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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2385 of 2008

PETITIONER: Mavji C Lakum

RESPONDENT: Central Bank of India

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/04/2008

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & V.S. Sirpurkar

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T REPORTABLE

CIVIL APPEAL NO 2385 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.6495 of 2005)

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.

1.      Leave granted.

2.      The appellant herein challenges Division Bench judgment of the  High Court of Gujarat dismissing his Writ Appeal.  The said Writ Appeal  was filed against the orders of the learned Single Judge of that court  whereby the Writ Petition filed by the Respondent-bank was allowed  setting aside the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal.  The Industrial  Tribunal had answered the Reference in favour of the appellant and had  set aside the punishment of discharge as also the other punishments and  restricted the said punishment to stoppage of one year’s increment.   3.      Following facts will highlight the controversy involved.   4.      Appellant Mavji C. Lakum had joined the services of the  Respondent-bank as a Peon on 1.9.1951.  He was promoted as a Head  Peon in the year 1963.  While in service, two charge-sheets came to be  served upon the appellant and an inquiry was held against him and he  came to be discharged from the service by an order dated 22.5.1984.  This  order was challenged by the appellant by filing a Regular Suit No.99 of  1984 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Anjar, Kutch-Bhuj.  The  said suit was dismissed.  In the appeal, though the District Court directed  reinstatement but denied the back-wages.   The appellate court also  permitted the Respondent-bank to hold fresh enquiry.  The appellate  judgment was challenged before the High Court by way of Second Appeal  by the appellant where he was awarded 75% back-wages from the date of  filing the suit.    5.     As the order of reinstatement became final, the appellant was  reinstated.  However, since the permission was granted by the District  Court to the respondent-bank to start inquiry afresh, that inquiry was  initiated in accordance with law and in that inquiry the appellant was found  guilty of few charges whereby he was given the punishment of discharge  on two charges. He was given the punishment of stopping his increments  in respect of other charges for which he was found guilty.  A show cause  notice dated 7.2.1991 was issued to the appellant calling upon him to show  cause why the punishment of dismissal should not be imposed upon him.   A reply was submitted by the appellant dated 18.3.1991 wherein he  contended that looking into the nature of the charges, the punishment of  dismissal was very harsh.  He also offered explanation regarding the  charges and the findings.  However, the Disciplinary Authority, after  considering the reply inflicted a composite punishment of discharge.  The  appellant thereafter filed a Departmental Appeal which was dismissed.  

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He, therefore, raised a dispute with regard to punishment of his discharge  and on that basis a Reference came to be made to Industrial Tribunal  (Central), Rajkot which was registered as ITC No.1 of 1993.   6.      The Industrial Tribunal firstly came to the conclusion that the  Departmental Inquiry was just and proper.  However, in so far as the merits  of the allegations were concerned, the Tribunal came to the conclusion  that there was no evidence supporting major charges, though there was  some misconduct on the part of the appellant.  Again the Tribunal  specifically held that the proved misconduct was not so serious as to invite  the extreme punishment of discharge.  Reference was thus partly allowed  and the order of discharge was set aside.  The Tribunal imposed the  punishment of withholding one increment with future effect.  In the  meanwhile the appellant retired from the services of the respondent with  effect from 3rd September, 1994. 7.      The respondent challenged the Award passed by the Industrial  Tribunal by way of a Writ Petition which came to be allowed by the learned  Single Judge who concluded his judgment as follows: "Considering the fact that respondent has been working with  the petitioner bank right from the year 1951 and he had put in  30 years of service before he was discharged from the service  and that now he has retired and reached at the age of 70  years, it is recommended that the petitioner may consider his  case for payment of back wages for the period in question at  the rate of 50%.  This is merely a recommendation and not  direction and it is for the bank to take the decision in this  behalf.  With this observation, this petition stands allowed.   Rule made absolute with no order as to costs."

