http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: MAHENDRA  SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/04/1973

BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN

CITATION:  1973 AIR 2288            1974 SCC  (3) 409

ACT: Arms Act, 1959.  Ss. 25(1) (a) and 27-Scope of-Possession of arms not for anti-social purpose-No licence-Sentence. Practice-High  Court’s  power to dismiss  appeal  summarily- Desirability  of giving reasons-Delay in final  disposal  of criminal appeals-Effect of.

HEADNOTE: On receipt of information the police searched the appellants house  on May 14, 1968.  In the central room of  that  house there  was an almirah of which the key was produced  by  the appellant and handed over to the Inspector of Police.   When the almirah was opened with the key it was found to  contain a  bag  with live cartridges and a gun.  As  no  licence  or permit for their possession was produced, the appellant  was prosecuted  and was convicted under Ss. 25(1)(a) and  27  of the  Arms  Act,  1959 and the  appellant  was  sentenced  to imprisonment  for two years R.I. His appeal  to  the  High Court  was dismissed summarily.  Special leave to appeal  to this  Court was granted and the accused was on bail  pending disposal of the appeal. HELD:     (1)  The  High Court has the power to  dismiss  an appeal in limine where in its opinion there is no  substance in  the  appeal.  But in cases where ,questions of  fact  or law, which are arguable and which are not unsubstantial, are ,raised,  it  is  desirable  that  the  High  Court,   while dismissing  summarily, should indicate broadly  the  reasons which prevailed with it.  In such cases not only the reasons recorded by the High Court would be helpful to this Court in better understanding and appreciating the High Court’s ’line of  approach but it would also serve to assure  the  accused that  the arguable points in his appeal have  been  properly argued and duly considered by the High Court. [64D-F] Mushtak  Hussain  v. Bombay [1953] S.C.R.  809  and  Mushtaq Ahmed Hussain ,and Mukhtar Hussain Ali Hussain v. The  State of Guj., Cr.  A. No. 9 of 1973 decided on 13-3-73 followed. (2)  However,  it  is  undesirable and  unnecessary  in  the larger interests of justice to send the present case back to the High Court for re-decision.  The appellant was convicted in  June  1969  and the High Court’s  decision  was  shortly there after.   Undue  delay in final  disposal  of  criminal appeals  tends to some extent to defeat the very purpose  of criminal  justice.   Speedy disposal of criminal  cases  for

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

commission of offences promotes confidence of the society in the  administration of criminal justice which  is  essential for  sustaining the faith of the law-abiding members of  the society  in the effectiveness of the rule of law.   It  also saves  the  accused from avoidable  harassment  inherent  in unreasonably prolonged trials and appeals. [64F-H; 65A-B] (3)  On  the  evidence on the record it is not  possible  to hold  that  the  existence of the arms in  the  almirah  was without  the appellant’s knowledge and that his possession of  the  arms was unconscious.   Therefore,  his  conviction under s.  25(1) (a) was justified. [65E-F] (4)  There  is no evidence in support of the conviction  for the offence under s. 27, and therefore, his conviction under that section cannot be sustained. [65F-G] (5)  There is no evidence of any undesirable antecedents  of the  appellant, and the possession of the arms has not  been shown  to be inspired by any sinister purpose.   Since  more than  4 years had elapsed since the date of the  offence  it would  be  in  the  ends  of  justice  if  the  sentence  of imprisonment  was  reduced to that already undergone  and  a sentence of fine is, imposed in addition. [65H; 66A-D]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.  3  of 1970. 63 Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated June 24, 1969 of them Calcutta High Court in Cr.  Appeal No. 378 of 1969. I. N. Shroff  for the appellant. P. K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUA, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of summary dismissal of the appellant’s appeal by  the High  Court  of Calcutta from the judgment and  order  of  a learned  Additional Sessions Judge, Asansol dated  June  18, 1969 convicting the appellant for offences under ss. 25  (1) (a) and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. According  to  the prosecution case, on  receipt  of  secret information, Inspector Kali Prasanna Chaudhury of  Detective Department,  along with Circle Inspector, S. L. Routh,  S.I. K.  D.  Chakravarty,  Officer-incharge  of  Hirapur   police station  and  S.I. K. D. Chatterjee, Town  Sub-Inspector  of Asansol  and some constables searched the appellant’s  house on May 14, 1968 between 6.40 a.m. and 9 a.m. in the presence of  some other witnesses.  In the Central Room of the  house there  was an almirah of which the key was produced  by  the appellant   and  handed  over  to   Inspector   Kaliprasanna Chaudhury  (P.W. 1).  The almirah was opened with  the  said key  wherein was found a bag containing seven.12  bore  live cartridges,  seven  .410 bore live  cartridges,  nine  rifle ammunition and one 12 bore fired cartridge case.  There  was also  found  a gun folded into two parts under a  bundle  of clothes  on  the  lowest shelf.   The  appellant  could  not produce any licence or permit for the possession of the  gun and  the  cartridges.   As a result  of  this  recovery  the appellant  was  arrested and challenged.  He was  duly  com- mitted  by  a  magistrate to the  court  of  Sessions.   The principal question which fell for decision at his trial  was whether  it could be said that he was in possession  of  the articles found from the almirah, as contemplated by s. 25 of the  Arms Act.  After discussing the evidence and the  legal position  on the question of presumption of  conscious  pos-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

