REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3604   OF 2009 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 14187 of 2007]

Mahender Pal & Others …Appellants

Versus

State of Haryana & Others …Respondents

J U D G M E N T  

S.B. SINHA, J:   

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 10.05.2007  

passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at  Chandigarh in Civil  

Writ Petition No. 7008 of 2007.

3. On  or  about  6.01.2006,  a  notification  under  Section  4  read  with  

Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) was  

issued for acquisition of the land in question for an alleged public purpose,

viz., for the development and utilization of land for residential/ commercial  

purpose.  A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 9.08.2006.

4. A  writ  petition  was  filed  by  the  appellants  challenging  these  

notifications which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh  

one on the same cause of action.  

5. On 14.11.2006, the government issued a notification under Section 4  

read with Section 17(4) of the Act and on 15.11.2006 as also a declaration  

under Section 6 of the Act, for acquiring the land for public purpose, viz.,  

for the development and utilization of land for outer ring road, green belt on  

both side, Pataudi Road to Jhajjar Road in the area of village Gokalgarh,  

District Rewari.

6. Appellants’ land was being  used for residential purposes and which  

also has the Samadhis of the ancestors of the appellants and a Shiva temple.  

The revenue records confirm the existence of these pucca constructions.

7. On 14.03.2007, notices were issued to the appellants under Section 9  

of the Act.  Appellants filed objections thereto on 29.03.2007.

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8. A writ petition was filed by the appellants, which was dismissed in  

limine by reason of the impugned judgment.

9. Appellants are, thus, before us.

10. The principal question which arises for consideration in this appeal is  

as  to  whether  in  the  facts  and circumstances  of  this  case  the  emergency  

powers in terms of Section 17 of the Act could have been resorted to by the  

State.

11. The  Act  has  been  enacted  for  the  acquisition  of  land  for  public  

purposes and for Companies.  Having regard to the provisions contained in  

Article 300A of the Constitution of India as also the provisions of Act, the  

State in exercise of its power of ‘eminent domain’ may deprive a person of  

his  right  to  a  property  only  when  there  exists  a  public  purpose  and  a  

reasonable amount by way of compensation is offered for acquisition of his  

land.  The Act fulfills the aforementioned criteria.  It, however, lays down  

the details procedures therefor.  It is also of some significance to notice that  

the  Parliament,  by  reason  of  the  Act,  has  imposed  further  restrictions/  

conditions for acquisition of land for the benefit of the land-owner.

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12. Right to file objection and hearing thereof to a notification issued by  

the appropriate government expressing its intention to acquire a property is a  

valuable right.  Such a valuable right of hearing and particularly in a case of  

this  nature  could  have been taken  away only  if  conditions  precedent  for  

exercise of this emergency power stood satisfied.  Sub-section (4) of Section  

17 of the Act is an exception to Section 5A of the Act.

An opinion of the government in this behalf is required to be formed  

if there exists an emergency.  Existence of the foundational fact for invoking  

the aforementioned provision is, therefore, a sine qua non for formation of  

opinion.   Such  an  subjective  satisfaction  must  be  based  on  an  objective  

criteria.   Ipse dixit on the part  of the State would not serve the purpose.  

Appellants,  in our opinion, had made out a case for examination of their  

cases in details.  The nature of constructions and other features of the land  

sought to be acquired have been noticed by us hereinbefore.   

13. The purported public purpose for which the land is to be acquired is  

for laying down a road.

We are not unmindful of the fact that the road connection is one of the  

purposes mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act in respect  

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whereof Sub-section (4) thereof would apply.  But the same would not mean  

that for the purpose of road connection irrespective of the nature of cases  

and/ or irrespective of the nature of the road to be constructed; Sub-section  

(4) of Section 17 of the Act could be invoked.

14. As an extraordinary power has been conferred upon the Appropriate  

Government in terms whereof the normal procedure laid down under Section  

5A of the  Act could be dispensed with,  the High Court,  in  our  opinion,  

should  have  entered  into  the  merit  of  the  matter.  [See  Mahadevappa  

Lachappa Kinagi and Others v.  State of Karnataka and Others (2008) 12  

SCC 418]

In Union of India and Others v. Mukesh Hans [(2004) 8 SCC 14], this  

Court held:

“32. A careful perusal of this provision which is  an  exception  to  the  normal  mode  of  acquisition  contemplated  under  the  Act  shows  that  mere  existence  of  urgency  or  unforeseen  emergency  though  is  a  condition  precedent  for  invoking  Section  17(4),  that  by  itself  is  not  sufficient  to  direct the dispensation of the Section 5-A inquiry.  It  requires  an  opinion  to  be  formed  by  the  Government  concerned  that  along  with  the  existence  of  such  urgency  or  unforeseen  emergency there is also a need for dispensing with  Section  5-A  inquiry  which  indicates  that  the  