8.      The judgment of the learned Single Judge was appealed against by  way of a Writ Appeal and as has been stated earlier, the Writ Appeal was  also dismissed, necessitating the present appeal before us. 9.      Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended  that the order of learned Single Judge as also the confirming order in the  Letters Patent Appeal by the Division Bench are patently erroneous.  As  regards the order of the learned Single Judge, the learned counsel  contended that the learned Judge had totally traveled beyond his  jurisdiction and went on to interfere with the findings of fact on re- appreciation of the evidence which was not permissible.  According to the  learned counsel, it was impermissible for the learned Judge to disturb the  findings recorded by Tribunal. According to the learned counsel the  Tribunal had a complete jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 not only to consider the factor of quantum of  punishment but also to re-appreciate the findings reached during the  disciplinary inquiry.  Learned counsel  has taken us through the order of  the Tribunal and has pointed out that the Tribunal had very carefully  appreciated the evidence and had come to the conclusion that the  misconduct proved against the appellant was insignificant and not so  serious so as to invite the extreme punishment of discharge.  According to  the learned counsel, once the Tribunal had exercised its jurisdiction under  Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, there was no question of  interference much less after re-appreciating the findings given by the  Tribunal. 10.     As regards the appellate order, the learned counsel criticized that  the Division Bench did not apply its mind and erroneously dismissed the  appeal treating it to be not maintainable. 11.     As against this, however, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of  the Respondent-bank supported the order of the learned Single Judge and  contended that since that order was passed under Article 227 of the  Constitution of India, the appeal itself was not maintainable.  Learned  counsel also urged that on merits also the order of the learned Single  Judge was absolutely correct.   12.     At the outset we shall consider the contention as to whether the  Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable against the order of the learned  Single Judge.  It was contended by the counsel for the respondent-bank  that the appeal was not maintainable since the learned Single Judge had

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exercised his jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and,  therefore, there was no question of Letters Patent Appeal being  maintainable against the same.  We, therefore, went through the Special  Civil Application, a copy of which is the part of the paperbook.  The said  writ petition clearly mentions on the very first page that the writ petition was  being filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.  Again para 10 of  the writ petition mentions as under: "Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Industrial  Tribunal, the petitioner begs to approach this Hon’ble court  under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the  award on the following amongst other grounds\005."

Ground (iv) on the same page says: "That the order passed by the Tribunal is arbitrary,  unreasonable, unjust and perverse."

Even prayer clause  in para 15 is as under:

"That by appropriate writ, direction and order, the impugned  order of Industrial Tribunal (Central) Rajkot at Annexure B be  quashed and/or set aside."

All this suggests that the writ petition was not only under Article 227 of the  Constitution of India but there is a specific mention of Article 226.  In a  reported decision of this Court in Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar &  Ors. V. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha and others [(1993) Supp. 1  SCC 11] a similar question fell for consideration.  In para 4 of the said  judgment this Court observed: "The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly  understood the above Umaji Kesho Meshram case.  In Umaji  case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in  filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the  Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his  application under both these articles in fairness of justice to  party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of  appeal the court ought to treat the application as being made  under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final  order the court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to  Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the  right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where  the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against  is under Article 226.  Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court  Appellate Side Rules read with clause 15 of the Letters Patent  provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court  from a judgment of the learned Single Judge passed on a writ  petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.  In the present  case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the  appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned  Single Judge.  In these circumstances we set aside the  impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the  Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned  Single Judge would not be heard and decided on merits\005."

These observations were made by this Court after taking into consideration  the observations made in Umaji Keshao Meshram & Ors. V. Radhikabai,  Widow of Anandrao Banapurkar & Anr. [1986 (Supp) SCC 401].  In the  present matter apart from the fact that the petition is labeled under Article  226 of the Constitution of India, it is clear that the grounds raised in the  petition suggest that the petition is not only under Article 227 but also  under Article 226 of the Constitution.  It is to be seen that in the grounds  raised against the order of the Tribunal, it is specifically suggested that the  order passed by the Tribunal was arbitrary, unreasonable, unjust and  perverse.  The further complaint made against the Tribunal’s order pertain  to failure on the part of the Tribunal to appreciate certain facts and  eventualities thereby complaining non application of mind on the part of the

