IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3541 OF 2002

Martin F. D’Souza      ..       Appellant

         -versus-

Mohd. Ishfaq      ..     Respondent

J U D G M E N T

MARKANDEY KATJU, J.

1. This appeal against the judgment of the National Consumer Disputes

Redressal Commission, New Delhi dated 22.3.2002 has been filed under Section 23

of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.   

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

3. The brief facts of the case are narrated below :

4. In March 1991,  the respondent who was suffering from chronic renal

failure was referred by the Director,  Health Services to  the Nanavati Hospital,

Mumbai for the purpose of a kidney transplant.

5. On  or  about  24.4.1991,  the  respondent  reached  Nanavati  Hospital,

Bombay and was under the treatment of the appellant Doctor.  At that stage, the

respondent was undergoing haemodialysis twice a week on account of chronic renal

failure.  Investigations were underway to find a suitable donor.  The respondent

wanted to be operated by Dr. Sonawala alone who was out of India from 1.6.1991

to 1.7.1991.

6. On 20.5.1991, the respondent approached the appellant Doctor.  At the

time,  the  respondent,  who  was  suffering from high fever,  did  not  want  to  be

admitted  to  the  Hospital  despite  the  advice of  the appellant.   Hence,  a broad

spectrum antibiotic was prescribed to him.

7. From  20.5.1991  to  29.5.1991,  the  respondent  attended  the

Haemodialysis Unit at Nanavati Hospital on three occasions.  At that time, his fever

remained between 101°-104°F.  The appellant constantly requested the complainant

to get admitted to hospital but the respondent refused.

8. On 29.5.1991 the respondent who had high fever of 104°F finally agreed

to get admitted to hospital due to his serious condition.

9. On 30.5.1991 the respondent was investigated for renal package.  The

medical  report  showed  high  creatinine  13  mg.,  blood  urea  180  mg.   The

Haemoglobin of  the  respondent  was  4.3%.   The  following chart indicates  the

results of the study in comparison to the normal range :-

Normal Range

S. Creatinine      13.0 mgs. %           0.7 – 1.5 mgs. %

Blood Urea      180 mgs. %     10-50 mgs. %

Haemoglobin      4.3 gms. %     11.5-13.5 gms. %

10. On 30.5.1991, the respondent was investigated for typhoid fever, which

was negative.  He was also investigated for ESR, which was expectedly high in view

of renal failure and anemia infection.  Urine analysis was also carried out which

showed the presence of bacteria.

11. On  3.6.1991,  the  reports  of  the  urine  culture  and  sensitivity  were

received.  The report showed severe urinary tract infection due to Klebsiella species

(1 lac/ml.).  The report also showed that the infection could be treated by Amikacin

and  Methenamine  Mandelate  and  that  the  infection  was  resistant  to  other

antibiotics.  Methnamine Mandelate cannot be used in patients suffering from renal

failure.

12. On 4.6.1991,  the blood culture report of the respondent was received,

which showed a serious infection of the blood stream (staphylococcus species).

13. On 5.6.1991, Amikacin injection was administered to the respondent for

three days (from 5th to 7th June, 1991), since the urinary infection of the respondent

was sensitive to Amikacin.  Cap. Augmentin (375 mg.) was administered three times

a day for the blood infection and the respondent was transfused one unit of blood

during dialysis.  Consequent upon the treatment, the temperature of the respondent

rapidly subsided.

14. From 5.6.1991 to 8.6.1991, the respondent insisted on immediate kidney

transplant even though the respondent had advised him that in view of his blood

and urine infection no transplant could take place for six weeks.

15. On 8.6.1991, the respondent, despite the appellant’s advice, got himself

discharged from Nanavati Hospital.  Since the respondent was suffering from blood

and urinary infection and had refused to come for haemodialysis on alternate days,

the appellant suggested Injection Amikacin (500 mg.) twice a day.  Certain other

drugs were also specified to be taken under the supervision of the appellant when

he visited the Dialysis Unit.

16. On 11.6.1991,  the  respondent  attended  the  Haemodialysis  Unit  and

complained to the appellant that he had slight tinnitus (ringing in the ear).  The

appellant has alleged that he immediately told the respondent to stop taking the

Amikacin and Augmentin and scored out  the  treatment on the  discharge card.

However, despite express instructions from the appellant, the respondent continued

to  take Amikacin till  17.6.1991.   Thereafter,  the  appellant  was  not  under the

treatment of the appellant.

17. On  14.6.1991,  18.6.1991  and  20.6.1991  the  respondent  received

haemodialysis  at  Nanavati Hospital  and allegedly did  not  complain of  deafness

during this period.

18. On 25.6.1991,  the  respondent,  on  his  own accord,  was  admitted  to

Prince  Aly  Khan  Hospital,  where  he  was  also  treated  with  antibiotics.   The

complainant  allegedly  did  not  complain  of  deafness  during  this  period  and

conversed with doctors normally, as is evident from their evidence.

19. On 30.7.1991, the respondent was operated upon for transplant after he

had  ceased  to  be  under  the  treatment  of  the  appellant.   On  13.8.1991,  the

respondent was discharged from Prince Aly Khan Hospital after his transplant.

The respondent returned to Delhi on 14.8.1991, after discharge.

20. On  7.7.1992,  the  respondent  filed  a  complaint  before  the  National

Consumer Disputes  Redressal  Commission,  New Delhi  (being Original Petition

No.178  of  1992)  claiming compensation of  an amount of  Rs.12,00,000/-  as  his

hearing had been affected.   The appellant filed his reply stating, inter alia, that

there was  no  material brought  on  record by  the  respondent  to  show any co-

relationship between the drugs prescribed and the state of his health.  Rejoinder

was filed by the respondent.

21. The  National Consumer Disputes  Redressal Commission (hereinafter

referred  to  as  `the  Commission’)  passed  an  order  on  6.10.1993  directing  the

nomination of an expert from the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi

(AIIMS) to examine the complaint and give an opinion.  This was done in order to

get an unbiased and neutral opinion.

22. AIIMS nominated Dr. P. Ghosh, and the report of Dr. P. Ghosh of the

All India Institute of Medical Sciences was submitted before the Commission, after

examining the respondent.  Dr. Ghosh was of the opinion that the drug Amikacin

was administered by the appellant as a life saving measure and was rightly used.  It

is submitted by the appellant that the said report further makes it clear that there

has been no negligence on the part of the appellant.   

23. Evidence was thereupon led before the Commission.  Two affidavits by

way of evidence were filed on behalf of the respondent, being that of his wife and

himself.  The witnesses for the respondent were :-

i)   The respondent Mohd. Ishfaq ii)   The wife of the respondent iii)  Dr. Ashok Sareen iv)   Dr. Vindu Amitabh

24. On behalf of the appellant, six affidavits by way of evidence were filed.

These  were  of   the  appellant  himself,  Dr.  Danbar (a  doctor  attached  to  the

Haemodialysis Department of  Nanavati Hospital),  Dr.  Abhijit Joshi (a Resident

Senior Houseman of Nanavati Hospital),  Mrs. Mukta Kalekar (a Senior sister at

Nanavati Hospital), Dr. Sonawala (the Urologist who referred the respondent to the

appellant) and Dr. Ashique Ali Rawal (a Urologist attached to Prince Aly Khan

Hospital).  The witnesses for the appellant were:-

i)   The appellant-Dr. M.F. D’Souza

ii)  Dr. Danbar iii) Dr. Upadhyay iv)  Mrs. Mukta Kalekar v)   Dr. Ashique Ali Rawal

25. The respondent  also  filed  an opinion of  the  Chief  of  Nephrology at

Fairview General Hospital, Cleveland, Ohlo, which was heavily relied upon in the

impugned judgment.  The appellant has alleged that the said opinion was written

without  examining the respondent and, in any case, the appellant was not afforded

an opportunity of cross-examining the person who gave the opinion.

26. The case of the respondent, in brief, is that the appellant was negligent

in prescribing Amikacin to the respondent of 500 mg twice a day for 14 days as

such dosage was excessive and caused hearing impairment.  It is also the case of the

respondent that the infection he was suffering from was not of  a nature as to

warrant administration of Amikacin to him.

27. The appellant  submitted  before the  Commission that  at  the  time of

admission of the respondent on 29.5.1991 to the  hospital, he had fever of 104°F

and, after investigation, it was found that his serum creatinine level was 13 mg%,

blood urea 180 mg% and Haemoglobin 4.3 mg.  Amikacin was prescribed to him

only after obtaining blood  and urine culture reports on 3rd and 4th June,  1991,

which showed the respondent resistant to other antibiotics.  Even the witness of the

respondent (Dr. Sareen) conceded that he would have prescribed Amikacin in the

facts  of  the  case.   However,  the  Commission  allowed  the  complaint  of  the

respondent by way of the impugned order dated 9.4.2002 and awarded Rs.4 lakh

with interest @ 12% from 1.8.1992 as well as Rs.3 lakh as compensation as well as

Rs.5000/- as costs.   

28. Before discussing the facts of the case, we would like to state the law

regarding Medical Negligence in India.

29. Cases, both civil and criminal as well as in Consumer Fora, are often

filed against medical practitioners and hospitals, complaining of medical negligence

against doctors/hospitals/nursing homes and hence the latter naturally would like to

know about their liability.

30. The general principles on this subject have been lucidly and elaborately

explained in the three Judge Bench decision of this Court in  Jacob Mathew vs.

State  of  Punjab and Anr. (2005)  6  SCC  1.   However,  difficulties  arise  in the

application of those general principles to specific cases.

31. For instance, in para 41 of the aforesaid decision it was observed :

“The practitioner must bring to his task a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge, and must exercise a reasonable degree of care.  Neither the very highest nor a very low degree of care and competence is what the law requires.”      

32. Now what is reasonable and what is unreasonable is a matter on which

even experts may disagree.  Also, they may disagree on what is a high level of care

and what is a low level of care.   

33. To give another example, in paragraph 12 to 16 of Jacob Mathew’s case

(Supra), it has been stated that simple negligence may result only in civil liability,

but gross negligence or recklessness may result in criminal liability as well.  For civil

liability only damages can be imposed by the Court but for criminal liability the

Doctor can also be sent to jail (apart from damages which may be imposed on him

in a civil suit or by the Consumer Fora).  However, what is simple negligence and

what is gross negligence may be a matter of dispute even among experts.

34. The law, like medicine, is an inexact science.  One cannot predict with

certainty an outcome of  many cases.   It  depends  on  the  particular facts  and

circumstances of the case, and also the personal notions of the Judge concerned who

is hearing the case.   However, the broad and general legal principles relating to

medical negligence need to be understood.

35. Before dealing with these principles two things have to be kept in mind :

(1)  Judges are not experts in medical science, rather they are lay men.  This itself

often makes it  somewhat difficult  for them to  decide  cases  relating to  medical

negligence.  Moreover, Judges have usually to rely on testimonies of other doctors

which may not necessarily in all cases be objective, since like in all professions and

services, doctors too sometimes have a tendency to support their own colleagues

who are charged with medical negligence.  The testimony may also be difficult to

understand, particularly in complicated medical matters, for a layman in medical

matters like a Judge;  and  (2) A balance has to be struck in such cases.  While

doctors who cause death or agony due to medical negligence should certainly be

penalized, it must also be remembered that like all professionals doctors too can

make errors of judgment but if they are punished for this no doctor can practice his

vocation with equanimity.  Indiscriminate proceedings and decisions against doctors

are counter productive and serve society no good.  They inhibit the free exercise of

judgment by a professional in a particular situation.

36. Keeping the above two notions in mind we may discuss the broad general

principles relating to medical negligence.

General Principles Relating to Medical Negligence

37. As  already  stated  above,  the  broad  general  principles  of  medical

negligence have been laid down in the Supreme Court Judgment in Jacob Mathew

vs.  State of Punjab and Anr. (supra).  However, these principles can be indicated

briefly here :

38. The  basic  principle  relating  to  medical  negligence  is  known as  the

BOLAM Rule.  This was laid down in the judgment of Justice McNair in Bolam vs.

Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 582 as follows :

“Where you get  a situation which involves  the  use  of  some special skill or competence, then the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus,  because he has not  got  this  special skill. The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and  professing  to  have that  special  skill.   A  man need  not possess the highest expert skill…..    It is well-established law that  it  is  sufficient  if  he  exercises  the  ordinary skill  of  an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art.”

Bolam’s test has been approved by the Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew’s case.

39. In Halsbury’s Laws of England the degree of skill and care required by a

medical practitioner is stated as follows :

“The practitioner must bring to his task a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge,  and must  exercise a reasonable  degree of  care. Neither  the  very  highest  nor  a  very  low  degree  of  care  and competence, judged in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, is what the law requires, and  a person is not liable in negligence because someone else  of  greater skill  and knowledge

would  have  prescribed  different  treatment  or  operated  in  a different way;  nor is  he guilty of  negligence if  he has  acted  in accordance with a practice accepted as  proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art,  even though a body of adverse opinion also existed among medical men.

Deviation  from  normal  practice  is  not  necessarily  evidence  of negligence.  To establish liability on that basis it must be shown (1) that there is a usual and normal practice; (2) that the defendant has not adopted it; and (3) that the course in fact adopted  is one no professional man of ordinary skill would have taken had he been acting with ordinary care.”

                                  (emphasis supplied)  

40. Eckersley  vs.  Binnie (1988) 18 Con LR 1 summarized the Bolam test in

the following words :

“From these general statements it  follows that a professional man should command the corpus of  knowledge which forms part of the professional equipment of the ordinary member of his  profession.   He  should  not  lag  behind  other  ordinary assiduous  and  intelligent  members  of  his  profession  in  the knowledge of new advances, discoveries and developments in his field.   He  should  have such  an  awareness  as  an  ordinarily competent would have of the deficiencies in his knowledge and the limitations on his skill.  He should be alert to the hazards and risks in any professional task he undertakes to the extent that  other  ordinarily  competent  members  of  the  profession would  be  alert.   He must  bring to  any professional task he undertakes no less expertise, skill and care than other ordinarily competent members of  his  profession would bring,  but  need bring no more.  The standard is that of the reasonable average. The law does  not require of a professional man that he be a paragon combining the qualities of a polymath and prophet.”  

41. A medical practitioner is not liable to be held negligent simply because

things  went  wrong  from  mischance  or  misadventure  or  through  an  error  of

judgment in choosing one reasonable course of treatment in preference to another.

He would be liable only where his conduct fell below that of the standards of a

reasonably competent practitioner in his field.  For instance, he would be liable if he

leaves a surgical gauze inside the patient after an operation vide Achutrao Haribhau

Khodwa & others   vs.  State  of  Maharashtra & others,  AIR  1996  SC  2377  or

operates on the wrong part of the body, and he would be also criminally liable if he

operates on someone for removing an organ for illegitimate trade.  

42. There is a tendency to confuse a reasonable person with an error free

person.  An error of judgment may or may not be negligent.  It depends on the

nature of the error.   

43. It is not enough to show that there is a body of competent professional

opinion which considers that the decision of the accused professional was a wrong

decision,  provided  there  also  exists  a  body  of  professional  opinion,  equally

competent,  which supports  the decision as reasonable in the circumstances.   As

Lord Clyde stated in Hunter vs.  Hanley 1955 SLT 213 :

“In the realm of diagnosis and treatment there is ample scope for genuine difference of opinion and one man clearly is not negligent merely  because  his  conclusion  differs  from  that  of  other professional men….  The true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment on the part of a doctor is whether he has been proved to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of if acting with ordinary care….”

                                                (emphasis supplied)

44. The standard of care has to be judged in the light of knowledge available

at the time of the incident and not at the date of the trial.  Also, where the charge of

negligence is of failure to use some particular equipment, the charge would fail if the

equipment was not generally available at that point of time.

