REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2050 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.15458 of 2007)

Maharashtra University of Health  Sciences & others        ..Appellant(s)

Versus  

Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal & others  ..Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Maharashtra  University  of  Health  Sciences  

through  its  Registrar  and  its  Grievance  

Committee and Management Council as appellants  

impugn the judgment dated 8.6.07 rendered by the  

Nagpur  Bench  of  Bombay  High  Court  on  several  

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writ petitions filed by the Management Council  

and the employees.  

3. The basic facts of the case are as under:

The appellant No.1, the Maharashtra University  

of  Health  Sciences  has  been  constituted  under  

Maharashtra University of Health Sciences Act, 1998  

(for short ‘the said Act’).  The 2nd appellant is the  

Committee constituted under Section 53 of the said  

Act and the 3rd appellant is the Management Council of  

the  appellant  No.1  and  also  constituted  under  the  

said Act.   

4. The 1st respondent in this appeal is a public  

trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust  

Act,  1950  and  the  said  trust  runs  several  

colleges  including  the  2nd respondent.  The  3rd  

respondent is the Principal of the said college  

and  the  4th respondent  is  a  Lecturer  therein.  

Both the 5th and 6th respondents were appointed  

Lecturers  in  the  said  college  but  their  

appointments  were  not  approved  but  they  

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continued  to  work  as  lecturers  in  the  said  

college.    

5. On 7.8.05 a representation was made by the 5th  

respondent  to  the  effect  that  after  she  had  

served the said college for the last three and a  

half year suddenly she was informed on 6.8.05  

that  the  college  authorities  accepted  her  

resignation.  That was shocking to her since the  

5th respondent  could  never  resign  as  she  had  

several liabilities and had no other income. The  

education of her two children had to be looked  

after while her husband was disabled in view of  

an accident and her father-in-law was a retired  

person.  In  her  representation  to  the  Vice  

Chancellor  of  the  appellant-University  she  

stated  that  at  the  time  of  her  appointment,  

college  authorities  took  her  signature  on  a  

resignation letter without mentioning any date  

and that might have been used to remove her from  

the college.  The University on receipt of the  

said representation sent a letter to the said  

college on 19th August, 2005 for its explanation  

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and  explanation  was  submitted  by  the  said  

college on 31.08.05.

6. Thereafter,  the  appellant-University  formed  a  

Committee to look into the grievance of the 5th  

respondent and the said Committee after visiting  

the  college  and  conducting  an  enquiry  on  

29.08.05,  01.09.05  and  02.09.05  submitted  its  

report to the appellant-University.

7. Again on 09.09.05, the 5th respondent submitted  

another  representation  to  the  Grievance  

Committee of the appellant-University which was  

also  forwarded  to  the  said  college  for  its  

response. That was submitted by the said college  

on  04.10.05  and  08.11.05.   Thereafter,  the  

appellant-University  gave  the  5th respondent  a  

hearing in respect of her complaint which she  

raised in her representation.  The said meeting  

was held before the Grievance Committee and the  

Grievance  Committee  gave  a  detailed  report  on  

the basis of its enquiry.  Before the report was  

given, the 5th respondent and the person against  

whom  complaint  was  lodged  were  examined  along  

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with some witnesses. Thereafter, the Grievance  

Committee took a decision to refer the matter to  

the  State  Commission  for  Women  for  further  

investigation and it was decided that the report  

of the said Commission was to be considered in  

the next meeting of the Committee.

8. Thereafter,  on  18th January,  2006  the  6th  

respondent lodged a further complaint with the  

police station Sadar against the 4th respondent  

as a result of which offence punishable under  

Section 509 of I.P.C was registered against the  

4th respondent  and  the  Summary  Criminal  Case  

No.4332/06  was  registered  in  the  Court  of  

J.M.F.C.,  Nagpur.  On  19.01.06,  5th respondent  

also lodged report with the police station and  

on the basis of the said report an offence came  

to be registered on 04.02.06 vide Crime No.22/06  

under Sections 468, 471, 354, 509, 506 read with  

Section  34  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code.   In  

connection with the aforesaid criminal case, the  

3rd and  4th respondents  were  arrested  by  the  

police on 05.02.06 and were remanded to police  

custody for two days.  They were granted bail by  

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the Court of J.M.F.C., Nagpur on 08.02.06.  The  

Principal  of  the  college  was  also  granted  

anticipatory  bail  on  06.02.06  and  which  order  

was subsequently confirmed on 23.02.06.

