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PETITIONER: MANAGEMENT SHAHDARA (DELHI) SAHARANPURLIGHT RAILWAY CO., LTD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S.S. RAILWAY WORKERS’ UNION

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/09/1968

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1969 AIR  513            1969 SCR  (2) 131  CITATOR INFO :  R          1970 SC  82  (7)  RF         1970 SC 512  (5,10)  RF         1972 SC1210  (14)  R          1984 SC 516  (23)  R          1984 SC1227  (6,8)

ACT: Industrial  Employment (Standing Orders) Act  (20 of  1946), as  amended by Act 36 of 1956, ss. 6 and  10(2)-Modification of existing Standing Orders-When permitted.

HEADNOTE: Six  months  after  the,  appelIant’s  Standing  Orders   as modified had come into operation, the respondent applied for further   modification  of  the Standing  Orders,  under  s. 10(2)  of the Industrial Employment (Standing  Orders)  Act, 1946,  ’as amended in 1956.  The certifying officer  allowed some  of the modifications and on appeal by the  respondent, the Appellate Authority allowed some more modifications.       In  appeal,  to  this  Court under  Art.  136  of  the Constitution, the appellant objected to four  modifications, namely:  (i)  that the appellant  should  give  reasons  and communicate  them  to  the  workmen   even   in   cases   of discharge  simpliciter; (ii) that appeals against  penalties imposed  should  be disposed of within 60 days;  (iii)  that when a workman is removed on the ground of inefficiency  due to  physical unfitness, the appellant should offer  to  such workman  alternative; employment  on reasonable  emoluments; and (iv) that a second show cause notice should be served on the  workman  at  the  stage of taking  a  decision  on  the suitable  punishment.   The  grounds  urged  were:  (1  )The authorities  under  the  Act can  certify  modifications  of existing Standing  Orders under s.  10(2) only when a change of  circumstances is established, because, s. 6 of  the  Act confers   finality   on   certified   Standing   Orders   or modifications  thereof; (2). On principles analogous to  res Judicata,  the authorities had no jurisdiction to grant  the modifications in the present case; and (3) the modifications were not reasonable or fair.     HELD:  (1) [Per Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ.]: A  change of  circumstances  is  not  a  condition  precedent  to  the

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maintainability of an application for modification under s." 10(2).     Under  the Act before its ’amendment in 1956, a  workman could   not  object  that  the  Standing  Orders  were   not reasonable  or  fair.   His  only remedy  was  to  raise  an industrial  dispute,  but that  remedy  was  unsatisfactory, since the dispute had to be sponsored by a union or at least a  substantial number of workmen and even then, the  process was a protracted one.  Parliament knew that the workmen  had the  right  to  raise an industrial  dispute  and  also  the defects  in that remedy and so amended ss. 4 and 10  of  the Act  by  Act  36  of  1956.   The  amendment  conferred   on individual  workman  the right to object to  draft  Standing Orders submitted by an employer on the ground that they  are either  not fair or not reasonable, and also gave the  right to  apply  for  their modification. Under  s.  6,  a  person aggrieved by the order of the certifying officer  certifying or  modifying Standing Orders, may appeal to  the  Appellate Authority  whose decision shall be final.  But the  finality only  means  that  there is no further  appeal  or  revision against the order and that the order cannot be challenged in ’a  civil  court.   It can, however. be  modified  under  s. 10(2).  The only limitations on the power are, (a) reason.- 132 ableness  and fairness of the modification and   (b)  except on   agreement between employer and the workmen  six  months must have elapsed from the date on which the Standing Orders or the last modifications thereof, came into operation,  the object  being  that  Standing Orders  or  the  modifications should  be allowed to work for some time to see if they  are satisfactory.  In an application for modification the  issue before   the authority would be not as to reasonableness  or fairness  of the existing Standing Orders. but  whether  the modification  ’applied for is fair and reasonable.  Such  an application  is  an   independent  application   and  merely because  it  could be made on the ground that  the  existing Standing  Orders  are discovered to be  unsatisfactory  even without any change in circumstances, it would not amount  to a review of  an  earlier  order. Further, there will not  be a   multiplicity   of  applications  because   the   workmen individually  have  the right to  apply  for  modifications. For,   unless   there   is  some   justification   for   the modification, the authorities under the Act would reject the applications. [139 G-H; 140 C-D; 141 A-C; 142 A-C; G-H;  143 A-C]     Bangalore Woollen Cotton & Silk Co. Ltd. v. The  Workmen [1968]  l  L.L.J. 555, Buckingham and Carnatic  Co.  Ltd.  v Workmen  C.A.  No.  674  of 1968  dt.  25th  July  1968  and Hindustan Brown Boveri Ltd. v. The Workmen C.A. No. 1631  of 1966 dt. 31st July 1967, referred to.     [Per Bhargava, J. dissenting]: When an application under s.   10(2)  is  made,  the  certifying  officer  can  modify Standing  Orders already certified, only if the  request  is not made on the basis of the same material which existed  at the earlier stage when they were certified. [155 G-H]     Before  the  amendment in 1956 if the  workmen  had  any grievance on the ground of unfairness or unreasonableness of the  Standing  Orders,  their  only  remedy  lay  under  the Industrial  Disputes  Act. By amendment in 1956,  a  limited remedy was provided for them in the Act itself by conferring on   the  certifying  officer  the  power  of  judging   the reasonableness  and fairness of the Standing Orders  and  of modifying  them  under s. 10(2).  Therefore, after 1956  the workmen have two alternative remedies for seeking alteration in the Standing Orders proposed or certified. Under s. 10(2)

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a request for modification can only be made on  the basis of fresh  facts  or fresh circumstances arising  subsequent  to the passing of the order by the Appellate Authority under s. 6 on the limited ground of reasonableness and fairness.. The Industrial Tribunal, however. can direct the alteration of a Standing  Order held to be reasonable and fair, without  any fresh  grounds, material, or change in circumstances  if  an industrial  dispute, in ’relation to it is raised, and  this is  the only remedy available if a modification  is  desired without  a change of circumstances. If it is held that  even the certifying officer can reconsider the reasonableness  or fairness of a Standing Order already certified and confirmed under  s. 6 the finality envisaged by the section  would  be nullified.   After a period of six months had  elapsed,  the certifying  officer could set aside an order passed  earlier by  his  superior, or a succeeding Appellate  Authority  may interfere  with his predecessor’s order, merely because  the certifying  officer  or Appellate Authority  considers   the modification  to  be reasonable and fair even  though  there was no change in the circumstances. [153 F-G;  154 A-B, D-F; 155 C-F; 156 A-C]     (2)   [Per  Shelat  and  VaidiaIingam,  JJ.]:   It    is doubtful   whether principles analogous to res judicata  can property be applied to industrial adjudication. [143 H]     Burn & Co. v. Their Employees, [1956] S.C.R. 781, Guest, Keen,  Williams (P) Ltd. v. Sterling,  [1960] 1  S.C.R.  348 and  Workmen  of Balmer Lawrie & Co. v. Balmer Lawrie &  Co. [1964-]  5  S,C.R.  344, referred to, 133     [Per Bhargava, J.]: This Court bas expressed conflicting views on the question of ’applying the principle  underlying the rule of res judicata to industrial adjudication. [150 E]     Burn  & Co.’s case, [1956] S.C.R.  781,   Balmer  Lawrie Co.’s  case, [1964] 5 S.C.R. 344 and Associated Cement Staff Union v. Associated Cement Co. [1964] 1 L.L.J. 12.  referred to.     (3)  [Per  Shelat  and Vaidialingam,  JJ.]:  So  far  as modifications  (ii)  and (iii) are concerned, in  an  appeal under  Art.  136, this Court would not  interfere  with  the conclusion  of  the  authorities  under  the  Act  since  no principle is involved. [144 F]     As regards modification (iv), the authorities under  the Act  held that it was fair and reasonable, and there  is  no justification for this Court to interfere with the decision. In Industrial matters, at present, the doctrine of hire  and fire   is   completely  abrogated,  because,   security   of employment  is one of the necessities for  industrial  peace and   harmony.  If reasons for discharging an  employee  are furnished tO him he not only has the satisfaction of knowing why  his  services are dispensed with,  but  in  appropriate cases  he can challenge it, as even when the services of  an employee   are  terminated  by  an  order    of    discharge simpliciter,   its legality and propriety can be  challenged before  an  industrial  tribunal. [145 A-E]     As regards modification (iv) the requirement of a second show cause notice is peculiar to cases coming under Art. 311 of  the  Constitution and neither the ordinary law  nor  the industrial  law requires an employer to give such a  notice. Even in Art. 311, the requirement is now removed and so,  it is not necessary to import it into industrial matters.  [145 E-F]     [Per  Bhargava  J. dissenting]: The order  must  be  set aside  because the four modifications were not based on  any fresh facts, material  or change of circumstances.  In fact, modification   (i)  was,  specifically  disallowed  by   the

