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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  210 of 2000

PETITIONER: Manish Ratan & Ors.                                              

RESPONDENT: State of M.P. & Anr.                                             

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/11/2006

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA,  J :          

       Application of Sections 177 and 178 of Code of Criminal Procedure  (Code) is involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order  dated 1.09.1998 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Crl.  Revision No. 98 of 1998.

       Appellant No. 1 was married with Meena, Respondent No. 2 herein at  Niwari, Distt. Tikangarh.  They were living at their matrimonial home at  Jabalpur.  Allegedly, a complaint was lodged by father-in-law of Appellant  No. 1 with the police station, Jabalpur on 19.04.1997 alleging that the  appellants have been ill-treating his daughter and demanded dowry.

       Meena allegedly lodged another First Information Report against the  appellants at the Police Station, Datia on 25.05.1997 whereupon a criminal  case was registered.  In the said complaint, the place of incident was said to  have taken place in House No. 151, Adarsh Nagar Narbada Road, Jabalpur.   The period during which the incident took place was said to be before  November, 1995 till 25.08.1997.  It was alleged:

"7.     That during the time of Dusshera the  complainant’s husband Manish, Father in law S.S.  Rattan, Mother in law Smt. Kiran and sister in law  Menaka (Minni) illtreated her so much that she left  her house and saved her life by some means and  reached in her Mama’s house at Bhopal and from  there she reached her house and since then she has  been staying with her father."

       A criminal revision was filed by the appellants questioning the  jurisdiction of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia.  By reason of  the impugned judgment, the said criminal revision application has been  dismissed opining that the offence being a continuing one, Datia Court had  jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence.   

       The High Court did not consider the question on the touchstone of  Sections 177 and 178 of the Code.  It is interesting to note that while  arriving at the decision the High Court distinguished the decision of this  Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee [(1997) 5  SCC 30], stating:

"\005The High Court held that excepting against the  husband, the complaint against other respondents  related to the incidents taking place at Raigarh and  as such, the criminal case on the basis of complaint

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made by the appellant was not maintainable  against the said other respondents at Raipur but it  was maintainable so far as the husband of the  appellant was concerned.  On these facts, the Apex  Court took the view that the complaint reveals a  continuing offence of the mal-treatment and  humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands  of all the accused \026 respondents, and in such  continuing offence, on some occasions all the  respondents had taken part and on other occasion,  one of the respondents had taken part.  It was,  therefore, held that in view of clause (c) of Section  178 of Cr.P.C., the High Court was not right.  The  order passed by the High Court was set aside and  the learned CJM, Raipur had jurisdiction to try the  case.  The facts of the present case are different.   There is nothing in the complaint to show that any  mal-treatment was given to the complainant at  Datia.  The allegations, which I may repeat here,  are that the mal-treatment was given within a  specific period at Jabalpur.  There is nothing to  show that any mal-treatment was given by any of  the petitioners at Datia and under these  circumstances, this case of Sujata Mukherjee does  not help the learned counsel for the complainant in  this case."

       By a curious process of reasoning, however, it was held:

"\005They demanded a sum of Rs. 7.00 lakhs and  forced her to write a letter to her parents in that  regard.  She was beaten and kept starving.   Somehow she managed to escape and went to her  Mama’s place at Bhopal and from there she went  to father’s place and was living there.  Thus these  facts go to show that she was forced to go to her  father’s place on account of the fact that she was  mal-treated; as demand of Rs. 7.00 lakhs was not  fulfilled.  As laid down in the aforesaid decision of  this Court, the word ’cruelty’ is not only the  physical cruelty, the lady was forced to live at her  father’s place on account of the torture of the  inlaws and as such it can safely be said that there  was also a mental cruelty.  The cruelty and the  terror of the in-laws continued even at the place of  the father where she was living.  In this view of the  matter, it can safely be said that the harassment  continued at the place where she was residing with  her father.  In view of the provision of Section 178  Cr.P.C., the offence may be inquired into and tried  by a Court where the physical harassment, marpeet  had taken place i.e. the in-laws’ place and also  where the harassment continued i.e. the place  where she was residing.  Thus in view of the law  laid down by this Court in the aforesaid authority  with which I respectfully agree, the Court at Datia  had also jurisdiction to try the case."

       It is not denied or disputed that no part of cause of action arose within  the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Datia Court.  Section 177 of the  Code ordains that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by  a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

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       Interpretation of the term "ordinarily" will have to be considered  having regard to the provisions contained in Section 178 thereof which reads  as under:

"178. Place of inquiry or trial.(a) When it is  uncertain in which of several local areas an offence  was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one  local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is continuing one, and  continues to be committed in more local areas than  one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in  different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a court having  jurisdiction over any of such local areas."

       Clause (c) of the said provision, thus, has been applied in the instant  case.

       Whether the allegations made in the complaint petition would  constitute a continuing offence, thus, is the core question.   

       In a case of this nature, an offence cannot be held to be a continuing  one, only because the complainant is forced to leave her matrimonial home.   