9. Then  on  18.02.06,  the  services  of  the  6th  

respondent were terminated by the said college.

10. In view of the complaint of the 6th respondent,  

the  University  called  the  1st,  2nd and  4th  

respondents for hearing on 08.03.06 before the  

Grievance  Committee  and  on  04.03.06  the  6th  

respondent  sent  a  complaint  to  the  appellant-

University  seeking  action  against  the  

respondents.   In  that  complaint  the  6th  

respondent  gave  details  of  ill-treatment  and  

sexual  harassment  which  she  and  other  lady  

lecturers and employees of the college including  

the  5th respondent  were  subjected  to  by  the  

authorities of the said college.  In view of  

such complaints, the Grievance Committee of the  

University met on 8th March, 2006 to consider the  

issues in the light of complaints received by  

the  6th respondent  against  the  college  

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authorities.  Pursuant  to  the  meeting  of  the  

Grievance  Committee,  the  University  by  its  

communication dated 21st March, 2006 directed the  

1st and 2nd respondents to take steps against the  

3rd  and  4th respondents  with  a  direction  to  

suspend them and it was also directed that the  

5th respondent may be reinstated.  It was also  

directed that approval granted in respect of the  

service of 3rd and 4th respondent be frozen. A  

reply was sent by the 1st respondent to the order  

of  the  appellant-University  dated  21.03.06.  

Thereafter,  the  appellant-University  further  

informed  the  college  authorities  that  the  

decision to freeze the approval of the 3rd and 4th  

respondents  was  taken  under  the  provision  of  

Clause 25.2 of the University Direction No.25/01  

and it was done in accordance with Section 16  

(8) of the said Act. The governing body of the  

respondent  college  in  its  meeting  held  on  

27.03.06  refused  to  comply  with  the  direction  

issued by the University by its letter dated 21st  

March, 2006 and this fact was communicated to  

the appellant by the said college.  On 1st April  

2006,  the  1st and  2nd respondents  addressed  a  

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letter of the same date and contended therein  

that the appellant-University does not have the  

power to freeze the approval of appointment of  

permanent  teachers  like  the  3rd and  4th  

respondents  and  the  appellant  was  asked  to  

withdraw  its  communication  dated  29th March,  

2006.

11. Assailing those communications dated 21st March,  

2006 and 29th March, 2006 of the appellants, the  

respondents  namely,  the  Trust,  the  College  

Authorities and those two teachers filed a writ  

petition being 1976/06 contending therein that  

the  appellant-University  has  no  authority  to  

issue those communications. That writ proceeding  

was heard on contest by the Hon’ble High Court.  

12. By  the  impugned  judgment  dated  08.06.07,  the  

Hon’ble  High  Court  partly  allowed  the  writ  

petition and quashed the orders passed by the  

University  in  respect  of  action  taken  against  

those  respondents  on  the  basis  of  the  

allegations of 5th and 6th respondent of sexual  

harassment at the work place.

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13. Challenging  the  said  judgment,  this  Court  has  

been moved.   

14. The main question on which the matter was argued  

by the appellants was that the High Court was in  

error in deciding that the Grievance Committee  

constituted under Section 53 of the said Act,  

has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any  

complaint filed by the 5th and 6th respondent, as  

they are not approved teachers of the respondent  

college.   

15. In order to appreciate the legal issues involved  

in this argument, it is better to set out the  

definition of ‘teacher’ under Section 2(35) of  

the said Act.  Section 2(35) of the said Act  

runs as under:-

“2(35) “teachers” means full time approved  Demonstrators,  Tutors,  Assistant  Lecturers,  Lecturers,  Readers,  Associate  Professors,  Professors  and  other  persons  teaching  or  giving  instructions  on  full  time  basis  in  affiliated colleges or approved institutions  in the university;”

16. Section 53 of the said Act  provides as follows:

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“53. (1) There shall be a Grievances Committee  in the University to deal with the grievances  of  teachers  and  other  employees  of  the  University,  Colleges,  institutions  and  recognised institutions and to hear and settle  grievances as far as may be practicable within  six months, and the committee shall make a  report to the Management Council.   

