http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 44  

PETITIONER: MAHARANA SHRI JAYVANTSINGHJI RANMALSINGHJI ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF GUJRAT

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/12/1961

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SARKAR, A.K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1962 AIR  821            1962 SCR  Supl. (2) 411  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1963 SC 864  (30)  RF         1970 SC 564  (43)  F          1971 SC1992  (14)  RF         1977 SC2121  (1)  R          1979 SC1550  (14)

ACT:      Land  Tenure,   Abolition   of-Amendment   of enactment-If creates  a  new  class  of  permanent tenants-Constitutional    validity-If    infringes fundamental rights  of  erstwhile  tenure-holders- Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Bom. LVII of 1958), ss. 3, 4, 6-Constitution of India, Art. 14, 19 (1)(f), 31, 31-A.

HEADNOTE:      The  petitioners,  who  were  tenure-holders, challenged  the  constitutional  validity  of  the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958 and  in particular ss. 3 and 4 read with s. 6 of  that  Act,  as  infringing  their  fundamental rights guaranteed  by Arts.  14, 19  and 31 of the Constitution. Their  case in  brief was that those provisions by making certain non-permanent tenants permanent as  from the  commencement of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949, enabled them to acquire occupancy right by payment of six times the assessment or the rent under s. 5A of that Act instead of  20 times  to 200  times the assessment under  s.   32H  of   the   Bombay   Tenancy   and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, 412 as amended  in  1956,  and  thereby  substantially deprived the petitioners of the rights acquired by them on  the ’tillers’  day, April  1, 1957,  when they ceased  to be  tenure-holders. It  was  urged that the  impugned Act  was a  piece of colourable legislation in  that it had confiscated, under the guise of defining a permanent tenant or changing a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 44  

rule of  evidence, a  large part  of the  purchase price the  petitioners were entitled to from their tenants, and  that the  State Legislature  had not the competence  to enact it as it was not saved by Art. 31A of the Constitution. ^      Held,    (Sarkar    and    Mudholkar,    JJ., dissenting), that ss.3, 4 and 6 of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958, in so far as  they  deemed  some  tenants  as  permanent tenants in  possession of  Taluqudari  land,  were unconstitutional and  void.  Under  the  guise  of changing the  definition of a permanent tenant and changing a  rule of  evidence, they really reduced the  purchase  price  that  the  petitioners  were entitled to  receive under  s. 32H  of the  Bombay Tenancy  and  Agricultural  Lands  Act,  1948,  as amended in 1956, from some of their tenants on the "tillers’ day."      Per Sinha,  C.J., and Das, J.-There can be no doubt that  s. 4  of the  impugned  Act,  properly construed,  created   a  new  class  of  permanent tenants not  contemplated by  s. 83  of the Bombay Land Revenue  Code, 1879,  and not in existence on the ’tillers’ day", and the combined effect of ss. 3, 4  and 6  of the  impugned Act  was that if the tenure holder did not make an application under s. 6 within  six months  from the commencement of the impugned Act for a declaration that a tenant under him was  not a  permanent tenant,  the name of the tenant would  be recorded as a permanent tenant if he fulfilled  the conditions laid down by s. 4 and thereafter he  would be  deemed under s. 3 to be a permanent tenant and under s. 4 all the provisions of the  Taluqdari Abolition  Act 1949, would apply to him.  The result  of this combined effect would be  to  deprive  the  tenure-holder  of  any  real opportunity of contesting the claims of the tenant and deprive  him of  the purchase price prescribed by s.  32H of  the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.      The right  of the  petitioners  to  the  said purchase price  from those  of their  tenants  who were non-permanent  on April  1, 1957, was a right of property  guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (f) and the impugned sections  adversely affected  that  right with retrospective effect Section 6, tested in the light of Art. 19(5), could not be said to impose a reasonable restriction  in  the  interest  of  the general public. 413      Bombay Dyeing  and Manufacturing  Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 1122, applied.      Sri Ram  Ram Narain  Medhi v.  The  State  of Bombay. [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489, referred to.      Article  31A   of  the  Constitution  had  no application.  The  relation  between  the  tenure- holders and  the tenants  had changed from that of landlord and tenant to that of creditor and debtor on April  1, 1957,  and  the  impugned  Act  which affected such  rights, did  not  come  within  the protection of that Article.      In view  of the  true scope and effect of ss. 3, 4 and 6, the impugned Act could not fall within any entry  of List  II or  List III of the Seventh

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 44  

Schedule to  the Constitution  and was  a piece of colourable legislation.      K.C. Gajapati  Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa [1954] S.C.R. 1, referred to.      Per Sarkar  and Mudholkar,  JJ.-Section 4  of the impugned  Act did not expand the definition of a permanent  tenant and  did  not  take  away  any property that  was vested  in the  landlord on the "tillers day".  Nor did it confer any new property on the  tenant. It  only applied  to and rescued a permanent tenant  faced with  the task  of proving the  nature   of  his   tenancy,  by   raising   a presumption of  permanency in  his favour.  If  in fact his  tenancy was  not permanent  and had been extinguished  by   law  but   he  was  tentatively recorded as  permanent, the  landlord could  rebut the presumption  in a proceeding under s. 6 (1) by producing  the  documents  in  his  possession  or otherwise by  showing that  the tenancy was not in fact   permanent    and,   therefore,   had   been extinguished by s. 32(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural   Lands    Act,   1948,   and   claim compensation  or   the  purchase  money  under  s. 32H(1)(II) of  the Act,  that  right  of  his  not having been  affected in  any way  by the impugned Act. If he failed, he would get the purchase price according to  s. 5A of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act,  1949, which  would not  be and was not challenged.      Dhirubha Devisingh  Gohil v. State of Bombay, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 691, referred to.      The impugned  Act dealt  with matters arising out  of  the  relationship  between  landlord  and tenant. Its  provisions were not intended to apply where such  relationship did  not subsist. The Act was,  therefore,  within  the  competence  of  the Legislature under  entry 18  of  List  II  of  the Seventh Schedule  to the Constitution and was thus not a piece of colourable legislation. 414      There was, therefore, no infringement of Art. 31(1) and  the Act  was within  the protection  of Art.   31A    of   the    Constitution   and   its Constitutional Validity  could not  be  challenged under Art. 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.      Held,  further,  that  the  distinction  made between tenure  villages and non-tenure ones was a classification based on the extent of availability of the  material for  raising the inference or the presumption  and   such   classification   had   a reasonable nexus  with the  object  sought  to  be achieved by the Act.      Per Ayyangar,  J.-There was  no basis for the argument that  s. 4  of the  impugned  Act  merely intended  to   provide  a  rule  of  evidence  for determining who was a permanent tenant under s. 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and did not extend the  category of  such tenants. It enacts a positive  rule   of  law  by  which  a  person  in possession of  holding of  a tenure-land  must  be "deemed" to be a permanent tenant on fulfilment of the three  specified conditions.  This is  evident from the  provisions of  s. 6(1) under which every person who satisfied the definition of a permanent tenant under  s. 4  was entitled automatically and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 44  

