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PETITIONER: MANGAT MAL (DEAD) AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. PUNNI DEVI (DEAD) AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/09/1995

BENCH: M.K. MUKHERJEE, G.T.NANAVATI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                           JUDGMENT BHARUCHA, J.      This appeal  by special  leave impugns the judgment and order dated  8th May,  1970 of  the High Court of Rajasthan. The issue  in the  appeal  relates  to  the  application  of Section 14(1)  of the  Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It stands outside the  line of  cases decided by this Court in that it is  argued   that,  in  giving  maintenance,  provision  for residence is not to be made.      One Karam  Chand had  two sons,  Dhanraj  and  Askaran. Dhanraj died in 1891 leaving no issue. Askaran had two sons, Johri Mal  and Bhikam Chand.  In 1905 Johri Mal was taken in adoption by  Dhanraj‘s widow.  After the  adoption of  Johri Mal, Askaran  and Bhikam  Chand remained  co-parceners until the death  in 1911 of Bhikam Chand. Bhikam Chand left behind his wife  Sukh Devi  and a  daughter. On 7th February, 1928, Askaran executed a will bequeathing his estate to Johri Mal. Sukh Devi,  who  had  been  living  with  her  father-in-law Askaran, protested; being the widow of a co-parcener she was entitled to  be maintained  out of joint family property. An agreement was  then entered  into between  Askaran and  Sukh Devi. It  was dated  26th June,  1934. It  recited that Sukh Devi had  been boarding  and lodging  with Askaran, and that family disputes  had arisen.  To put  an end  to the  family disputes, Askaran and Sukh Devi, by the agreement, appointed one Mool Chand as arbitrator to ˜allot property and cost for executant  number   2  for   her  life   for  residence  and maintenance˜. The  arbitrator Mool  Chand entered  upon  the reference and  made an  award on  9th July, 1934. He set out the  particulars  of  properties  belonging  to  Askaran  at Bidasar and  Ladnu and  gave the  choice of selecting one to Sukh Devi to "reside till her life time in them or in it and she can  use it  in any way she likes. On necessity she will get its  repairs done  with her  own money. She will have no right to  sell, mortgage or transfer in any other way. After her  death,   the  properties  stated  in  Para  No.1  or  2 (whichever she might take) will revert to Askaran, his heirs and legal  representatives. Her  right will  be only  in her lifetime. She  is authorised  to undertake  construction for necessity and  convenience. She  may  increase  or  decrease

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apartments with her money. But she will not be authorised to destroy, deteriorate its usefulness and condition, etc.      (4) For  the maintenance  of Smt.  Sukh Devi, I give my finding that  it is  better to  give a  lump sum  instead of giving monthly  or annually  because she  wants  to  receive money in  lump sum.  By giving lump sum, the disputes, which might arise  from time  to time  at the  time of  demand and payment, might be avoided.  Therefore I give my finding that Askaran will  pay a  sum of  Rs.45,000/- (rupees  forty five thousand only) to Smt. Sukh Devi for maintenance in case she accepts the  house at  Ladnu and in case she takes the house and the  Nohra at  Bidasar, she  will be  given  Rs.37,000/- (rupees thirty  seven thousand  only).  Since  there  is  no apartment in the Nohra, Askaran will pay a sum of Rs. 1000/- (rupees one  thousand only) more besides Rs.37,000/- (rupees thirty seven  thousand only)  for constructing  Dhalia, room for keeping grass and fodder and a Hauz............      (5)  The   money  which   will  be  given  to  her  for maintenance will be her personal money and she can use it as she likes........................      (8) After the execution of the aforesaid terms, Askaran will be  free from  all kinds of litigations or compensation of Smt.  Sukh Devi  and  she  will  have  no  right  in  the ancestral or  personal properties of Askaran or his heirs or legal representatives.  Further, Askaran, his heirs or legal representatives will  also have no right in Smt. Sukh Devi‘s any  property   or  her   Shtridhan  except  noted  in  Para No.3.........................."      On 10th  July, 1934,  Sukh  Devi  executed  a  document wherein she  stated that  she had  accepted the  property at Bidasar under  the terms  of Mool  Chand‘s award.  She would "have right  in the house and Nohra at Bidasar in the manner that I will go on residing in the said house at Bidasar till my life  time and  go on  using the  Nohra. I  will keep the house and  Nohra in my possession and use them in the manner I like  and on  necessity, I  will get  it repaired  with my money. I  will be authorised to effect minor changes etc. by way of  construction for  my convenience,  but I will not be authorised to  waste or  damage the  said Haveli  and Nohra. After my  death the  house will again revert to Askaran, his surviving sons  and grandsons  or other heirs and successors or legal  representatives. My  heirs and successors or legal representative will have no right of possession or ownership over the said property.      (3) The  arbitrator has allowed me Rs. 37,000/- in case I take the house and Nohra at Bidasar (Nohra with Rs. 1000/- for constructing  rooms). I agree to take this amount for my maintenance etc. over which I will have absolute right.      (7) In  the end  it is  clearly stated that now I shall have no  concern of  any kind  in the  movable and immovable properties and  the cash  of Askaran which might be existing in this state or in British India or at any other place.      Askaran died on 24th April, 1945.      Section 14  of the  Hindu Succession  Act, 1956,  reads thus :      "Property of  a female  Hindu to  be her      absolute property  -  (1)  Any  property      possessed by  a  female  Hindu,  whether      acquired    before    or    after    the      commencement of  this Act, shall be held      by her  as full owner thereof and not as      a limited owner.      Explanation  -   In  this   sub-section,      "property"  includes  both  movable  and      immovable property  acquired by a female

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    Hindu by  inheritance or devise, or at a      partition, or  in lieu of maintenance or      arrears of  maintenance, or by gift from      any person,  whether a  relative or not,      before, at  or after her marriage, or by      her  own   skill  or   exertion,  or  by      purchase or  by prescription,  or in any      other manner  whatsoever, and  also  any      such property  held by  her as stridhana      immediately before  the commencement  of      this Act.      (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1)      shall apply  to any property acquired by      way of gift or under a will or any other      instrument or under a decree or order of      a civil  court or  under an  award where      the terms  of the  gift, will  or  other      instrument or the decree, order or award      prescribe a  restricted estate  in  such      property.˜      On 11th  April, 1960,  Sukh Devi  executed  sale  deeds relating to the ’nohra’ in the Bidasar property in favour of one Mangat  Mal, in  respect of  its Western  side, and  one Trilok Chand, in respect of its Eastern side.      On 17th  May, 1960, Johri Mal and his sons filed a suit challenging the  validity of the sale. The vendees were made parties. The  trial court  dismissed the  suit holding  that Sukh Devi  had become,  by reason of the Act, the full owner of the  property at  Bidasar. The plaintiffs appealed to the High Court.  The High Court took the view that the words "in lieu of  maintenance" in  the Explanation  to Section 14 (1) applied to property specifically allotted to a widow for her maintenance  while   the  words  "or  in  any  other  manner whatsoever" covered  specific property  allotted to  her for her residence.  It held  that Sukh  Devi had  not become the full owner  of the  property at  Bidasar on  the coming into force of  the Act  because she  had only  a restricted life- estate therein.  The appeal  was, accordingly,  allowed. The sale deeds  were held  to be  void and  the plaintiffs to be entitled to  possession of  the nohra upon the death of Sukh Devi      This appeal  is by  the vendees  of the ‘nohra‘, Mangat Mal and Trilok Chand.      Mr.  Bagga,   learned  counsel   for  the   appellants, submitted  that  Sukh  Devi  had  a  pre-existing  right  to maintenance and  that under  the award  she was given a life interest in  the Bidasar  property along  with a  sum of Rs. 37,000/- in  lieu of  that right.  She, therefore,  acquired limited ownership of the Bidasar property under the award in 1934  and   that  limited   ownership  blossomed  into  full ownership on the coming into force of the Act.      Mr.  