45. The  higher  the  acuteness  in  an  emergency  and  the   higher  the

complication,  the  more  are  the  chances  of  error of  judgment.   At  times,  the

professional is confronted with making a choice between the devil and the deep sea

and has to  choose  the lesser evil.   The doctor is  often called  upon to  adopt  a

procedure which involves higher element of risk, but which he honestly believes as

providing  greater  chances  of  success  for  the  patient  rather than  a  procedure

involving  lesser  risk  but  higher  chances  of  failure.   Which  course  is  more

appropriate to follow, would depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case

but a doctor cannot be penalized if he adopts the former procedure, even if it results

in a failure.  The usual practice prevalent nowadays is to obtain the consent of the

patient or of the person in-charge of the patient if the patient is not in a position to

give consent before adopting a given procedure.

46. There  may  be  a  few  cases  where  an  exceptionally  brilliant  doctor

performs an operation or prescribes a treatment which has never been tried before

to save the life of a patient when no known method of treatment is available.  If the

patient dies or suffers some serious harm, should the doctor be held liable?  In our

opinion he  should  not.   Science  advances  by  experimentation,  but  experiments

sometime end in failure e.g.  the operation on the Iranian twin sisters who were

joined at the head since birth, or the first heart transplant by Dr. Barnard in South

Africa.  However, in such cases it is advisable for the doctor to explain the situation

to the patient and take his written consent.

47. Simply because a patient has not favourably responded to a treatment

given by a doctor or a surgery has failed, the doctor cannot be held straightway

liable for medical negligence by applying the doctrine of  res  ipsa  loquitur.   No

sensible professional would intentionally commit an act or omission which would

result  in harm or injury to  the  patient  since the  professional reputation of  the

professional would be at stake.  A single failure may cost him dear in his lapse.

48. As observed by the Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew’s case :

“A medical practitioner faced with an emergency ordinarily tries his best  to redeem the patient out of his suffering.  He does not gain anything by acting with negligence or by omitting to do an act. Obviously, therefore, it will be for the complainant to clearly make out a case of negligence before a medical practitioner is charged with or proceeded against criminally.  A surgeon with shaky hands under fear of  legal action cannot perform a successful operation and  a  quivering  physician  cannot  administer  the  end-dose  of medicine to his patient.

If  the  hands  be  trembling  with  the  dangling  fear  of  facing  a criminal prosecution in the event of failure for whatever reason – whether  attributable  to  himself  or  not,  neither  can  a  surgeon successfully wield  his  life-saving scalpel  to  perform an essential surgery, nor can a physician successfully administer the life-saving dose  of  medicine.   Discretion being the better part of  valour, a medical professional would feel better advised to leave a terminal patient to his own fate in the case of emergency where the chance of success may be 10% (or so), rather than taking the risk of making a last ditch effort towards saving the subject and facing a criminal prosecution if his effort fails.  Such timidity forced upon a doctor would be a disservice to society.”

49. When a patient dies or suffers some mishap, there is a tendency to blame

the doctor for this.   Things have gone wrong and, therefore, somebody must be

punished for it.  However, it is well known that even the best professionals, what to

say of the average professional, sometimes have failures.  A lawyer cannot win every

case in his professional career but surely he cannot be penalized for losing a case

provided he appeared in it and made his submissions.

50. To fasten liability in criminal proceedings e.g. under Section 304A IPC

the degree of negligence has to be higher than the negligence which is enough to

fasten liability in civil proceedings.  Thus for civil liability it may be enough for the

complainant to prove that the doctor did not exercise reasonable care in accordance

with the principles mentioned above, but for convicting a doctor in a criminal case,

it must also be proved that this negligence was gross amounting to recklessness.

51. The  difference  between  simple  negligence  and  gross  negligence  has

broadly been explained in paragraphs 12 to 16 of  Jacob Mathew’s case,  though

difficulties may arise in the application of the principle in particular cases.   For

instance,  if  a  mop  is  left  behind  in  the  stomach of  a  patient  while  doing  an

operation, would it be simple negligence or gross negligence?  If a scissors or sharp

edged medical instrument is left in the patient’s body while doing the operation

would that make a difference from merely leaving a mop?

52. The professional is  one who professes  to  have some special skill.   A

professional impliedly assures the person dealing with him (i) that he has the skill

which he professes to possess, (ii) that skill shall be exercised with reasonable care

and caution.

53. Judged  by  this  standard,  the  professional  may  be  held  liable  for

negligence on the ground that he was not possessed of the requisite skill which he

professes  to  have.   Thus  a  doctor  who  has  a  qualification  in  Ayurvedic  or

Homeopathic medicine will be liable if  he prescribes Allopathic treatment which

causes some harm vide Poonam Verma  vs.  Ashwin Patel & Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 332.

In Dr. Shiv Kumar Gautam  vs.  Alima, Revision Petition No.586 of 1999 decided

on 10.10.2006,  the National Consumer Commission held a homeopath liable for

negligence for prescribing allopathic medicines and administering glucose drip and

giving injections.

Protection to Doctors in Criminal Cases

54. In para 52 of  Jacob Mathew’s case the Supreme Court realizing that

doctors have to be protected from frivolous complaints of medical negligence, has

laid down certain rules in this connection :

(i) A  private  complaint  should  not  be  entertained  unless  the

complainant has produced prima facie evidence before the court in the

form of a credible opinion given by another competent doctor to support

the charge of rashness or negligence on the part of the accused doctor.

(ii)  The investigating officer should,  before proceeding against

the  doctor  accused  of  rash  or  negligent  act  or  omission,  obtain  an

independent and competent medical opinion, preferably from a doctor in

government service, qualified in that branch of medical practice who can

normally be expected to give an impartial opinion applying the  Bolam

test.

(iii) A doctor accused of  negligence should not be arrested in a

routine manner simply because a charge has been leveled against him.

Unless  his  arrest  is  necessary for  furthering  the  investigation  or  for

collecting evidence or unless the investigating officer feels satisfied that

the doctor proceeded against would not make himself available to face

the prosecution unless arrested, the arrest should be withheld.   

Precautions which Doctor/Hospitals/Nursing Homes should take :

(a) Current practices, infrastructure, paramedical and other staff,

hygiene and sterility should be observed strictly.  Thus, in  Sarwat Ali

Khan  vs.  Prof. R. Gogi and others Original Petition No.181 of 1997,

decided on 18.7.2007 by the National Consumer Commission, the facts

were that out of 52 cataract operations performed between 26th and 28th

September, 1995 in an eye hospital 14 persons lost their vision in the

operated eye.  An enquiry revealed that in the Operation Theatre two

autoclaves  were not  working properly.   This  equipment  is  absolutely

necessary to carry out sterilization of  instruments,  cotton,  pads,  linen,

etc.,  and  the  damage  occurred  because  of  its  absence  in  working

condition.  The doctors were held liable.       

(b) No  prescription  should  ordinarily be  given without  actual

examination.   The  tendency to  give  prescription  over  the  telephone,

except in an acute emergency, should be avoided.

(c) A doctor should not merely go by the version of the patient

regarding his symptoms, but should also make his own analysis including

tests and investigations where necessary.

(d) A doctor should  not experiment unless  necessary and even

then he should  ordinarily get a written consent from the patient.

(e) An expert should be consulted in case of any doubt.  Thus, in

Smt. Indrani Bhattacharjee, Original Petition No.233 of 1996 decided by

the  National  Consumer  Commission  on  9.8.2007,  the  patient  was

diagnosed  as  having  `Mild  Lateral  Wall  Eschemia’.   The  doctor

prescribed medicine for gastro-entiritis, but he expired.  It was held that

the  doctor  was  negligent  as  he  should  have  advised  consulting  a

Cardiologist in writing.

(f) Full  record  of  the  diagnosis,  treatment,  etc.  should  be

maintained.

Application of the above mentioned general principles to particular cases  :

Decisions of the Court   

55. In  Pt. Parmanand Katara  vs.  Union of India & Others AIR 1989 SC

2039,  the  petitioner  referred  to  a  report  published  in  the  newspaper  “The

Hindustan Times” in which it was mentioned that a scooterist was knocked down by

a speeding car.  Seeing the profusely bleeding scooterist, a person who was on the

road, picked up the injured and took him to the nearest hospital.   The doctors

refused to  attend and told  the man that he should take the patient to  another

hospital located 20 kilometers away authorized to handle medico-legal cases.  The

injured was then taken to that hospital but by the time he could reach, the victim

succumbed to his injuries.

56. The Supreme Court referred to the Code of Medical Ethics drawn up

with  the  approval of  the  Central  Government under Section  33  of  the  Indian

Council  Medical  Act  and  observed  “Every  doctor  whether  at  a  Government

Hospital  or otherwise has  the  professional obligation to  extend his  services  for

protecting  life.   The  obligation  being  total,  absolute  and  paramount,  laws  of

procedure whether in statutes or otherwise  cannot be  sustained and,  therefore,

must give way.”

57. The Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the doctor in an emergency

to begin treatment of the patient and he should not await the arrival of the police or

to complete the legal formalities.  The life of a person is far more important than

legal formalities. This view is in accordance with the Hippocratic oath of doctors.  

58. Although this decision has laid down that it is the duty of a doctor to

attend to a patient who is brought to him in an emergency, it does not state what

penalty  will  be  imposed  on  a  doctor  who  refuses  to  attend  the  said  patient.

Consequently it will depend on the fact and circumstances of the case.  However,

this case is important because nowadays health care has often become a business, as

is  mentioned  in  George  Bernard Shaw’s  play  “The  Doctor’s  Dilemma”.   The

medical profession is a noble profession and it should not be brought down to the

level of a simple business or commerce.  The truth of the matter, sadly, is that today

in India many doctors (though not all) have become totally money-minded, and have

forgotten  their  Hippocratic  oath.   Since  most  people  in  India  are  poor  the

consequence is that for them proper medical treatment is next to impossible, and

hence they have to rely on quacks.  This is a disgrace to a noble profession.

59. In Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity and others  vs.  State of West

Bengal and Another  AIR 1996 SC 2426, the Supreme Court held that the denial of

emergency aid to the petitioner due to the non availability of bed in the Government

Hospital  amounts  to  the  violation  of  the  right  to  life  under Article  21  of  the

Constitution.  The Court went on to say that the Constitutional obligation imposed

on the State by Article 21 cannot be abdicated on the ground of financial constraint.

60. In Md. Suleman Ansari (D.M.S.)  vs.  Shankar Bhandari (2005) 12 SCC

430 the respondent suffered a fracture of his hand.  He went to the appellant who

held himself out to be a qualified medical practitioner.  The appellant bandaged the

respondent’s hand and prescribed certain medicines.  He was ultimately taken to

another doctor but by this time the damage to his hand was permanent.  It was

found  that  the  appellant  was  not  a  qualified  doctor  to  give  treatment  to  the

respondent.   The  Supreme  Court  had  directed  him  to  pay  Rs.80,000  as

compensation to the respondent.

61. In Surendra Chauhan  vs.  State of M.P. (2000) 4 SCC 110, the appellant

was having a degree of  Bachelor of  Medicine in Electrohomoeopathy from the

Board of Electrohomoeopathy Systems of Medicines, Jabalpur (M.P.).  He did not

possess  any recognized  medical  qualification  as  defined  in  the  Indian  Medical

Council Act, 1956.  Yet he performed an operation to terminate the three month

pregnancy in a woman, who died in the clinic due to shock due to non application of

anesthesia.   The Supreme Court confirmed his sentence but reduced it to one and a

half years rigorous imprisonment under Section 314/34 IPC and a fine of Rs.25000

payable to the mother of the deceased.

62. In State of Haryana and others  vs.  Raj Rani (2005) 7 SCC 22 it was

held that if a child is born to a woman even after she had undergone a sterilization

operation by a surgeon, the doctor was not liable because there cannot be a 100%

certainty that  no  child  will  be  born after a sterilization operation.   The Court

followed the earlier view of another three Judge Bench in State of Punjab  vs.  Shiv

Ram & others (2005) 7 SCC 1.  These decisions will be deemed to have overruled

the two Judge Bench decision in  State of Haryana and Others  vs.  Smt. Santra

AIR 2000 SC 1888 in which it was held that if a child is born  after the sterilization

operation the surgeon will be liable for negligence.

63. In  P.N. Rao  vs.  G. Jayaprakasu AIR 1990 AP 207, the plaintiff was a

brilliant young boy who had passed the pre-University course securing 100% marks

in Mathematics and 93.5%  in physical sciences.  He was also getting a monthly

scholarship.   He was offered a seat  in B.E.  Degree course in four Engineering

Colleges.  He had a minor ailment  - chronic nasal discharge – for which his mother

took him to a doctor for consultation who diagnosed the disease as Nasal Allergy

and suggested operation for removal of tonsils.  He was admitted in the Government

General Hospital,  Guntur and the operation was performed.  He did not regain

consciousness even after three days and thereafter for another 15 days he was not

able to speak coherently.  When he was discharged from hospital, he could only

utter a few words and could not  read or write and lost  all his  knowledge and

learning.  His father took him to Vellore where he was examined by a Professor of

Neuro Surgery and it was found that his brain had suffered due to cerebral anoxia,

which  was  a  result  of  improper  induction  of  anaesthetics  and  failure  to  take

immediate steps  to reduce anaesthesia.  The court after examining the witnesses

including  the  Professor  of  Anaesthesiology  held  that  defendants  were  clearly

negligent  in discharging their duties  and the  State  Government was vicariously

liable.         

64. In  Dr. Laxman Balkrishna Joshi  vs.  Dr. Trimbak Bapu Godbole and

Another  AIR 1969 SC 128, a patient had suffered from fracture of the femur.  The

accused  doctor while  putting  the  leg  in plaster used  manual traction and used

excessive force for this purpose, with the help of three men, although such traction

is never done under morphia alone but done under proper general anaesthesia.  This

gave a tremendous shock  causing the death of the boy.  On these facts the Supreme

Court held that the doctor was liable to pay damages to the parents of the boy.

65. In Dr. Suresh Gupta  vs.  Government of N.C.T. of Delhi and another

AIR 2004 SC 4091, the appellant was a doctor accused under Section 304A IPC for

causing death of his patient.  The operation performed by him was for removing his

nasal deformity.  The Magistrate who charged the appellant stated in his judgment

that the appellant while conducting the operation for removal of the nasal deformity

gave incision in a  wrong part and due to that blood seeped into the respiratory

passage and because of that the patient collapsed and died.  The High Court upheld

the order of the Magistrate observing that adequate care was not taken to prevent

seepage of blood resulting in asphyxia.  The Supreme Court held that from the

medical opinions adduced by the prosecution the cause of death was stated to be

`not introducing a cuffed endotracheal tube of proper size as to prevent aspiration

of blood from the wound in the respiratory passage.’  The Supreme Court held that

this act attributed to the doctor, even if accepted to be true, can be described as a

negligent act as there was a lack of care and precaution.  For this act of negligence

he was held liable in a civil case but it cannot be described to be so reckless or

grossly negligent as to  make him liable in a criminal case.   For conviction in a

criminal case the negligence and rashness should be of such a high degree which can

be described as totally apathetic towards the patient.

66. In  Dr. Sr. Louie and Anr.  vs.  Smt. Kannolil Pathumma & Anr.  the

National Consumer Commission held that Dr. Louie showed herself as an M.D.

although she was only M.D. Freiburg, a German Degree which is equivalent to an

M.B.B.S. degree in India.  She was guilty of negligence in treating a woman and her

baby  which died.   There was  vacuum slip,  and the  baby was  delivered in  an

asphyxiated condition.

67. In Nihal Kaur  vs.  Director, P.G.I.M.S.R. (1996) CPJ 112 a patient died

a day after surgery and the relatives found a pair of scissors utilized by the surgeon

while collecting the last remains.  The doctor was held liable and a compensation of

Rs.1.20 lakhs was awarded by the State Consumer Forum, Chandigarh.         