without applying  for to be entered as a permanent tenant in  the record  of rights  by the Mamlatdar unless the  tenure-holder filed  an  objection  in writing. Obviously such objection could only be on grounds open  to him  under s. 4. Section 4(b) and s.6(1) of the impugned Act had to be read together as forming  an integrated whole. The entire object and purpose  of the  impugned enactment  was  not, therefore,  to   enact  a  rule  of  evidence  for determining who  were permanent  tenants under the pre-existing   law but  to define and create a new class of  permanent tenants  who satisfied s. 4 of the Act.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL, JURISDICTION:  Petition Nos. 120 of 58 etc.      Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.      G. S.  Pathak, J.B.  Dadachanji, S.N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P.L. Vohra, for the petitioners (in Petns. 120 and 147 of 1958).      S. B. Dadachanji, S.N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P.L.  Vohra, for  the petitioner (in Petn. No. 149/58).      J.B. Dadachanji,  S.N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P.L.  Vohra, for  the petitioners  (in  Petns. Nos. 148 and 150/58). 415      C.K. Daphtary,  Solicitor-General  of  India, N.P. Nathwani, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the respondents.      N.P.  Nathwani   and   I.   N.   Shroff   for respondents Nos.  5 and 6 (in Petns. Nos. 120, 148 and 156 of 1958).      1961. December  22.-The Judgment of Sinha, C. J., and  Das, J.,  was delivered  by Das,  J., the judgment  of   Sarkar  and   Mudholkar  JJ.,   was delivered by  Mudholkar,  J.,  and  Ayyangar,  J., delivered a separate judgment.      S. K.  Das, J.-In  these  13  writ  petitions arises a  common  question  of  law,  namely,  the constitutional validity  of some of the provisions of  the   Bombay  Land   Tenure   Abolition   Laws (Amendment) Act,  1958 (Bombay  Act LVII  of 1958) and in  particular, of the provisions contained in ss. 3  and 4  read with  s. 6  thereof.  We  shall hereinafter refer to this Act as the impugned Act, 1958.      Put very briefly, the case of the petitioners is that  as a  result of  the  provisions  of  the impugned Act,  1958, certain non-permanent tenants were deemed  to be  permanent tenants  as from the commencement  of   the  Bombay   Taluqdari  Tenure Abolition Act,  1949 (Bombay  Act LXII  of  1949), hereinafter referred to as the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949  and thereby  became entitled to acquire on payment  of six  times the  assessment  or  six times the  rent instead of at least the minimum of twenty times  the assessment,  the  rights  of  an "occupant" within  the meaning  of s.  5A  of  the Taluqdari Abolition  Act, 1949. This result, it is contended,   has    substantially   deprived   the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 44  

petitioners of  the rights  which they acquired on tillers’ day  (April 1,  1957) by  reason  of  the provisions contained  in s.  32 and other relevant sections of  the Bombay  Tenancy and  Agricultural Lands Act,  1948 (Bombay  Act LXVII  of  1948)  as amended from time to time. It is 416 stated that  this deprivation  has resulted in the violation of  certain fundamental  rights  of  the petitioners, such  as those guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19  and 31  of the  Constitution. On behalf of the petitioners  it has  also been  contended that apart from  the question  of  violation  of  their fundamental rights,  the impugned  Act, 1958  is a piece of  colourable legislation in the sense that under the guise of changing a rule of evidence, it has in effect taken away the petitioners’ property without payment  of compensation  and given  it to another; it  is, therefore, a piece of legislation which does  not come  within any  entry of the two legislative   lists    under   which   the   State Legislature was competent to make laws.      To appreciate  the points urged in support of the petitions  which have all been heard together, it will  be necessary  to consider  the effect and inter-; action  of some  of the provisions of four principal  Acts,   namely,  (1)  the  Bombay  Land Revenue  code   1879  (Bombay   Act  V  of  1879), hereinafter referred  to as  the Revenue Code; (2) the Bombay  Tenancy and  Agricultural  Lands  Act, 1948, as  amended from  time to  time, hereinafter called the  Tenancy Act,  1948; (3)  the Taluqdari Abolition Act  1979; and  (4)  the  impugned  Act, 1958.  We   shall  presently   read  the  relevant provisions of  these Acts. But before we do so, it is necessary  to state  some facts.  The facts are similar,  though   not  the   same,  in   all  the petitions. It  will be  sufficient  to  state  the facts of one of the petitions (Petition no. 120 of 1958) in detail in order to focus attention on the main question  of law  which is  the same  in  all these  petitions   and  which  we  have  indicated briefly in the preceding paragraph.      The  petitioners  are  all  ex-Taluqdars.  In Petition No.  120 of  1958 the  petitioner  was  a Taluqdar of  two estates  known as Sanand and Koth in the Ahmedabad district of the then State of 417 Bombay and  now of the State of Gujarat. These two estates  comprised   24  Taluqdari  villages.  The petitioner was  the absolute proprietor of all the lands comprised  in the  two estates,  subject  to payment of  land revenue  to the State (Government under the  petitioner  there  were  tenants-it  is stated, some  permanent and some non-permanent. In the year  1949, the  Bombay Provincial Legislature enacted the  Taluqdari Abolition  Act, 1949  which came into force on August 15, 1950. As a result of the provisions  of that  Act, the Taluqdari tenure as such was abolished and certain properties, such as, wells, tanks, waste lands, uncultivated lands, etc., were acquired by the State; and the Taluqdar was converted  into mere  "occupant" as defined in the Revenue  Code and  was to  pay land revenue in accordance  with  the  provisions  of  that  Code.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 44  

Section 3  (16) of  the Revenue  code  defined  an "occupant"  as   meaning  "a   holder  in   actual possession  of  unalienated  land,  other  than  a tenant; provided  that where  the holder in actual possession is  a tenant,  the landlord or superior landlord, as  the case  may be, shall be deemed to be the  occupant." In 1955 the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 was amended and s. 5A was inserted. This section, in  effect, gave  a permanent  tenant  in possession of  Taluqdari land  the right to become an occupant  if he  paid six  times the assessment for acquiring  the right  of occupancy.  In  other words, if  a permanent  tenant of  an  ex-Taluqdar paid the  required amount  as stated  in s. 5A, he became an  occupant. himself  in place  of the ex- Taluqdar and  came into  direct relation  with the State in  the matter  of payment  of land revenue, and acquired  all the  rights of an occupant under the Revenue Code. The right which was conferred by s. 5A  was available at first for a limited period only, but  it was  extended till 1962 as stated at the Bar.  It is  necessary to  state now  what  is meant by  "permanent tenant".  Section 16  of  the Taluqdari Abolition 418 Act, 1949  made the provisions of the Revenue Code applicable thereto  and an  attempt  was  made  to harmonize  the   provisions   of   the   Taluqdari Abolition Act,  1949 with  the provisions  of  the Revenue Code; therefore, for understanding what is a "permanent  tenant" we have to go to the Revenue Code, s.  83 whereof,  so far  as it  is relevant, reads as follows:      "83  x    x    x    x    x           And where  by reason of the antiquity of      a tenancy,  no satisfactory  evidence of  its      commencement is forthcoming, and there is not      any  such  evidence  of  the  period  of  its      intended  duration,   if  any,   agreed  upon      between the  landlord and  tenant,  or  those      under whom  they respectively claim title, or      any usage  of the  locality as to duration of      such  tenants,   it  shall,  as  against  the      immediate landlord of the tenant, be presumed      to be  co-extensive with  the duration of the      tenure of  such landlord  and  of  those  who      derive title under him.           And  where   there  is  no  satisfactory      evidence of the capacity in which a person in      possession of  land in  respect of  which  he      renders service  or pays rent to the landlord      received, holds  or retains possession of the      same it  shall be  presumed  that  he  is  in      possession as tenant.           x         x         x         x It will  be noticed that the expression "permanent tenant" does  not occur  in the  section. What  is stated therein  is that  in certain  circumstances the duration of the tenancy of a tenant as against his immediate landlord shall be presumed to be co- extensive with  the duration of the tenure of such landlord. The two circumstances mentioned are, (1) where by reason of the antiquity of the tenancy no satisfactory  evidence   of  its  commencement  is forthcoming,  and  (2)  where  there  is  no  such

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 44  

evidence 419 of the  period of  its intended  duration, if any, agreed upon  between the  landlord and  tenant, or any usage  of the  locality as  to duration of the tenancy. Some  time later,  by Bombay Act, XIII of 1956, the  definition of  a "permanent tenant" was inserted in  s. 2(10A)  of the  Tenancy Act, 1948. That definition was in these terms:           "‘permanent tenant’ means a person-           (a)  who    immediately    before    the      commencement  of   the  Bombay   Tenancy  and      Agricultural  Lands   (Amendment)  Act,  1955      (hereinafter  called   ‘the   Amending   Act,      1955’)-                (i) holds  land  as  mulgenidar  or      mirasdar; or                (ii) by custom,  agreement, or  the           decree or  order of  a Court  holds  the           land on lease permanently; or           (b)  the  commencement  or  duration  of      whose tenancy cannot satisfactorily be proved      by reason of antiquity;           and includes  a tenant whose name or the      name of  whose predecessor-in-title  has been      entered in  the record  of rights  or in  any      public record  or in any other revenue record      as a  permanent tenant immediately before the      commencement of the Amending Act, 1955." Section 87A  of the  Tenancy Act, shall, which was also inserted  by Bombay  Act XII of 1956 by s. 47 thereof, said:           "Nothing in  this Act,  shall affect the      provisions  of   any  of   the  Land  Tenures      Abolition Acts,  specified in Schedule III to      this Act, in so far as such provisions relate      to the  conferment of right of An occupant in      favour of  any inferior  holder or  tenant in      respect of any land held by him." 420 In Schedule  III to  the Tenancy  Act,  1948,  was given  a  list  of  Land  Tenures  Abolition  Act, including  the   Taluqdari  Abolition  Act,  1949. Therefore, the effect of s. 87A aforesaid was that nothing in  the Tenancy  Act, 1948,  affected  the provisions of  the Taluqdari  Abolition Act, 1949, in so  far as  the provisions  in  s.  5A  of  the Taluqdari Abolition  Act 1949, conferred the right of an  occupant in favour of a permanent tenant in possession of any taluqdari land on payment of the sums mentioned  therein. The  arguments before  us have proceeded  on the  footing  that  before  the coming into  force of  the impugned Act, 1958, the status of  a permanent tenant in possession of any taluqdari  land   was  to  be  determined  by  the provisions in  s. 83 of the Revenue Code; in other words by  the two  circumstances mentioned in that section.      What was  the position with regard to tenants who were not permanent ? No right was conferred on them by  s. 5A  of the  Taluqrlari Abolition  Act, 1949, which  section was  inserted in  that Act in 1955 by  Bombay Act I of 1955. The rights of these non-permanent tenants were governed by the Tenancy Act,  1948,   which  underwent   some  fundamental

