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PETITIONER: MEET SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/02/1980

BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1980 AIR 1141            1980 SCR  (2)1152  1980 SCC  (3) 291  CITATOR INFO :  R          1984 SC1594  (2)

ACT:      "Special Reasons"  in ordinary  and in  the context  of sentencing process-Meaning  of-Prevention of Corruption Act, Section 5(2) and proviso there to scope of-Duty of the Court while  exercising   its  discretion   under   the   proviso, explained.

HEADNOTE:      Section 5(2)  of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 prescribes a  minimum sentence  of one year, in all cases of conviction under  the Act, with a proviso that the Court may for  any  special  reasons  recorded  in  writing  impose  a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year.      The  petitioner  was  convicted  for  having  committed offences under  section 161  I.P.C. and Section 5(2) of POCA and was  sentenced to suffer R.I. for one year on each count and on  the second  count, also to pay a fine of Rs. 400/-or in default  to suffer  further R.I.  for three months by the learned Special  Judge. Both  the substantive  sentences  of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently.      In  appeal   the  High  Court,  while  maintaining  the conviction, reduced  the substantive  sentence  of  rigorous imprisonment for one year to the sentence undergone till the date of  the Judgment  of the  High Court  and increased the fine to  Rs. 4,000/-(Rupees  four thousand) or in default to suffer further  R.I. for  one year. The High Court, while so altering the  sentence, took  into consideration  two facts, namely, (i)  that the  petitioner was dismissed from service and (ii) that he is a family man.      Dismissing the  special leave  petition of  the convict against his  conviction, there being no appeal by State, the Court ^      HELD: 1. The language of the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Prevention  of Corruption  Act makes it abundantly clear that court  is under  an  obligation  to  impose  a  minimum punishment once  the conviction  is recorded  under  Section 5(2) and  the minimum  punishment of  imprisonment is  for a term not less than one year. Undoubtedly the proviso confers power on the Court to award less than the minimum punishment

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if the  Court convicting  and sentencing  the accused, is of the opinion  that for any special reasons which the Court is under an  obligation  to  record  in  writing,  sentence  of imprisonment for a term less than the minimum is called for. Conceding that  the quantum of sentence is in the discretion of the  trial Court,  where the  Legislature stepped  in and circumscribed  and  fettered  the  discretion  by  directing imposing of  a minimum  sentence, the court can exercise its discretion  within   the  limited   spheres  left   open  by legislature. The Legislature circumscribed the discretion by requiring the  Court to  impose minimum sentence but left it open to  award less  than the minimum statutorily prescribed for special reasons. The reasons have to be special reasons. The words ’special reasons’ in the context in which they are 1153 used could only mean special to the accused on whom sentence is being imposed. The Court has to weigh reasons advanced in respect of  each individual  accused whose  case is taken up for awarding sentence. [1155C-G]      In the  instant case,  there was  no justification much less special reasons statutorily required, for awarding less than the  minimum sentence. Stricto sensu court exceeded its jurisdiction while interfering with the quantum of sentence. [1157E]      Jagdish Prasad v. West Bengal, [1972] 2 S.C.R. p. 845 @ 851, relied on.      2.  The   word  "special"   has  to  be  understood  in contradistinction to word "general" or "ordinary". "Special" means distinguished  by some  unusual quality,  out  of  the ordinary.  Again  "special"  means  ’particular’;  peculiar; different from  others; designed  for a  particular purpose, occasion,  or  person;  limited  in  range;  confined  to  a definite field  of action. Thus, anything which is common to a large class governed by the same statute cannot be said to be special  to each  of them.  And, "special reasons" in the context of sentencing process must be special to the accused in the case or special to the facts and circumstances of the case in  which the  sentence  is  being  awarded.  [1155G-H, 1156A]      3. In  the instant  case, the  only two reasons special according to  the High  Court for  awarding  less  than  the minimum sentence  are (i)  appellant before  it has lost his job and  (ii) and  he is  a married man with children. These two reasons  would be common to ninety nine percent of cases tried under  Prevention of Corruption Act and if they can be styled as  "special reasons"  for  awarding  less  than  the minimum  sentence  the  proviso  would  be  rendered  wholly nugatory. [1156G-H, 1157A] Observation:      The Court  should not  be oblivious  to the  fact  that while  conferring  discretion  in  the  matter  of  awarding adequate sentence  within limits  prescribed by the statute, the Legislature  finding  cases  of  misplaced  sympathy  in sentencing  process   fettered  the  Court’s  discretion  by prescribing a  minimum sentence  and making it obligatory to record special  reasons for  awarding less than the minimum. If still  the notice  of encroachments on court’s discretion is not  taken, time  may not be far when the Legislature out of exasperation may resort to what it has done in Section 16 of  Prevention   of  Food  Adulteration  Act  where  minimum sentence is  prescribed and Court’s discretion to award less in any case is wholly taken away. [1157A-C]