session  in  circumstances  like the  present,  the  learned Additional Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that  these articles  were in the appellant’s conscious possession.   No licence  or permit for these articles having been  produced, the  appellant  was convicted both under s.  25(1)  (a)  and under s. 27 of the Arms Act.  Under s. 27 of the Arms Act no separate  sentence was considered necessary but under s.  25 (1)  (a) he was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment  for  two years. It may incidentally be mentioned that in the trial court  on behalf  of the appellant the legality of  the  investigation into  the  offence in question was also assailed,  it  being further contended that the S.I. K. D. Chakravarty,  Officer- in-charge  of  Hirapur police station was not  empowered  to investigate  the case.  As these questions are not  agitated in this Court, we need say nothing on those points. Against  his conviction the appellant appealed to  the  High Court  under s. 410, Cr-P.C. but this appeal  was  dismissed summarily on June 24, 1969 without indicating any reasons in support of the order of summary dismissal. 64 Before  us on behalf of the appellant it was contended  that the order of summary dismissal by the High Court is contrary to  the  consistent  view taken by this  Court  in  numerous decisions  where  it has been firmly laid down  that  if  an appeal  raises arguable points of fact or law, then,  it  is undesirable  and  improper to dismiss it  summarily  without indicating, at least broadly the reasons for such dismissal. In  this case, according to the submission, the question  of the  conscious possession of the articles, on the facts  and circumstances  of this case. was of considerable  importance and it required scrutiny of the evidence on the record.  The appeal  also  raised some other questions  relating  to  the alleged  infirmities  in  the search  conducted  during  the investigation.    Indeed,  according  to   the   appellant’s counsel,  there  were nearly ten grounds of  appeal  in  the memorandum which suggest that the question of the  conscious possession  of  these  articles clearly  required  a  closer scrutiny of the evidence in the case. In  our view, there is force in the appellant’s  contention. Beginning with the decision in Mushtak Hussein v.  The State of  Bombay(1) this Court has, in numerous cases,  emphasised the extreme desirability of indicating, however broadly, the reasons  which  prevail with the High  Court  in  dismissing summarily  an  appeal in which questions of act or  law  are raised,   which   do not  seem  to   be   unarguable   or insubstantial.   This,  however,  does  not  mean  that  the statute does not empower the High Court to dismiss an appeal in limine where in its opinion there is no substance in  the appeal.   The  latest decision of this Court  was  given  on March  13, 1973 in Mustaq Ahmed Mohamed Hussain and  Mukhtar Hussain Ali Hussain v. The State of Gujarat(2) in which some of  the previous decisions of this Court on this point  have been digested.  In arguable cases not only would the reasons recorded  by  the  High Court be helpful to  this  Court  in better understanding and appreciating the High Court’s  line of  approach, but it would also serve to assure the  accused that the arguable points in his appeal were properly  argued and  duly  considered  by the High  Court.   This  assurance cannot be considered to be without importance and value. The  question, however, arises whether it is  desirable  and necessary  in  the larger interest of justice  to  send  the present  case back to the High Court for re-decision  or  it would  be  more conducive to the cause of ’justice  that  we ourselves  examine  the evidence and dispose of  the  appeal

