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PETITIONER: MAJ. GENL. A.S. GAURAYA & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S.N. THAKUR AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/04/1986

BENCH: KHALID, V. (J) BENCH: KHALID, V. (J) DUTT, M.M. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR 1440            1986 SCR  (2) 771  1986 SCC  (2) 709        1986 SCALE  (1)1128

ACT:      Criminal Procedure  Code, 1973  -  Whether  subordinate criminal  Courts  have  inherent  jurisdiction  outside  the provisions of the Code.

HEADNOTE:      Respondent No.l, complainant, filed a complaint against the  appellants-accused   in  the   Court  of  the  Judicial Magistrate, First  Class, New  Delhi disclosing  an  offence punishable under s. 67 and 72-C(l)(a) of the Mines Act, 1952 read  with   Regulation  106   of  the  Metallifarous  Mines Regulation, 1961.  The Magistrate took the complaint on file and issued  summons to the accused to appear on 6.1.1972. On 6.1.1972  neither  the  complainant  nor  the  accused  were present  and,   therefore,  the   Magistrate  dismissed  the complaint in  default  and  for  want  of  prosecution.  The respondent filed an application on 13.1.1972 for restoration of  the   complaint  and   on  20.1.72,  after  hearing  the complainant,  the  Magistrate  restored  the  complaint  and issued summons  to  the  accused.  Thereafter  the  accused- appellants  moved   an  application  before  the  Magistrate stating  that   the  order   dated   20.1.72   was   without jurisdiction since the Magistrate had become functus officio by  order   dated  6.1.72.   The  Magistrate  rejected  this application holding  that he  had inherent  powers under the code of  Criminal Procedure to review and recall his earlier orders. The  Additional Chief  Judicial Magistrate  and  the Delhi High Court dismissed the first and the second revision petition filed  by the  appellants against  the order of the Magistrate.      Pursuant to  a judgement delivered by the Supreme Court on 5th  August, 1976 in the case of Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali  Singh, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 125 holding that no Criminal Court had any inherent jurisdiction, not provided for in the Criminal Procedure Code, the appellants moved an application before  the  Metropolitan  Magistrate  contending  that  all proceedings after  the dismissal  of the  complaint by order dated 6th  January, 1972  were without  jurisdiction in  the light 772 of the  law laid down by the Supreme Court and requested the Magistrate  to  drop  further  proceedings.  The  Magistrate

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accepted this contention and dropped the proceedings against the  appellants-accused.   Aggrieved  by   this  order,  the respondent filed  a revision  before the Additional Sessions Judge who  reversed the  decision of  the Magistrate holding that a pronouncement as to the position of law in a judicial decision by the Supreme Court cannot be treated as a sort of legislation by  Parliament giving retrospective effect as to enjoin re-appointing  of  all  matters  which  have  already become final  and closed.  Thereupon, the appellants filed a writ petition  before  the  High  Court  and  the  same  was dismissed in limine. Hence this appeal by special leave.      Allowing the appeal. ^      HELD. 1.  In view of the law laid down by Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 125, the  order of  the High  Court is set aside and that of the Magistrate  dated 6.1.77  dismissing  the  complaint  is restored. [781 C]      2.(i)  Section  249  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code enables a  magistrate to  discharge  the  accused  when  the complainant is  absent and  when the conditions laid down in the said  section  are  satisfied.  Section  256(1)  of  the Criminal Procedure  Code enables  a magistrate to acquit the accused if  the complainant does not appear. Thus, the order of dismissal  of a  complaint by a criminal court due to the absence of  a complainant  is a  proper order. Therefore, so far as  the accused  is concerned,  dismissal of a complaint for non-appearance  of the  complainant or  his discharge or acquittal on  the same  ground is  a final  order and in the absence of  any specific provision in the Code, a Magistrate cannot exercise  any inherent jurisdiction. [776 E-F: 777 G- H]      2.(ii) There  is absolutely no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1908 empowering a Magistrate to review or recall an order passed by him. Code of Criminal Procedure does  contain  a  provision  for  inherent  powers,  namely, Section 561-A  which, however,  confers these  powers on the High Court  and the  High Court alone. Unlike Section 151 of Civil Procedure  Code, the  subordinate criminal courts have no inherent  powers. In  these circumstances, therefore, the learned Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to re-call the order dismissing the complaint. [778 C-E] 773      2.(iii) Filing  of a  second complaint  is not the same thing as  reviving a dismissed complaint after recalling the order of  dismissal. The  Criminal Procedure  Code does  not contain any  provision enabling  the Criminal  Court to  use such an inherent power. A second complaint is permissible in law if it could be brought within the limitations imposed by the Supreme  Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar [1962] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 297. [777 A-B; 776 H]      Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 125, followed.      B.D. Sethi  v. V.P.  Dewan, 1971  Delhi Law  Times 162, over-ruled.      3. A  mere reading  of Article  141 brings  into  sharp focus its expanse and all pervasive nature. There is nothing like any prospective operation alone of the law laid down by the Supreme  Court. The  law laid  down by the Supreme Court applies to all pending proceedings. [780 D; 779 E]      Shenoy and  Co. v.  Commercial Tax  Officer,  [1985]  2 S.C.C. 512, relied upon.      In the  instant case,  the  Additional  Sessions  Judge overlooked the  binding nature  of the  law declared  by the Supreme  Court   mandating  under   Art.  141,  every  court