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Appellate  Authority at an earlier stage and merely  because his  successor  considered  it reasonable and  fair  it  was permitted without any change in the circumstances. [156 E-F, H]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Civil Appeal No. 27 of 1968.     Appeal  by special leave from the order  dated   October 27,  1967  of the Chief Labour  Commissioner  (Central)  and Appellate Authority, New Delhi in No. I.E. 1 ( 11 )/7/66-     H.R.  Gokhale,  B.  Parthasarathy:  O.C.  Mathut,   J.B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.     R.K.  Garg, S.C. Agarwala and Anil Kumar Gupta, for  the respondent.     The Judgment of J.M. SHELAT and C.A. VAIDIALINGAM,  JJ., was  delivered  by  SHELAT,  J.  BHARGAVA,  J.  delivered  a dissenting Opinion.     Shelat,  J.   This appeal, by special leave, is  by  the employer  and  raises the question as to the scope  of  sec. 10(2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 20 of  1946,  as  amended  by  Act  36  of  1956  (referred  to hereinafter as the Act). 134       The  Standing  Orders of  the  Appellant-company  were certified   on  August  7,  1962  by  the  Regional   Labour Commissioner,  Central,  under s. 4 of the  Act.   Both  the company and the workmen filed appeals against the said order which  were disposed of by the Appellate authority under  s. 6.   Sometime  thereafter the respondent-union  applied  for certain modifications, some of’ which were certified by  the Regional Labour Commissioner by his order dated December 28, 1963.   The Appellant-company filed an  appeal  against  the said  order  which  was  disposed of  by  the  Chief  Labour Commissioner in April 1964. On April 25, 1965 the respondent union  made  a further application  for  modifications.  The Regional Labour Commissioner by his order dated September 2, 1965  allowed certain modifications but rejected  the  rest. The  union thereupon appealed against the said order.  After hearing   the parties the Chief Labour  Commissioner  passed his   impugned  order  dated  October  27,   1967   ordering certification   of   certain   modifications.   Though   the Appellant-company    objected   at   first   to   all    the modifications, counsel pressed the appeal in respect of four modifications only.  The first modification challenged is in Standing  Order  9, clause (a)which, as unamended,  read  as follows:                       "The   railway  under  the  terms   of               employment  has  the right  to  terminate  the               services   of  a  permanent Workman on  giving               him  one  month’s  notice in  writing  or  one               month’s pay may be paid in lieu of notice." The  union claimed that the management should  give  reasons even  when they terminated the services of an employee by  a discharge  simpliciter. The modification  allowed   directed reasons  to  be recorded in writing and communicated to  the workman if he so desires at the time of discharge but not if the   management  considers  it  inadvisable.   The   second modification  is  in  Standing  Order 12, clause (A), which, in its unamended form,    read  as  follows:                       "When  any of the penalties  specified               in Order 9 is imposed upon a workman an appeal               shall  lie  to  the authority next above  that               imposing the penalty.  An appeal shall lie  to

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             the  Managing Agents only on  original  orders               passed by the General Manager  .....  " The union’s plea was that some time limit was necessary  for the  disposal of the appeals as the managing agents who  are the  appellate authority against the orders of  the  General Manager  took  months  to dispose of  such  appeals  thereby delaying  the workman from raising an industrial dispute  in time  and seek timely relief. The modification  allowed  was that  every  such  appeal  shall  be  disposed,  of  by  the appellate  authority  within 60 days from the  date  of  its receipt.  The third modification is  in  Standing  Order  11 (’vii) which read as follows:        135                       "Removal from service: A workman shall               be  liable to be removed from service  in  the               following circumstances:               (a) Inefficiency.               The modification allowed was as follows:                       "In   case  of  inefficiency  due   to               physical   unfitness  the  workman  whom   the               management   considers   suitable   for   some               alternative  employment shall be  offered  the               same on reasonable emoluments having regard to               his former emoluments." The   modification  contains,  it  will  be  noticed,   four limitations: (1 ) it applies only to cases of removal on the ground  of  physical  unfitness, (2)  the  consideration  of suitability  for  an  alternate employment is  left  to  the management, (3 ) the existence of alternative post, and  (4) the  question as to what reasonable emoluments should be  is left  to  the  management.  The fourth  modification  is  in Standing  Order 11 (vii) (c) which, in its  unamended  form, was as follows.                       "Every     person     against     whom               departmental enquiry is       being made shall               be  supplied  with  a  copy  of  the  findings               in  connection with his dismissal and  removal               from ser-     vice.  The workman shall also be               supplied with a copy       of the  proceedings               of   the   enquiry  committee   as   soon   as               possible  after the conclusion of the  enquiry               proceedings        in his case and be  allowed               to   defend  his  case  through        union’s               representative."                  The modification allowed was as follows:                        "In  case the management  propose  to               remove   the workman from service  they  shall               serve  on  the  workmen  separate  show  cause               notice to that effect."       Counsel for the company challenged the impugned  order in its two facets: the scope of the power  of   modification under  s.  10(2),  and  on merits on  the  ground  that  the modifications  did not stand the test of reasonableness  and fairness.  On the first question his contention was that the jurisdiction and powers of the authorities under the Act  to certify  modifications of the existing standing  orders  are limited  to  cases  where  a  change  of  circumstances   is established.   In  the course of  his   argument,   counsel, however,  qualified the contention by conceding that  if  at the  time  of the last certification  certain  circumstances were, for one reason 136 or   the  other,  omitted  from  consideration  they   would constitute   a  Valid  reason  for  modification   and   the modification  would  be granted even though in such a case a

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change of circumstances has not occurred. He next  contended that in any case though s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure did  not apply, principles analogous to res  judicata  would apply  to  an  application  for  modification  unless   such application is occasioned by new circumstances having arisen or  is based on new facts.  Briefly, the argument  was  that the  object of the Act is to have conditions of  service  of workmen  in  an establishment defined  with  precision,  and therefore,  to  have standing orders   dealing   with   such conditions  certified.  For industrial harmony and peace  it is  necessary that those conditions are stable and  do  no.t remain  undefined  or  fluctuating.  In  pursuance  of  this object the Act confers finality  to such  certified standing orders or modifications thereof under s. 6.  The  contention was   that  if  modifications  were  allowed   without   any restraint, there would be multiple applications specially as individual  workman have been given the right to  apply  for modifications.  Therefore, the word ’final’ in s. 6, it’ was argued,  must be so read as to mean that an application  for modification under  s, 10(2)  can only be maintainable if it is  justified  on the ground of a  change  of  circumstances having  occurred  after the fast  certification,   which  of course,  according to the concession made by  counsel,  also would  include cases where certain circumstances   were  not taken into account at the time of the last certification.     The   relevant   provisions   of   the   Act   requiring consideration  in this appeal are ss. 4, 6, 10, 11  and  12. Section  4 provides that standing orders shall be  certified under  the Act if (a) a provision is made therein for  every matter  set out in the Schedule, and (b) they are  otherwise in  conformity with the provisions of the Act.  The  section further  provides  that  it shall be the   function  of  the certifying officer or the appellate authority to  adjudicate upon  the fairness or reasonableness ’of the’ provisions  of the  standing  orders. Section 6 provides  that  any  person aggrieved  by  the order of the  certifying  officer  passed under s. 5(2) may appeal to the appellate authority and  the appellate authority, "whose decision shall be final",  shall by  an  order  confirm  the  standing  orders  in  the  form certified  under s. 5 (2) or amend or add thereto to  render them   certifiable  under  the  Act.   Section   10,   whose interpretation  is  in  question, provides by  sub-s.  1  as follows:                     "Standing orders finally certified under               this   Act  shall  not,  except  on  agreement               between  the  employer  and  the  workmen,  be               liable to modification until  the expiry of  6               months  from  the date on which  the  standing               orders or the last modifications thereof  came               into operation." 137   Sub-s. 2 runs as follows:                    "Subject to the provisions of sub-section               (1), an em-                 ployer   or   workman  may  apply   to   the               certifying officer                 to have the standing orders modified  ..... Sub-s.  3 provides that the foregoing provisiOnS of the  Act shall apply in respect of an application for modification as they  apply  to  the certification  of  the  first  standing orders.  Section 11 empowers the certifying officer and  the appellate  authority  to correct  clerical  or  arithmetical mistakes in an order passed  by them or  errors arising from any  accidental  slip or omission.  Lastly, s.  12  provides that  no  oral evidence having the effect of  adding  to  or