(2) It shall be lawful for the Grievances  Committee to entertain and consider grievances  or  complaints  and  report  to  the  Management  Council for taking such action as it deems fit  and the decisions of the Management Council on  such report shall be final.

(3)  The  Grievances  Committee  shall  consist of the following members, namely:

(a) The Pro-Vice Chancellor, - Chairperson (b)  Four  members  of  the  management  

council  nominated  by  the  Management  Council  from amongst themselves     – Members

(c) The Registrar - Member Secretary

(4) The Registrar shall not have a right  to vote.”

17. Construing the aforesaid two Sections, the High  

Court,  following  the  principle  of  “ejusdem  

generis” held that 5th and 6th respondent, being  

unapproved  teachers,  do  not  come  within  the  

definition  of  ‘teachers’  under  Section  2(35)  

quoted above.   

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18. This Court cannot accept the aforesaid decision  

of the High Court for various reasons indicated  

hereinafter.

19. If the definition of teachers, as quoted above,  

is properly perused it would appear that within  

the definition of teachers not only full time  

approved  Demonstrators,  Tutors,  Assistant  

Lecturers, etc., are included but the definition  

is  wide  enough  to  include  “and  other  persons  

teaching  or  giving  instructions  on  full  time  

basis  in  affiliated  colleges  or  approved  

institutions in the university.”  Similarly, the  

Grievance Committee which is established under  

Section 53 of the said Act has also been given  

wide powers to deal with not only the grievances  

of teachers but also of other employees of the  

University, college, institution and to settle  

their grievances as far as may be practicable  

within a certain time-frame.  Sub-section (2) of  

Section  53  of  the  said  Act  provides  for  

consequential  steps  which  the  Grievance  

Committee  may  take  after  entertaining  the  

grievances of the category of persons named in  

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Section 53(1).  Section 53(3) provides for the  

constitution  of  the  Grievance  Committee  and  

Section 53(4) is procedural in nature.   

20. On  a  combined  reading  of  Section  2(35)  with  

Section 53 of the said Act, this Court is of the  

opinion that in respect of unapproved teachers  

also Grievance Committee has the jurisdiction to  

entertain complaint and undertake the statutory  

exercise conferred on it under Section 53 of the  

said Act.

21. The definition of teachers under Section 2(35)  

is  wide  enough  to  include  even  unapproved  

teacher.  In fact the said definition has two  

parts,  the  first  part  deals  with  full  time  

approved  Demonstrators,  Tutors,  Assistant  

Lecturers,  Lecturers  etc.  and  the  second  part  

deals  with  other  persons teaching  or  giving  

instructions  on  full  time  basis  in  affiliated  

colleges  or  approved  institutions  in  the  

University.

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22. Even  though  the  approved  teachers  and  those  

‘other  persons’  who  are  teaching  and  giving  

instructions fall in two different classes both  

are encompassed with the definition of teacher  

under Section 2(35) of the Act. The word ‘and’  

before  ‘other  persons’  is  disjunctive  and  

indicate a different class of people.   

23. A class is a conceptual creation taking within  

its  fold  numerous  categories  of  persons  with  

similar characteristics. Here in the  group of  

‘other  persons’  fall  those  who,  on  full  time  

basis,  are  teaching  or  giving  instructions  in  

colleges affiliated with the University and they  

are also teachers even if they are unapproved.  

This seems to be the purport of Section 2(35) of  

the Act.  

24. It cannot be disputed that 5th and 6th respondent  

were engaged in teaching on full time basis in  

the respondent college, which is an affiliated  

college of the appellant-University.   

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25. This Court is constrained to observe that the  

Hon’ble High Court has not properly appreciated  

the  principle  of  ejusdem  generis in  

understanding  the  scope  of  Section  2(35)  read  

with Section 53 of the Act.   

26. The  Latin  expression  “ejusdem  generis”  which  

means  “of  the  same  kind  or  nature”  is  a  

principle of construction, meaning thereby when  

general words in a statutory text are flanked by  

restricted  words,  the  meaning  of  the  general  

words are taken to be restricted by implication  

with the meaning of restricted words.  This is a  

principle  which  arises  “from  the  linguistic  

implication  by  which  words  having  literally  a  

wide  meaning  (when  taken  in  isolation)  are  

treated  as  reduced  in  scope  by  the  verbal  

context.”  It may be regarded as an instance of  

ellipsis,  or  reliance  on  implication.   This  

principle is presumed to apply unless there is  

some  contrary  indication  (See  Glanville  

Williams, ‘The Origins and Logical Implications  

of the Ejusdem Generis Rule’ 7 Conv (NS) 119).