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subordinate to this Court to accept it. The High Court could have, if  it had  examined the  matter, corrected  the error into which  the Sessions Judge fell. The observations of the Sessions Judge  disclose a  confusion of  thought about  the effect of  decision rendered  by the  Supreme  Court  and  a misreading of Article 141 of the Constitution. [779 F-G;D-E]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal No. 184 of 1979.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  the 9.8.78  of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Misc. No. 391 of 1978.      Rajender Nath  Sachar, D.N.  Mishra, Ms. L. Goswami and T.M. Ansari with him for the Petitioners. 774      V. Mahajan and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KHALID, J.  This  Criminal  appeal  by  special  leave, involves the question :           Whether a  Sub-ordinate  Criminal  Court  has  any           inherent jurisdiction  outside the  provisions  of           the Criminal Procedure Code ? Incidentally, the  scope of  Article 141 of the Constitution also comes up for consideration.      The  facts  of  the  case  can  be  stated  first.  The appellants, two  in number,  are the  accused in a complaint filed by  the first  respondent in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First  Class, New  Delhi, disclosing  an offence punishable under  Section 67 and 72C(l)(a) of the Mines Act, 1952, read  with Regulation  106 of  the Metallifarous Mines Regulation 1961.  The learned  Magistrate took the complaint on file  and issued  summons to  the accused  to  appear  on 6.1.1972. On  6.1.1972   neither  the  complainant  nor  the accused were  present and  therefore, the  Magistrate passed the following order :           "Accused  not   present.  None   present  for  the           complainant  also.   The   complaint   is   hereby           dismissed in default and for want of prosecution." On 13.1.1972,  the  complainant  filed  an  application  for restoration of  the complaint.  On 20.1.1972, the Magistrate passed the following order :           "I  heard   Shri  T.S.  Sodhi.  The  complaint  be           restored. Summon accused for 21/2." On 21.2.1972,  the accused  petitioners moved an application before the Magistrate stating that the order dated 20.1.1972 was without  jurisdiction since  the Magistrate  had  become functus  officio,   by  his   order  dated   6.1.1972.  This application was  rejected by  the Magistrate  by  his  order dated 8.5.1972.  He was  of the  view that  he had  inherent powers under  the Code  of Criminal  Procedure to review and re-call his earlier orders. 775      Aggrieved by  this order,  the petitioners  filed  a  A revision before  the  Court  of  Additional  Chief  Judicial Magistrate, New Delhi, which was dismissed on 6/7/1973.      This was  followed by  another revision before the High Court of  Delhi. The Delhi High Court dismissed the revision by its  order  dated  10.1.1975,  relying  upon  an  earlier decision of  the same  Court to  the effect  that a criminal court had  certain inherent  powers, though not specifically mentioned in the Code.      On 5.8.1976,  this Court  delivered its Judgment in the case of  Bindeshwari Prasad  Singh  v.  Kali  Singh,  [1977]

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S.C.R. 125  holding that  no criminal court had any inherent jurisdiction, not  provided for  in the  Criminal  Procedure Code. The  petitioners, armed  with this  decision, moved an application   before    the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   on 22.12.1976,  contending  that  all  proceedings,  after  the dismissal of  the complaint  by order  dated 6.1.1972,  were without jurisdiction  in the  light of  the law laid down by this Court  and requested  the Magistrate  to  drop  fruther proceedings. The  learned Metropolitan  Magistrate  accepted this contention and by his order dated 16.7.1977 dropped the proceedings against the petitioners.      Aggrieved  by  this  order,  the  respondents  filed  a revision  before   the  Sessions   Judge,  New   Delhi.  The Additional Sessions  Judge, New  Delhi, to  whom  this  case stood transferred,  reversed the  decision of the Magistrate by his  order dated  7.1.1978 and  held that  : "so  for  as Article 141  of the  Constitution of  India and the ratio of these decisions  is  concerned,  there  can  be  no  dispute whatsoever. At  the same  time a  pronouncement  as  to  the position of  law in a judicial decision by the Supreme Court cannot be treated as a sort of legislation by the Parliament giving retrospective  effect as  to enjoin  reopening of all matters which have already become final and closed."      Aggrieved by this order the petitioners moved the Delhi High Court  under Article  227 of  the Constitution of India read with  Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to quash further proceedings, relying upon the decision of this Court mentioned  above and  contending that the order of the Sessions 776 Judge was  wrong. This  revision petition  was dismissed  in limine by the High Court on 9.8.1978, observing :           "I find no sufficient reason to interfere with the           impugned order. Dismissed." It is against this order that this appeal has been filed.      The first  question to  be considered  is  whether  the Magistrate could  have re-called  his order.  It  cannot  be disputed  that  the  Magistrate  has  powers  to  dismiss  a complaint and  discharge the accused when the complainant is absent. In  Ram Prasad Maitra v. Emperor, 1928 A.I.R. - Cal. 569 a  division bench  of the  Calcutta High  Court  had  to consider  the   question  whether  the  Sessions  judge  was justified in  directing the complaint to be sent back to the Magistrate  for  further  enquiry  when  the  complaint  was dismissed under  section 203  of  Criminal  Procedure  Code. Answering the question in the negative, it was observed :           "...... In a case like this, where the complainant           does not  choose to be present, he cannot be heard           afterwards to  say that  the matter should be sent           back to the Magistrate for further enquiry..." This  Judgment   indirectly  recognises   the  power   in  a Magistrate to dismiss a complaint for default. We agree with this conclusion.      Section 249  of the  Criminal Procedure  Code enables a Magistrate to  discharge the accused when the complainant is absent and when the conditions laid down in the said section are satisfied. Section 256(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code enables  a   Magistrate  to   acquit  the   accused  if  the complainant does not appear. Thus, the order of dismissal of a complaint  by a  criminal court  due to  the absence  of a complainant is  a proper  order. But  the  question  remains whether a  magistrate can restore a complaint to his file by revoking his  earlier  order  dismissing  it  for  the  non- appearance of  the complainant  and proceed  with it when an application is  made by  the complainant  to  revive  it.  A

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second complaint  is permissible  in  law  if  it  could  be brought within  the limitations  imposed by  this  Court  in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, [1962] 777 Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 297. Filing of a second complaint is not the A  same  thing  as  reviving  a  dismissed  complaint  after recalling the  earlier  order  of  dismissal.  The  Criminal Procedure Code  does not  contain any provision enabling the criminal court to exercise such an inherent power.      In B.D. Sethi v. V.P. Dewan, 1971 Delhi Law Times 162 a division  bench   of  the  Delhi  High  Court  held  that  a Magistrate could  revive a  dismissed  complaint  since  the order dismissing the complaint was not a Judgment or a final order. In paragraph 9, the Court observes as follows :           "9. As  long as  the order  of the Magistrate does           not amount to a Judgment or a final order there is           nothing  in   the  Code   of  Criminal   Procedure           prohibiting the  Magistrate  from  entertaining  a           fresh application  asking for  the same  relief on           the same facts or from re-considering that order.           During the course of the proceedings, a Magistrate           has to  pass various  interlocutory orders  and it           will  not  be  correct  to  say  that  he  has  no           jurisdiction to re-consider them.." We would like to point out that this approach is wrong. What the Court  has to  see is  not whether  the Code of Criminal procedure contains  any provision  prohibiting a  Magistrate from entertaining  an application  to  restore  a  dismissed complaint, but  the task  should be  to find out whether the said Code  contains any  provision enabling  a Magistrate to exercise an  inherent jurisdiction  which he  otherwise does not have.  It was  relying upon this decision that the Delhi High Court  in this  case directed the Magistrate to re-call the order  of dismissal  of the  complaint. The  Delhi  High Court referred to various decisions dealing with section 367 (old code)  of the Criminal Procedure Code as to what should be the  contents of  a Judgment.  In our  view,  the  entire discussion is misplaced. So far as the accused is concerned, dismissal  of   a  complaint   for  non-appearance   of  the complainant or his discharge or acquittal on the same ground is a  final  order  and  in  the  absence  of  any  specific provision in  the Code,  a Magistrate  cannot  exercise  any inherent jurisdiction. 778      For our  purpose, this  matter is  now concluded  by  a judgment of  this Court  in the  case of  Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v.  Kali Singh,  [1977] 1  S.C.R. 125. We may usefully quote the following passage at page 126 :           ".......  Even   if   the   Magistrate   had   any           jurisdiction to  re-call this order, it could have           been done  by another  judicial order after giving           reasons that he was satisfied that a case was made           out for  re-calling the  order. We,  however, need           not  dilate   on  this   point  because  there  is           absolutely no  provision in  the Code  of Criminal           Procedure of  1908 (which  applies to  this  case)           empowering a  Magistrate to  review or  re-call an           order passed  by him.  Code of  Criminal Procedure           does contain  a  provision  for  inherent  powers,           namely,  Section  561-A  which,  however,  confers           these powers  on the High Court and the High Court           alone. Unlike Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code,           the subordinate  criminal courts  have no inherent           powers. In  these  circumstances,  therefore,  the           learned Magistrate  had absolutely no jurisdiction