Thakur,   learned  counsel  for  the  respondents, submitted that,  for the application of Section 14(1) it was requisite that  the property should have been ‘acquired‘ and that the  acquisition was  of ownership rights comparable to those of  a limited  estate holder  under the old Hindu law. Since  Sukh  Devi  had  been  conceded  only  the  right  of residence in  the Bidasar property, she had not acquired any right thereto. Hence, Section 14 (1) did not apply.  The use of the  two expressions  "limited owner" and "full owner" in Section 14  (1)  presupposed  the  existence  of  a  limited ownership right before the same could be converted into full ownership. The  modes of  acquisition  contemplated  in  the Explanation to  Section 14  (1) suggested  that it  was  the right of  ownership which  was insisted upon. A right in the

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nature of  a right  of residence could not be equated with a right of ownership.  Even during the life time of Sukh Devi, the reversioners,  to whom  the Bidasar property belonged as legatees under  Askaran‘s  will,  could  create  a  mortgage thereof without  her permission because they continued to be the owners of Bidasad property.  The concession in the award of the  right of  residence in  the Bidasar property to Sukh Devi was  over and  above the  provision for  maintenance in terms of  money.   Even if it were to be held that the award conferred a  title to  the  property  for  the  purposes  of Section 14 (1), it did not come from any pre-existing right.      In the  leading case  on the  subject of section 14, V. Tulasamma &  ors. vs. V. Sesha Reddi (Dead) by L.Rs., 1977-3 S.C.R. 261,  it was  held that under the Sastric Hindu Law a Hindu Widow had a right to be maintained out of joint family property and  this right  ripened into a charge if the widow took  the   necessary  steps   for  having  her  maintenance ascertained and  specifically charged  on the  joint  family property.   Even if  no specific  charge were  created, this right was  enforceable against  joint family property in the hands of a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with notice of her claim.  When specific property was allotted to the widow in lieu  of her  claim for maintenance, the allotment was in satisfaction of  her right to be maintained out of the joint family property.  It was  not a  grant for  the  first  time without any  pre-existing right  in the widow. The widow got the property  by  virtue  of  her  pre-existing  right,  the instrument giving  the  property  being  merely  a  document effectuating such  pre-existing right.  Section 14  (1)  was large in its amplitude and covered every kind of acquisition of property  by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance.  Where such property was possessed by her at the date  of commencement  of the  Act, she  became its full owner.   The words "any property" were large enough to cover any and  every kind  of property  but in order to expand the reach and ambit of the Section and make it all comprehensive the Explanation  thereto had  been enacted . Whatever be the kind of property, movable or immovable, and whichever be the mode of  acquisition, it would be covered by Section 14 (1). The  object   of  the   Legislature  was  to  wipe  out  the disabilities from  which a Hindu woman suffered in regard to the ownership  of property  under the old Sastric Law and to recognise her status as an independent and absolute owner of property. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 was in the nature of a proviso  to sub-section  (1). It  had to  be read  in  the context to sub-section (1) to leave as large a scope for the operation of  sub-section (1)  as possible.  So  read,  sub- section (2)  had to  be confined to cases where property was acquired by a Hindu woman without any pre-existing right for the first time under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award,  the terms of which prescribed a restricted estate in the  property. Where  property was  acquired by  a  Hindu woman in  lieu of  her right to maintenance it was by virtue of a  pre-existing right  and such acquisition was no within the  scope   and  ambit  of  sub-section  (2)  even  if  the instrument allotting  the property  prescribed a  restricted estate in  it. Where  property was acquired by a Hindu woman under an  instrument by  virtue of  a pre-existing  right to maintenance and,  under the  law as  it stood  prior to  the enactment of  the Act,  she would  have had  no more  than a limited  interest  in  the  property,  a  provision  in  the instrument giving  her limited  interest in the property was merely by  way of  recognition of  the legal  position as it existed  and  the  restriction  on  her  interest,  being  a disability imposed  by law,  was wiped  out and  her limited