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otherwise  varying  or  contradicting  standing  orders   as finally  certified  under the Act shall be admitted  in  any court.     Counsel  conceded, and did so rightly, that there is  no express  provision in any one of these sections  restricting the  right  to apply for modification or the  power  of  the authorities to allow modification only on proof of a  change of circumstances.  The only limitations to the power are the reasonableness   or  fairness  which   of  course  must   be established  and the expiry of six months after the date  of the standing orders or their last modifications coming  into operation.  In the absence of any such express   restriction we  should  then ask ourselves whether there is  in  any  of these   sections  anything  which  would  indicate  such   a restriction  by  necessary implication.  In that  connection the  only  word  which  can point  to  such  a  restriction, according  to.  counsel, is the word ’final’ in sec.  6,  so that  the contention reduces itself to this that  by  making the  order  of the appellate authority final under  sec.  6, Parliament intended by necessary implication that the bar of finality  can  only be removed if  new  circumstances  arise which necessitate or justify modification.     But  the intention of the legislature, as  observed   by Lord  Watson  in Salomon v.A. Salomon & Co.  Ltd.(1)  "is  a common but very slippery phrase, which popularly understood, may  signify  anything from intention embodied  in  positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the  legislature probably   would   have meant, although there  has  been  an omission  to  enact".  It is well settled that  the  meaning which  words  ought to be understood to bear is  not  to  be ascertained  by  any  process akin to  speculation  and  the primary  duty of a court is to find the natural  meaning  of the  words  used in the context in which  they  occur,  that context  including  any other phrase in the  Act  which  may throw light on the sense in which the makers of the Act used the  words in dispute.  In R.v. Wimbledon Justices(2)   Lord Goddard    said:  "Although  in  construing   an   Act    of Parliament  the court must always try to give effect to  the intention of the Act and must look (1) [1897] A.C. 22, 38.   (2) [1953] 1 Q.B. 380. 2 Sup. C.l./69--10 138 not  only  at the remedy provided but also at  the  mischief aimed  at,  it cannot add words to a statute or  read  words into  it  which  are not there  ....   "Similarly,  in  R.v. Mansel Jones(1) Lord Coleridge said that it was me  business of  the courts to see what Parliament had said,  instead  of reading into an Act what ought to have been said. So too, in Latham  v.  Lafone(2), Martin B. said: "I think  the  proper rule  for construing this statute is to adhere to its  words strictly;  and it is my strong belief that, by reasoning  on long-drawn  inferences and remote consequences,  the  courts have  pronounced many judgments affecting debts and  actions in a manner that the persons who originated and prepared the Act never dreamed of."  In the light of these principles  we ought, therefore, to give a literal meaning to the  language used  by Parliament unless the language is ambiguous or  its literal  sense  gives  rise  to an  anomaly  or  results  in something which  would defeat the purpose of the Act.     The Act was passed because the legislature thought  that in many industrial establishments the conditions of  service were  not  uniform and sometimes were not  even  reduced  to writing.   This  led to conflicts resulting  in  unnecessary industrial disputes.  The object of passing the Act was thus to require employers to define with certainty the conditions

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of  service in their establishments and to require  them  to reduce  them  to  writing  and  to  get  them   compulsorily certified.   The matters in respect of which the  conditions of  employment  had to be certified were  specified  in  the schedule  to  the  Act.   As the  Act  stood  prior  to  its amendment in 1956, sec. 3 required the employer to submit to the  certifying. officer draft standing orders  proposed  by him  for adoption in his establishment. Section  4  provided that  standing orders shall be certifiable if (a)  provision is  made therein for every matter set out in  the  Schedule, and  (b)  that they were otherwise in  conformity  with  the provisions  of  the Act.. The  section,  however,  expressly provided that it shall not be the function of the certifying officer   or the appellate authority to adjudicate upon  the fairness or reasonableness of the standing orders.  Under s. 5, the certifying officer was required to send a copy of the draft  standing  orders  to the union, if  any,  or  in  its absence  to  the workmen in the manner  prescribed  together with a notice calling for objections by them, if any, and to give  opportunity to the employer and the workmen  of  being heard and then to decide whether or not any modification  of or  addition to the draft standing orders was  necessary  to render  them certifiable under the Act. Section  6  provided for  an appeal by any person aggrieved by the  order  passed under  s.  5.  The appellate authority, whose  decision  was made final, had the power to confirm or amend or add to  the standing  orders passed by the certifying officer to  render them certifiable under the Act. Though the [1889]  23Q.B.D.  29,32.             (2) [1867] L.R.  2  Ex. 115,121. 139 order passed by the appellate authority was made final under s.  6, sec. 10 provided for modification. Sub-s. 1 of s.  10 provided  that standing orders finally certified under  this Act shall not, except on agreement between the employer  and the  workmen, be liable to modification until expiry of  six months from the date on which they or the last  modification thereof came into operation. Sub-s. 2 read as follows:                       "An  employer desiring to  modify  his               standing orders shall apply to the  Certifying               Officer  in  that  behalf Sub-s.  3 provided that the foregoing provisions of the  Act shall apply in respect of an application under sub-sec. 2 as they  apply  to  the certification  of  the  first  standing orders.     As  the  Act  stood  prior to 1956,  there  was  thus  a prohibition  against the certifying officer going  into  the question of reasonableness or fairness of the draft standing orders submitted to him by the employer.  His only  function was to see that the draft made    provisions for all matters contained  in  the  Schedule and that it  D   was  otherwise certifiable under the Act.  Therefore though the     workmen through the union or otherwise were served with  the    copy of  the  draft and had the right to  raise  objections,  the objections could be of a limited character, namely, that the draft did    not provide for all matters in the Schedule  or that it was not otherwise certifiable under the Act. Even in an  appeal  under s. 6, the E  only  objections  they  could raise  were limited to the two aforesaid     questions.  The workmen thus could not object that the draft standing orders were  not  reasonable  or fair. Under s. 10,  the  right  to apply  for modification was conferred on the employer  alone and   in view of sub-s. 3 the only consideration  which  the certifying   authority could apply to such modification  was the  one  which  he  F   could apply  under  ss.  4  and  6.

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Therefore, no question whether the    modification was  fair or  reasonable could be raised. It is thus clear   that  the workman  had very little say in the matter even if  he  felt that the standing orders or their modifications were  either not    reasonable or fair. They could, of course,  raise  an industrial   dispute.    But   that   remedy   was    hardly satisfactory.  Such a  dispute    had to be first  sponsored by  a union or at least a substantial number of workmen;  it bad  next  to  go through the process  of  conciliation  and lastly  the  appropriate  Government  may  or  may  not   be prepared to refer such a dispute to industrial adjudication. Even   if it did, the entire process was a protracted one. In  1956, parliament effected radical changes  in  the   Act widening its scope and altering its very complexion. Section 4, as  amended by Act 36 of 1956, entrusted the  authorities under  the   Act with the duty to adjudicate  upon  fairness and  reasonableness   of the standing orders.   The  enquiry when such-standing’ orders 140 are  submitted  for  certification is  now  two-fold:  (1  ) whether the standig orders are in consonance with the  model standing   orders,  and  (2)  whether  they  are  fair   and reasonable.  The workmen, therefore, can raise an  objection as  to the reasonableness or fairness of the draft  standing orders  submitted for certification.  By amending  s.  10(2) both  .the workmen and the employer are given the  right  to apply  for modification and by reason of the change made  in s.  4  a  modification  has also now to  be  tested  by  the yardstick of fairness and reasonableness.  The Act  provides a  speedy     and cheap remedy available to  the  individual workman  to  have his conditions of service  determined  and also  for  their modifications. By amending ss. 4 and  1  O, Parliament  not only  broadened  the. scope of the  Act  but also.  gave  a  clear  expression  to  the  change  in   its legislative policy.  Parliament knew that the workmen,  even as  the  unamended  Act stood, had the  right  to  raise  an industrial  dispute, yet, not satisfied with such a  remedy, it  conferred   by  amending  ss. 4  and  10  the  right  to individual  workmen  to contest the  draft  standing  orders submitted  by the employer for certification on  the  ground that  they  are  either not fair  or  reasonable,  and  more important  still, the right to apply for their  modification despite the finality of the order of the appellate authority under s. 6. Parliament thus deliberately gave a dual  remedy to the workmen both under this Act and under the  Industrial Disputes  Act.  This  fact  has  in  recent  decisions  been recognised  by this  Court. (of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton  & Silk Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen(1), Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd.  v. Workmen(2) and Hindustan Brown Boveri Ltd.  v.  The Workmen(a).     It  will  be pertinent, while  examining  the   question whether there is a restriction, as suggested by counsel,  to the  right to apply for modifications, to bear in  mind  the change in the legislative policy reflected in the amendments of  ss.  4 and 10.  It will be noticed that s. 10  does  not state  that  once  a standing order   is  modified  and  the modification  is  certified,  no  further  modification   is permissible except upon  proof that new circumstances   have arisen since the last modification.  As a matter of fact the legislature  has not incorporated any words in the  sub-sec. restricting  the right to apply for modification  except  of course  the time limit of six months in sub-s. 1. Section  6 no doubt lays down that the order of the appellate authority in  an  appeal against the order of the  certifying  officer under  s. 5 is final but that finality is itself subject  to