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27. This ejusdem generis principle is a facet of the  

principle of Noscitur a sociis. The Latin maxim  

Noscitur a sociis contemplates that a statutory  

term is recognised by its associated words.  The  

Latin word ‘sociis’ means ‘society’.  Therefore,  

when general words are juxtaposed with specific  

words,  general  words  cannot  be  read  in  

isolation. Their colour and their contents are  

to be derived from their context [See similar  

observations  of  Viscount  Simonds  in  Attorney  General v.  Prince  Ernest  Augustus  of  Hanover,  (1957) AC 436 at 461 of the report]

28. But  like  all  other  linguistic  canons  of  

construction,  the  ejusdem  generis principle  

applies only when a contrary intention does not  

appear.  In instant case, a contrary intention  

is clearly indicated inasmuch as the definition  

of ‘teachers’ under Section 2(35) of the said  

Act, as pointed out above, is in two parts.  The  

first part deals with enumerated categories but  

the second part which begins by the expression  

“and  other”  envisages  a  different  category  of  

persons.  Here ‘and’ is disjunctive. So, while  

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construing  such  a  definition  the  principle  of  

ejusdem generis cannot be applied.   

29. In this context, we should do well to remember  

the caution sounded by Lord Scarman in Quazi v.  Quazi – [(1979) 3 All-England Reports 897].  At  page 916 of the report, the learned Law Lord  

made this pertinent observation:-  

“If the legislative purpose of a statute  is such that a statutory series should be  read ejusdem generis, so be it; the rule  is helpful.  But, if it is not, the rule  is more likely to defeat than to fulfil  the purpose of the statute.  The rule,  like  many  other  rules  of  statutory  interpretation, is a useful servant but a  bad master.”

30. This  Court  while  construing  the  principle  of  

ejusdem generis laid down similar principles in  

the case of K.K. Kochuni v. State of Madras and  Kerala,  [AIR  1960  SC  1080].   A  Constitution  Bench of this Court in Kochuni (supra) speaking  through Justice Subba Rao (as His Lordship then  

was) at paragraph 50 at page 1103 of the report  

opined:-

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“...The rule is that when general words  follow particular and specific words of  the same nature, the general words must  be  confined  to  the  things  of  the  same  kind  as  those  specified.   But  it  is  clearly laid down by decided cases that  the specific words must form a distinct  genus  or  category.   It  is  not  an  inviolable  rule  of  law,  but  is  only  permissible inference  in the absence of  an indication to the contrary.”

(Emphasis supplied)

31. Again this Court in another Constitution Bench  

decision in the case of Amar Chandra Chakraborty  v.  The Collector of Excise, Govt. of Tripura,  Agartala and others, AIR 1972 SC 1863, speaking  through  Justice  Dua,  reiterated  the  same  

principles in paragraph 9, at page 1868 of the  

report.  On the principle of  ejusdem generis,  

the learned Judge observed as follows:-

“…The  ejusdem  generis  rule  strives  to  reconcile  the  incompatibility  between  specific  and  general  words.   This  doctrine  applies  when  (i)  the  statute  contains  an  enumeration  of  specific  words;  (ii)  the  subjects  of  the  enumeration  constitute  a  class  or  category; (iii) that class or category is  not  exhausted  by  the  enumeration;  (iv)  the general term follows the enumeration;  and  (v)  there  is  no  indication  of  a  different legislative intent.”

(Emphasis supplied)

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32. As noted above, in the instant case, there is a  

statutory  indication  to  the  contrary.  

Therefore, where there is statutory indication  

to the contrary the definition of teacher under  

Section 2(35) cannot be read on the basis of  

ejusdem  generis nor  can  the  definition  be  

confined to only approved teachers.  If that is  

done, then a substantial part of the definition  

under  Section  2(35)  would  become  redundant.  

That is against the very essence of the doctrine  

of  ejusdem  generis.   The  purpose  of  this  

doctrine  is  to  reconcile  any  incompatibility  

between specific and general words so that all  

words in a Statute can be given effect and no  

word  becomes  superfluous  (See  Sutherland:  

Statutory  Construction,  5th Edition,  page  189,  

Volume 2A).