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         to re-call the order dismissing the complaint. The           remedy of  the respondent was to move the Sessions           Judge or  the High  Court in  revision.  In  fact,           after having  passed the  order dated  23.11.1968,           the  Sub-divisional   magistrate  became   functus           officio and had no power to review or re-call that           order  on   any  ground   whatsoever.   In   these           circumstances, therefore,  the order even if there           be one,  re-calling order dismissing the complaint           was entirely  without jurisdiction. This being the           position,  all  subsequent  proceedings  following           upon re-calling  the said order, would fall to the           ground including  order dated  3.5.1972, summoning           the accused  which must  also be  treated to  be a           nullity and  destitute of  any legal  effect.  The           High  Court   has  not   at  all  considered  this           important aspect  of the  matter which  alone  was           sufficient to  put an end to these proceedings. It           was  suggested   by  Mr.  D.  Goburdhan  that  the           application given  by him for re-calling the order           of dismissal  of the  complaint would  amount to a           fresh complaint. We are, 779           however, unable  to  agree  with  this  contention           because there was no fresh complaint and it is not           well settled  that a second complaint can lie only           on fresh  facts or even on the previous facts only           if a  special case is made out. This has been held           by this  Court in  Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj           Ranjan  Sarkar   (supra).   For   these   reasons,           therefore, the appeal is allowed. The order of the           High Court maintaining the order of the Magistrate           dated 3.5.1972  is set  aside and the order of the           Magistrate dated  3.5.1972 summoning the appellant           is hereby quashed.      When  the  matter  went  before  the  High  Court,  the decision of this Court referred above must have been brought to its  notice, since  the order  by the Additional Sessions Judge refers  to it.  We would  have happy if the High Court had considered the matter in some detail especially when its attention was  drawn to  this decision instead of dismissing the revision  in limine.  The observations  of the  Sessions Judge, extracted  above, discloses  a confusion  of  thought about the  effect of a decision rendered by this Count and a misreading of  Article 141  of the  constitution.  There  is nothing like any prospective operation alone of the law laid down by  this Court. The law laid down by this court applies to all  pending  proceedings.  If  the  Sessions  Judge  had expressed his  helplessness because  of the earlier order of the High  Court binding  on him and had allowed the revision on that  ground, we  could  have  understood  the  reasoning behind it. He got rid of the effect of this Court’s Judgment by observing that a decision by this Court cannot be treated as "a sort of legislation by Parliament" and thus overlooked the binding  nature of  the  law  declared  by  this  Court, mandating under  Article 141,  every Courts  subordinate  to this Court to accept it. The High Court could have if it had examined the  matter, corrected  the error  into  which  the Sessions Judge fell.      The sweep of Article 141 of the Constitution, so far as the Judgments  of this  Court are  concerned,  came  up  for consideration before  this Court  recently in Shenoy and Co. v. Commercial  Tax Officer,  [1985] (2)  S.C.C. 512 to which one of  us was  a party. It is not necessary to refer to the facts of  that case,  in detail.  Suffice it to say that the

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contention 780 that the  law laid  down by this Court in an appeal filed by the State  would not bind the other parties against whom the State of  Karnataka did  not  file  appeals  from  a  common Judgment, was repelled by this Court in the following words:           "....It is,  therefore, idle  to contend  that the           law laid down by this Court in that Judgment would           bind only  the Hansa Corporation and not the other           petitioners against  whom the  State of  Karnataka           had not  filed any  appeal. To  do so is to ignore           the binding  nature of  a judgment  of this  Court           under Article 141 of the Constitution. Article 141           reads as follows :           "The law  declared by  the Supreme  Court shall be           binding on  all courts  within  the  territory  of           India." A mere reading of this article brings into           sharp focus  its  expanse  and  is  all  pervasive           nature.  In   cases  like   this,  where  numerous           petitions are disposed of by a common judgment and           only one  appeal is  filed,  the  parties  to  the           common judgment  could very  well have  and should           have intervened and could have requested the Court           to hear  them also.  They cannot  be heard  to say           that the  decision was  taken by this Court behind           their back  or profess  ignorance of the fact that           an appeal  had been filed by the State against the           common judgment....           To contend  that this  conclusion applies  only to           the party  before this  Court is  to  destroy  the           efficacy and integrity of the judgment and to make           the mandate  of Article  141 illusory. But setting           aside the  common judgment  of the High Court, the           mandamus issued  by the  High  Court  is  rendered           ineffective not  only  in  one  case  but  in  all           cases." Normally, when  several matters  are disposed of by a common Judgment, and  the defeated  party  files  only  one  appeal against one  such matter  and succeeds  in that  matter,  he would still  be faced  with the  plea  of  finality  of  the Judgment based on res-judicata by those against whom appeals were not  filed. But this plea did not find favour with this Court in the above 781 case. It  was held  that the Judgment rendered by this Court in one appeal, took away the finality of the common Judgment even against  those against  whom  appeals  were  not  filed because of the all pervasive operation of Article 141.      We do  not think it necessary to probe further into the facts of  this case and lengthen this Judgment, for one good reason; this  case has  moved along  the  files  of  various Courts for  more than  15 years  and it is high time that we give it  a decent  burial. In  view of  the law laid down by this Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh’s case (supra) we set aside the  order of  the High  Court, allow  this appeal and restore  the   order  of   the  Magistrate,  dated  6.1.1972 dismissing the complaint. M.L.A.                                       Appeal allowed. 782