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PETITIONER: MAMLESHWAR PRASAD & ANR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KANAHAIYA LAL (DEAD) THROUGH L.Rs.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/03/1975

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. RAY, A.N. (CJ) MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN

CITATION:  1975 AIR  907            1975 SCR  (3) 834  1975 SCC  (2) 232

ACT: Practice  and Procedure--Judgment given at the  instance  of the  party  in one appeal on the basis it would  dispose  of connected  appeals  on  Identical  facts  and   law--Whether connected  appeals  can be argued on the  basis  of  earlier judgment being incuriam.

HEADNOTE: The question that arose in the three appeals and a connected appeal related to the jurisdiction of Civil courts under the Delhi  Land Reforms Act to adjudicate on certain  questions. The  four matters were disposed of by a common  judgment  by the  High Court.  Special leave having been  granted,  there were four appeals to this Court.  The appellants then  moved this  Court with a view to save money etc., that one of  the four  appeals may be got ready and directed to be posted  as the matter for decision is common to all.  Accordingly,  one of the appeals was heard and decided against the appellants. It  was,  however,  contended, as regards  the  other  three appeals,  that the earlier adjudication was a  judgment  per incuriam  and,  therefore, was not binding  either  on  the) appellants or the Court. Rejecting the contention, HELD : (1) As a result of an application at an earlier stage the  appellants got benefits like reduced  security  deposit and   consolidation  for  printing  and  hearing  on   their representation  to the Court that the points arising in  all the appeals were common and the disposal of one would govern the  rest.   A litigant cannot play fast and lose  with  the Court. [836F-H] Ex Parte Pratt (52) Q.B. 334, referred to. (2)  Ordinarily  a  decision once rendered must  later  bind like  cases  that  is,  a prior decision  of  the  Court  on identical facts and law binds the. court on the same  points in  a later case.  In the present case the earlier  decision was admittedly rendered on facts and law,  indistinguishably identical with those in the other the, appeals. (837B, C-D] (3)  In  exceptional  and rare instances, where  by  obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running  counter to the reasoning and the result reached, it may not have the sway  of a binding precedent.  But in the present case,  the

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point about the Civil Court’s power to go into a land reform litigation  had  been considered and adversely  decided,  so much  so, it is not correct for the appellants to  say  that the  matter had, by grave inadvertence been missed. to  give rise  to  any  question of a judgment  given  per  incuriam. [835E; 837B-C] Cassel & Co. Ltd. v. Broome [19721 1 All.  E.R. 801=[1972] 2 W.L.R. 645 and The English Legal System by R. J. Walker & M. G. Walker, III Edn., Butterworths, 1972, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.  2167  to 2169 of 1968. From  the Judgment and Order dated 16th August, 1966 of  the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 63-D, 65-D & 66-D of 1965. N.   S.  Bindra,  S.  S. Dalal and D.  D.  Sharma,  for  the appellants. V.   D. Mahajan, for respondents (In C.As. 2168-69). Sarjoo  Prasad, Uma Mehta, R. K. Mehta and M. L. Jain,,  for the respondent (in C.A. No. 2167/68). 835 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. A common judgment of the Division Bench  of the  Delhi High Court disposed of four appeals,  the  points covered by all being admittedly identical’ Special leave was granted  by  this  Court and thus  four  appeals  came  into existence  here.   However, the appellants before  us  moved this Court that with a view to save money and energy, one of the four may be directed to be got ready and disposed of and the  others may, thereafter, follow the fate of  the  first. On  this  basis C.A. 2556 of 1966 was heard  at  length  and decided  adversely to the present appellants.  Shri  Bindra, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the  earlier adjudication  by  this  Court amounted  to  a  judgment  per incuriam  and  did not bind him or the Court.  He  was  thus free,to  argue on the merits, especially the holding on  the civil court’s jurisdiction, and the matter was at large.  We have to consider this contention on its merits. Certain  background  facts bearing on  the  narrow  question above posed serve to appreciate the point made.  The present batch  of  appeals,  as  already  stated,  emanated  from  a judgment covering them all rendered by the Delhi High  Court which itself arose out of a like common judgment of a Single Judge  of the High Court and so on down the pyramid  to  the base  viz.,  the decree of the trial  Court.   The  Pretoria appellant  had  lost  the battle all along  the  line.   For brevity’s sake, we may content ourselves with the  statement that  the  Courts  had been invited to  pronounce  upon  the jurisdiction  of  the  civil court to  adjudicate  upon  the controversy which related to the Delhi Land Reforms Act with special reference to relevant provisions barring suits.   In short  the point about the civil court’s power to go into  a land  reform litigation had been considered  and.  adversely decided, so much so it is not correct for the appellants  to say that the matter had, by grave inadvertence, been missed. We are not examining the soundness of the actual decision on the  merits since indeed we feel that the appeals must  fail in  limine  and no principle of judgment  per  incuriam  can salvage the case. At an early stage, an application was made before this Court embracing  all  the appeals, including  the  present  three, which runs thus               "In  the matter of : Civil Appeal No. 2556  of