33. It  is  also  one  of  the  cardinal  canons  of  

construction that no Statute can be interpreted  

in such a way as to render a part of it otiose.  

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34. It  is,  therefore,  clear  where  there  is  a  

different legislative intent, as in this case,  

the  principle  of  ejusdem  generis cannot  be  

applied  to  make  a  part  of  the  definition  

completely redundant.   

35. By  giving  such  a  narrow  and  truncated  

interpretation  of  ‘teachers’  under  Section  

2(35), High court has not only ignored a part of  

Section  2(35)  but  it  has  also  unfortunately  

given  an  interpretation  which  is  incompatible  

with the avowed purpose of Section 53 of the  

Act.

36. The  purpose  of  setting  up  the  Grievance  

Committee  under  Section  53  of  the  Act  is  to  

provide an effective grievance redressal forum  

to  teachers  and  other  employees.  Any  

interpretation of ‘teachers’ under Section 2(35)  

of  the  Act  which  denies  the  persons  covered  

under Section 2(35) an access to the said forum  

completely  nullifies  the  dominant  purpose  of  

creating such a forum.  It goes without saying  

that unapproved teachers need the protection of  

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this forum more than the approved teachers.  By  

creating such a forum the University virtually  

exercised  its  authority  and  jurisdiction  as  a  

loco-parentis  over  teachers-both  approved  and  

unapproved  and  who  are  working  in  various  

colleges affiliated with it. The idea is to give  

such teachers and employees a protection against  

any kind of harassment which they might receive  

in their work place.  The creation of such a  

forum is in tune with protecting the ‘dignity of  

the  individual’  which  is  one  of  the  core  

constitutional concepts.   

37. Therefore,  the  doctrine  of  ejusdem  generis  

cannot be pressed into service to defeat this  

dominant statutory purpose.  In this context we  

may  usefully  recall  the  observations  of  the  

Supreme  Court  of  United  States  in  Guy  T.  Helvering v.  Stockholms  Enskilda  Bank,  293  US  84, 88-89, 79 L Ed 211, 55 S Ct 50, 52 (1934),  

as under:-

“while the rule is a well-established and  useful one, it is, like other canons of  statutory  construction,  only  an  aid  to  

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the ascertainment of the true meaning of  the  statute.   It  is  neither  final  nor  exclusive.  To ascertain the meaning of  the  words  of  a  statute,  they  may  be  submitted to the test of all appropriate  canons  of  statutory  construction,  of  which the rule of ejusdem generis is only  one.   If,  upon  a  consideration  of  the  context  and  the  objects  sought  to  be  attained and of the act as a whole, it  adequately appears that the general words  were  not  used  in  the  restricted  sense  suggested  by  the  rule,  we  must  give  effect to the conclusion afforded by the  wider view in order that the will of the  Legislature shall not fail.”  

(Emphasis supplied)

38. Therefore,  with  great  respect,  this  Court  is  

constrained to hold that the Hon’ble High Court  

possibly fell into an error by holding that the  

Grievance  Committee  has  no  jurisdiction  to  

entertain  the  complaints  made  by  5th and  6th  

respondent since they are not approved teachers.  

39. Various other factual aspects were considered by  

the High Court but since the High Court has come  

to a clear erroneous conclusion that Grievance  

Committee  has  no  jurisdiction  in  dealing  with  

the complaint filed by the 5th and 6th respondent,  

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the very basis of the High Court judgment is  

unfortunately flawed and cannot be sustained.   

40. For  the  reasons  aforesaid,  the  appeal  is  

allowed.  The judgment of the High Court is set  

aside.   

41. The High court shall now dispose of the writ  

petition filed before it in the light of the  

observations  made  hereinbefore  about  the  

jurisdiction  of  the  Grievance  Committee.  

However,  this  Court  makes  it  clear  that  the  

order of reinstatement made in respect of 5th and  

6th respondent  shall  be  maintained  and  their  

continuity  in  service  cannot  be  disturbed  

without  following  the  provision  of  University  

Acts and Statutes.   

42. The  appeal  is  allowed  with  the  directions  

mentioned hereinabove.  Parties are left to bear  

their own costs.       

.......................J.

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(G.S SINGHVI)

.......................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi February 25, 2010

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