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interest enlarged under sub-section (1).      In Smt.  Gulwant Kaur  and anr.  vs. Mohinder Singh and ors., 1987-3 S.C.R. 576, it was argued that even if the land in question  had been  given to  the appellant  in  lieu  of maintenance, it had to be established that what was given to her was  a limited  estate in the sense of ownership without the right of alienation and that under Section 14 of the Act only such  a limited  estate would blossom into her absolute estate. This  Court rejected  the argument.  It said that it was  obvious   that  Section   14  was   aimed  at  removing restrictions or  limitation on the right of a Hindu woman to enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as her possesion  was traceable  to a lawful origin, that is to say, if  she had a vestige of a title. It made no difference whether the  property was  acquired by inheritance or devise or at  a partition  or in  lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase  or   by  prescription   or  in  any  other  manner whatsoever. The  Explanation to  Section  14  (1)  expressly referred to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and the Court could  not  see  what  further  title  the  widow  was required to  establish before she could claim full ownership under Section 14 (1) in respect of property given to her and possessed by  her in lieu of maintenance.  The very right to receive maintenance  was  sufficient  title  to  enable  the ripening of  possession into  full ownership  if she  was in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance. The Court added that  it did  not understand  that in  the case of Bai Vajia vs.  Thakorbhai Chelabhai,  1979-3 S.C.R.  291, it had been laid down that what was enlarged by Section 14 (1) into a full  estate was  the Hindu  woman‘s estate known to Hindu law. When  the Court  had used  the words  "limited estate", they were  used to  connote a right in the property to which the possession  of the  Hindu woman  could  legitimately  be traced, but it was not a full right of ownership. If a Hindu woman was  put in  possession of  property pursuant to or in recognition of  a right  to maintenance,  it  could  not  be denied that  she had acquired a limited right or interest in the property and once that position was accepted it followed that the  right got enlarged to full ownership under Section 14 (1).      The property  acquired by  a Hindu widow under an award for partition  of her late husband‘s estate was the subject- matter of  the decision  of this  Court in Badri Pershad vs. Smt. Kanso  Devi, 1970-2  S.C.R. 95.  The word "acquired" in Section 14  (1) had,  the Court said, to be given the widest possible meaning.   This  was so  because of the language of the Explanation  which made  sub-section (1)  applicable  to acquisition of  property by  inheritance or  devise or  at a partition  or   in  lieu   of  maintenance   or  arrears  of maintenance or  by gift  or  by  a  female‘s  own  skill  or exertion or  by purchase  or prescription  or in any mannere whatsoever. Sub-section  (2) of  section 14  was more in the nature of  a proviso  to sub-section (1). It could come into operation  only   if  acquisition  by  any  of  the  methods indicated therein  was made for the first time without there being any  pre-existing right in the  Hindu woman who was in possession of  the property.  The mere  fact that  there had been a  partition by  means of arbitration which resulted in an award  and a  decree based on it did not bring the matter within sub-section  (2) as the provisions of sub-section (1) became  fully  applicable  in  view  of  the  terms  of  the Explanation.      Mr. Thakur  drew our  attention to Eramma vs. Veerupana and ors.,  1966-2 S.C.R.  626, and  he emphasised  a passage