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             1966 and               In  the  matter of Appeals  arising  from  the               orders dated 14-8-1968 of the Delhi High Court               in S.C.A. No. 186-D/66, 189-D of 1966 and 190-               D/66 and               "in  the  matter  of  Mamleshwar  Pershad  and               another.               x                     x                      x               x               The petitioners (appellants) accordingly  pray               that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to pass               orders               (1)   Consolidating   the  4  appeals   above-               mentioned.               (2)   Modifying the orders dated 8-12-1966  in               S.L.P.               836               1366  of  1966 so that the  security  for  the               respondents’  costs  deposited  in  the   said               appeal may be considered also as security  for               the costs of the Respondents in the 3  appeals               arising from the S.C.As. No. 186-15, 189-D and               190-D of 1966.               (3)   That in case the appellants are required               to  furnish  further security apart  from  the               amount  deposited in Civil Appeal No.  2556-of               1966,  time may be suitably extended for  such               deposit  and  delay in depositing  within  the               time allowed by the Rules may be condoned.               (4)   Modifying  the directions regarding  the               preparation of record so that the  proceedings               in the High Courts to be printed in the appeal               No.  2556  of 1966 be read as  record  in  the               three  other appeals aforementioned  and  that               the  record for the said three  other  appeals               may  be  printed  only so as  to  include  the               proceedings  in  the trial Court and  the  1st               Appellate Courts; and               (5)   Such further or other directions may  be               made as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the               circumstances of the case." What  needs to be underscored is the appellant’s own  prayer that the four appeals be consolidated.  The reason given  is tell-tale :               "That  only one judgment of the High Court  in               the Letters Patent Appeals is impugned  before               your  Lordships  in all the 4  appeals  above-               mentioned.  It is therefore in the interest of               justice  that  the 4 appeals viz.,  the  Civil               Appeal  No.  2556  of 1966  and  the  other  3               appeals arising from SCAs No. 186-D, 189-D and               190-D  of 1966 deserve to be consolidated  and               would be disposed of by one argument common to               all of them.  That there isnothing  to  be               decided  by this Hon’ble Court in any  of  the               Appeals which is not common to any of the rest               of them."               (Emphasis, ours) This  prayer  was granted and thus the  appellants  got  the benefits like reduced security deposit and consolidation for purposes  of printing and hearing of the appeals,  on  their representation  to the Court that the points arising in  all the appeals were common and the disposal of one would govern the rest. A  litigant cannot play fast and loose with the Court.   His