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JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 405 of 1980.      Appeal by  special leave  from the  judgment and  Order dated 31-10-1979  of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Crl. Appeal No. 986/77.      N. C.  Talukdar, Shrinath  Singh and  M. S. Dhillon for the Petitioner.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      DESAI, J.-While  we decline  to grant  special leave in this case, an unsavoury feature of the judgment which rather stares into our 1154 face, and surfaces at regular intervals, makes it obligatory to make a few observations.      Petitioner was  convicted for having committed offences under Section  161 of  the I.P.C.  and Section  5(2) of  the Prevention of  Corruption Act  and was  sentenced to  suffer R.I. for  one year  on each  count and  on the second count, also to  pay a  fine of  Rs. 400/-or  in default  to  suffer further R.I.  for three months by the learned Special Judge. Both the Substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently.      Petitioner preferred  Criminal Appeal  No. 989  of 1977 against his  conviction and  sentence to  the High  Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.      This appeal  came up for final hearing before a learned single judge  of the  High Court on 31st October, 1979. When the appeal was taken up for hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner appearing  in the  High Court  did  not  question either the  correctness or  the legality  of the conviction. This is  unquestionable as the High Court has observed while disposing of  the appeal  that "no  arguments on  merits are advanced".  The   High  Court  then  proceeded  to  consider adequacy or  otherwise of  sentence imposed on the appellant before it.  The High  Court then  proceeded  to  reduce  the substantive  sentence   of   the   appellant   of   rigorous imprisonment for one year to the sentence undergone till the date of  the judgment  of the  High Court. While so reducing the  substantive   sentence  the   High  Court  noticed  the following circumstances  which in  the opinion  of the  High Court were  sufficient to  enable it  to interfere  with the sentences imposed  upon the  present petitioner. It would be advantageous to extract the relevant observations:-      "The  learned   counsel  for  the  appellant  has  only submitted that the appellant has already been dismissed from service; that  he is a family man, and that his sentence may be reduced  to that  already undergone. In my view no useful purpose will be served by sending him again to jail to serve his unexpired  period of  sentence. He  has already lost his job. The  ends of  justice will be amply met if his sentence of imprisonment  is reduced  to that  already undergone  and instead sentence  of fine  is enhanced  from Rs.  400 to Rs. 4000 (four  thousand) or  in default  to suffer further R.I. for one year. I order accordingly."      The judgment  of the  High Court throws no light on the question as to how much sentence the appellant had undergone by the time the 1155 High Court  released him on bail while admitting his appeal. But it cannot be more than a few days only.      Petitioner as  pointed out  earlier  is  convicted  for committing offences  under Section  161 IPC  and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act reads as under:-