       In State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Another [(1972) 2 SCC  890], it was stated:

"A continuing offence is one which is susceptible  of continuance and is distinguishable from the one  which is committed once and for all. It is one of  those offences which arises out of a failure to obey  or comply with a rule or its requirement and which  involves a penalty, the liability for which continues  until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or  complied with. On every occasion that such  disobediance or non-compliance occurs and  reoccurs, there is the offence committed. The  distinction between the two kinds of offences is  between an act or omission which constitutes an  offence once and for all and an act or omission  which continues, and therefore, constitutes a fresh  offence every time or occasion on which it  continues. In the case of a continuing offence,  there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the  offence which is absent in the case of an offence  which takes place when an act or omission is  committed once and for all."           In Sujata Mukherjee (supra) this Court held the offence to be a  continuing one as specific allegations had been made against the husband  that he had also gone to Raipur where the complaint was filed and had  assaulted the appellant therein.  It was in the aforementioned fact situation,  this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court holding that the incident  at Raipur was not an isolated event stating:

"At the hearing of these appeals, Mr Gambhir, the  learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has  submitted that it will be evident from the  complaint that the appellant has alleged that she  had been subjected to cruel treatment persistently  at Raigarh and also at Raipur and incident taking  place at Raipur is not an isolated event, but

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consequential to the series of incidents taking  place at Raigarh. Therefore, the High Court was  wrong in appreciating the scope of the complaint  and proceeding on the footing that several isolated  events had taken place at Raigarh and one isolated  incident had taken place at Raipur. Hence, the  criminal case filed in the Court of the Chief  Judicial Magistrate, Raipur was only maintainable  against the respondent husband against whom  some overt act at Raipur was alleged. But such  case was not maintainable against the other  respondents."

       This Court having regard to the peculiar fact situation obtaining  therein held:

"\005We have taken into consideration the complaint  filed by the appellant and it appears to us that the  complaint reveals a continuing offence of  maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the  appellant in the hands of all the accused  respondents and in such continuing offence, on  some occasions all the respondents had taken part  and on other occasion, one of the respondents had  taken part. Therefore, clause (c) of Section 178 of  the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly  attracted. We, therefore, set aside the impugned  order of the High Court and direct the learned  Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur to proceed with  the criminal case\005"

       Sujata Mukherjee (supra) was distinguished by a Division Bench of  this Court in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai  and Another [(2004) 8 SCC 100] where noticing the interpretation of the  expression "cause of action", it was held that the expression "ordinarily"  need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions  may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the  provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court.  In  that case the complaint itself disclosed that after 15.04.1997, the respondent  left Nagercoil and went to Chennai and was staying there.  Thus, having  regard to the fact that all allegations according to the complainant took place  at Nagercoil, it was held that the courts at Chennai did not have the  jurisdiction to deal with the matter.  It was held:

"This Court held in that factual background that  clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the  present case the factual position is different and the  complainant herself left the house of the husband  on 15-4-1997 on account of alleged dowry  demands by the husband and his relations. There is  thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about  any demand of dowry or commission of any act  constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That  being so, the logic of Section 178(c) of the Code  relating to continuance of the offences cannot be  applied."           Yet again in Ramesh and Others v. State of T.N. [(2005) 3 SCC 507],  Abraham Ajith (supra) was followed by this Court stating:

"In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for  us to delve into the question of territorial  jurisdiction of the Court at Trichy in detail. Suffice

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it to say that on looking at the complaint at its face  value, the offences alleged cannot be said to have  been committed wholly or partly within the local  jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court at Trichy.  Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting  the offence can be said to have occurred within the  local jurisdiction of that court. Almost all the  allegations pertain to acts of cruelty for the  purpose of extracting additional property as dowry  while she was in the matrimonial home at Mumbai  and the alleged acts of misappropriation of her  movable property at Mumbai. However, there is  one allegation relevant to Section 498-A from  which it could be inferred that one of the acts  giving rise to the offence under the said section  had taken place in Chennai. It is alleged that when  the relations of the informant met her in-laws at a  hotel in Chennai where they were staying on 13- 10-1998, there was again a demand for dowry and  a threat to torture her in case she was sent back to  Mumbai without the money and articles  demanded. Thus the alleged acts which according to the  petitioner constitute the offences under Sections  498-A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in  Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Prima facie, there  is nothing in the entire complaint which goes to  show that any acts constituting the alleged  offences were at all committed at Trichy."

       The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present  case.

       Our attention was drawn to the fact that no criminal case was lodged  at Jabalpur.  Our attention was further drawn to the fact that the investigation  of the case is complete.   

       We, therefore, are of the opinion that, interest of justice would be  subserved, while setting aside the order of the High Court, if in exercise of  our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct  transfer of the criminal case pending in the Court of Chief Judicial  Magistrate, Datia to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur.  We  accordingly do so.

       Although the complainant has filed an application before us for  impleading herself as a party, nobody has appeared on her behalf.  We,  therefore, direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to issue notice to  her.  Keeping in view of the fact that Respondent No. 2 is residing at Datia,  we would request the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to accommodate  her in the matter of fixing the date (s) of hearing as far as possible.   

       The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions.