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PETITIONER: MAJATI SUBBARAO

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: P.K.K. KRISHNA RAO (DECEASED) BY LRS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/09/1989

BENCH: KANIA, M.H. BENCH: KANIA, M.H. KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR 2187            1989 SCR  Supl. (1) 153  1989 SCC  (4) 732        JT 1989 (3)   694  1989 SCALE  (2)602  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1991 SC1594  (14)

ACT:     A.P.  Buildings  (Lease, Rent & Eviction)  Control  Act, 1960--Sections  10, 12 and 13--Eviction of tenant on  ground of denial of landlords title--When arises.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant-tenant was in occupation of the  premises and  carrying on business. The original respondent  who  was the  owner of the said premises filed an  eviction  petition against the appellant on the ground of bona fide requirement as he wanted to set up his eldest son in business by  start- ing  a  photo  studio in the said  premises.  The  appellant disputed  the correctness of the claim and alleged that  the property  in which the said premises were situated  was  the absolute  endowed property of which the original  respondent was  the de facto trustee and as such he had no personal  or proprietary  interest  in  the said property  to  evict  the appellant on the ground of personal use and occupation.  The respondent  asserted that he was the absolute owner  of  the said  premises.  The  Rent Controller passed  a  decree  for eviction on the ground that the bona fide requirement of the respondent-landlord was made out and also on the ground that the  appellant had denied the title of the respondent  which denial  was  not bona fide. The appellant  filed  an  appeal before the Appellate Authority which was dismissed upholding the  order  of eviction passed by the Rent  Controller.  The appellant  preferred a revision petition to the  High  Court and  a Single Judge of the High Court also upheld the  order of  eviction. The appellant came in an appeal to this  Court by special leave.     It  was  contended for the appellant that  in  order  to constitute a ground for eviction the denial of title must be anterior to the filing of the eviction petition and a denial of  title in the course of eviction petition would not  con- stitute  a ground for eviction. The contention on behalf  of the  respondent was that the denial of the landlord’s  title was not the only ground pleaded for eviction but it was also contended that the appellant was liable to be evicted as the respondent  wanted the said premises for his  personal  bona

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fide use and occupation. Dismissing the appeal by special leave, this Court, 154     HELD:  The  A.P.  Rent Act was enacted with  a  view  to consolidate  the  law relating to regulation of  leasing  of buildings, control of rent thereof and prevention of  unrea- sonable eviction of tenants in the State of Andhra  Pradesh. Section  10  of  the A.P. Rent Act deals  with  eviction  of tenants. Sub-Section (1) of that section prohibits  eviction of tenants except in accordance with the provisions of  that section or sections 12 and 13 of that Act. [156D-E]     It  is  well settled that the Court hearing  a  suit  or appeal can take into account events which are subsequent  to the  filing of the suit in order to give appropriate  relief or mould the relief appropriately. [157F]     Kundan  Mal v. Gurudutta, Judgments today (1989) 1  S.C. 147, not applicable.     The landlord can recover possession of the property only on  one or more of the grounds enacted in the relevant  sec- tion  of  the Rent Acts. Even after the termination  of  the contractual  tenancy the landlord under the  definitions  of the  terms landlord and tenant contained in the  Rent  Acts, remains a landlord and the tenant remains a tenant,  because of  the  express  provision made in the  enactments  that  a tenant means or includes ’a person continuing in  possession after  the  termination of the tenancy in his  favour’.  Yet another important feature of the Rent Acts is that either by way  of  a non-obstante clause or by  necessary  implication these  enactments have done away with the law  contained  in section  108  of the Transfer of Property Act  dealing  with rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee.  [158D- E]     Maharaja  of  Jaypore v. Rukmani Pattamahdevi,  46  I.A. 109; A.I.R. [1919] P.C. 1 and V. Dhanapal Chattiar v.  Yeso- dai Ammal, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 334, referred to.     Sada Ram and Others v. Gajjan Shiama, A.I.R. 1970 Punjab JUDGMENT: H.P.  22 and Machavaram Venkate Narayana Rao  v.  Sarvepalli Narayane Rao Sarada and another, [1978] 1 R.C.J. 368, relied upon.

&     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2732  of 1980.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  25.8.1980  of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.R.P. No. 7974 of 1979. 155  A.V. Rangam for the Appellant.     C.  Setharamaiah, P.K. Rao, V.A. Babu and K.R.  Nagaraja for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     KANIA, J. This is an appeal by Special Leave against the judgment  of  a learned Single Judge of the  Andhra  Pradesh High Court in Civil’ Revision Petition No. 7974 of 1979. The appellant before us is the tenant and the original  respond- ent  is the landlord who is dead and is represented  by  his legal representatives.     The  premises  in question are in Eluru Town  in  Andhra Pradesh.  The appellant is carrying on business in the  name and  style of Sri Panduranga Engineering Company.  According to the original respondent (who will hereinafter be referred to as "the respondent") he was the owner of the building  in which the said premises situated and hence, the owner of the

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said  premises.  The respondent filed an  eviction  petition against the appellant on the ground of bona fide requirement as he wanted to set up his eldest son in business by  start- ing  a  photo  studio in the said  premises.  The  appellant disputed the correctness of the said claim. The appellant in his  counter to the eviction petition, inter  alia,  alleged that  the  said  property in which the  said  premises  were situated was the absolute endowed property of punyamurthula- vari  Choultry of which the original respondent was  the  de facto  trustee and that the original respondent had no  per- sonal  or  proprietary  interest in the  said  property.  He asserted that the said property belonged to the said  Choul- try and that the original respondent had no manner of  right to  evict  the appellant on the ground of personal  use  and occupation.  The appellant asserted that the  said  premises were not the individual property of the original  respondent but trust property. The respondent filed a rejoinder denying that the said premises were the endowed property or that the said  property was a part of punyamurthulavari Choultry.  He asserted that he was the absolute owner of the said property which  was purchased by his father under a  registered  sale deed  dated 29th June, 1908. The respondent  submitted  that the  appellant had denied his title and, as the said  denial was  not bona fide, the appellant was liable to  be  evicted also  on the ground of denial of title of the landlord.  The Rent  Controller passed a decree for eviction on the  ground that  the bona fide requirement of  the  landlord-respondent was  made  out and also on the ground  that  the  appellant- tenant had denied the title of respondent-landlord which 156 denial was not bona fide. The appellant preferred an  appeal against  the said decision to the Appellate  Authority.  The Appellate Authority, however, dismissed the appeal upholding both  the grounds of eviction found by the Rent  Controller. Against  this decision, the appellant preferred  a  revision petition  to the High Court. The High Court in its  impugned judgment upheld the order of eviction only on the ground  of denial of title which was not a bona fide denial. It is this decision of the High Court which is challenged before us.     The finding that the denial of title was not bona  fide, is  essentially  a finding of fact and,  fairly  enough,  no dispute has been raised by learned counsel for the appellant in respect of that finding. It is, however, submitted by him that in order to constitute a ground for eviction the denial of  title  .must be anterior to the filing of  the  eviction petition  and  a denial of title in the course  of  eviction petition would not constitute a ground for eviction. He drew our attention to the provisions of section 10 of the  Andhra Pradesh  Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)  Control  Act, 1960  (hereinafter referred to as "the A.P. Rent Act").  The A.P. Rent Act was enacted with a view to consolidate the law relating  to regulation of leasing of buildings, control  of rent  thereof  and prevention of  unreasonable  eviction  of tenants  in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Section 10  of  the A.P.  Rent Act deals with eviction of  tenants.  Sub-section (1) of that section prohibits eviction of tenants except  in accordance  with the provisions of that section or  sections 12 and 13 of that Act. The relevant part of sub-section  (2) of section 10 of the A.P. Rent Act runs as follows:                "(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant               shall apply to the controller for a  direction               in  that  behalf.  If  the  Controller,  after               giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity  of               showing  cause  against  the  application,  is               satisfied;

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               (i) x      x         x         x                         (ii) x      x         x         x                        (iii) x      x         x         x                         (iv) x      x         x         x                 (v) x      x         x         x                        (vi)  that the tenant has denied  the               title  of the land lord or claimed a right  of               permanent   tenancy  and  that            such               denial or claim was not bona fide,                         the  Controller shall make an  order               directing  the tenant to put the  landlord  in               possession of the building and               157               if the controller is not so satisfied he shall               make an order rejecting the application." It  was urged by learned counsel for the appellant that  the ground  for  eviction must come into  existence  before  the application to the Rent Controller for eviction is made  and hence,  a  denial of title which can be relied upon  by  the landlord-respondent  for eviction must be. anterior  to  the eviction petition.     In support of his contention, Mr. Rangam, learned  coun- sel  for the appellant placed reliance on the decision of  a Bench  of this Court in Kundan Mal v.  Gurudutta,  Judgments Today  (1989) 1 S.C. 147. In that case it has been  observed that  in providing disclaimer as a ground for eviction of  a tenant  in  clause  (f) of section 13(1)  of  the  Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 the Legis- lature  decided to give effect to the provisions  of  clause (g)  of  section 111 of the Transfer of  Property  Act.  The principle of forfeiture on disclaimer is rounded on the rule that a man cannot approbate and reprobate at the same  time. Since the consequence of applying the rule is very  serious, it must be held that the denial of title to has to be  clear and  in  unequivocal terms. In our view,  this  decision  is hardly  of any assistance to learned counsel. The  principle laid  down  in that case is that, in order to  constitute  a ground for eviction, the denial of title has to be clear and in  unequivocal terms. In the present case, the facts  found show  that  the  denial of title of the  respondent  by  the appellant was in dear and unequivocal terms. Although it  is observed in the said judgment that in providing this  ground for  eviction,  the Legislature of the  State  of  Rajasthan decided  to give effect to the provisions of clause  (g)  of section  111 of the Transfer of Property Act,  the  judgment nowhere lays down that the denial of title must be  anterior to the eviction petition nor does it say that the provisions relating  to  eviction  of tenants  under  the  Transfer  of Property Act are applicable to the eviction of tenants under the Rajasthan Rent Act. In this connection we may point  out that  it  is well settled that the Court hearing a  suit  or appeal can take into account events which are subsequent  to the  filing of the suit in order to give appropriate  relief or mould the relief appropriately. Moreover, it is  signifi- cant that in the present case, the denial of the  landlord’s title  was  not the only ground pleaded in  support  of  the claim for eviction but it was also contended by the respond- ent  that  the  appellant was liable to be  evicted  as  the respondent  wanted the said premises for his  personal  bona fide use and occupation. 158     It was argued by learned counsel for the appellant  that even  accepting  that  there was a denial of  title  by  the appellant and the result would be only that the  respondent- landlord  became entitled to forfeit the lease and in  order