68. In Spring Medows Hospital & Another  vs.  Harjol Ahluwalia thr’ K.S.

Ahluwalia & Another  (1998) CPJ 1, a minor child was admitted by his parents to a

nursing home as he was suffering fever.  The patient was admitted and the doctor

diagnosed typhoid and gave medicines for typhoid fever.  A nurse asked the father

of the patient to get an injection Lariago which was administered by the nurse to the

patient who immediately collapsed.  The doctor was examined and testified that the

child suffered a cardiac arrest on account of the medicine having being injected

which led  to  brain damage.   The National Commission held that the cause of

cardiac arrest was intravenous injection of Lariago of such a high dose.  The doctor

was negligent in performing his duty because instead of administering the injection

himself he permitted the nurse to give the injection.  There was clear dereliction of

duty on the part of the nurse who was not even a qualified nurse and was not

registered with any nursing council of any State.  Both the doctor and nurse and the

hospital were found liable and Rs.12.5 lakhs was awarded as compensation to the

parents.

69. In Consumer Protection Council and Others  vs.  Dr. M. Sundaram and

Another (1998) CPJ 3,  the facts were that one Mrs. Rajalaxmi was admitted to a

nursing home which diagnosed  the ailment as Hodgkin’s  Lymphoma.  She was

administered Endoxan injection five doses in five days.  She was referred to another

doctor who was an ENT specialist,  who after examination opined that no lymph

glands were seen.  A sample of her bone marrow was sent to an Oncologist who

opined that the picture does  not fit  with Hodgkin’s disease but the patient had

megaloblastic anemia in the bone marrow.  Subsequently she was discharged from

the nursing home and was advised to visit CMC Vellore for treatment.  The patient

consulted another doctor who diagnosed the same as renal failure.  The complainant

alleged that the first doctor failed and neglected to refer the matter to a Cancer

Specialist  but  wrongly  diagnosed  the  ailment  of  the  patient  as  Hodgkin’s

Lymphoma and had unnecessarily administered injection of Endoxan and because

of the toxicity of that drug the  kidney cells of the patient got destroyed resulting in

renal failure for which she had to undergo kidney transplantation which led to her

death.  The National Commission, upholding the State Commission decision, held

that  there  was  no  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  doctor  who  had  consulted  a

pathologist, and in the light of discussion with him and on inspection of some more

slides  of bone marrow specimens which also revealed the same finding,  namely,

existence of deposits of Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, proceeded to administer the patient

injections of Endoxan.  It was held on the basis of medical opinion that any prudent

consultant physician would not delay the commencement of chemotherapy where

repeated examination of  the bone marrow slides had yielded the report that the

Hodgkin’s deposits were present.  Endoxan is a drug of choice in the treatment of

Hodgkin’s Lymphoma and there was no negligence on the part of the doctor.

70. In  Sethuraman Subramaniam Iyer  vs.   Triveni  Nursing  Home  and

Another (1998) CPJ 110, the complainant’s wife suffered from Sinusitis and was

advised surgery by the doctor.  She had suffered a massive heart attack while in the

operation theatre.  The State Commission found that necessary precautions and

effective measures were taken to save the deceased and dismissed the complaint.

The State Commission relied on the affidavits of four doctors who opined that there

was no negligence.  The complainant had not given any expert evidence to support

his allegation and in these circumstances it was held that no case was made out

against the doctor.    

71. In A. S. Mittal & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. JT 1989 (2) SC 419, 1989

(3) SCC 223 a free eye camp was organized for ophthalmic surgical treatment to

patients.   However, the eyes of several patients after operation were irreversibly

damaged, owing to post-operative infection of the intra ocular cavities of the eyes,

caused by normal saline used at the time of surgery.  The Supreme Court directed

the State Government to pay Rs.12,500/- as compensation to each victim as there

was a clear negligence.

72. In Indian Medical Association  vs.  V.P. Shantha 1995(6) SCC 651 (vide

para 37) it has been held that the following acts are clearly due to negligence :

(i) Removal of the wrong limb;

(ii) Performance of an operation on

      the wrong patient;

(iii) Giving  injection  of  a  drug           to  which  the  patient  is                allergic  without    looking                into the  out-patient  card    containing the warning;

(iv) Use of wrong gas during the          course of an anaesthetic, etc.

73. From the aforementioned principles  and decisions relating to  medical

negligence,  with  which  we  agree,  it  is  evident  that  doctors  and  nursing

homes/hospitals  need  not  be  unduly  worried  about  the  performance  of  their

functions.  The law is a watchdog, and not a bloodhound, and as long as doctors do

their duty with reasonable care they will not be held liable even if their treatment

was unsuccessful.

74. However, every doctor should,  for his own interest,  carefully read the

Code of Medical Ethics which is part of the Indian Medical Council (Professional

Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 issued by the Medical Council of

India under Section 20A read with Section 3(m) of the Indian Medical Council Act.

1956.

75. Having mentioned the principles and some decisions relating to medical

negligence (with which we respectfully agree), we may now consider whether the

impugned judgment of the Commission is sustainable.  In our opinion the judgment

of the Commission cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside.

76. The basic principle relating to the law of medical negligence is the Bolam

Rule which has been quoted above.  The test in fixing  negligence is the standard of

the ordinary skilled doctor exercising and professing to have that special skill, but a

doctor need not possess the highest expert skill.  Considering the facts of the case

we cannot hold that the appellant was guilty of medical negligence.

77. The  facts  of  the  case  reveal that  the  respondent  was  suffering from

chronic  renal  failure  and  was  undergoing  haemodialysis  twice  a  week on  that

account.  He was suffering from high fever which remained between 101°-104°F.

He refused to get admitted to hospital despite the advice of the appellant.  The

appellant prescribed antibiotics for him.  The respondent was also suffering from

severe  urinary  tract  infection  which  could  only  be  treated  by  Amikacin  or

Methenamine Mandelate.  Since Methenamine Mandelate cannot be used in patients

suffering from renal failure, Amikacin injection was administered to him.     

78. A perusal of the complaint filed by the respondent before the National

Commission shows that his main allegation is that he suffered hearing impairment

due to the negligence of the appellant herein who allegedly prescribed overdose of

Amikacin injections without caring about the critical condition of the respondent

which did not warrant that much dose.  The complainant (respondent herein) has

alleged that due to  this  medical negligence the complainant has suffered mental

torture  and  frustration  and  other  signs  of  helplessness  and  is  feeling  totally

handicapped,  and his efficiency in office has got  adversely affected.   It  may be

mentioned  that  the  respondent  is  working as  Export  Promotion Officer in  the

Ministry of Commerce, Udyog Bhawan, New Delhi.

79. The case of the appellant, however, is that the complainant was referred

to the appellant by Dr. F. P. Soonawalla, the renowned Urologist of Bombay.  The

complainant had consulted Dr. F. P. Soonawalla who had referred the complainant

to the appellant for routine Haemodialysis and pre-transplant treatment.  In our

opinion, the very fact that Dr. Soonawalla referred the complainant to the appellant

is an indication that the appellant has a good reputation in his field, because Dr.

Soonawalla is an eminent doctor of India of international repute, and he would not

have ordinarily referred a patient to an incompetent doctor. This is one factor which

goes in favour of the appellant, though of course it is not conclusive.

80. It appears that after the complainant was referred to the appellant by Dr.

Soonawalla he met the appellant for the first  time on 24.4.1991  as  an outdoor

patient in the Haemodialysis Unit attached to Bulabhai Nanavati Hospital, Bombay.

After examining the complainant, the appellant found that the complainant was a

patient of Chronic Renal Failure due to Bilateral Poly Cystic Kidneys.   Hence the

appellant suggested to the complainant to have Haemodialysis twice a week as an

outdoor patient.  The complainant was also investigated to find a suitable kidney

donor.

81. The  appellant  has  alleged  in  his  written  statement  filed  before  the

National Commission that the complainant was in a hurry to have a quick kidney

transplant  by  Dr.  Soonawalla and  he  was  very obstinate,  stubborn and  short-

tempered.   Dr.  Soonawalla was  out  of  India  from 1.6.1991  to  1.7.1991.   On

20.5.1991, the complainant approached the appellant with high fever of 101-103OF,

and the appellant suggested immediate admission of the complainant in the hospital

for detailed investigation and treatment but the complainant refused to get himself

admitted and refused to comply with the advice.  Hence the appellant was obliged to

put the complainant on a Broad Spectrum Antibiotic Ampoxim 500 mg four times a

day and Tab. Crocin – SOS fever.