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the right to apply for modification under s. 10(2). Even so, it  was urged that the finality of the order under s. 6  was indicative  of  a condition precedent  to  the  jurisdiction under   sec.   10(2)  to  entertain   an   application   for modification on a new set (1) [1968] 1 L.LJ. 555. (2) C.A. No. 674 of 1968 decided oft 25th July, 1968. (3) C.A. No. l631 ofl966 decided on 31st July, 1967. 141     circumstances   having  arisen  in  the  meantime.   The question is whether such is the position.     The finality to the order passed under s. 6 really means that  there  is no further appeal or revision  against  that order and no more.  This view finds support from s. 12 which lays  down  that  once  the  standing  orders  are   finally certified,  no oral evidence can be led in any  court  which has  the  effect  of  adding  to  or  otherwise  varying  or contradicting  such  standing orders. Section 6,  when  read with  s.  12,  indicates  that the  finality  given  to  the certification  by  the  appellate authority  is  against  a, challenge thereof in a civil court.  But the finality  given to  the  appellate  authority’s  order  is  subject  to  the modification of those very standing orders certified by him. As  already  stated, s. 10 itself does not  lay   down   any restriction  to the right to apply for modification-   Apart from the right to apply for modification under the Act,  the workmen ,can raise an industrial dispute with regard to  the standing orders. There is nothing in the Industrial Disputes Act restricting the right to raise such a dispute only  when a  new  set of circumstances has arisen.  If that  right  is unrestricted, can it be possible that the very_  legislature which passed both the Acts could have, while conferring  the right on the workmen individually, restricted that right  as suggested  by  counsel ?  To illustrate,  a  new  industrial establishment  is set up and workmen  are  engaged  therein. Either  there is no union or if there is one it is  not  yet properly organised. The standing orders of the establishment are certified under the Act.  At the time of  certification, the  union  or  the workmen’s  representatives   had  raised either  no  objections  or  only   certain  objections.   If subsequently the workmen feel that further objections  could have  been raised and if so raised the authority  under  the Act  would have taken them into consideration, does it  mean that because new circumstances have since then not   arisen, the workmen would be barred from applying for modification ? Let us take another illustration.  Where, after the standing orders  or their modifications are certified, it  strikes  a workman after they have been in operation for some time that a  further  improvement  in his  conditions  of  service  is desirable,  would  he   be  debarred  from  applying  for  a further  modification  on  the  ground  that  no  change  of circumstances  in  the meantime has taken place?  Where  the standing  orders  provide 10 festival holidays,  if  counsel were  right, the workmen can never apply for an addition  in their number as they would be faced with the contention that the festivals existed at the time of the last  certification and there was therefore no change of circumstances.      The  Act  is  a beneficent  piece  of  legislation  and therefore  unless compelled by any words in it we would  not be justified in importing in s. 10 through inference only  a restriction  to the right conferred by. it on account  of  a supposed danger of multiplicity 153 for  the  purpose of ensuring that  conditions  of  service, which  the employer laid down, became known to the   workmen

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and   the  liberty  of  the  employer  in  prescribing   the conditions  of service was only limited to the  extent  that the  Standing  Orders  had  to be  in  conformity  with  the provisions  of  the  Act  and, as  far  as  practicable,  in conformity  with  Model  Standing  Orders.   The  Certifying Officer  or  the  Appellate  Authority  were  debarred  from adjudicating upon the fairness or the reasonableness of  the provisions of the Standing Orders.  Then, as noticed in  the case   of   Rohtak Hissar District  Electricity  Supply  Co. Ltd.(1),   the   Legislature made a drastic  change  in  the policy  of the Act  by  amending section 4 and  laying  upon the  Certifying  Officer the duty of  deciding  whether  the Standing Orders proposed by the employer were reasonable and fair,  and  also by amending section 10(2) so as  to  permit even  a workman to apply for modification of  the  certified Standing  Orders, while, in the original Act,  the  employer alone  had  the right to make such an application.   It  is, however, to be noticed that the preamble of the Act was no.t altered, so that the purpose of the Act remained as  before. While the Act was in its unamended form, if the workmen  had a  grievance,  they  could not  apply  for  modification  of certified  Standing Orders and, even at the time of  initial certification, they could only object to a Standing Order on the ground that it was not in conformity with the provisions of  the Act or Model Standing Orders.  After amendment,  the workmen were given the right to object to the draft Standing Orders at the time of first certification on the ground that the  Standing Orders were not fair and reasonable and,  even subsequently,  to  apply for modification of  the  certified Standing  Orders  after expiry of the period of  six  months prescribed  under  s.  10( 1 ) of  the  Act.   These  rights granted  to  the  workmen and the powers  conferred  on  the Certifying  Officer  and the Appellate  Authority,  however, ,still had to be exercised for the purpose of giving  effect to  the object of the Act as it continued to remain  in  the preamble,  which was not altered.  Before the  amendment  of the Act, if the workmen had any grievance on the  ground  of unfairness  or  unreasonableness  of  the  Standing   Orders proposed  by the employer, their only remedy lay  under  the Industrial  Disputes Act.  By amendment in 1956,  a  limited remedy was provided for them in the Act itself by conferring on  the  Certifying  Officer the  function  of  judging  the reasonableness and fairness of the proposed Standing Orders. These  amendments  cannot, however, affect  the  alternative remedy  which the workmen had of seeking redress  under  the Industrial Disputes Act if  they  had grievance against  any of the Standing Orders certified by the Certifying   Officer [See  Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Company  Ltd. v. Their Workmen and Another(2), and the (1)  [1966]  2 S.C.R, 863.                    (2)  [1968]  1 L,L.J. 555. 2 Sup. C1169--11 143 of  applications.   The  policy of s. 10  is  clear  that  a modification  should not be allowed within six  months  from the date when the standing orders or the last  modifications thereof  came into operation.  The object of  providing  the time   limit  was  that  the  standing  orders   .or   their modifications  should  be allowed to work  for  sufficiently long  time  to see whether they work properly or  not.  Even that  time  limit is not rigid because a  modification  even before  six months is permissible if there is  an  agreement between the parties.     The ground for urging that a restriction should be  read in   s.   10  was  the  apprehension  that   since   workmen

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individually  have  the  right to  apply  for  modifications there  would   be multiple applications  which  an  employer would have to face.  Secondly, that an application without a change  of circumstances would be tantamount to a review  by the    same    authority   of   his    previous   order   of certification.   It was said that if no restriction is  read in  s.  10 it would mean that the same  authority.  who.  on satisfaction  of  the  fairness  and  reasonableness  of   a standing  order  or its last modification had  certified  it would  be  called upon to review his  previous  decision  on reasonableness and fairness.  Such a review, it was  argued, is  permissible only on  well-recognised   grounds,  namely, discovery  of  new  and important  matter  or  evidence,   a mistake  or an error apparent on the face of the  record  or any other sufficient reason.     An  application  for modification would  ordinarily   be made  where (1) a change of circumstances has  occurred,  or (2)  where experience of the working of the standing  orders last   certified results in inconvenience  bardship  anomaly etc.  or (3)  where some fact was lost sight of at the  t;me of  certification, or (4) where the applicant feels  that  a modification will be more beneficial. In category (1)  there would  be  no difficulty as a change  of  circumstances  has taken  place.  But in cases falling, under the rest  of  the categories there will be no change of circumstances.   Does- it  mean  that  though the implementation  of  the  standing orders  has resulted. in hardship. inconvenience or  anomaly no modification can be asked for because there is no  change of  circumstances  ? As to multiplicity of  applications  we think   that  there  is  no  justification  for   any   such apprehension.  for.  unless  there in  a  justification  for modification the authorities under the Act would reject them on the ground that they are frivolous and therefore  neither fair nor reasonable.  Lastly as to such an application being a  review of the last certifying order an application  under s.  10 is not a review.  An application for review would  be made   in the  proceedings in ’which the’ judgment or  order sought to be reviewed is passed That would not be s0 in  the case of an application under s. ’10(2);  Such an application is   independent   of   the  proceedings   in   which   the’ last.certifying order was passed and. is made in ’the 143 exercise   of  an  independent  right  conferred  upon   the applicant by s. ]0(2).  In an application for  modification, the  issue  before  the authority would be  not  as  to  the reasonableness  or fairness of the standing orders or  their last modification, but whether the modification now  applied for is fair and reasonable.  Therefore,  the contention that a  change of circumstances is a condition precedent  to  the maintainability of an application under s. 10(2) or that  an application for modification without proof of such a  change amounts  to  review by the same authority  of  its  previous order is not correct .      It  was then argued that assuming that  a  modification without  a change of circumstances is permissible though  s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to industry matters,  sound policy dictates that principles analogous to res judicata must be applied and it must be held that unless circumstances  have changed an application for  modification would be ,barred.  For this, counsel relied on Burn & Co. v. Their  Employees(x).  There the demand was for  wage  scales fixed in an award by the Mercantile Tribunal instead of  the scales  in accordance with the scheme of the Bengal  Chamber of Commerce.  In  a  dispute  previously raised by labour an award  was  made  in 1950 which  accepted  the  wage  scales