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         "Any   public   servant   who   commits   criminal      misconduct shall  be punishable with imprisonment for a      term which  shall not  be less  than one year but which      may extend  to seven  years and shall also be liable to      fine:           Provided that  the  court  may,  for  any  special      reasons recorded  in  writing,  impose  a  sentence  of      imprisonment of less than one year." (underlining ours)      The language  of the  proviso makes it abundantly clear that court  is under  an  obligation  to  impose  a  minimum punishment once  the conviction  is recorded  under  Section 5(2) and  the minimum  punishment of  imprisonment is  for a term not less than one year. Undoubtedly the proviso confers power  on   the  Court   to  award  less  than  the  minimum punishment, if  the  Court  convicting  and  sentencing  the accused, is  of the  opinion that  for any  special  reasons which the court is under an obligation to record in writing, sentence of imprisonment for a term less than the minimum is called for. Conceding that the quantum of sentence is in the discretion of the trial court, where the Legislature stepped in  and   circumscribed  and   fettered  the  discretion  by directing imposition  of a  minimum sentence,  the court can exercise its  discretion within the limited sphere left open by legislature. The Legislature circumscribed the discretion by requiring  the court  to impose minimum sentence but left it  open   to  award   less  than  the  minimum  statutorily prescribed for  special reasons.  The  reasons  have  to  be special reasons.  The words ’special reasons’ in the context in which  they are  used could  only  mean  special  to  the accused on  whom sentence is being imposed. The court has to weigh reasons advanced in respect of each individual accused whose case  is taken  up for  awarding  sentence.  The  word ’special’ has  to be understood in contradistinction to word ’general’  or  ’ordinary’.  Now  what  does  term  ’special’ connote ?  "Special" means  distinguished  by  some  unusual quality; out  of  the  ordinary.  (See  Words  and  Phrases, Permanent  Edition,  Volume  39A  p.  82.)  Webster  defines "special" as  particular; peculiar;  different from  others; designed for  a particular  purpose,  occasion,  or  person; limited in  range; confined  to a  definite field of action. Thus anything which is common to a large class 1156 governed by the same statute cannot be said to be special to each of  them. It  would  thus  unquestionably  appear  that "special reasons"  in the context of sentencing process must be special  to the  accused in  the case  or special  to the facts and  the  circumstances  of  the  case  in  which  the sentence is being awarded.      The High  Court then  was under  an obligation to award minimum  sentence   unless  the   accused  advanced  special reasons, i.e.  special to him in the facts and circumstances of the  case and  successfully invoked the discretion vested in the  Court  to  award  less  than  the  minimum  sentence prescribed by  law. The  Court observes  that this appellant corrupt  officer   whose  corruption   was  proved   to  its satisfaction because  the High  Court declined  to interfere with the  conviction of the appellant for corruption and who must consequently or of necessity be dismissed from service, considered his  dismissal from  service as a special reason. Frankly speaking  the High Court honestly did not expect any corrupt officer  to be  retained in  service.  Ordinarily  a corrupt official  whose corruption  is proved to the hilt is liable to  be dismissed,  and therefore,  this aspect is not special to  the appellant.  Accordingly if an officer proved to be  corrupt to the satisfaction of the court is liable to

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be dismissed  it cannot  influence the question of sentence. Also because  it would  be true of all public servants dealt with under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Another special  reason that  appealed to  the High Court is that appellant  is a  ’family man’.  Possibly the High Court considered marriage and children of the appellant as special to him. An unusually large number of the Government officers from amongst those charged with corruption and convicted for the same  would be  married men  with  family,  unless  they joined service  before marriage and became corrupt very soon at the  inception of  the career.  And ordinarily speaking a family of  corrupt officer in some cases if not all benefits by the  corrupt activity  unless shown to the contrary which is not  the case.  If large  number of  public servants from those convicted  under section  5(2) of  the  Prevention  of Corruption Act  are married  men  with  children  it  passes comprehension how  this fact can be styled as special to the appellant influencing  his sentence.  It  may  be  mentioned without fear  of contradiction  that the  only two  reasons, special according  to the  High Court for awarding less than the minimum  sentence are (i) appellant has lost his job and (ii) he  is a  married man  with children. These two reasons would be common to ninety nine per cent of cases tried under Prevention of  Corruption Act  and if  they can be styled as special reasons for awarding less than the 1157 minimum  sentence  the  proviso  would  be  rendered  wholly nugatory. The Court should not be oblivious to the fact that while  conferring  discretion  in  the  matter  of  awarding adequate sentence  within limits  prescribed by the statute, the Legislature  finding  cases  of  misplaced  sympathy  in sentencing  process   fettered  the  Court’s  discretion  by prescribing a  minimum sentence  and making it obligatory to record special  reasons for  awarding less than the minimum. If still  the notice  of encroachments on court’s discretion is not  taken, time  may not be far when the Legislature out of exasperation may resort to what it has done in Section 16 of  Prevention   of  Food  Adulteration  Act  where  minimum sentence is  prescribed and Courts’ discretion to award less in any  case is  wholly taken away. In this context it would be timely  to recall  the warning  uttered by  this Court in Jagdish Prasad v. West Bengal This Court said:           "Offences under  the Act  being anti-social crimes      affecting the  health and well-being of our people, the      Legislature having  regard to  the trend  of courts  to      impose in  most cases only fines or where a sentence of      imprisonment was  passed a  light sentence  was awarded      even in cases where a severe sentence was called for, a      more drastic  step was  taken by  it in  prescribing  a      minimum sentence  and a minimum fine to be imposed even      for a first offence."      In this  case, there  was no  justification, much  less special reasons statutorily required, for awarding less than the minimum  sentence.  stricto  sensu  Court  exceeded  its jurisdiction while interfering with the quantum of sentence. And with  this observation  we  dismiss  the  special  leave petition. S.R.                                     Petition dismissed. 1158