82. From 21.5.1991, the complainant attended the Haemodialysis unit of the

hospital on three occasions and informed the appellant that the fever had not yet

remitted.  The appellant again advised the complainant to get admitted in hospital,

but he refused the advice on account of his obstinacy.  

83. On 29.5.1991,  the complainant was in a serious condition having high

fever of 104OF.  After much persuasion he finally agreed to be admitted for final

investigation and got admitted in the hospital on 29.5.1991.

84. The complainant was investigated on 30.5.1991 and his report showed

High Creatinine - 13 mg., Blood Urea – 180 mg and Haemoglobin 4.3% which was

5 days prior to the commencement of the injection Amikacin  and not after the said

injection.

85. In our opinion it is  clear that the respondent already had high Blood

Creatinine, Blood Urea and low Haemoglobin before the injection of Amikacin.  He

had  also  high  fever which was  on  account  of  serious  blood  and  urinary tract

infection.  The appellant was of the view that the respondent’s infection could only

be treated by injection of Amikacin, as Methenamine Mandelate could not be used

due  to  his  chronic renal  failure.   The  respondent’s  report  also  established  his

resistance to all other antibiotics.  Gastroscopy was done on 4.6.1991 and Amikacin

was administered after test dosage only from 5.6.1991.  Amikacin was administered

on 5th, 6th and 7th June, 1991 and at this stage he did not complain of any side effects

and his temperature subsided  rapidly.   On 5.6.1991,  he was administered Cap.

Augmentin 375 mg three times a day for his serious Blood Infection and he was also

transferred one Unit of Blood during dialysis and his temperature subsided rapidly

and he felt much better.  

86. The appellant advised the respondent in view of his blood infection that

he  should  not  get  transplanted  for  six  weeks,  but  the  complainant/respondent

insisted on getting the transplant although he was not medically in fit condition.

Hence the appellant advised the respondent to further stay in the hospital for some

time, but the respondent did not agree and he started shouting at the top of his

voice and insisted to be discharged from the hospital on his own on 8.6.1991 at 9

a.m..

87. In view of his insistence the respondent was discharged from the hospital

on  his  own  on  8.6.1991  at  9  a.m..   The  appellant  suggested  alternate  day

Haemodialysis but the respondent refused saying that he was staying too far away

and could not come three times a week for Haemodialysis.  In this situation, the

appellant was left with no choice but to suggest Injection Amikacin (500 mg) twice a

day in view of the respondent’s infection and delicate condition and his refusal to

visit the Haemodialysis facility on alternate dates. The appellant also suggested the

following drugs under the supervision of the doctor when he would visit the dialysis

unit:

“1. Injection Amikacin 500 mg twice a day x 10           days for urinary tract infection.   2. Cap. Augmentine 375 mg 3 times a day for 6          weeks for blood infection 3. Cap. Becosule tab daily 4. Tab. Folvite 1 tab. Daily 5. Syrup Alludux 6. Injection Engrex once a month for 2 months 7. Cap. Bantes 100 mg twice a day”

88. It appears that the respondent attended the Haemodyalsis unit where he

met the appellant on 11th, 14th, 18th and 20th June, 1991.  Thereafter the respondent

did not come to the hospital.  

89. On  11.6.1991  the  respondent  complained  to  the  appellant  of  slight

tinnitus or ringing in the ear.  The appellant immediately reviewed the treatment on

the discharge card in possession of the respondent and asked the said respondent

and also asked his  attendant i.e.  his  wife to  stop  Injection Amikacin and Cap.

Augmantine verbally, and also marked ‘X’ on the discharge card in his own hand

writing on 11.6.1991 i.e.  3  days after discharge.  Hence,  as per direction of  the

appellant the respondent should have stopped receiving Injection Amikacin after

10.6.1991, but on his own he kept on taking Amikacin Injections.  The Discharge

Card as per the respondent’s complaint clearly shows that the said injection had

been ‘X’ crossed, and he was directed not to take the said injection from 11.6.1991

i.e.  on his very first complaint when he made mention of ringing in the ears or

tinnitus.

90. On perusal of the Xerox copies of the papers of the Cash Memo supplied

by  the  respondent  as  per  annexure  ‘4’  it  is  in  our  opinion  evident  that  the

respondent continued to take the medicine against the advice of the appellant, and

had unilaterally been getting injected as late as 17.6.1991, i.e. 7 days after he had

been instructed verbally and in writing in the presence of his attendant i.e. his wife

and staff members of the said hospital to stop Injection Amikacin/Cap. Augmantine

because of tinnitus as early as on 11.6.1991.

91. On 19.6.1991 a relative of the respondent who identified himself on the

phone as one Mr. Khan from Byculla rang up and stated that the said respondent

was once again running high fever.  The appellant once again immediately advised

him urgent admission to the said hospital which the respondent  refused to comply

and said that he would go elsewhere.   

92. From the above facts it is evident that the appellant was not to blame in

any  way  and  it  was  the  non-cooperative  attitude  of  the  respondent,  and  his

continuing with the Amikacin injection even after 11.6.1991 which was the cause of

his ailment, i.e. the impairment of his hearing.  A patient who does not listen to his

doctor’s advice often has to face the adverse consequences.

93. It is evident from the fact that the respondent was already seriously ill

before he met the appellant.  There is nothing to show from the evidence that the

appellant was in any way negligent, rather it appears that the appellant did his best

to give good treatment to the respondent to save his life but the respondent himself

did not cooperate.

94. Several doctors have been examined by the National Commission and we

have read their evidence which is  on record.  Apart from that, there is also the

opinion of Prof. P. Ghosh of All India Institute of Medical Sciences who had been

nominated by AIIMS as requested by the Commission, which is also on record.  It

has been stated by Dr. Ghosh that many factors in the case of renal diseases may

cause hearing loss. Prof. Ghosh has stated that it is impossible to foretell about the

sensitivity  of  a  patient  to  a  drug,  thereby  making  it  difficult  to  assess  the

contributions towards toxicity by the other factors involved.  Hearing loss in renal

patients is  a complex problem which is  a result of  many adverse and unrelated

factors. Generally, the state of hearing of a renal patient at any time is more likely to

be the result of a multifactorial effect than the response to a single agent.  

95. Prof  Ghosh  has  no  doubt  mentioned  that  concomitant  use  of

Aminoglycoside antibiotics (e.g. Amikacin) and loop diuretic may lead to summation

and potentiation of  ototoxic  effect,  and the  patient  has  a higher risk factor of

hearing impairment if there is a higher dose of Amikacin.  However, he has stated

that such gross impairment of the balancing function has perhaps been wrought by

a combination of factors.    

96. Prof Ghosh has also opined that the Amikacin dose of 500 mg twice a

day  for  14  days  prescribed  by  the  doctor  was  a  life  saving measure and  the

appellant did not have any option but to take this step.  Life is more important than

saving the function of the ear.  Prof Ghosh was of the view that antibiotics was

rightly given on the report of the sensitivity test which showed that the organisms

were sensitive  to  Amikacin.   Hence  the  antibiotic,  was  not  blindly  used  on  a

speculation or as a clinical experiment.

97. Prof  Ghosh mentioned that in the literature on Amikacin it  has been

mentioned that in a life threatening infection adult dosage may be increased to 500

mg every eight hours but should not be administered for longer than 10 days.

98. In view of the opinion of Prof Ghosh, who is an expert of the All India

Institute of Medical Sciences, we are clearly of the view that the appellant was not

guilty of medical negligence and rather wanted to save the life of the respondent.

The appellant was faced with a situation where not only was there kidney failure of

the patient,  but  also urinary tract infection and blood  infection.   In  this  grave

situation threatening the life of the patient the appellant had to take drastic steps.

Even if  he prescribed Amikacin for a longer period than is  normally done,  he

obviously did it to save the life of the respondent.