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according  to the scheme of the Bengal Chamber  of  Commerce and  rejected the demand for the scales according  to  those awarded  by  the  Mercantile  Tribunal   which   were   more favourable.  It was in these  circumstances that this  Court expressed the view that an award fixing wage scales   should have fairly long range operation and should not be unsettled unless  a  change of circumstances has  occurred  justifying fresh  adjudication.   But with the constant  spiralling  of prices  the  principle would appear to have lost much of its efficacy.  The trend in recent decisions is that application of  technical   rules such as  res  judicata.  acquiescence, estoppel   etc.   are   not   appropriate   to    industrial adjudication.  In Guest, Keen, Williams Private Ltd.  v.P.J. Sterling(2)  a modification of a standing order relating  to the   age  of  superannuation  was  sought  by  raising   an industrial  dispute. It was contended that the reference  of that  dispute was barred by acquiescence and  laches.   That contention    was   rejected,  the  Court   observing   that industrial  tribunal  should  be  slow  and  circumspect  in applying  technical  principles such  as   acquiescence  and estoppel.  In  Workmen of Balmer Lawrie &   Co.  v.   Balmer Lawrie & Co.(3) also it was observed that the question as to revision  of wage scales must be examined on the  merits  of each  individual  case and technical considerations  of  res judicata  should not be allowed to hamper the discretion  of industrial  adjudication      therefore.  doubtful   whether principles   analogous   to  res judicata  can  properly  be applied to industrial adjudication. (1) S.C.R.781, 789.              (2) [1960] l S.C.R. 348. (2) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 344. 144     On   merits,   Mr.   Gokhale  argued   that   the   four modifications  to  which he objected were neither  fair  nor reasonable and that therefore we should set them aside,  The ,question  is, whether in an appeal under Art. 136 we  would be   justified  in  interfering  with  conclusions   as   to reasonableness and fairness by authorities empowered by  the Act  to  arrive  at  such  conclusions.   In  Rohtak  Hissar District  Electricity  Supply  Co. Ltd. v.  State  of  Uttar Pradesh  &  Ors.(1)  this Court prevented  counsel  for  the employer  from canvassing such a question on the Found  that the  matter of fairness and reasonableness was left  by  the legislature  to the authorities constituted under  the  Act. In Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. v. The Workmen & Ors.(2)  this Court repeated what it had earlier stated in Bengal Chemical &  Pharmaceutical  Workers v. Their Workmen(3)  that  though Art.,  136 is couched in widest terms, it is  necessary  to, exercise  discretionary jurisdiction  of this Court only  in cases  where awards are made in violation of the  principles of  natural  justice or axe made in a manner  causing  grave injustice  to  parties or raise an  important  principle  of industrial  law  requiring  elucidation  by  this  Court  or disclose  exceptional  or Special circumstances which  merit consideration by this Court.     As   aforesaid,  the  modifications  objected   by   the appellant company are: (1 ) giving reasons and communicating them   to the workman concerned even in eases  of  discharge simpliciter,  (2) insertion of lime limit of 60 days in  the disposal of appeals, (3) insertion in standing order 11 of a clause  that where a workman is re. moved on the  ground  of inefficiency  due  to  physical  unfitness,  the  management should  offer  to such a workman alternative  employment  on reasonable  emoluments  and  (4)  insertion  of  the  clause requiring a_ second show cause notice at time stage when the decision  of  suitable punishment is to be made. So  far  as

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modifications  (2),  and  (3)  are  concerned,  clearly   no principle  is involved and there would be  no  justification for  us  to interfere with the conclusion of  the  appellate authority   on  the  question  of  their  being   fair   and reasonable.    As  regards  the  first   modification,   the contention was that an employer has under the law of  master and  servant  the right to terminate the service‘s  of  his: employee  by a discharge simpliciter after giving a  month’s notice  or  a  month’s wages in. lieu thereof,  and  is  not required to give reasons for such an order.  The  Industrial Disputes Act also does not lay down any fetter to that right by requiring him to give reasons  to the employee  concerned and  industrial  adjudication has so far recognized  such  a right.    To   impose  such  a  fetter  by   a   change   in orders  is  therefore  not warranted by  any  statute,  and, therefore,  cannot be said to be either fair or  reasonable. It  must,  however,  be borne. in mind  that  the  right  to contract in industrial  S.C.R. 863.              (2) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 652,                     supp. 2 S.C.R. 136, 140. 145 matters is no longer  an absolute right and statutes dealing with  industrial  matters abound with  restrictions  on  the absolute fight to contract.  The doctrine of hire and  fire, for  instance, is now completely abrogated both by  statutes and by industrial adjudication, and even where the  services of  an  employee  are terminated by an  order  of  discharge simpliciter the legality and propriety of such an order  can be  challenged in industrial tribunals.  These  restrictions on  the  absolute right to contract  are  imposed  evidently because  security of employment is. more and more   regarded as  one of the necessities for industrial peace and  harmony and the contentment it brings about a prerequisite of social justice.  During  the last decade or so statutes  have  been passed such as the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act,  1953 which  require  a reasonable cause for dispensing  with  the services   of   an  employee  by  an  order   of   discharge simpliciter.  If  reasons for discharging  an  employee  are furnished  to  the employee concerned, he not only  has  the satisfaction  of  knowing why his services   are   dispensed with-  but it becomes easy for him in appropriate  cases  to challenge  the  order on. the ground that it is  either  not legal  or proper which in the absence of knowledge of  those reasons  it may be difficult, if not impossible for  him  to do.   In these circumstances, if the authorities  under  the Act have come to the conclusion that such a modification  is fair  and  reasonable  we  would  hardly  be  justified   in interfering with such a decision.     As  regards  the modification requiting  a  second  show cause  notice, neither the ordinary law of the land nor  the industrial  law requires an employer to give such a  notice. In  none of the decisions given by courts or  the  tribunals such  a second  show cause notice m case of removal has ever been  demanded or considered necessary.  The only  class  of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary  are those arising under Art. 311. Even that has now been removed by  the recent amendment of that Article.  To import such  a requirement  from  Art. 311 in industrial matters  does  not appear  to  be  either necessary. or  proper  and  would  be equating  industrial employees with civil servants.  In  our view,  there is no justification on any principle  for  such equation,   Besides, such a requirement would  unnecessarily prolong  disciplinary  enquiries which in the  interest   of industrial   peace should be disposed of in as short a  time as possible. In our view it is not possible to consider this

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modification  as  justifiable either     on  the  ground  of reasonableness  or  fairness  and should  therefore  be  set aside.      The appeal, therefore, is partly allowed to the  extent aforesaid  and  the  impugned order to that  extent  is  set aside.  There v,ill be      Bhargava, J.  The management of the  Shahdara   (Delhi) Saharnpur  Light Railway Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred  to as 146   "the Company") has riffled this appeal, by special  leave, against        an   order  passed  by   the   Chief   Labour Commissioner (Central)    under section 6 ,of the Industrial Employment  (Standing  Orders)     Act,  1946   (hereinafter referred  to  as  "the Act") as  an  appellate    authority, granting  partially  an application made  under  section  10 of the Act presented on behalf of the respondent,  Shahdara- Saharanpur Railway Workers’ Union. The first draft  Standing Orders      submitted  by  the  Company  to  the  Certifying Officer  under s. 4     of the Act were certified by him  on 7/8-8-1962, after deciding    objections that had been filed on  behalf  of  the  workmen In  appeal,  the  Chief  Labour Commissioner   (Central),    New  Delhi,    modified   those Standing  Orders  to some extent by his order  dated    12th February,   1963.  Subsequently, these  certified   Standing Orders were modified by the order dated 28th December,  1963 passed by the Certifying Officer, and the appeal against his orders    of modification was dismissed on the  23rd  April, 1964.  Then,  on     25th April, 1965,  an  application  was presented  under  s.  10(2)  of the Act  on  behalf  of  the respondent  seeking  modifications in a number  of  Standing Orders  as  they stood after  original  certification    and first  modification.   The  Certifying  Officer  passed  his orders  on this application and, against those  orders,  the respondent  filed     an  appeal  before  the  Chief  Labour Commissioner  (Central),  New    Delhi.   The  Chief  Labour Commissioner,  by  his order dated  27th     October,  1967, allowed modifications  in a number of Standing  Orders.  The present   appeal  is  directed  against  this   order    and challenges  the  modifications granted in  Standing   Orders Nos.      9(a),  12(A), 11(ix), 11(vii) and  13.   The  main ground urged    by the Company before this Court in  support of  this appeal was  that the Chief Labour Commissioner  was not  justified in directing  modifications in  the  Standing Orders,  already  certified,   in   the  absence  of   fresh material  or fresh facts on the basis of which  alone     he was entitled to grant modifications under s. 10 of the  Act. Learned  counsel appearing on behalf of the Company  in  the alternative,  also put forward the plea that  on  principles analogous  to   the rule of res judicata it should  be  held that the Chief Labour    Commissioner had no jurisdiction to grant  these  modifications  under  s. 10  in  view  of  the previous  decisions  given  when the  Standing  Orders  were originally certified and modified for the first time.      So far as the argument of learned counsel based on  the applicability  of  principles analogous to the rule  of  res judicata  is concerned, learned counsel conceded that  there is  no  direct  ruling of any Court laying  down  that  such principles  are  applicable  when a  Certifying  Officer  is dealing with an application for modification     of Standing Orders  under s. 10 of the Act, or when  an  appeal  against such  an  order is being heard by  the  Appellate  Authority under s. 6 of the Act.  Reliance was, however, placed on the decision  of  this Court in Burn & Co., Calcutta  v..  Their Emplo