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which reads thus :      "(7) It  is true  that the appellant was      in possession of Eran Gowda‘s properties      but that fact alone is not sufficient to      attract  the   operation  of  S.14.  The      property possessed by a female Hindu, as      contemplated in  the section  is clearly      property to  which she has acquired some      kind of  title whether  before or  after      the commencement  of the  Act. It may be      noticed that the Explanation to S.14 (1)      sets   out    the   various   modes   of      acquisition of  the property by a female      Hindu and  indicates  that  the  section      applies only  to property  to which  the      female Hindu  has acquired  some kind of      title, however  restricted the nature of      her interest  may be. The words "as full      owner  thereof  and  not  as  a  limited      owner" as  given in  the last portion of      sub-section (1) of S. 14 clearly suggest      that the  legislature intended  that the      limited  ownership  of  a  Hindu  female      should be  changed into  full ownership.      In other  words, S.14  (1)  of  the  Act      contemplates that a Hindu female who, in      the absence  of  this  provision,  would      have been limited owner of the property,      will now  become full  owner of the same      by virtue  of this  section.  The object      of the  section  is  to  extinguish  the      estate  called   ‘limited   estate‘   or      ‘widow‘s estate‘  in Hindu  Law  and  to      make a  Hindu woman,  who under  the old      law would have been only a limited owner      a full  owner of  the property  will all      powers of  disposition and  to make  the      estate heritable  by her  own heirs  and      not revertible  to the heirs of the last      male holder.   The  Explanation to  sub-      section (2)  of S.  14  also  refers  to      acquisition of property. It is true that      the  Explanation   has  not   given  any      exhaustive  connotation   of  the   word      "property" but  the word ‘acquired‘ used      in the  Explanation  and  also  in  sub-      section (2)  of S.  14 clearly indicates      that the  object of  the section  is  to      make a  Hindu female a full owner of the      property which  she has already acquired      or  which   she   acquires   after   the      enforcement of  the Act.  It does not in      any way  confer a  title on  the  female      Hindu where  she did not in fact possess      any  vestige  or  title.    It  follows,      therefore, that  the section  cannot  be      interpreted  so   as  to   validate  the      illegal  confer  any  title  on  a  mere      trespasser.   In    other   words,   the      provisions of  Section 14 (1) of the Act      cannot be  attracted in  the case  of  a      Hindu female who is in possession of the      property of  the last male holder on the      date of the commencement of the Act when      she is  only a  trespasser  without  any

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    right to property."      It is difficult to see how this judgment can assist the respondents‘ case.   The  Court did  not intend to mean that the object  of Section  14 was only to extinguish the estate called ‘limited  estate‘ or ‘widow‘s estate‘ under the Hindu Law. That is clear from the passage quoted when it refers to "some kind of title" and "any vestige of title". It is clear also from  what the  Court held  in the last sentence quoted above, namely, that the provisions of Section 14 (1) are not attracted in  the case of a Hindu woman who is in possession of property  only as  a trespasser  and  without  any  right thereto.      The next  case which  Mr. Thakur cited was Mangal Singh and ors.  vs. Smt.  Rattno (dead).   1967-3  S.C.R. 454. Mr. Thakur stressed that it was there stated that the expression "possessed by"  in Section  14 (1) was not intended to apply to  a   case  of  mere  possession  without  title  and  the Legislature intended  this provision  for  cases  where  the Hindu woman  possessed a  right of ownership in the property in question.   In paragraph 9 of the same judgment the Court said that  it appeared  that the  relevant date on which the Hindu woman  should be  possessed of the property in dispute should be  the date  on which  the question  of applying the provisions of  Section 14 (1) arose.  If, on that date, when the provisions  of this  Section were  sought to be applied, the property  was possessed  by a  Hindu women,  it would be held that  she was full owner of it and not merely a limited owner.      The next  judgment upon which Mr.Thakur placed reliance was  that   of  this  Court  in  Bai  Vajia  vs.  Thakorbhai Chelabhai, 1979-3 S.C.R. 291, to which reference has already been made. It was pointed out that the Court had said that a plain reading  of Section  14 (1)  made it  clear  that  the concerned Hindu  woman should  have limited ownership in the property, which  limited ownership would get enlarged by the operation of  that sub-section.   