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word  to  the  Court is as good as his  bond  and  we  must, without more ado, negative the present shift in stand by  an astute  discovery  of a plea that the earlier  judgment  was rendered per incuriam. The  wisdom  which has fallen from Bowen, L.J. in  Ex  Parte Pratt(1), though delivered in a different context, has wider relevance to include the present position.  The learned Lord Justice observed (1)  52 Q.B. 334, 341.                             837               "There  is a good old-fashioned rule  that  no               one  has a right to conduct himself  before  a               tribunal  as if he accepted its  jurisdiction,               and then afterwards, when he finds that it has               decided  against him, to turn round  and  say,               "You have no jurisdiction"." Certainty  of the law, consistency of rulings and comity  of courts--all  flowering from the same  principle-coverage  to the conclusion that a decision once rendered must later bind like cases.  We do not intend to detract from the rule that, in  exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence  or oversight  a  judgment  fails to notice  a  plain  statutory provision  or  obligatory authority running counter  to  the reasoning  and result reached, it may not have the  sway  of binding  precedents.   It  should  be  a  glaring  case,  an obtrusive omission.  No such situation presents itself  here and  we  do  not embark on the  principle  of  judgment  per incuriam. Finally  it remains to be noticed that a prior  decision  of this Court on identical facts and law binds the Court on the same  points  in  a later case.  Here  we  have  a  decision admittedly  rendered  on facts  and  law,  indistinguishably identical, and that ruling must bind. Shri  Bindra,  learned  counsel has cited  a  few  decisions before us to substantiate his submission that judgments  per incuriam bind none except the particular parties to the lis. In  this  context,  he  has  drawn  ,our  attention  to  the observations in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.(1) which has been approved by the House of Lords in Young v.  Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.(2). Similar statements are found in brief terms  in the rulings reported as Nicholas v.  Penny(3)  and The  Bengal  Immunity  Company Ltd.  Case(4).  We  need  not debate, in the present case, this fresh ground to  undermine otherwise,  conclusive judgments for other  paramount  ruler governing   justice  administration  prevail,   as   earlier indicated.  But it is extremely significant that this facile theory  was frowned upon by the House of Lords in  Cassel  & Co.   Ltd.  v. Broome(5).  In that case the  highest  Court, viz. the House of Lords.               "rejected in condemnatory terms the, Court  of               Appeal’s  decision  to the  effect  that  the,               decision  of the House of Lords in  Rookes  v.               Barnard  (1964 A.C. 1129) on the issue of  ex-               emplary damages had been reached per  incuriam               because  of  two  previous  decisions  of  the               House.  Lord Hailsham, L.C., in the course  of               the leading speech for the majority.  asserted               that               ’it is not open to the Court of Appeal to give               gratuitous advice to judges of first  instance               to  ignore decisions of the House of Lords  in               this way’               while  Lord  Reid  took the vie  what  it  was               ’obvious  that the Court of Appeal  failed  to               understand Lord Devlin’s

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             (1)   [1944] 1 K. B. 718, 729.               (3)   [1950] 2 K.B. 466.               (5)   [1972]  1 All E.R. 801-(1972)  2  W.L.R.               645.               (2) [1946] A.C. 163,169.               (4) [1955] 2 S.C. R. 603               838                speech.   The  per incuriam principle  is  of               limited  application. very few decisions  have               subsequently  been  regarded  as  having  been               reached   per  incuriam  and  in  Morelle   v.               Wakeling (1) 1955 2 Q.B. 379) a Master of  the               Rolls stated that such instances should be ’of               the rarest occurrence’, and should be  limited               to   ’decisions   given   in   ignorance    or               forgetfulness  of some inconsistent  statutory               provision or of some authority binding on  the               court concerned’.  Thus the doctrine will  not               be  extended  to cases which were  merely  not               fully  argued or which appear to take a  wrong               view  of the authorities or to misinterpret  a               statute."(1) Now  to costs.  A compassionate submission was made by  Shri Bindra  that the parties do bear their costs in this  Court. We direct accordingly. V.P.S.                                                Appeal dismissed   (1)  "The  English  Legal System" by R.J. Walker &  M.  G. Walker, if Edn.Butterworths, 1972. 839