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147 yees(1), where this Court was dealing with the applicability of  the principle analogous to the rule of res  judicata  to proceedings  before  an Industrial Tribunal dealing  with  a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act.  In that  case, an earlier award had been given in an industrial dispute and the  question arose whether, in the subsequent  dispute  for adjudication,  the  decisions  given in  the  earlier  award should  be held as binding, unless it was shown  that  there had  been  a change of circumstances. In the  appeal  before this Court, it was urged that the Appellate Tribunal was  in error  in brushing aside the earlier award and  in  deciding the  matter  afresh as if it arose for the  first  time  for determination;  and it was argued that, when once a  dispute is   referred  to  a  Tribunal  and  that  results   in   an adjudication,  that must be taken as binding on the  parties thereto, unless there was a change of circumstances, and, as none  such  had been alleged or proved,  the  earlier  award should  have  been accepted, as indeed it was  accepted   by the Adjudicator.  This Court held:                   ’               "In  the  instant case, the  Labour  Appellate               Tribunal  dismissed  this  argument  with  the               observation that that was ’a rule of  prudence               and  not  of law’.  If the Tribunal  meant  by               this  observation  that the statute  does  not               enact  that an award should not  be  re-opened               except   on   the   ground   of   change    of               circumstances,  that would be  quite  correct.               But  that  is not decisive  of  the  question,               because  there is no provision in the  statute               prescribing when and under what  circumstances               an  award could be re-opened.   Section  19(4)               authorises the Government to move the Tribunal               for  shortening the  period during  which  the               award  would  operate, if ’there  has  been  a               material change in the circumstances on  which               it was based’.  But this has reference to  the               period of one year fixed under section 19  (3)               and  if  that indicates anything, it  is  that               that  would be the proper ground on which  the               award  could  be   re-opened   under   section               19(6), and that is what the learned  Attorney-               General contends.  But we propose to  consider               the  question  on the footing  that  there  is               nothing in the statute to indicate the grounds               on which an award  could  be  reopened.   What               then is the position ?  Are we to hold that an               award  given  on  ’a  matter  in   controversy               between the parties after full hearing  ceases               to have any force if either of them repudiates               it under section 19(6), and that the  Tribunal               has  no  option.  when the   matter  is  again               referred  to  it  for  adjudication,  but   to               proceed to try it de novo, traverse the entire               ground  once  again,  land  come  to  a  fresh               decision.  That would be contrary (1) [1956]S.C.R 781 148               to   the  well-recognised  principle  that   a               decision   once   rendered  by   a   competent               authority  on  a matter in issue  between  the               parties  after  a full enquiry should  not  be               permitted  to be re-agitated.  It is  on  this               principle  that  the  rule  of  res   judicata               enacted in section 11  of  the Civil Procedure

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             Code  is based.  That section  is,  no  doubt,               in  terms inapplicable to the present  matter,               but  the principle underlying   it,  expressed               in  the  maxim ’interest rei  publica  ut  sit               finis   litium’,  is rounded on  sound  public               policy  and is of universal application.  ’The               rule of res  judicata is  dictated’,  observed               Sir  Lawrence  Jenkins,  C.J.,  in  Sheoparsan               Singh  v.  Ramnandan Prasad  Singh(1),  ’by  a               wisdom  which is for all time.’ And there  are               good  reasons  why this  principle  should  be               applicable   to   decisions   of    Industrial               Tribunals also.  Legislation  regulating   the               relation   between Capital and Labour has  two               objects  in view.  It seeks to ensure  to  the               workmen,  who have not the capacity  to  treat               with capital on equal terms, fair returns  for               their  labour.   It  also  seeks  to   prevent               disputes  between employer and  employees,  so               that   production  might  not   be   adversely               affected  and  the  larger  interests  of  the               society  might not suffer.  Now, if we are  to               hold that an adjudication loses its force when               it is repudiated under section 19(6) and  that               the  whole controversy is at large,  then  the               result  would  be that  far  from  reconciling               themselves  to the award and settling down  to               work it, either party will treat it as a  mere               stage  in  the  prosecution  of  a   prolonged               struggle,  and  far from  bringing  industrial               peace,  the  awards would turn out to  be  but               truces  giving  the  parties  breathing   time               before  resuming hostile action  with  renewed               vigour.   On  the other hand, if  we  are,  to               regard  them  as intended to  have  long  term               operation and at the same time hold that  they               are  liable  to be modified by change  in  the               circumstances  on which they were based,  both               the  purposes  of  the  legislature  would  be               served.   That  is  the  view  taken  by   the               Tribunals themselves in The Army & Navy Stores               Ltd.,  Bombay  v. Their Workmen(2),  and  Ford               Motor  Co. o] India Ltd. v.  Their  Workmen(a)               and  we are of opinion that they lay down  the                             correct  principle,  and  that  there  were  no               grounds  for  the Appellate Tribunal  for  not               following them".     As  against this view expressed by this  Court,  learned counsel  for  the respondent relied on the remarks  made  by this Court in (1)  [1916].  L.R. 43 I.A., 91.               (2)  119511  2 L.L.J. 31, (3) [1951] 2 L.L.J. 231, 149 a  subsequent  case    Workmen of Balmer Lawrie and  Co.  v. Balmer  Lawrie  and Co. (1).  In that case,  the  Court  was dealing  with the question of alteration in  wage  structure and  had  to consider the effect of an earlier  award.   The Court held:                     "When  a wage structure is  framed,  all               relevant  factors are taken into  account  and               normally  it  should remain in operation for a               fairly   long   period;  but   it   would   be               unreasonable to introduce  considerations   of               res  judicata  as such,  because  for  various

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             reasons    which   constitute   the    special               characteristics  of  industrial  adjudication,               the said technical considerations would be  in               admissible.  As the Labour Appellate  Tribunal               itself has observed, the principle of  gradual               advance   towards   the  living   wage   which               industrial  adjudication  can  never   ignore,               itself  constitutes such a special feature  of               industrial  adjudication that it  renders  the               application  of  the  technical  rule  of  res               judicata  singularly  inappropriate.  If   the               paying  capacity of the employer increases  or               the  cost of living shows an upward trend,  or               there are other anomalies, mistakes or  errors               in  the award fixing wage structure, Or  there               has.  been  a rise  in  the  wage structure in               comparable    industries   in   the    region,               industrial  employees  would be  justified  in               making  a claim for the re-examination of  the               wage structure and if such a claim is referred               for      industrial     adjudication,      the               Adjudicator would not normally be justified in               rejecting it solely on the ground that  enough               time  has not passed after the making  of  the               award,  or  that material change  in  relevant               circumstances had not been proved.  It is,  of               course, not possible to lay down any hard  and                             fast  rule in the matter.  The questio n  as  to               revision  must  be examined on the  merits  in               each individual case that is brought before an               adjudicator for his adjudication."     Further  support was sought by learned counsel from  the remarks made by this Court in Associated Cement Staff  Union and Another v.Associated Cement Company and. Others(a).  The judgment in this case was given only about a month after the judgment  in the case of Workmen of Balmer Lawrie & Co.  (1) by the same Bench of this Court which held:                     "It   is   true   that   too    frequent               alterations   of  conditions  of  service   by               industrial  adjudication have  been  generally               deprecated  by this Court for the reason  that               it  is likely to disturb industrial peace  and               equilibrium.  At the same time, the Court  has               more than once pointed (1) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 344.              (2) [1964] 1 L.L.J. 12. 150               out the importance of remembering the  dynamic               nature     , of industrial relations. That  is               why  the  Court  has, specially  in  the  more               recent   decisions,   refused  to   apply   to               industrial  adjudications  principles  of  res               judicata   that  are  meant  and  suited   for               ordinary   civil   litigations.   Even   where               conditions of service have been changed only a               few years before, industrial adjudication  has               allowed  fresh  changes if  convinced  of  the               necessity  and justification of these  by  the               existing conditions and circumstances.  Where,               as   in  the  present  case,  in  a   previous               reference the tribunal has refused the  demand               for  change.,  there is even less  reason  for               saying that that refusal should have any  such               binding  effect.  It is important to  remember