99. We have also seen the evidence of other doctors as well as the affidavits

filed before the National Commission.  No doubt some of the doctors who have

deposed  in  this  case  have  given  different  opinions,  but  in  cases  relating  to

allegations of medical negligence this Court has to exercise great caution.  

100. Dr. Ashok Sareen who is MD in medicine and trained in  Nephrology has

in his evidence stated that for Kidney failure patients one has to be very careful with

the drug Amikacin. He stated that he uses the drug only when other antibiotics have

failed or cannot be  used.  It  should be  used with wide intervals and only when

absolutely necessary and when no other drug is  available.  When asked whether

Amikacin should be given to a patient with 10 days stretch, as was prescribed by the

appellant in this case, Dr. Sareen replied that it was difficult to give an answer to

that question because it depends entirely on the treating physician.  Dr. Sareen has

admitted that giving Amikacin injection twice a day for 14 days can cause nerve

deafness which means losing one’s hearing.  No doubt,  Dr. Sareen in his cross-

examination stated that he would have prescribed the dose given to the respondent

differently but he has not stated what would be the dose  he would have prescribed.

101. We have also perused the evidence of Dr. Vindu Amitabh, who is a MD

in medicine in Safdarjung hospital and looking after Nephrology also.    He has

stated that normally Amikacin is given for 5 to 7 days twice daily.  However, he has

also stated that in severe circumstances it can be given for a longer period but if the

patient is developing complications then the doses should be stopped immediately.

If there is no substitute for it then Amikacin should be given in a very guarded dose.

He has admitted that Amikacin can lead to deafness.

102. In the affidavit of Dr. Raval of the Bombay Indian Inhabitant, who has

been practicing in Urology for several years it is stated that the respondent had

undergone a kidney transplant operation under Dr. Raval’s supervision on 30th July

1991 at the Prince Alikhan Hospital, Bombay and he was discharged on 13th August,

1991.  Dr. Raval has stated in his affidavit that during the time the respondent was

under his care he had a free conversation in English and Urdu without the aid of

interpreter and he did not complain of suffering any hearing problem until he was

discharged in the middle of August 1991.   An affidavit to the same effect has been

given by Dr.  Kirti  L.  Upadhyaya, of  Bombay Indian Inhabitant,  who is  also a

Nephrologist.   He  stated  that the respondent did  not complain of  any hearing

problem to him also.  

103. An affidavit has also been filed by Dr. Sharad M. Sheth,  of Bombay

Indian Inhabitant  who  is  also  MD  qualified  in  Nephrology.  He  also  stated  in

paragraph 3 of his affidavit as follows:-

“I state that in the circumstances of the case when Klebsiella Organism was found resistant to all powerful drugs inclusive  of  Augmentin  with  the  exception  of  Amikacin any nephrologist of a reasonable standard of proficiency would have prescribed “Amikacin” drug in measured doses as a life saving

drug despite the well established fact that this drug might cause ‘tinnitus’ or partial hearing impairment which is reversible, to almost  complete  extent  in   most  of  the  cases  after discontinuation  of  the  drug  as  soon  as  any  of  the  above symptoms makes its appearance.  I state that in this situation, ‘Amikacin’ could not have been avoided if the danger to the life of the patient had to be thwarted.  The diagnosis of Dr. M.F. D’Souza and the line of treatment adopted and administered to the said  Shri Mohd.  Ishaq,  who was suffering from a renal failure in addition to the above specific infections appears to be correct.”  

104. The  appellant  has  also  filed  his  own  affidavit  before  the  National

Consumer Commission which we have perused.  We have also seen the affidavit of

Dr. Ashok L. Kirpalani of Lady Ratan Tata Medical Centre, Bombay, who is MD in

Nephrology.  He stated that the medicine prescribed by the appellant was absolutely

right in the circumstances in view of the fact, that the patient was suffering serious

life threatening infection.   

105 We may also refer to the affidavit of Mrs. Mukta Kolekar of Bombay

Indian Inhabitant, who is a   Senior Sister attached to the hospital.  She has stated

in her affidavit as follows :-   

“I know Dr. Martin F.D’Souza who is a Nephrologist and who is attached to the said hospital since 1984.  I say that I know Mr. Mohd. Ishaq.  I distinctly remember him, as very few patients are as ill-tempered arrogant and obstinate like him. The said Mohd. Ishaq came to the said hospital as an outdoor as well as indoor  patient  for  Haemodialysis  on  a  number  of  occasions commencing from the month of April, 14th 1991 till 20th June, 1991 till 8th June, 1991 until suo moto he left the hospital.  I say that on 11th June,1991 the said Mohd. Ishaq came to the hospital for the purpose of Haemodialysis.  He had come of his own and he had no problem either in walking or in hearing.  Nothing abnormal was found in him.  However, during Haemodialysis, he complained to the  Doctor  of  ringing  in  the  ears  and  thereupon  Dr.  Martin F.D’Souza called for the Discharge Card of the said Mohd. Ishaq and verified the medicine and injections which were prescribed and on  verification,  Dr.  Martin  F.D’Souza  immediately  deleted injection Amikacine and Cap. Augmentin and put a cross against the  prescription  of  the  said  injection,  and  immediately  gave instructions to me as well as to the other staff members not to give that injection at all, and also told the said Mohd. Ishaq and his wife who had accompanied him, not to take or get administered the

said injection.

I say that after 11th June, 1991, the said Mohd. Ishaq came to the hospital as  an outdoor patient on 14th June,  17th June and 20th June,  1991  and  did  not  make  any  complaint  of  any  nature whatsoever with regard to his hearing faculties.  On the contrary, he used to have conversation and used to respond to the same as an ordinary man. The said Mohd. Ishaq used to come to hospital on his own without the assistance or help of anybody and after the dialysis also he used to go on his own.  Thus, until 20th June, 1991, the said Mohd.  Ishaq had no problems either in hearing or in movement of the limbs or parts of his body or in lifting parts of his body or in walking.”

106. From these deposition and affidavits it cannot be said that the appellant

was  negligent.   In  fact  most  of  the  doctors  who  have deposed  or  given their

affidavits before the Commission have stated that the appellant was not negligent.  

107. In his written statement filed before the National Commission the appellant

has stated in paragraph 9 (q-r) as follows :

“(q) On the  11th June,1991  the Complainant complained to Opposite Party of slight tinnitus or ringing in the ear.  Opposite Party immediately reviewed the treatment on the discharge card in possession of the Complainant and asked the said Complainant and also made his attendant i.e.  his wife to understand and asked her also to stop Injection Amikacin and Cap.  Augmentin  verbally  as  well  as  marked  ‘X’  on  the discharge card in his own hand writing i.e. on 11th June, 1991 i.e. 3 days after discharge.  Therefore, as per direction Opposite Party  Complainant  could  have  taken  or  received  Injection Amikacin only upto 10th June, 1991 when he showed the very first  and  Preliminary  side  effect  of  Injection  Amikacin. Discharge Card as per the Complainant’s Complaint Annexure ‘3’speaks clearly that the said Injection has been ‘X’ crossed and he was directed not to take the said Injection   from 11th June, 1991 i.e. on his very first complaint he made of ringing in the ears, or tinnitus.   

(r) On perusal of the Xerox copies of the papers of the Cash Memo supplied by the Complainant as per Annexure ‘4’ it  is  evident  that  the  Complainant against  the advice of  the Opposite Party and in breach of assurances, high handedly and unilaterally had been getting injected as late as 17th June, 1991 i.e. 7 days after he had been instructed verbally and in writing in the presence of his attendant i.e. his wife and staff members of the said hospital to stop Injection Amikacin/Cap. Augmentin because of tinnitus as early as 11th June, 1991”

108. We see no reason to disbelieve the above allegations of the appellant that

on 11.6.1991 he had asked the respondent to stop taking Amikacin injections, and in

fact  this  version is  corroborated  by  the  testimony of  the  Senior  Sister  Mukta

Kolekar in her affidavit, relevant part of which has been quoted above.  Hence, it

was the respondent himself who is to blame for having continued Amikacin after

11.6.1991against the advice of the appellant.  