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Tribunal.  Complaint has also been made against the approach of the  Tribunal and it is suggested that the said approach was perverse.  After  reading the writ petition we are convinced that the contentions raised and  the facts stated in the petition justify the respondent herein to file an  application both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.   13.     Learned counsel, however, pointed out that the learned Judge at the  end of his judgment had given certain directions which were in the nature  of the directions given under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.  We do  not agree with this contention.  In the first place the learned Judge himself  has clearly stated that his suggestion to the bank to award 50% of the  back-wages, in view of the long service of the appellant, was merely a  recommendation and not a direction and that it was for the bank to take the  decision in this  behalf.  Therefore, this is not a case where any direction  as such is issued under Article 227 of the Constitution.  The  recommendation made by the learned Judge, as has been stated in the  judgment itself, cannot amount to a direction made under Article 227 of the  Constitution of India.  It is to be remembered that such directions are not  made to the parties, the directions contemplated under Article 227 are to  the concerned authorities against whose order the writ petition is filed.  In  this behalf we must further point out that in Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd.  V. Shankar Prasad [(1999) 6 SCC 275] this Court explained the situation  as to whether the writ petition should be treated to be under Article 226 or  under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.  That was the case where the  Labour Court passed an order in Revision under the provisions of Section  28 of the Maharashtra (Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of  Unfair Labour Practices) Act, 1971.  This order was confirmed by the  Industrial Tribunal under Section 44 of the said Act where both the courts  held that the retrenchment of the workman did not amount to any unfair  labour practice on the part of the appellant.  These orders were challenged  by the workman by filing the writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the  Constitution before the High Court.  The learned Single Judge dismissed  the said writ petition but the order of the learned Single Judges itself  showed that he was considering the writ petition of the workman which  was moved before him invoking the High Court’s jurisdiction under Articles  226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.  In that writ petition the workman  had requested the High Court to call for the records and proceedings of the  Revision Petition and after perusal thereof to be further pleased to quash  and set aside the said order of the Labour Court.  It was averred in the writ  petition that the authorities below, while interpreting various provisions of  the Maharashtra Act as also the Industrial Disputes Act and the rules  framed thereunder had totally lost sight of the object and purpose of these  provisions and had put an interpretation alien to the industrial  jurisprudence and has thus committed serious error of law apparent on the  face of the record which resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice and  also in failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in the courts below under  the provisions of the Maharashtra Act.  It was further averred that the  orders of the courts below had resulted in infraction of the fundamental  rights of the workman.   14.     When we see the present petition, the situation is no different.  What  was averred by the respondent in its writ petition was in the same tone and  it was clearly averred that the Tribunal had ignored the principles of  industrial jurisprudence and that had resulted in miscarriage of justice.  In  para 16 of the reported judgment, the court observed: "It is, therefore, obvious that the writ petition invoking  jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles 226 and 227  of the Constitution had tried to make out a case for the High  Court’s interference seeking issuance of an appropriate writ of  certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.  Basic  averments for invoking such a jurisdiction were already  pleaded in the writ petition for the High Court’s consideration.   It is true, as submitted by learned counsel for the appellant,  that the order of the learned Single Judge nowhere stated that  the Court was considering the writ petition under Article 226 of  the Constitution of India.  It is equally true that the learned  Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by observing that the

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courts below had appreciated the contentions and rejected the  complaint.  But the said observation of the learned Single  Judge did not necessarily mean that the learned Judge was  not inclined to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of  India only.  The said observation equally supports the  conclusion that the learned Judge as not inclined to interfere  under Articles 226 and 227.  As seen earlier, he was  considering the aforesaid writ petition moved under Article  226, as well as Article 227 of the Constitution of India.  Under  these circumstances, it is not possible to agree with the  contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the  learned Single Judge had refused to interfere only under  Article 227 of the Constitution of India when he dismissed the  writ petition of the respondent.."