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             in this connection that working hours remained               unchanged  for many years in this concern  and               during these years, considerable changes  have               taken place in the country’s economic position               and    expectations.    With    the    growing               realization of need for better distribution of               national wealth has also come an understanding               of  the need for increase in production as  an               essential   prerequisite  of   which   greater               efforts  on the part of the labour  force  are               necessary.   That itself is sufficient  reason               against  accepting  the argument  against  any               change in working hours if found justified  on               relevant   considerations   that   have   been               indicated above." These three decisions, which have been brought to our notice prima   facie   indicate  that  the  Court   has   expressed conflicting views’ on the question of applying the principle underlying  the  rule  of res judicata  to  proceedings  for adjudication   of  industrial  disputes  by  an   Industrial Tribunal   under  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act.   In   the circumstances,  I  have felt some  hesitation  in   applying this principle in the present case as urged on behalf of the Company  consider  that, in the present case,  it  would  be much   more  appropriate to examine the scheme  of  the  Act itself to find out the intention of the legislature  and  to arrive  at a decision on thin basis on the question  whether a  modification  on an application under s. 10  of  the  Act should   only   be  allowed  on  the  basis  of   facts   or circumstances   appearing   subsequent   to   the   previous certification of the Standing Orders, or whether, in dealing with  the  application  for  modification,  the   Certifying Officer  and  the Appel late Authority  can  re-examine  the entire  position  even  as it existed at  the  time  of  the previous orders  and  arrive  at  a  differed decision.     The  scheme  of the Act was examined by  this  Court  in Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v.  State of Uttar Pradesh and Others(1), where this, Court held:                                            . (1) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 863.                   ’               "The  Act was passed on the 23rd April,  1946,               and  the  Standing Orders framed by  the  U.P.               Government  under section 15 of the  Act  were               published on the 14th May, 1947.  The  Central               Act  (the  Industrial Disputes Act No.  14  of               1947  )  came into force on the  I  st  April,               1947,  whereas the U.P. Act  (U.P.  Industrial               Disputes  Act No. 28 of 1947) came into  force               on  the 1st February, 1948.  It will  thus  be               seen  that  the  Act came  into  force  before               either  the Central Act or the U.P.  Act   was               passed.  The scheme  of the Act originally was               to    require    employers    in    industrial               establishment   to  define   with   sufficient               precision  the conditions of employment  under               them and to make the said conditions known  to               the workmen employed by them.  The Legislature               thought     that,    in    many     industrial               establishments,  the conditions of  employment               were  not always uniform, and sometimes,  were               not  even reduced to writing, and that led  to               considerable   confusion   which    ultimately               resulted in industrial disputes.  That is  why               the  Legislature  passed the  Act  making   it               compulsory  for   the establishments, to which

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             the   Act  applied,  to  reduce   to   writing               conditions   of   employment  and   get   them               certified as provided by the Act. The  matters               in  respect of which conditions of  employment               had  to  be certified were specified  ’in  the               schedule  appended to the Act.  This  Schedule               contains  11  matters  in  respect  of   which               Standing orders had to be made.  In fact,  the               words "Standing orders" are defined by s. 2(g)               as  meaning rules relating to matters set  out               in  the  Schedule.  The  "Certifying  officer"               appointed under the Act is defined by s. 2(c),               whereas "Appellate Authority" is defined by s.               2(a).      Originally, the jurisdiction of the Certifying  officer and  the  Appellate Authority was very  limited;  they  were called   upon  to  consider  whether  the  Standing   orders submitted   for  certification  conformed   to  the    Model Standing  orders or not.  Section 3(2) provides  that  these Standing  orders  shall  be,  as  far  as  practicable,   in conformity  with  such Model Standing orders.   Section  15, which deals with the powers  of the  appropriate  Government to  make rules, authorises, by cl. (2)(b),  the  appropriate Government to set out Model Standing Orders for the purposes of this Act.  That is how the original jurisdiction  of  the certifying  authorities  was limited to. examine  the  draft Standing  Orders  submitted for certification   and  cOmPare them with the Model.. Standing Orders. 152                     In  1956, however, a radical change  was               made in the provisions of the Act.  Section 4,               as amesded by Act 36 of 1956, has imposed upon               the   Certifying  Officer  or  the   Appellate               Authority  the  duty to  adjudicate  upon  the               fairness   or   the  reasonableness   of   the               provisions  of any Standing Orders.  In  other               words,  after the amendment was made in  1956,               the jurisdiction of the certifying authorities               has  become very much wider and the  scope  of               the  enquiry also has  become  correspondingly               wider.    When  draft  Standing   Orders   are               submitted  for certification, the enquiry  now               has  to  be two-fold; are  the  said  Standing               Orders  in  conformity  with   Model  Standing               Orders; and are they reasonable or fair ?   In               dealing   with  this  latter   question,   the               Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority               have been given powers of a Civil Court by  s.               11  (1  ).  The decision  of   the  Certifying               Officer  is made appealable to  the  Appellate               Authority   under  s. 6 at  the   instance  of               either party. Similatly, by an amendment  made               in 1956 in s. 10(2), both the employer and the               workmen   are  permitted  to  apply  for   the               modification of the said Standing Orders after               the  expiration of 6 months from the  date  of               their coming into operation.  It will thus  be               seen  that when certification proceedings  are               held  before the certifying  authorities,  the               reasonableness    or  the  fairness   of   the               provisions  contained  in the  draft  Standing               Orders falls to be examined." It  is in the fight of this scheme of the Act  explained  by this Court that the decision has to be arrived at as to how, in what manner, and under what circumstances the  Certifying

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Officer    or    the  Appellate   Authority   should   grant modifications when an application under s. 10(2) of the  Act is validly made after the expiry of the period of six months laid down in s. 10 (1 ) of the Act.     The  purpose of the Act, as it was originally passed  in 1946,   was  merely  to  require  employers  in   industrial establishments   to  define with  sufficient  precision  the conditions   of  employment under them and to make the  said conditions known to the workmen employed by them.  To.  give effect  to  this  purpose, s. 3 of the Act  gave  the  power exclusively to the employers to submit draft Standing Orders for  certification.  The Certifying Officer had  to  certify the Standing Orders, if provision was made in them for every matter set out in the Schedule and the Standing Orders  were otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act.   In addition,  sub-s. (2) of section 3 also laid down  that  the provision  to be made was to. be, as far as practicable,  in conformity  with  Model Standing Orders  prescribed  by  the appropriate  State  Government.   Thus,  the  Act,  in   its original form, was designed only 153 for  the  purpose of ensuring that  conditions  (A  service, which  the employer laid down, became known to  the  workmen and   the  liberty  of  the  employer  in  prescribing   the conditions  of service was only limited to the  extent  that the  Standing  Orders  had  to be  in  conformity  with  the provisions  of  the  Act  and, as  far  as  practicable,  in conformity  with  Model  Standing  Orders.   The  Certifying Officer  or  the  Appellate  Authority  were  debarred  from adjudicating upon the fairness or the reasonableness of  the provisions of the Standing Orders.  Then, as noticed in  the case  of  Rohtak  Hissar  District  Electricity  Supply  Co. Ltd.(1), the Legislature made a drastic change in the policy of  the  Act  by  amending section 4  and  laying  upon  the Certifying Officer the duty of deciding whether the Standing Orders  proposed by the employer were reasonable  and  fair, and  also by amending section 10(2) so as to permit  even  a workman to apply for modification of the certified  Standing Orders,  while, in the original Act, the employer alone  had the  right to make such an application.  It is, however,  to be noticed that the preamble of the Act was not altered,  so that  the purpose of the Act remained as before.  While  the Act  was  in  its  unamended form,  if  the  workmen  had  a grievance,   they  could  not  apply  for  modification   of certified  Standing Orders and, even at the time of  initial certification, they could only object to a Standing Order on the ground that it was not in conformity with the provisions of  the Act or Model Standing Orders.  After amendment,  the workmen were given the right to object to the draft Standing Orders at the time of first certification on the ground that the  Standing Orders were not fair and reasonable and,  even subsequently,  to  apply for modification of  the  certified Standing  Orders  after expiry of the period of  six  months prescribed under s. 10(1) of the Act.  These rights  granted to  the workmen and the powers conferred on  the  Certifying Officer  and the Appellate Authority, however, still had  to be exercised for the, purpose of giving effect to the object of the Act as it continued to remain in the preamble,  which was  not altered.  Before the amendment of the Act,  if  the workmen  had  any grievance on the ground of  unfairness  or unreasonableness  of  the Standing Orders  proposed  by  the employer,  their only remedy lay under the  Industrial  Dis- putes Act.  By amendment in 1956, a limited remedy was  pro- vided  for  them  in the Act itself by  conferring  on  the, Certifying    Officer   the   function   of   judging    the