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 44  

changes in 1956 (see Bombay Act XIII of 1956). The changes relevant for our purpose were contained in s. 32  and some  of the  succeeding sections.  The effect of  these sections  was considered  by this court in  Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay  (1).   After  summarising  the  provisions contained in ss. 32 to 32R, this Court said:           "The title  of the  landlord to the land      passes  immediately  to  the  tenant  on  the      tillers’  day   and  there   is  a  completed      purchase  or  sale  thereof  as  between  the      landlord and  the tenant.  The tenant  is  no      doubt given a locus penitentiae and an option      of declaring whether 421 he is  or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. If he fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land, the  Tribunal shall  by an  order in writing declare  that   such  tenant  is  not  willing  to purchase  the   land  and  that  the  purchase  is ineffective. It  is only  by such a declaration by the   Tribunal    that   the    purchase   becomes ineffective. If no such declaration is made by the Tribunal the  purchase would  stand as statutorily effected on  the tillers’ day and will continue to be operative,  the only  obligation on  the tenant then being  the  payment  of  price  in  the  mode determined by  the Tribunal. If the tenant commits default in  the payment  of such  price either  in lump  or  by  instalments  as  determined  by  the Tribunal, s.  32M  declares  the  purchase  to  be ineffective but  in that event the land shall then be at the disposal of the Collector to be disposed of by  him in  the manner  provided therein.  Here also the  purchase continues  to be  effective  as from  the  tillers’  day  until  such  default  is committed  and,   there  is   no  question   of  a conditional purchase  or sale taking place between the landlord  and tenant.  The title  to the  land which was vested originally in the landlord passes to  the   tenant  on   the  tillers’  day  or  the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is  defeasible only  in  the  event  of  the tenant failing  to appear  or making  a  statement that he  is not  willing to  purchase the  land or committing default in payment of the price thereof as determined  by the  Tribunal. The tenant gets a vested interest  in the  land defeasible  only  in either of  those cases  and it cannot therefore be said that  the title  of landlord  to the  land is suspended for any period definite or indefinite." 422 The tillers’  day referred  to above was the first day of  April, 1957. The argument on behalf of the petitioners is  that according  to the decision of this Court,  the title of the petitioners to lands held by  tenants who  were entitled to the benefit of ss. 32 to 32R passed immediately to the tenants on the  tillers’ day  and there  was  a  completed purchase  or   sale   thereof   as   between   the petitioners and  the tenants.  So far as permanent tenants in  possession  of  taluqdari  lands  were concerned, they  were governed  by s.  5A  of  the Taluqdari Abolition  Act, 1949, and nothing in the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 44  

Tenancy Act, 1948, affected their right under that section. But  non-permanent tenants  in possession of taluqdari  lands  became  purchasers  of  their lands on  the tillers’  day with  an obligation to pay the  purchase price mentioned in s. 32H of the Tenancy Act,  1948. Section  32H, in  so far as it bears upon non-permanent tenants, says:           "32H. (1)  Subject to  the additions and      deductions as  provided in  sub-sections (1A)      and  (1B),   the  purchase   price  shall  be      reckoned as follows, namely:-                (i) in  the  case  of  a  permanent tenant                     X         X         X                (ii) in  the case of other tenants,           the  purchase   price   shall   be   the           aggregate of the following amounts, that           is to say,-           (a) such  amounts as  the  Tribunal  may      determine not  being less  than 20  times the      assessment and  not more  than 200  times the      assessment;           (b) the  value of any structures, wells,      and   embankment    constructed   and   other      permanent fixtures  made and trees planted by      the landlord on the land;           (c) the  amount of  the arrears of rent,      if any  lawfully due  on the  tillers’ day or      the postponed date; 423           (d) the  amounts, if  any,  paid  by  or      recovered from  the landlord  as land revenue      and other  cesses referred to in clauses (a),      (b),  (c)  and  (d)  of  sub-section  (1)  of      section 10A,  in the  event of the failure on      the part of the tenant to pay the same.           Explanation 1.-     *         * *           Explanation 2.-     *         * *           (1A) Where  a tenant to whom subsections      (1) and (2) of section 10A do not apply, has,      after the  commencement of the Bombay Tenancy      and agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955,      paid in  respect of  the land  held by him as      tenant land revenue and other cesses referred      to in  sub-section (1)  of that  section,  on      account of the failure of the landlord to pay      the same,  a sum equal to the total amount so      paid by  the tenant  until the  date  of  the      determination of  the purchase price shall be      deducted from  the aggregate  of the  amounts      determined under sub-section (1).           (1B) (a)  On the  amount arrived  at  in      accordance  with   the  provisions   of  sub-      sections  (1)   and  (lA)   there  shall   be      calculated interest  at 4-1/2,  per cent, per      annum for  the period  between  the  date  on      which the  tenant is deemed to have purchased      the land under section 32 and the date of the      determination of the purchase price.           (b)  (i)   The  amount  of  interest  so      calculated shall be added to, and           (ii) the amount of rent, if any, paid by      the tenant  to the  landlord and the value of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 44  

    any products of trees planted by the landlord      if such  products are removed by the landlord      during the  said  period  shall  be  deducted      from, the amount so arrived at. 424           (2) The  State Government may by general      or special  order, fix  different minima  and      maxima for  the purpose  of sub-clause (a) of      clause (ii)  of sub-section (1) in respect of      any kind  of land  held  by  tenants  in  any      backward area.  In  fixing  such  minima  and      maxima,  the   State  Government  shall  have      regard to  the rent  payable for the land and      the factors  specified in  sub-section (3) of      section 63A." The difference  in the purchase price mentioned in s. 5A  of the  Taluqdari Abolition  Act, 1949, and the purchase  price mentioned  in s.  32H  of  the Tenancy Act,  1948, is  noticeable. Under s. 5A of the Taluqdari  Abolition Act,  1949, the  purchase price for  the right of occupancy is approximately six times the assessment fixed for the land. Under s. 32H,  however, the  minimum  is  20  times  the assessment  and   the  maximum   200   times   the assessment. These  minima and maxima are liable to reduction in  the case  of land held by tenants in any backward area.      Now, the main grievance of the petitioners is this.  So   far  as   non-permanent  tenants  were concerned, the  title of  the petitioners to their lands passed  on April 1, 1957, to the tenants and the petitioners  ceased to  be landlords. All that they became  entitled  to  on  that  day  was  the purchase price  mentioned in s. 32H. By one stroke of the  pen as  it were,  the impugned  Act, 1958, made  almost   all  non-permanent   tenants   into permanent  tenants   and  thereby   deprived   the petitioners of  the higher  purchase  price  which they were  entitled to  get under  s. 32H  and the succeeding sections  of the  Tenancy Act, 1948. In petition No.  120  of  1958  the  petitioners  has stated that  he would  lose about Rs. 14 lacs as a result of  the provisions  of  the  impugned  Act, 1958.      We may now read some of the provisions of the impugned Act, 1958. The Act is entitled "an Act 425 further  to  define  permanent  tenants,  inferior holders and  permanent holders for the purposes of certain Land  Tenure Abolition laws and to provide for  certain   other  matters."  In  view  of  the argument advanced  before  us  on  behalf  of  the respondents that  the impugned  Act,  1958  merely changes a  rule of evidence, it is worthly of note that the  long title itself states that the Act is an  Act   further  to  define  permanent  tenants. Section 2 of the Act is the interpretation section and the  expression ’Land  Tenure  Abolition  law’ means in  relation to  a  permanent  tenant,  Acts specified in Part I of the Schedule. The Taluqdari Abolition Act,  1949 is  one of the Acts mentioned in Part I of the Schedule. The expression ’tenure- holder’ means  inter alia  a taluqdar and ’tenure- land’ means inter alia taluqdari land. Sections 3, 4 are  6 and  important for our purpose and should