It  was  not  intended  to enlarge any  sort of  a right  which in  no sense  could  be described as  ownership.   The  expression  "and  not  as  a limited owner"  would, then, not have been used at all. Now, in this  case it was also said that limited ownership in the Hindu woman  was a  sine qua  non for  the applicability  of Section 14 (1) and this requirement stood fully satisfied in the case  of a  widow to whom property was made over in lieu of maintenance  with full  rights of enjoyment thereof minus the power of alienation.  These were precisely the incidents of limited  ownership.   It was also said that the enactment of Section  14 was  a step  in the  direction  of  practical recognition of  the equality  of the  sexes and was meant to elevate woman  from a  subservient position  in the economic field to  a pedestal where they could exercise full power of enjoyment and  disposal of  property held by them as owners, untrammelled  by  artificial  limitations  placed  on  their rights of  ownership by  a society  in which the will of the dominant male  prevailed to bring about a subjugation of the opposite sex.   It  was also  a step  calculated  to  ensure uniformity in the law relating to the nature of ownership of ‘stridhana‘.   This dual  purpose underlying the Explanation to Section  14 (1)  had to be borne in mind and given effect to  when   the  section   was  subjected   to  analysis  and interpretation and  sub-section (2)  was not  to be  given a meaning which  would defeat  that purpose  and negative  the legislative intent,  if the  language used  so warranted.  A combind reading  of the two sub-sections and the Explanation left no room for doubt that sub-sections (2) did not operate to take  in property  acquired by  a Hindu  woman in lieu of

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maintenance or  arrears of  maintenance (which  was property specifically included  in the  enumeration contained  in the Explanation) out of the purview of sub-section (1).      The reference  made by  Askaran and  Sukh Devi  to  the arbitration of  Mool Chand  records that  Sukh Devi  was the widow of  Askaran‘s son  and had  been boarding  and lodging with Askaran.  Family disputes  had made  the continuance of joint lodging  and boarding  impossible and  Mool Chand  was appointed arbitrator  "to allot  property and  cost" to Sukh Devi" for  her life  for residence  and maintenance".  There was, therefore,  clearly, recognition  of Sukh  Devi‘s  pre- existing right  to maintenance.   The  award that Mool Chand made gave  Sukh  Devi  an  alternative  in  respect  of  the property in  which she desired to reside, one at Bidasar and one at  Ladnu.   The award  stated that  if  she  chose  the property  at   Ladnu  she  would  receive  Rs.  45,000/-  in addition, and if she chose the property at Bidasar she would receive Rs.  37,000/- in  addition (as  also Rs. 1,000/- for constructing certain  apartments).   The award entitled Sukh Devi to  use the  property she  chose for residence for life and "she can use in any way she likes".  She was entitled to undertake construction  for necessity  and  convenience,  to increase and  decrease apartments  with her money and to get repairs done.   The  only limitation was that she should not destroy or  damage  the  property.    Sukh  Devi  chose  the property at  Bidasar for  residence  and  in  the  deed  she executed in  that behalf she stated that she would "keep the house and  Nohra in my possession and use them in the manner I like".      In our  view, on  a perusal  of the terms of reference, the award  and the document executed by Sukh Devi indicating her preference  for the  Bidasar property, there is no doubt that Sukh  Devi acquired the Bidasar property and the sum of Rs.  38,000/-   in  lieu   of  her   pre-existing  right  to maintenance.   That the  award of the property and the money was linked  is clear  from the  fact that the quantum of the money depended  upon whether  Sukh Devi  chose  the  Bidasar property or  the Ladnu property.  The award of both property and  money   was  in  lieu  of  her  pre-existing  right  to maintenance.      Maintenance, as  we see it, necessarily must encompas a provision for  residence.   Maintenance is given so that the lady can  live in the manner, more or less, to which she was accustomed.   