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reasonableness and fairness of the proposed Standing Orders. These  amendments  cannot, however, affect  the  alternative remedy  which the workmen had of seeking redress  under  the Industrial Disputes Act if they had grievance against any of the Standing Orders certified by the Certifying Officer [See Bangalore  Woollen,  Cotton and Silk Mills Company  Ltd.  v. Their Workmen and Another(2), and the (1) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 863. (2) [1968] 1 L.L.J. 555. 2 Sup.  CI/69-11 154 Buckingham  and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Their  Workmen(1).   It is, therefore, clear that, after the amendment in 1956,  the workmen  have  now  two  alternative  remedies  for  seeking alterations in the Standing Orders proposed or ,already certified.  They can object to the proposed Standing  Orders at  the  time  of  first  certification,  or  can  ask   for modification of the certified Standing Orders under s. 10(2) on the limited ground  of fairness  or  reasonableness. But, for the same purpose, they also have the alternative  remedy of  seeking  redress under the Industrial Disputes  Act,  in which  case the scope of their demand would be  much  wider. If the proceedings go for adjudication  under the Industrial Disputes  Act,  the  workmen can claim  alterations  of  the Standing  Orders  not merely on the ground  of  fairness  or reasonableness,   but  even  on  other  grounds,   such   as further,  liberalisation  of  the terms  and  conditions  of service, even though the certified Standing Orders  may   be otherwise  fair and reasonable.  The remedy provided by  the Act has, therefore, a limited scope only.     In this background, the effect of s. 6, which lays  down that  when  the  Appellate  Authority  gives  its   decision confirming the Standing Orders either in the form  certified by   the  Certifying Officer or after amending the  Standing Orders   by  making  modifications,  thereof  or   additions thereto,  his  decision shall be final, has  further  to  be considered.   On   the  face of it,  this   provision  means that,  if  the Appellate Authority confirms   the   Standing Orders  at  the time of first certification, that  order  is not  to   be subsequently questioned before  any  authority. There  is, of course, the provision in s.  10(2)  permitting either an employer  or  a workman to apply for  modification of  the Standing Orders after the expiry of six months  from the  date of certification.  It appears to me that,  on  the language  of  s. 6, it must be held that  this  request  for modification under s. 10(2) can only be made on the basis of fresh facts or fresh circumstances arising subsequent to the passing  of the order by the Appellate Authority under s.  6 confirming  the Standing Orders for the first time.  If,  on receiving an application for modification under s. 10(2) the Certifying  Officer is held to be authorised  to  reconsider the  reasonableness or fairness of a Standing Order  already certified  and  confirmed  under  section  6  the   finality envisaged  under that section in respect of the decision  of the Appellate AuthOrity will be nullified.  Cases may  arise where,  on  first  application  for  certification  of   the Standing  Orders, an objection may be raised by the  workmen and  a modification sought on the  ground that the  proposed Standing Order is not fair or reasonable.  Such an objection may  be  dismissed both by the Certifying  Officer  and  the Appellate  Authority. Six months after the certification,  a workman  may  apply for the same modification  of  the  same Standing Order without any fresh facts or circumstances.  If it  be held that  the  power  of  the (1) Civil  Appeal  No. 674 of 1968 decided on 25-7-1968.

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155 Certifying Officer on an application for modification is not limited  at  all and can be exercised even on  the  material which  was originally before the Certifying Officer and  the Appellate Authority, the Certifying Officer may, on the same material, come to a conclusion different from the conclusion arrived  at  by the Appellate Authority at the  first  stage under s. 6 of the Act.  In that case, the Certifying Officer may allow the modification which was previously rejected  by the Appellate Authority.  The wide interpretation, urged  by learned  counsel  for the workmen in this  appeal  that  the power  of  a  Certifying  Officer  on  an  application   for modification  is  not  limited at all, can  thus  result  in orders being made which completely negative the finality  of the decision given by an Appellate Authority under section 6 at  an  earlier stage.  In fact, if tins  interpretation  is accepted and it is held that an order of modification can be made on the identical material  which  was available to  the Appellate  Authority at the time of its  earlier  order,  it would  mean that merely because a period of six  months  has elapsed,,  a  Certifying Officer would be competent  to  re- appraise the same facts and circumstances, take a  different view  and  set  aside  the  order  passed  by  his  superior authority   and,  thus,  in effect, sit in judgment over  an order made by a superior authority. of course, a  Certifying Officer,  being  junior  to the   Appellate  Authority,  may hesitate to do so; but  a successor  Appellate Authority may very well hold views different from his predecessor and  may come  to  a decision on identical material that  a  Standing Order  held to be fair and reasonable by his predecessor  at the stage of appeal under s. 6 was not fair and  reasonable; and  that a modification should be allowed on the ground  of being fair and reasonable, even though that modification was disallowed by his predecessor.  It is also to be noted  that the  right  to  apply for modification is  not  confined  to workmen  alone, but that right is granted to  the  employers also.   There  can, therefore, be reverse’ cases  where  the draft  Standing  Order  submitted  by  an  employer  may  be modified  by  the Appellate Authority under s.  6  and,  six months later, the employer may again apply for  modification so as to result in restoration of his original draft in  the hope  that the successor Appellate Authority would hold  the opinion  that the original draft Standing Order proposed  by the   employer  was  fair  and  reasonable  and   that   the modification  made  by his predecessor under s.  6  was  not justified.   Considering  these circumstances, I am  of  the view that, when an application under s. 10(2) of the Act  is made,  the  Certifying Officer can  modify  Standing  Orders already  certified, only if the request is not made  on  the basis  of  the same material which existed  at  the  earlier stage   when   the  Standing Orders were  certified.   I  am unable to accept an interpretation which will completely  do away with the finality of orders made under s. 6 of the  Act by an Appellate Authority. 156     This  interpretation,  of course, does  not  affect  the right  of the workmen to seek an amendment of  the  Standing Orders,  even  if certified as reasonable and  fair  by  the Appellate    Authority   under   s.   6    by    appropriate proceedings .under  the  Industrial Disputes Act.  In  fact, it  appears to me that the power of a Tribunal dealing  with an industrial dispute under that Act relating to a  Standing Order will, of course, be wide enough to permit the Tribunal to  direct  alteration  of  a  Standing  Order  held  to  be reasonable and fair by the Appellate Authority under s. 6 of

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the  Act,  in  case a dispute about it is  referred  to  the Tribunal;  and that is the only remedy available  if  either the  workman  or the employer desires to  have  modification without  any fresh grounds, material or circumstances.   The validity  of  the order of the Appellate  Authority  in  the present appeal has to be judged on this basis.     I  have already mentioned earlier the  various  Standing Orders  in  respect of which modifications  allowed  by  the Appellate  Authority  were sought to be challenged  in  this appeal.   The  objections  in  respect  of  some  of   these modifications,  which were originally challenged,  were  not pressed  by  counsel during the hearing of the  appeal  and, consequently,  those  modifications need not  be  interfered with.   At the stage of final hearing, learned counsel  only pressed  for setting aside four modifications mentioned   by the  Chief  Labour Commissioner in his. appellate  order  as items  Nos.  1,  3, 5 and 6 relating  to  modifications  .of Standing.  Orders  9(a),  12(A)  and  11(vn).   It  may   be mentioned  that  items  5 and 6 are  both  modifications  in Standing Order 11 (vii).  In each  of these cases, the order passed  by the Chief Labour Commissioner now impugned  shows that  he  did  not rely on any  fresh   facts,  material  or circumstances which were not available at the earlier  stage when  the  Standing  Orders were first  certified  or  first modified.   In effect, therefore, the present order  amounts to passing orders, different from earlier orders passed   by the   Appellate Authority, on a reconsideration of the  same material  which was available to both the  Authorities.   In fact, the  modification at item No. 1 in Standing Order 9(a) had  been  specifically  disallowed in appeal by  the  Chief Labour Commissioner in his order dated 12th February,  1963, when he first heard the appeal under s. 6 and confirmed  the certification  of  the original Standing  Orders.  Thus,  in respect  of  item  No.  1, what  the  present  Chief  Labour CommisSioner has done is to permit the modification  because he  considered it reasonable and fair, even though,  on  the same  material,  his predecessor had  disallowed  this  very modification  on  the  basis  that,  in  his  opinion,   the original. draft Standing Order was fair and reasonable.   On the principle enunciated above,  it  is clear that the order of  the Chief Labour Commissioner, allowing all  these  four modifications,  which  is  not based  on  any  fresh  facts, material or circumstances, is liable to be set aside.     As  a  result, I would partly allow the appeal  and  set aside the order of the Chief Labour Commissioner  (Central), permitting  modifications mentioned by him in his  Order  at item  Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 6 relating to Standing  Orders  9(a), 12(A)  and  Il(vii).  In the circumstances of this  case,  I would direct parties to bear their own costs of this appeal. V.P.S.                               Appeal allowed in part. 158