This Court has further relied upon the decision in the case of Umaji  Keshao Meshram’s case (supra).  The situation is no different in the  present case.  The respondent had raised the contentions regarding the  order of the Tribunal in the very same manner.  Though the learned Judge  observed that he was acting only under Article 227 of the Constitution of  India, it cannot be said that the writ petition was disposed of only under  Article 227 of the Constitution.  The writ petition was such as would fall  also under Article 226 of the Constitution which label was already attached  to the writ petition.  Similar relief was also sought for by praying for an  appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the Industrial Tribunal’s  order.  We are, therefore, convinced that the law laid down in Lokmat’s  case applies on all fours.  In the same para 16 this Court proceeds to  observe: "It was open to the respondent to invoke the jurisdiction of the  High Court both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution  of India.  Once such a jurisdiction was invoked and when his  writ petition was dismissed on merits, it cannot be said that the  learned Single Judge had exercised his jurisdiction only under  Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This conclusion directly  flows from the relevant averments made in the writ petition  and the nature of jurisdiction invoked by the respondent as  noted by the learned Single Judge in his judgment, as seen  earlier.  Consequently, it could not be said that clause 15 of  the Letters Patent was not attracted for preferring appeal  against the judgment of the learned Single Judge."

Similar observations regarding Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are  to be found in the subsequent decision in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander  Rai & Ors. [(2003) 6 SCC 675] where the court has followed the law laid  down in Umaji Keshao Meshram’s case (supra) as also in Lokmat’s  case (supra).  15.     We are, therefore, convinced that the Division Bench erred in  treating the matter falling only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 16.     We would have ordinarily remanded the matter to the Division Bench  for consideration on merits.  However, we would desist from doing that in  view of the fact that this whole controversy has started right from 1984 and  24 years have so far been lost.  The appellant, in this case, was  discharged in the year 1984 and since then he is fighting for his rights.   True it is that he has been paid his back-wages in part, however, we are  convinced that the Tribunal’s order setting aside his order of punishment of  discharge was a correct order and the learned Single Judge erred in  setting aside that order.   17.     When we see the Tribunal’s Award, it is clear that firstly the Tribunal  came to the conclusion that the inquiry was fair and proper.  Thereafter in  para 7, the Tribunal has considered the arguments on behalf of the bank to  the effect that once the inquiry has been held to be legal and proper, no  interference can be made as regards the punishment.  It is to be noted that  the first charge against the appellant was rough and rude behaviour with  client Gulabchand and company’s partner Harenderbhai Shah, while the  second charge was also regarding the rude behaviour with the higher