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to be a ground for eviction in a suit that forfeiture  would have  to precede the suit or petition for eviction.  It  was submitted by him that it was not open to a landlord to  take advantage  of  a denial of title by the tenant in  the  very proceedings  for eviction in the course of which the  denial was  made. The denial must be anterior to the eviction  pro- ceedings. In support of this argument learned counsel placed reliance  on the decision in Maharaja of Jeypore v.  Rukmani Pattamahdevi,  46  I.A. 109; AIR 1919 P.C. 1. In  our  view, this  argument also does not stand scrutiny. In V.  Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Arnrnal, [1980] 1 SCR 334 a Constitution Bench  of  this Court comprising seven-learned  Judges  held that  in  the matter of determination of tenancy  the  State Rent Acts do not permit a landlord to snap his  relationship with the tenant merely by serving on him a notice to quit as is  the  position under the Transfer of  Property  Act.  The landlord can recover possession of the property only on  one or  more of the grounds enacted in the relevant  section  of the Rent Acts. Even after the termination of the contractual tenancy  the landlord under the definitions of landlord  and tenant contained in the Rent Acts, remains a landlord and  a tenant  remains  a tenant because of the  express  provision made in the enactments that a tenant means ’a person contin- uing  in possession after the termination of the tenancy  in his favour’. Yet another important feature of the Rent  Acts is that either by way of a non obstante clause or by  neces- sary  implication these enactments have done away  with  the law contained in section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing  with rights and liabilities of the lessor  and  the lessee. The difference between the position obtaining  under the Transfer of Property Act and the Rent Acts in the matter of determination of a lease is that under the former Act  in order to recover possession of the leased premises  determi- nation of the lease is necessary because during the continu- ance of the lease the landlord cannot recover possession  of the premises while under the Rent Acts the landlord  becomes entitled to recover possession only on the fulfilment of the conditions  laid  down in the relevant sections.  He  cannot recover  possession merely by determining the  tenancy.  Nor can  he be stopped from doing so on the ground that  he  has not  terminated the contractual tenancy. In the case  before us,  we  find  that the denial of landlord’s  title  by  the tenant  has been expressly made a ground for eviction  under section 10(2)(vi) of the A.P. Rent Act which we have already set  out earlier. In view of this, the entire basis for  the argument  that the denial of title must be anterior  to  the proceedings for eviction under the A.P. Rent 159 Act is knocked out. In our opinion, the argument of  learned counsel  for the appellant must, therefore, be rejected.  We find,  on the other hand, that a number of High Courts  have taken the view that even a denial of the landlord’s title by a  tenant  in a written statement in  an  eviction  petition under the Rent Act concerned furnishes a ground for eviction and  can be relied upon in the very proceedings in  which  a written statement containing the denial has been filed (See: Sada  Ram  and Others v. Gajjan Shiama, AIR  1970  Punjab  & Haryana 511; Shiv Parshad v. Smt. Shila Rani, AIR 1974  H.P. 22  and Machavaram Venkata Narayana Rao v. Sarvepalli  Nara- yana  Rao  Sarada and another, [1978] 1 R.C.J. 368.  As  ob- served by the Punjab and Haryana High Court to insist that a denial  of  title in the written statement cannot  be  taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord would  only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the

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landlord  would be obliged to file a second suit for  eject- ment  of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed  by the  tenant’s  denial of his character as a  tenant  in  the written statement.     It  was submitted by learned counsel for  the  appellant that,  in  any  event, the respondent failed  to  apply  for amendment of his plaint and incorporate the ground of denial of  title therein as he was bound to do so in order  to  get relief  on that ground which had arisen after  the  eviction petition  was filed. We agree that normally this would  have been  so  but, in the present case, we find that  the  Trial Court,  namely, the Rent Controller, framed an issue  as  to whether  the tenant’s denial of the landlord’s title to  the schedule property including the said premises was bona fide. The parties went to trial on this clear issue and the appel- lant  had full knowledge of the ground alleged against  him. It  was open to him to have objected to the framing of  this issue on the ground that it was not alleged in the  eviction petition  that  the appellant had denied the  title  of  the respondent and that the denial of title was bona fide. If he had done that the respondent could have well applied for  an amendment  of  the  eviction petition  to  incorporate  that ground. Having failed to raise that contention at that stage it is not open now to the appellant to say that the eviction decree  could  not be passed against him as  the  ground  of denial of title was not pleaded in the eviction petition. No other argument have been advanced before us. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissal with costs. S.K.A.                                         Appeal   dis- missed. 160