The concept  of maintenance  must,  therefore, include provision  for food  and clothing  and the  like and take into  acount the  basic need  of a  roof over the head. Provision for  residence may be made either by giving a lump sum in  money, or  property in lieu thereof.  It may also be made by  providing, for  the course  of the  lady‘s life,  a residence and  money for  oher necessary expenditure.  Where provision is  made in this manner, by giving a life interest in property for the purposes of residence, that provision is made in  lieu of a pre-existing right to maintenance and the Hindu lady acquires far more than the vestige of title which is deemed sufficient to attract Section 14 (1).      We are  supported in  the view  that we take by Mulla‘s Hindu Law (Sixteenth Edition) which sets out the position in law prior  to the  Act.   The Manager  of a joint Mitakshara family is  under a  legal obligation  to maintain  all  male members of  the family,  their wives and their children.  On the death  of any  one of  the male  members he  is bound to maintain his  widow and  his children.   The  obligation  to maintain these persons arises from the fact that the Manager is in possession of the family property (para 543).  An heir is legally  bound  to  provide,  out  of  the  estate  which

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descends to him, maintenance for those persons whom the late proprietor was  legally or  morally bound  to maintain (para 544).   A wife  is entitled to be maintained by her husband, whether he  possesses property  or not.  When a man with his eyes open  maries a  girl accustomed  to a  certain style of living, he  undertakes the  obligation of maintaining her in that style  (para 554).  A widow who does not succeed to the estate of her husband as his heir is entitled to maintenance out of  his separate  property as well as out of property in which he  was a  co-parcener at  the time of his death (para 559).    A  Hindu  widow  is,  in  the  absence  of  special circumstances, entitled  to reside  in the  family  dwelling house in  which she  lived with her husband (para 562).  The maintenance to  be allowed  to a  widow should  be  such  an amount as  will enable  her to  live consistently  with  her position as  a widow,  with  the  same  degree  comfort  and reasonable luxury  as she had in her husband‘s house, unless there are  circumstances which affect, one way or the other, her mode  of living  there.   In determining  the amount  of maintenance the Court should have regard, inter alia, to the provision and  status of  the deceased  husband and  of  the widow and  the reasonable  wants of the widow, including not only the  ordinary expenses  of living,  but what  she might reasonably expend  for religious and other duties incidental to her  station in  life (para  566).   Where  an  undivided family consists  of two or more males, related as father and son or  otherwise, and one of them dies leaving a widow, she is entitled  to reside in the family dwelling house in which she lived  with her  husband.   If the  house is sold by the surviving coparceners  without necessity,  the sale does not affect her  right, and  the purchaser cannot evict her until another suitable  residence is  found for her (para 573).  A widow who  is entitled  to maintenance  may sue, inter alia, for a  charge on  a specific portion of her husband‘s estate for her maintenance and residence (para 579).      The Hindu Adoption & Maintenance Act, 1959, was enacted to amend  and codify  the  law  relating  to  adoptions  and maintenance among  Hindus, and  it  defines  maintenance  in Section 3  (d) to  include "(1)  in all cases, provision for food, clothing,  residence, education and medical attendance and treatment."  (Emphasis supplied.)      Under the  award provision  was made,  in lieu  of Sukh Devi‘s pre-existing  right  to  maintenance,  of  money  and interest for  life  in  the  Bidasar  property.  Sukh  Devi, therefore, acquired  limited ownership rights in the Bidasar property  in   recognition  of  her  pre-existing  right  to maintenance.   Upon the  coming into  force of  the Act  the limited rights  acquired by Sukh Devi in 1934 blossomed into full ownership  of the  Bidasar  property,  and  she  became entitled to  sell its  ‘nohra‘.  In our view, therefore, the High Court was in error in the view that it took.      The appeal  is allowed.   The  judgment and order under appeal is  set aside  and the  judgment and order of the Sr. Civil Judge, Churu is restored.      In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.