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legislature intended the appropriate Government to  apply its mind before dispensing with Section 5-A  inquiry. It also indicates that mere existence of an  urgency  under  Section  17(1)  or  unforeseen  emergency under Section 17(2) would not by itself  be  sufficient  for  dispensing  with  Section  5-A  inquiry.  If  that  was  not  the  intention  of  the  legislature then the latter part of sub-section (4) of  Section 17 would not have been necessary and the  legislature  in  Sections  17(1)  and (2)  itself  could  have  incorporated  that  in  such  situation  of  existence  of  urgency  or  unforeseen  emergency  automatically  Section  5-A  inquiry  will  be  dispensed with. But then that is not the language of  the  section  which  in  our  opinion  requires  the  appropriate  Government  to  further  consider  the  need for  dispensing with  Section 5-A inquiry  in  spite  of  the  existence  of  unforeseen  emergency.  This understanding of ours as to the requirement of  an  application  of  mind  by  the  appropriate  Government  while  dispensing  with  Section  5-A  inquiry does not mean that in each and every case  when  there  is  an  urgency  contemplated  under  Section  17(1)  and  unforeseen  emergency  contemplated  under  Section  17(2)  exists  that  by  itself  would  not  contain  the  need  for  dispensing  with Section 5-A inquiry. It is possible in a given  case  the  urgency  noticed  by  the  appropriate  Government under Section 17(1) or the unforeseen  emergency under  Section  17(2)  itself  may be  of  such degree  that  it  could require  the  appropriate  Government on that very basis to dispense with the  inquiry under Section 5-A but then there is a need  for  application  of  mind  by  the  appropriate  Government that such an urgency for dispensation  of the Section 5-A inquiry is inherent in the two  types  of  urgencies  contemplated  under  Sections  17(1) and (2) of the Act.”

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15. In  Union  of  India  and  Others v.  Krishan  Lal  Arneja  and  Others  

[(2004) 8 SCC 453], this Court held:

“16. Section  17 confers extraordinary powers on  the authorities under which it can dispense with the  normal procedure laid down under Section  5A of  the  Act  in  exceptional  case  of  urgency.  Such  powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case  of real urgency enabling the Government to take  immediate possession of the land proposed to be  acquired  for  public  purpose.  A  public  purpose,  however,  laudable  it  may  be,  by  itself  is  not  sufficient  to  take  aid  of  Section  17 to  use  this  extraordinary power as use of such power deprives  a land owner of his right in relation to immoveable  property  to  file  objections  for  the  proposed  acquisition and it also dispenses with the inquiry  under Section  5A of the Act. The Authority must  have  subjective  satisfaction  of  the  need  for  invoking urgency clause under Section 17 keeping  in  mind  the  nature  of  the  public  purpose,  real  urgency that  the  situation demands and the  time  factor  i.e.  whether  taking  possession  of  the  property  can  wait  for  a  minimum  period  within  which the objections  could be received from the  land owners and the inquiry under Section  5A of  the  Act  could  be  completed.  In  other  words,  if  power under Section  17 is not exercised, the very  purpose  for  which  the  land  is  being  acquired  urgently would be frustrated or defeated. Normally  urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does  not  arise  suddenly  or  overnight  but  sometimes  such  urgency  may  arise  unexpectedly,  exceptionally  or  extraordinarily  depending  on  situations such as due to earthquake, flood or some  specific  time-bound  project  where  the  delay  is  

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likely  to  render  the  purpose  nugatory  or  infructuous. A citizen's property can be acquired in  accordance with law but in the absence of real and  genuine  urgency,  it  may  not  be  appropriate  to  deprive  an  aggrieved  party  of  a  fair  and  just  opportunity of putting forth its objections for due  consideration  of  the  acquiring  authority.  While  applying  the  urgency  clause,  the  State  should  indeed  act  with  due  care  and  responsibility.  Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or  support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on  the part of the State Administration.”  

16. It is a well-settled principle of law that an exception carved out from  

the main provision as a result whereof a citizen of India may be deprived of  

his property particularly having regard to the fact that if it is considered to be  

a  human  right,  procedural  safeguards  laid  down  therefor  must  be  

scrupulously complied with.  It being an expropriatory legislation deserves  

strict construction.  {See Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur  

Chenai and Others [(2005) 7 SCC 627]; Devinder Singh and Others v. State  

of Punjab and Others [(2008) 1 SCC 728]; and  City Montessori School v.  

State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [2009 (2) SCALE 740]}.

17. For the reasons aforementioned,  the  impugned judgment cannot  be  

sustained which is set aside accordingly and the matter is remitted to the  

High Court for consideration of the matter afresh on merit.

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18. Mr. T.V. George, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State,  

submits that  counter-affidavit  before the High Court shall  be filed within  

four weeks.  The State may also produce the records before the High Court  

so  as  to  enable  it  to  arrive  at  a  satisfaction  that,  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances  of  this  case,  the  emergency  power  of  the  appropriate  

government could be resorted to.  We request the High Court to consider the  

desirability of disposing of the matter expeditiously.   

19.  The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions with costs.  

Counsel’s fee assessed at Rs.10,000/-.

………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

..…………………………J.     [Asok Kumar Ganguly]

NEW DELHI; MAY 15, 2009

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