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 44  

be read in full.           "3. A  person shall,  within the meaning      of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law, be      deemed to  be an inferior holder, a permanent      holder or,  as the  case may  be, a permanent      tenant, on  the date  of the abolition of the      relevant land  tenure, if  his name  has been      recorded in  the record  of rights  or  other      public  or  revenue  record  as  an  inferior      holder, permanent  holder or permanent tenant      in respect of any tenure-land-           (a) on  the date of the abolition of the      relevant land tenure, or           (b) in pursuance of orders issued during      the  course  of  any  proceedings  under  the      relevant Land Tenure Abolition law or, as the      case may  be, the  Bombay Land  Revenue Code,      1879-                (i) before the commencement of this Act, or 426                (ii) after the commence of this Act           in cases in which inquiries were pending           at the commencement of this Act, or           (c) in  pursuance of  an order issued by      the Mamlatdar  in respect  of an  entry under      section 6 of this Act.           4. For  the purposes of the relevant Act      specified  in  Part  I  of  the  Schedule,  a      person-           (a) who  on the date of the commencement      of that Act was holding any tenure-land and           (b) who and whose predecessors in title,      if any,  were, immediately  before that  date      for such continuous period of twelve years or      more, holding  the same  tenure-land, or  any      other tenure-land,  as a  tenant or  inferior      holder under  the tenure-holder  for the time      being on  payment of  an amount exceeding the      assessment of  the land,  shall unless  it is      proved by the tenure-holder that he would not      have been  a permanent tenant on the basis of      continued possession of the land under clause      (b), be  deemed to  be a  permanent tenant of      the  land   under  clause  (a)  and  all  the      provisions of  that Act shall apply to him as      they apply to a permanent tenant.           Explanation.-The  assessment   for   the      purpose of  this section shall be reckoned as      provided in clauses (a) and (b) of section 5.           6. (1) The rights of an inferior holder,      permanent holder  or permanent  tenant  under      sections 4  and 5  shall be  entered  in  the      record of  rights unless  the  tenure  holder      applies in  writing to  the Mamlatdar  within      six months  from the date of the commencement      of  this  Act  for  a  declaration  that  any      holder,  or   tenant  under  him  is  not  an      inferior holder, a 427      permanent holder  or, as  the case  may be, a      permanent tenant.           (2)  Any   such  application   shall  be      disposed of  as if  it were an application in      respect of a disputed case under section 135D

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 44  

    of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879."      The constitutional  validity of the aforesaid provisions has been challenged before us on behalf of the petitioners on the following grounds.      (1) The  Bombay  State  legislature  was  not competent to  enact the  impugned Act,  which is a piece of  colourable legislation inasmuch as under the guise  of  defining  a  permanent  tenant,  or changing  a   rule  of  evidence,  it  has  really confiscated a  large part  of the  purchase  price which the  petitioners were  entitled to  under s. 32H of  the Tenancy  Act, 1948  from some of their tenants;      (2) The  impugned Act  contravenes the rights of the  petitioners guaranteed by the Constitution under Arts. 14, 19 (1) (f) and 31 there of; and      (3) Article 31A does not save it. On behalf  of the respondents the main argument is that the impugned Act, 1958, merely changes a rule of evidence  for  determining  who  are  permanent tenants in  possession of taluqdari lands; it does nothing more  than that and is not, therefore, bad on any  of the  grounds urged  on  behalf  of  the petitioners. It  is clear that if the impugned Act merely changes  a rule of evidence for determining who  are   permanent  tenants   in  possession  of taluqdari lands,  then the  points urged as to the violation of  the petitioners’  fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19 (l) (f) and 31 would not at all arise. If,  on the  contrary, it is found that the impugned Act  is not  a piece of legislation which changes a  rule of  evidence but  is a  device  by which the  petitioners have been deprived of their property 428 without payment  of compensation, then it would be a piece  of colourable  legislation not within the competence   of   the   State   Legislature.   The legislation would  then fall  on the  main  ground that it  is a piece of colourable legislation, the subject matter  of which  is not  covered  by  any entry in List II or List III.      Therefore, the  crux of the matter is what is the true scope and effect of the provisions of the impugned  Act,  1958.  To  this  question  we  now address ourselves.      It may  be stated at the very outset that the constitutional validity of the relevant provisions of the  Taluqdari  Abolition  Act,  1949  and  the Tenancy Act,  1948 as  amended by Bombay Act, XIII of 1956  has not  been challenged  before  us.  In Dhirubha Devisingh  Gohil v.  The state  of Bombay and Sri  Ram Ram  Narain Medhi  v.  The  State  of Bombay,  it  was  held  by  this  Court  that  the relevant  provisions   of  those   two  Acts  were Constitutionally valid.  What has  been challenged before us  is the  constitutional validity  of the relevant provisions  of  the  impugned  Act  1958, particularly the provisions in ss. 3,4 and 6 which we have  quoted earlier.  What is  the  scope  and effect of  those provisions?  Section 3  in effect states that  a person shall, within the meaning of the relevant  Land Tenure Abolition law, be deemed to be  a permanent  tenant  on  the  date  of  the abolition of the relevant land tenure, if his name

