras Port Trust would refund the amount irrespective of the result of the appeal. At the hearing the Court declined  to go into the question whether the claim of the trader  for such  refund was  barred by  s. 1 l() of the Madras Port Trust Act. 1905. and added:           "The plea  of limitation  based on this section is           one  which   the  court  always  looks  upon  with           disfavour and  it is  unfortunate  that  a  public           authority like  the  Port  Trust  should,  in  all           morality and  justice, take  up  such  a  plea  to           defeat a just claim of the citizen." The Court then said:           "It is  high  time  that  governments  and  public           authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon           technical  pleas  for  the  purpose  of  defeating           legitimate claims  of citizens and do what is fair           and just to the citizens. " This is  mere expression of a hope and does not lay down any universal  rule   of  application  that  the  Government  is prevented from  pleading limitation  as a  bar. On the other hand, the  Court itself  observed in the Madras Port Trust’s case that  ’if a government or a public authority takes up a technical plea,  the Court  has to decide it and if the plea is  well-founded   it  has  to  be  upheld  by  the  Court’. Obviously, the  petitioners cannot plead their own laches as a ground sufficient for condonation of delay.      There is  no reason  for us  to grant  special leave in these cases which are hopelessly barred by time and there is no justification for condonation of inordinate delay.      The special  leave petitions  are accordingly dismissed with costs. M.L.A.                                  Petitions dismissed. 665