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PETITIONER: MANAGEMENT OF NILPUR TEA ESTATE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ASSAM & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/11/1995

BENCH: SINGH N.P. (J) BENCH: SINGH N.P. (J) AHMADI A.M. (CJ) KIRPAL B.N. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  737            1996 SCC  (1)  60  JT 1995 (8)   272        1995 SCALE  (6)504

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T N.P. SINGH. J.      Leave granted.      This appeal  has been filed on behalf of the Management of Nilpur  Tea Estate  for setting  aside  the  order  dated 8.2.1995 passed  by a  learned Judge  of the  Guwahati  High Court, dismissing  the writ  petition filed on behalf of the appellant, for quashing the order passed by the Labour Court under  Section   33-C(2)  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act (hereinafter referred  to as the ‘Act’). The order aforesaid has been  affirmed by the Division Bench by dismissal of the writ appeal by its order dated 15.5.1995.      A charge-sheet was issued by the appellant on 9.10.1981 against the third respondent (hereinafter referred to as the ‘respondent’) alleging certain misconduct under the standing order. Thereafter  a domestic  enquiry was  held and  on the basis of  the report  of the  Enquiry Officer by order dated 1.2.1982  the   services  of   the  said   respondent   were terminated. On an industrial dispute being raised, reference of the  dispute was  made for  adjudication  to  the  Labour Court. The  Labour Court  gave its award which was published in the  gazette in January 1988. By the aforesaid award, the order of termination was set aside and a direction was given that respondent be reinstated.      A writ  notation was  filed on  behalf of the appellant before the  High Court questioning the validity of the award aforesaid. The said writ petition was dismissed on 24.6.1993 by a  learned Judge  upholding the order of the Labour Court directing reinstatement.  The writ appeal filed on behalf of the appellant  was also  dismissed on  29.9.1993. It  may be mentioned  that   during  the   pendency  of  writ  petition respondent was  reinstated but  on 19.4.1988  the  appellant communicated  an   order  to   the  said   respondent  again terminating his services. He was also called upon to collect

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his back wages. There is no dispute that the second order of termination after  reinstatement of  the respondent  as  per direction given  by the Labour Court, was not challenged and no dispute  was raised  in respect  of the  said order dated 19.4.1988. On  11.10.1993 a  letter  was  addressed  by  the appellant to the said respondent requesting him to hand over possession of  the staff quarter as his services had already been terminated  on 19.4.1988. A Title Suit No.2/94 was also filed in  the court  of the Assistant District Judge. Tejpur for recovery  of vacant possession of the said quarter. Then the respondent filed an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act before the Labour Court on 16.2.1994 for computation of the  amount of  money due to him as back wages payable by the appellant.  On that  petition the  Labour Court directed the appellant  to pay  an amount  of Rs.1,54,851/-  as  duss towards  the   wages  and  other  benefits  payable  to  the respondent for  the period commencing from 1.2.1982 when the services of  the said  respondent were terminated till March 1994. The  writ petition as well writ appeal challenging the said order  of Labour  Court  under  Section  33-C(2),  were dismissed by  the High  Court saying that there was no error apparent on  the face  of the  order  of  the  Labour  Court calling for an interference by the High Court.      On behalf  of the  appellant it  was pointed  out  that there was  no dispute  in the present case that second order of termination  of the  services  of  the  respondent  dated 19.4.1988 had remained unchallenged and validity thereof had never been questioned by the respondent before any forum. It was  also   pointed  out   that  the  said  order  had  been communicated to  the respondent,  who completely ignored the same  and   only  when  the  aforesaid  communication  dated 11.10.1993  was   issued  by  the  appellant  requiring  the respondent to hand over possession of the staff quarter, the aforesaid petition  under  Section  33-C(2)  was  filed  for computation of  the arrears  of back  wages. As  no step had been taken  by the  respondent to  question the  legality or otherwise of  the order  of termination dated 19.4.1988. The said order  could not  have been ignored by the Labour Court or the  High Court,  for purposes  of calculating the amount which remained  due and is payable to the respondent. To put it in  other words, the Labour Court or the High Court could not have directed payment to the respondent for period after 19.4.1988  when   the  services   of  the   respondent  were terminated afresh.  The counsel for the respondent could not take a  stand that  respondent had  challenged the aforesaid order dated  19.4.1988 terminating  his services after being reinstated. Unless  the said order of termination is held to be invalid,  it cannot  be ignored  in  a  proceeding  under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The counsel who appeared for the respondent  could  not  explain  as  to  why  the  order  of termination dated  19.4.1988 was  completely ignored  by the respondent. In  view of  the order dated 19.4.1988 it has to be assumed  that the  services of  the respondent  had  been terminated and  the relationship  as  employer  and  workman between the appellant and the said respondent came to an end on 19.4.1988,  because of  which the said respondent was not entitled to  claim any back wages after 18.4.1988. In such a situation, we  are left  with no  option but  to modify  the orders of  the Labour  Court as well as of the High Court to the extent  that the back wages and other benefits which had been computed  by the  Labour Court as the amount payable to the  respondent,   has  to  be  calculated  till  18.4.1988. Consequently, the direction to make payment upto March, 1994 is set  aside and  it shall be restricted to the period from 1.2.1982 to 18.4.1988.

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    On behalf of the respondent, our attention was drawn to an  order  of  the  High  Court  in  a  contempt  proceeding initiated by  the said  respondent. The counsel who appeared for  the   appellant  had  given  an  undertaking  that  the appellant shall  pay all  the dues  to the  said  respondent within  the  time  fixed  in  the  said  order.  That  order according to  us is  of no  help to the respondent. Now that has to  be read  as the  amount which  in law  is due to the respondent. We  accordingly, direct that the dues payable to the respondent  in terms  of  this  order  be  paid  to  the respondent within  two months from today, by calculating the dues payable  to the  said respondent upto 18.4.1988, if not already paid.      The appeal  is allowed  to the  extent indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.