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 44  

has been recorded in the record of rights or other public or  revenue record as a permanent tenant in respect of  any tenure  land in  any of  the three following circumstances-      (a) on  the date  of  the  abolition  of  the relevant land-tenure; or      (b) in  pursuance of orders issued during the course of  any proceeding  under the relevant land tenure abolition law or the Revenue Code 429 either before  or after  the commencement  of  the impugned Act, 1958; or      (c) in  pursuance of  an order  issued by the Mamlatdar in respect of an entry under s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958. It is worthy of note that s. 3 does not create a mere presumption, as is referred to in s. 135J of the Revenue Code. Section 135J of the Revenue  Code states  inter alia that an entry in the  record of  rights shall  be presumed to be true until  the contrary  is proved.  Section 3 of the impugned  Act, 1958  states, however,  that  a person shall be deemed to be a permanent tenant on the date  of the  abolition of  the relevant  land tenure if his name has been recorded in the record of rights  in respect of any tenure land in any of the three  circumstances mentioned as (a), (b) and (c) therein.  In other  words, if  any one  of the three  circumstances   mentioned  in  the  section exists, then  by a  fiction of  law a  person  who fulfils that  circumstance must  be deemed to be a permanent tenant.  Section 4 says in effect that a tenant(a) who  on the  date of the commencement of the Taluqdari  Abolition Act, 1949 was holding any tenure land, and (b) who and whose predecessors in title, if  any, were  immediately before that date for such  continuous periods  as  aggregate  to  a total continuous  period  of  12  years  or  more, holding the  same tenure land, or any other tenure land shall  unless it  is proved  by  the  tenure- holder that  he would  not have  been a  permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of the land under  (b) above, be deemed to be a permanent tenant  of   the  land  under  (a),  and  all  the provisions of  the Taluqdari  Abolition Act,  1949 shall apply  to him  as they  apply to a permanent tenant. There is a third condition mentioned in s. 4, namely,  the amount  which the tenant pays must exceed the  assessment of the land. This condition does not,  however  have  any  importance  in  the discussion which  follows and no further reference to it is necessary. 430      There is  no difficulty  in understanding cl. (a) of  s. 4  but cl.  (b) is  not so  clear.  The expression "continuous  periods as  aggregate to a total continuous  period of  twelve years or more" is neither  very elegant  nor very clear. Perhaps, the   expression   means   that   one   particular continuous period may be of less than twelve years but there  may be  more than  one such  continuous period and  in such  a case  the totality  of such continuous periods  must aggregate twelve years or more; if  however, one  continuous period  extends over twelve years or more, there is no difficulty, and the question of the aggregate totalling twelve

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 44  

years  does   not  arise.   The  question  of  the aggregate totalling  twelve years  will arise when there are  more continuous  periods than  one,  of less  than   twelve  years   duration  each.   The possessions for  such continuous periods may be of the same tenure-land or of different tenure-lands. If however, the aggregate of continuous periods of possession of the same tenure-land or of any other tenure-land comes  to twelve  years or  more, then cl. (b)  of s.  4 is fulfilled. It further appears that conditions  mentioned  in  (a)  and  (b)  are cumulative. In other words, for the application of s.4, a tenant must be in possession of tenure-land on the  date of  the commencement of the Taluqdari Abolition Act,  1949 (August 15, 1950) and further more must  have been  in possession  of  the  same tenure-land  or   of  any  other  tenure-land  for continuous periods  aggregating more  than  twelve years immediately  before the  said date. A person who fulfils  the aforesaid two conditions shall be deemed to be a permanent tenant of the land unless it is  proved by  the tenure-holder  that he would not have  been a permanent tenants of the basis of possession referred  to in  cl.(b). The expression "unless it  is proved by the tenure-holder that he would not  have been  a permanent  tenant  on  the basis of  continued possession  of the  land under clause  (b)"   has  again   given  rise   to  some difficulty. Two views have been can- 431 vassed before  us. One view is that the expression means that  the tenure-holder can only contest the correctness  of   the  claim   of  twelve   years’ possession and  show that  the tenant  was not  in possession of  the land or lands concerned or that the continuous period or periods of possession did not aggregate twelve years. The other view is that the  tenure-holder   can  show  that  the  tenancy commenced on  a particular  date or  that there is satisfactory  evidence  of  the  duration  of  the tenancy, and therefore, under s. 83 of the Revenue Code the  tenant would  not be  a permanent tenant merely by  reason  of  twelve  years’  possession. Section 4 as worded is somewhat obscure and if one were to  go merely by the words used, one would be inclined to  accept the  first view. On that view, the Section undoubtedly would go much further than merely introducing  a rule  of evidence;  it would create  a  new  class  of  permanent  tenants  not contemplated by  s. 83  of the  Revenue Code.  The latter section  talks of  two circumstances  which determine the  status of  a tenant: one relates to commencement of  the tenancy  and the other to its intended duration. Under s. 83 the onus will be on the person  who claim  a  permanent  status  as  a tenant to  prove that  either the  commencement of the tenancy  is not  known or  that  its  intended duration was  not agreed upon between the landlord and tenant or was not governed by any usage of the locality. Section  4 of  the  impugned  Act,  1958 gives a go-by to these circumstances. It brings in different considerations  altogether. In effect it says that  if a  person was  in possession  of any tenure-land  on  August  15,  1950  (the  date  of commencement of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949)