109. Moreover, in the statement of Dr. Ghosh before the National Consumer

Dispute Redressal Commission it has been stated that it is by no means established

that Amikacin alone can cause deafness. Dr. Ghosh stated that there are 8 factors

that can cause loss of hearing. Moreover, there are conflicting versions about the

deafness of the respondent.  While the respondent stated that he became deaf in

June 1991, most of the Doctors who filed affidavits before the Commission have

stated that they freely conversed with him in several meetings much after 21st June

and in fact up to the middle of August 1991.    

110. The National Commission had sought the assistance of AIIMS to give a

report about the allegations of medical negligence against the appellant.  AIIMS had

appointed Dr. Ghosh to investigate the case and submit a report and Dr. Ghosh

submitted a report in favour of appellant. Surprisingly, the Commission has not

placed much reliance on the report of Dr. Ghosh, although he is an outstanding

ENT specialist of international repute.   

111. We have carefully perused the judgment of the National Commission and

we regret that we are unable to  concur with the views expressed therein.   The

Commission,  which consists  of  laymen in the  field  of  medicine,  has  sought  to

substitute its own views over that of medical experts, and has practically acted as

super-specialists  in  medicine.   Moreover,  it  has  practically  brushed  aside  the

evidence of Dr. Ghosh, whose opinion was sought on its own direction, as well as the

affidavits  of  several other doctors  (referred to  above) who have stated  that the

appellant acted correctly in the situation he was faced.   

112. The  Commission  should  have  realized  that  different  doctors  have

different approaches, for instance, some have more radical while some have more

conservative approaches.   All  doctors  cannot  be  fitted  into  a  straight-jacketed

formula, and cannot be penalized for departing from that formula.

113. While this Court has no sympathy for doctors who are negligent, it must

also be said that frivolous complaints against doctors have increased by leaps and

bounds in our country particularly after the medical profession was placed within

the purview of the Consumer Protection Act.  To give an example, earlier when a

patient who had a symptom of having a heart attack would come to a doctor, the

doctor would immediately inject him with Morphia or Pethidine injection before

sending him to the Cardiac Care Unit (CCU) because in cases of heart attack time is

the essence of  the matter.   However,  in some cases  the  patient  died  before he

reached  the  hospital.   After  the  medical  profession  was  brought  under  the

Consumer Protection Act vide Indian Medical Association  vs.  V.P. Shantha 1995

(6) SCC 651 doctors who administer the Morphia or Pethidine injection are often

blamed and cases of medical negligence are filed against them.  The result is that

many doctors have stopped giving (even as family physicians) Morphia or Pethidine

injection even in emergencies despite the fact that from the symptoms the doctor

honestly thought that the patient was having a heart attack.  This was out of fear

that if the patient died the doctor would have to face legal proceedings.

114. Similarly in cases of head injuries (which are very common in road side

accidents in Delhi and other cities)  earlier the doctor who was first  approached

would started giving first aid and apply stitches to stop the bleeding.  However, now

what is often seen is that doctors out of fear of facing legal proceedings do not give

first aid to the patient, and instead tell him to proceed to the hospital by which time

the patient may develop other complications.   

115. Hence Courts/Consumer Fora should keep the above factors in mind

when deciding cases related to medical negligence, and not take a view which would

be in fact a disservice to the public.  The decision of this Court in Indian Medical

Association  vs.   V.P.  Shantha (Supra) should  not  be  understood to  mean that

doctors  should  be  harassed merely because their treatment was unsuccessful  or

caused some mishap which was not necessarily due to negligence.  In fact in the

aforesaid decision it has been observed (vide para 22) :-

“In the matter of professional liability professions differ from other occupations for the reason that professions operate in spheres where success cannot be achieved in every case and very often success or failure depends upon factors beyond the professional man’s control.”……………

116. It  may be mentioned that the All India Institute of Sciences has been

doing outstanding research in Stem Cell Therapy for the last eight years or so for

treating patients suffering from paralysis, terminal cardiac condition, parkinsonism,

etc, though not yet with very notable success.  This does not mean that the work of

Stem Cell Therapy should stop, otherwise science cannot progress.

117. We, therefore, direct that whenever a complaint is  received against a

doctor or hospital by the Consumer Fora (whether District, State or National) or by

the Criminal Court then before issuing notice to  the doctor or hospital against

whom the complaint was made the Consumer Forum or Criminal Court should first

refer the matter to a competent doctor or committee of doctors, specialized in the

field  relating to  which the  medical negligence is  attributed,  and only after that

doctor or committee reports that there is a prima facie case of medical negligence

should notice be then issued to the concerned doctor/hospital.  This is necessary to

avoid harassment to doctors who may not be ultimately found to be negligent.  We

further warn the police officials not to  arrest or harass doctors unless  the facts

clearly come within the  parameters laid down in Jacob  Mathew’s  case  (supra),

otherwise the policemen will themselves have to face legal action.  

118. In the present case the appellant was faced with an extremely serious

situation.  Had the appellant been only suffering from renal failure it is possible that

a view could be  taken that the dose  prescribed for the appellant was excessive.

However, the respondent was not only suffering from renal failure but he was also

suffering from urinary tract infection and also blood infection i.e Septicaemia which

is blood poisoning caused by bacteria or a toxin.  He had also extremely high urea.

In this  extremely serious situation, the appellant had naturally to  take a drastic

measure to attempt to save the life of the respondent.  The situation was aggravated

by the non-cooperation of the respondent who seems to be of  an  assertive  nature

as  deposed  by  the  witnesses.   Extraordinary situations  require  extraordinary

remedies.  Even assuming that such a high dose of Amikacin would ordinarily lead

to hearing impairment, the   appellant was faced with a situation between the devil

and the deep sea.  If he chose to save the life of the patient rather than his hearing

surely he cannot faulted.   

119. In the present case the blood urea of the respondent was found to be 180

mgs.% whereas normally it should not exceed 10-50 mgs.%.   This shows that very

serious infection in the kidney of the respondent was taking place which required

drastic measures.

120. The  allegation against  the  appellant  is  that  he  gave overdose  of  the

antibiotic.  In this connection it may be mentioned that antibiotics are usually given

for a minimum of five days, but there is no upper limit to the number of days for

which they should continue,  and it  all depends  on the condition of  the patient.

Giving lesser dose of antibiotic may create other complications because it can cause

resistance in the bacteria to the drug, and then it will be more difficult to treat.

121. As  regards  the  impairment  of  hearing  of  the  respondent  it  may be

mentioned that there is no known antibiotic drug which has no side effect.  Hence

merely because there was impairment in the hearing of the respondent that does not

mean that the appellant was negligent.  The appellant was desperately trying to save

the  life  of  the  respondent,  which he  succeeded  in  doing.   Life  is  surely more

important than side effects.

122. For example many Anti Tubercular drugs (e.g. Streptomycin) can cause

impairment of hearing.  Does this mean that TB patients should be allowed to die

and not be given the Anti Tubercular drug because it impairs the hearing?  Surely

the answer will be in the negative.           

123. The courts and Consumer Fora are not experts in medical science, and

must not substitute their own views over that of  specialists.   It  is  true that the

medical profession has to an extent become commercialized and there are many

doctors who depart from their Hippocratic oath for their selfish ends of making

money.  However, the entire medical fraternity cannot be blamed or branded as

lacking in integrity or competence just because of some bad apples.

124. It  must  be  remembered that sometimes despite  their best  efforts  the

treatment of a doctor fails.   For instance, sometimes despite the best effort of a

surgeon, the patient dies. That does not mean that the doctor or the surgeon must

be held to be guilty of medical negligence, unless there is some strong evidence to

suggest that he is.

125. On the  facts  of  this  particular case,  we  are of  the  opinion that  the

appellant was not guilty of medical negligence.  Resultantly, the appeal is allowed;

the impugned judgment and order of the National Commission is set aside.   No

costs.

   ......................J.     [MARKANDEY KATJU]

.....................J.      [R.M. LODHA]

New Delhi, February 17, 2009.