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officers of the bank and disobedience with the work entrusted; the third  charge was that he was instructed to remain present on the bank’s  account closing day, he had gone away; the fourth charge was regarding  the breach of bank’s rules pertaining to leave; the fifth charge was with  regard to frequently leaving the place during office hours without  permission while the sixth charge was regarding the illegally  making  trunk calls on the bank’s phone without permission and the seventh  charge was incurring excessive debts from outside.  It is already seen that  charges 4 and 6 were held not to be proved.  It was pointed out before the  Tribunal on behalf of the appellant that for Charge Nos.1 and 3, the  punishment was for stopping the increments while it was for Charge No. 2  and 5 that the punishment of discharge was awarded.  For other charges  minor punishments of censure, etc., and stopping of two increments were  imposed.  Thus it was only for the two charges, namely, Charge Nos.2 and  5 that the punishment of discharge was given to him.  In respect of rest of  the charges it was merely a punishment of stopping of increments.  It was  pointed out by the workman and rightly accepted by the Tribunal that for  long 40 years of his service there was not a single allegation against the  appellant.  It was also considered by the Tribunal that he had not only  properly worked for 30-31 years but has also got promotion of Head Peon  during this period.   18.     The Tribunal then took stock of the evidence of Harendra Shah with  whom the appellant allegedly misbehaved.  The Tribunal ultimately chose  to record that the appellant could not have been found guilty of  misbehaviour.  The Tribunal also took stock of the evidence of one Shri  Desai and came to the conclusion that he did not even know the duties of  the appellant as a Head Peon and that there was no record available and  further according to this witness there was no record available of the  outgoing trunk calls.  The Tribunal also noted the fact that there was no  past record of habitual misconduct on the part of the appellant and,  therefore, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was no sufficient  evidence regarding habitual misuse of the telephones.  The Tribunal also  noted the evidence of Peon H.K. Pandya who had said that the delinquent  conduct was good with him and he was properly discharging his duties.   The Tribunal has also referred to the fact that Shri H.K. Pandya has given  his signature on the complaint against the appellant not even knowing  about the document on which he was putting his signature and that he  given the signature just because it was asked from him.  The Tribunal also  noted the evidence of H.N. Shethia, Clerk and recorded a finding that his  evidence was not believable.  The Tribunal has further noted that Shri  Sethia used to visit Shri Jadeja with whom the appellant had strained  relations.  The Tribunal further took stock of evidence of one K.B. Mehta  who was unable to tell as to whether any action was taken against the  appellant from 1962 to 1980 and that the conduct of delinquent was good  in the bank premises.  The evidence of other witnesses, namely, Shri  Vadhera and Shri J.A. Shah was considered by the Tribunal and the  Tribunal ultimately recorded that there was no record available with the  bank regarding the past history of the delinquent or about his misbehaviour  or any complaint made by any of the staff members.  The Tribunal then  records: "On overall examination of the examination-in-chief and the  cross-examination made during the whole departmental  inquiry, it appears that the bank’s staff did not like the  delinquent’s conduct, whereas the delinquent was under an  impression that he is discharging his main duties and he has  not to do any other work.  This is during the period from 1982  only\005." "\005.it appears that there is no sufficient record or evidence  against the delinquent so as to impose punishment of  discharge on the workman.  Therefore, the punishment of  discharge is liable to be set aside.  Now, on overall  appreciation, it appears that due to some sort of bitterness  between the workman and the staff members, the workman  has committed some misconduct.  In my opinion it would be  just, proper and in the interest of justice of punishment of

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withholding the increment with future effect is imposed upon  the delinquent and I, therefore, pass the following order\005\005."

All this suggests that the Tribunal had considered everything in great  details.   19.     In our opinion under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act the  Tribunal was quite justified in using its discretion.  The scope of Section  11-A has been explained by this Court from time to time in Life Insurance  Corporation of India v. R. Dhandapani [(2006) 13 SCC 613; Mahindra  Ltd. V. N.B. Narawade [(2005) 3 SCC 331] and M.P. Electricity Board v.  Jagdish Chandra Sharma [(2005) 3 SCC 401]. Lastly, this Court has held  that in L and T Komatsu Ltd. V. N. Uadayakumar [(2008) 1 SCC 224]  that assaulting or giving abuses to the superior would  justify the dismissal.   We have carefully examined the facts in all the above cases and find that  the appellant’s case nowhere comes near the one described in all the  above four cases.  After all the Tribunal has to judge on the basis of the  proved misbehaviour.  In this case we have already recorded that the  Tribunal was firstly correct in holding that the misbehaviour was not wholly  proved and whatever misconduct was proved, did not deserve the extreme  punishment of discharge. 20.     on this backdrop when we see unusually long judgment of the  learned Single Judge, it comes out that the learned Single Judge held  firstly that the Tribunal had exceeded its powers vested in it under the  provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act.  The learned  Judge, as regards, Section 11-A, after quoting the same, observed: "Though the Tribunal was equipped with the power to come to  its own conclusion whether in a given case the imposition of  punishment of discharge or dismissal from the service is  justified.  It is for that purpose that the Tribunal is authorized to  go into the evidence that has been adduced before the Inquiry  Officer in details and find out whether the punishment of  discharge or dismissal is commensurate with the nature of  charges proved against the delinquent."