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 44  

and was  further more  in possession  of the  same tenure-land  or   any  other   tenure-land  for  a continuous aggregate  period of  twelve years,  he would be  deemed to  be a permanent tenant, unless the  tenure-holder  proved  that  he  was  not  in possession for  a continuous  aggregate period  of twelve years 432 as laid down in cl. (b) of the section. This means that instead  of the two circumstances relating to commencement and  duration a  new consideration is brought in, namely, whether the tenant has been in possession for  a continuous,  aggregate period of twelve years.  If  he  has  been,  then  he  is  a permanent tenant.  If he  has  not  been  in  such possession, then he is not a permanent tenants. In other words,  s. 4  of  the  impugned  Act,  1958, completely changes  the definition  of a permanent tenant  and  creates  a  new  class  of  permanent tenants who were not permanent tenants on April 1, 1957. If  this view  is correct, and we think that there is  a good deal to be said in favour of this view, then s. 4 of the impugned Act, 1958 in spite of giving  the  tenure-holder  an  opportunity  of proving that  the tenant was not in possession for an aggregate  continuous period  of  twelve  years under s. 4 read with s. 6, undoubtedly changes the very definition  of permanent  tenant and  by that change wipes  out a  large part  of  the  purchase price which  the petitioners  were entitled to get on April 1, 1957 from some of their tenants. It is not disputed  that on  this  view  of  s.  4,  the impugned  legislation  would  be  unconstitutional inasmuch as  it would bring within the category of permanent tenants  persons who  were non-permanent tenants  under  the  previous  law  and  there  by deprive the tenure-holders of part of the purchase money which they were to get from them.      It has  been contended  that the  second view with regard to the expression "unless it is proved by the tenure-holder that he would not have been a permanent  tenant   on  the   basis  of  continued possession  of  the  land  under  clause  (b)"  is preferable on  the ground  that cl.  (b) is one of the conditions which the tenant must fulfil before he can get the benefit of s. 4 and there would not be much  sense in  allowing the  tenure-holder  to disprove a  condition which the tenant must fulfil before he can get 433 the benefit  of s.  4. We  find  it  difficult  to accept  this   view.  On   a  pure   question   of construction of  the words  used in  s. 4,  we see nothing wrong  in allowing  the  tenure-holder  to prove that  the tenant  was not  in possession for continuous periods  aggregating twelve  years. Let us, however, assume that the second view as to the interpretation of  s. 4 of the impugned Act, 1958, is preferable  to the first view. What then is the position? The  position then  is that a tenant who fulfils the  two conditions  mentioned in cls. (a) and (b)  must be  deemed to  be a permanent tenant unless the  tenure-holder proves  the commencement and/or duration of the tenancy. From this point of view it  may be  argued that s. 4 merely changes a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 44  

rule of  evidence  and  throws  the  onus  on  the tenure-holder to  prove that  in spite  of  twelve years’ continuous possession mentioned in cl. (b), the tenant  is not a permanent tenant by reason of the circumstance  that  the  commencement  of  the tenancy or  its intended  duration is known. Under s. 6  the rights  of a permanent tenant under s. 4 shall be  entered in  the record  of rights unless the  tenure-holder   applies  in  writing  to  the Mamlatdar within  six months  from the date of the commencement of  the impugned  Act, 1958,  for the declaration that  the tenant  under him  is not  a permanent tenant. If any such application is filed by the  tenure-holder, it  shall be disposed of as if it were an application in respect of a disputed case under  s. 135D  of the  Revenue Code. What is the effect  of s.  6 ?  It  was  conceded  by  the learned counsel appearing for the respondent State and also  the respondent  tenants that the tenure- holder has  only one  opportunity of saying that a tenant under him is not a permanent tenant and the tenure-holder   must   avail   himself   of   that opportunity within  six months from June 10, 1958, the date  on which  the impugned  Act, 1858,  came into force.  The combined effect of ss. 3, 4 and 6 appears to us to be this. If the tenure-holder has made no application 434 within six  months  from  June  10,  1958,  for  a declaration that  a tenant  under  him  is  not  a permanent  tenant,  every  tenant  under  him  who fulfils the  conditions mentioned  in cls. (a) and (b) of s. 4 at once gets recorded in the record of rights as  a permanent tenant. As soon as he is so recorded, he  must be  deemed under  s. 3  to be a permanent tenant  by a fiction of law and under s. 4 all  the provisions  of the  Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949,  will apply  to him  as they apply to a permanent tenant. This combined effect of ss. 3, 4 and 6  of the  impugned  Act,  1958  does  in  our opinion deprive  the  tenure-holder  of  any  real opportunity  of   contesting  the  claims  of  his tenants and makes them permanent tenants once they are recorded  in the  record  of  rights,  thereby depriving the  tenure-holder of the purchase price which he  was entitled  to get  from them under s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948.      On behalf of the respondents it was stated at the Bar that the petitioners had made applications for a  declaration under s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958,  and   that  those  applications  are  still pending. We  have no  materials in support of this statement. No affidavit has been made on behalf of the respondents  to this effect; nor do we know if those  applications   related  to   all  the  non- permanent tenants of the petitioners. What we know is  that   in  a  stay  application  made  by  the petitioner in  petition No.  120 of  1958  it  was averred that  the  petitioner  had  filed  several declaratory suits  before the  Mamlatdar under  s. 70(b) of  the Tenancy Act, 1948, for a declaration that the  tenants  concerned  were  not  permanent tenants. Those  suits were however, filed prior to the coming  into force  of the impugned Act, 1958. The petitioner  asked for a stay of those suits on

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 44  

two grounds:  firstly, that  after the coming into force of  the impugned  Act, 1958, the suits would become  infructuous,   and  secondly,   that   the Mamlatdar concerned  would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the constitutional 435 validity of  the provisions  of the  impugned Act, 1958, and  in view  of those  provisions would  be bound  to   hold  that   the  tenants  had  become permanent tenants.  This Court  passed no order on the application  for stay.  But the petitioner, it appears, moved  the Mamlatdar  to stay the hearing of the  suits pending  the disposal  of  the  writ petition in  this Court and the suits were stayed. In a  second  petition  filed  on  behalf  of  the petitioner it  was stated  that after  the  coming into  force   of  the   impugned  Act,  1958,  the petitioner received a notice to show cause why the non-permanent tenants  under  him  should  not  be declared to be permanent tenants and the record of rights amended accordingly. The petitioner applied to the  Revenue  Officer  concerned  to  stay  the proceedings in  view of  the writ petition pending in this  Court. This  request was, however, turned down. The  petitioner then  came to this Court and it appears  that an  order was  made to the effect that any  investigation which  might be  necessary for the  proceedings pending  before  the  Revenue Officer might  be continued, but no final order or entry should be made till the disposal of the writ petition. Such  an order appears to have been made in  respect  of  a  number  of  villages  and  the petitioner stated that he had thousands of tenants in 24  villages, some of whom were permanent, some protected, and  some ordinary.  Nothing was stated in those petitions or in the replies thereto as to whether the  tenure-holder had made an application for a  declaration within  the meaning  of s. 6 of the impugned  Act, 1958.  All that has been stated in the application is that in response to a notice received from the Revenue Officer, the petitioner, as a  tenure-holder, had  moved this  Court for  a stay of  the proceedings.  If the  petitioner  had filed no  application for a declaration within the meaning of  s. 6  of the  impugned Act,  1958, and within the  time allowed  by that section, then it is obvious 436 that the  Revenue Officer  dealing with  the suits under s.  70(b) of  the Tenancy Act, 1948, pending before him,  or the  Revenue Officer  dealing with other proceedings  before him, must give effect to the provisions  of ss.  3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958.  It is,  therefore difficult to see how the pendency  of the  suits or  other  proceedings before the  Revenue Officers  concerned can  be of any assistance  to the  petitioners. The question, therefore, boils  down to  this. Section  6 of the impugned Act,  1958 does  give one  opportunity to the petitioners  to  make  an  application  for  a declaration that  any tenant  under him  is not  a permanent tenant,  but that  opportunity was to be availed of  within six  months from June 10, 1958. Once that  opportunity is  lost, the tenure-holder cannot claim  that a  tenant who  fulfils cls. (a)