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

finally  without further prolonging the proceedings  against the  appellant.  It may be pointed out that the recovery  of the  articles in question was effected as far back  as  May, 1968  and the appellant’s conviction by the trial  court  is dated June 16, 1969.  The High Court dismissed his appeal on June  24,  1969, land this Court granted  special  leave  on January  8,  1970 when the appellant was released  on  bail. More  than  3  years have now elapsed  since  the  grant  of special  leave  and  the appellant’s release  on  bail.   We consider  it  would  be  highly unfair  and  unjust  to  the appellant  to prolong the uncertainty of the final  fate  of this  case  by sending it back to the High Court  for  final disposal of the appeal after rehearing.  We have. therefore, undertaken  to examine the evidence ourselves  because  that would  guarantee  speedy disposal of the  case  against  the appellant.  We may in this con- (1) (1953) S.C.R. 806. (2) Crl.  A. No. 9 of 1973 decided on 13-3-73. 65 nection point out that undue delay in the final disposal  of criminal  cases  tends, to some extent, to defeat  the  very purpose  of criminal justice.  Speedy disposal  of  criminal cases for commission of offences promotes confidence of  the society  in the administration of criminal justice which  is essential  for  sustaining  the  faith  of  the  law-abiding members  of the society in the effectiveness of the rule  of law.   It also saves the accused from  avoidable  harassment inherent in unreasonably prolonged trials and appeals. After  having been taken through the evidence, we find  that the  testimony of K. P. Choudhary, P.W.1 that the  appellant had  produced the key of the almirah in question and  handed it over to the witness who opened the almirah with that  key is  trust-worthy and no infirmity is found in his  evidence. The evidence of Dharmadas Thakur, P.W.2, fully supports  the evidence  of P.W.1 on this point.  So does the  evidence  of Santosh  Lal  Routh,  P.W.4. No doubt P.W.1  and  P.W.4  are police  officers, but P.W.2 is an employee of Indian Iron  & Steel  Company Ltd.  The appellant worked in the  department of  P.W.  2.  Now once it is held  that  the  appellant  had produced the key of the almirah the presumption arises  that the  arms found in that almirah were in his possession.   No doubt,  there were certain articles belonging to women,  but that  is  immaterial.  It is not the appellant’s  case  that this key used to be taken by the other members of his family who used to place their articles in this almirah without the appellant’s  knowledge  and  that  anyone  of  them   might, therefore, have Placed the arms in question in that  almirah without  his knowledge.  In fact, the appellant has  on  the other hand, completely denied the recovery of these articles from the almirah.  His plea is not wholly irrelevant and can certainly be taken. into consideration. On the evidence on the record, therefore, it is not possible to  hold that the existence of the arms in the almirah  were without the appellant’s knowledge or that his possession  of the arms was unconscious.  Ms conviction under S. 25(1)  (a) of  the Arms Act, 1969 is, therefore,. fully justified.   It is, however, difficult to sustain his conviction under s. 27 of  the  Arms  Act.  There is no  evidence  to  support  the offence  under that section and indeed the trial  court  has convicted  him  without properly applying its  mind  to  the ingredients  of  that offence.  The. judgment of  the  trial court  seems  to suggest that mere possession  of  the  arms would  also  constitute an offence under S. 27 of  the  Arms Act.   This  view  is clearly not  correct.   But  since  no separate sentence was imposed under S. 27, it is unnecessary

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

to say anything more about it than that the conviction under S. 27 must be quashed. The  question,  however, arises as to what sentence  in  the circumstances  of the case would meet the ends  of  justice. As already observed, the offence was committed in May,  1968 and  the appellant was convicted in June, 1969.  We are  now in April, 1973.  The possession of the arms in question  has not  been  shown  to be inspired by  any  sinister  purpose. There  is no evidence of any undesirable antecedents of  the appellant,  nor is there any suggestion that the  arms  were likely  to  be  used for  some  antisocial  purpose.   Their possession by the appellant might well have been intended to be utilized for the purpose 944 Sup.  CI/73 66 of  self-defence,  though  undoubtedly  the  possession  was without  a  proper licence.  Considering  all  the  relevant circumstances  of the case, we feel that it would  meet  the ends  of justice-if the sentence of imprisonment is  reduced to  that  already undergone and a sentence of fine  of  P.s. 5001’-  is  in  addition imposed on  the  appellant  and  in default  of  payment of fine, the appellant is  directed  to serve a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one month.  We order accordingly. The appeal succeeds in part to the extent just stated. V.P.S.                            Appeal partly allowed. 67