So far the finding of the learned Single Judge appears to be correct.   However, the whole thrust of the judgment has changed merely because  the Industrial Tribunal had found the inquiry to be fair and proper.  The  learned Judge seems to be of the opinion that if the inquiry is held to be  fair and proper, then the Industrial Tribunal cannot go into the question of  evidence or the quantum of punishment.  We are afraid that is not the  correct law.  Even if the inquiry is found to be fair, that would be only a  finding certifying that all possible opportunities were given to the delinquent  and the principles of natural justice and fair play were observed.  That  does not mean that the findings arrived at were essentially the correct  findings.  If the Industrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the findings  could not be supported on the basis of the evidence given or further comes  to the conclusion that the punishment given is shockingly disproportionate,  the Industrial Tribunal would still be justified in re-appreciating the  evidence and/or interfering with the quantum of punishment.  There can be  no dispute that power under Section 11-A has to be exercised judiciously  and the interference is possible only when the Tribunal is not satisfied with  the findings and further concludes that punishment imposed by the  Management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the  workman concerned.  Besides, the Tribunal has to give reasons as to why  it is not satisfied either with the findings or with the quantum of punishment  and that such reason should not be fanciful or whimsical but there should  be good reasons.  In our opinion the reasons given by the Tribunal were  correct and the treatment given by the Tribunal to the evidence was  perfectly justified.  The Tribunal committed no error in observing that for  good long 30 years there was no complaint against the work of the  appellant and that such a complaint suddenly surfaced only in the year  1982.  The Tribunal was justified in appreciating the fact that the charges  were not only trivial and were not so serious as to entail the extreme  punishment of discharge.  Here was the typical example where the  evidence was of a most general nature and the charges were also not

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such as would have invited the extreme punishment.  It was not as if the  appellant had abused or had done any physical altercation with his  superiors or colleagues.  What was complained was of his absence on  some days and his argumentative nature.  Though the learned Judge had  discussed all the principles regarding the exercise of powers under Section  11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act as also the doctrine of proportionality  and the Wednesbury’s principles, we are afraid the learned Judge has not  applied all these principles properly to the present case.  The learned  Judge has quoted extensively from the celebrated decision of  M/s.Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. V. The Management  [AIR 1973 SC 1227], however, the learned Judges seems to have ignored  the observations made in para 32 of that decision where it is observed  that:  "The words "in the course of adjudication proceeds, the  Tribunal is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal  was not justified" clearly indicate that the Tribunal is now  clothed with the power of re-appraise the evidence in the  domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence  relied on by an employer establishes the misconduct alleged  against a workman.  What was originally a plausible  conclusion that could be drawn by an employer from the  evidence,  has now given place to a satisfaction being arrived  at by the Tribunal that the finding of misconduct is correct\005..  The Tribunal is at liberty to consider not only whether the  finding of misconduct recorded by an employer is correct but  also to differ from the said finding if a proper case is made out"

We are surprised at the following observations of the learned Judge in  para 7.1: "Nowhere during the course of the judgment the Tribunal  appears to have followed the aforesaid guidelines or the  Wednesbury test.  When it was re-appreciating evidence and  on the strength of it, was reaching to different conclusions and  ultimately it has substituted the punishment, it was incumbent  upon it to follow aforesaid guidelines.  It was only upon finding  that the decision of the authority was illegal or that it was  based on material not relevant or relevant material was not  taken into consideration or that it was so unreasonable, that  no prudent man could have reached to such decision or that it  was disproportionate to the nature of the guilt held established  so as to shock the judicial conscience, the Tribunal could have  substituted the penalty.  The entire text of award of the  Tribunal does not indicate this."

We are unable to agree with these observations.   21.     On the other hand the Tribunal, in our opinion has correctly  appreciated the evidence and has also correctly substituted the  punishment.  In whole of the judgment, the learned Single Judge has not  referred to any of the factual findings recorded by the Tribunal.  In our  opinion the judgment of the learned Single Judge was wholly incorrect in  so far as it dubbed the Tribunal’s judgment as wrong.  We approve of the  judgment of the Tribunal and set aside the judgment of the learned Single  Judge. 22.     For the above reasons we are of the opinion that the Writ Petition  filed by the respondent and ultimately confirmed by the appellate judgment  was incorrectly allowed.  We dismiss the writ petition and restore the  Award of the Tribunal.   23.     In view of the above the appeal is allowed.  Under the circumstances  we deem it fit to inflict the cost of Rs.30,000/- against the Respondent- bank.