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 44  

and (b)  of s.  4 is  not a  permanent tenant. Our attention was drawn to sub-ss. (3), (4) and (5) of s. 5A  of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949. Those sub-sections say  in effect  that if  any question arises whether  any person  is a permanent tenant, the State  Government or  an officer authorised by the State  Government in  that behalf shall decide the question;  where  such  officer  decides  such question any  person aggrieved by the decision may file an  appeal to  the State Government within 60 days from  the  date  of  the  decision;  and  the decision of  the State  Government shall be final. It was  not suggested before us that the aforesaid sub-sections would give the tenure-holder a second opportunity of contesting the claim of the tenant, and it  seems to  us quite  clear that the tenure- holder who  had  failed  to  make  an  application within the  time mentioned in s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958,  would not  be in  a position  to  take advantage of  sub-ss. (3), (4) and (5) of s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949. If ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, are good and valid in law, then  whichever be  the authority that has to decide the  claim of the tenant, it must decide it in accordance with those provisions. 437 In these  circumstances, can  it be  said that the opportunity given  by s.  6 is  a real opportunity and does  it amount  to merely  changing a rule of evidence ?  We think  that this  question must  be answered in the negative.      It is  to be  noted that on April 1, 1957 the petitioners ceased  to be  tenure-holders  of  the lands held by non-permanent tenants and as held by this Court,  ss. 32  to 32R  of the  Tenancy  Act, 1948, clearly  contemplated  the  vesting  of  the title  in   the  tenants   on  the  tillers’  day, defeasible    only     on    certain     specified contingencies. This Court held that those sections were designed to bring about an extinguishment, or in any  event a  modification  of  the  landlord’s rights in  the estate  within the  meaning of Art. 31A (1)  (a) of  the Constitution. If that was the true effect  of ss.  32 to 32R of the Tenancy Act, 1948, then  on April  1, 1957 the petitioners were left only with the right to get the purchase price under s.  32H. That  right of  the petitioners was undoubtedly a  right to  property. In Bombay Dying and Manufacturing  Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay (1) this  Court observed,  with regard  to  unpaid wages of  an employee,  that when  an employee had done his  work, the  amount of wages earned by him become a  debt due  to him  from the  employer and this was  property which  could be  assigned under the law.  The  provisions  of  the  Bombay  Labour Welfare Fund  Act (Bombay  Act XL  of  1953)  were under consideration in that case. Section 3 of the Act transferred inter alia all unpaid accumulation of wages  to a  fund known  as the  Bombay  Labour Welfare Fund. This Court held that s. 3 (1) of the Act in so far as it related to unpaid accumulation in s.  3(2) (b)  was unconstitutional  and void by reason of  the right  guaranteed under  Art. 19(1) (f) of  the Constitution  and  was  not  saved  by cl.(5) thereof.  We think  that the same principle

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 44  

must apply in the 438 present case.  The right of the petitioners to the purchase price  under s.  32H of  the Tenancy Act, 1948, from  those of  their tenants  who were non- permanent  on  April  1,  1957,  was  a  right  of property in  respect of which the petitioners have a guarantee  under Art.  19 (1)(f). The provisions in ss.  3,4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, in so far  as   they   laid   down   that   in   certain circumstances a  tenant shall  be deemed  to be  a permanent tenant  from the  date of  the Taluqdari abolition Act,  1949, adversely affected the right of the  petitioners with  retrospective effect; it practically wiped off a large part of the purchase price which  the petitioners were entitled to get. If s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, is to be tested on the  touchstone of  reasonable restrictions  in the interests  of the  general public as laid down in cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution, it must be held  that it  does  not  impose  a  reasonable restriction. We  have found  it very  difficult to understand why  and how  it is reasonable that the tenure-holder must  make an application within six months from  the commencement of the impugned Act, 1958, for  a declaration  that his tenants are not permanent  tenants.  The  petitioners  have  three kinds  of   tenants-permanent  tenants,  protected tenants, and  ordinary tenants.  On April  1, 1957 the petitioners  ceased to  be tenure  holders  in respect  of   all  tenants  other  than  permanent tenants and  became entitled  only to the purchase price under  s. 32H. If any tenant claimed on that date that  he was  a permanent  tenant, he  had to establish his  claim in  accordance with  s. 83 of the Revenue  Code. Such a claim could be contested by the  tenure-holder whenever made by the tenant. But by  the  impugned  Act,  1958,  all  this  was changed, and  unless the  tenure  holder  made  an application within  six months of the commencement of the  impugned  Act,  1958,  he  was  not  in  a position to  say that  a particular tenant who was in possession of tenure-land for continuous period aggregating twelve years on and before August 15, 439 1950, was not a permanent tenant. We are unable to hold that the six months’ limit imposed by s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, is in the circumstances, a reasonable restriction  within the meaning of Art. 19(5)  of   the  Constitution.   It  is  a  little difficult  to  understand  how  the  tenure-holder could know  which  of  his  non-permanent  tenants would claim  to be  permanent on  the coming  into force of  the impugned  Act, 1958.  Obviously, the tenure-holder had  to anticipate that all his non- permanent tenants might claim to be permanent, and therefore it  was incumbent  on  him  to  make  an application for  a determination  that none of his non-permanent tenants  were permanent,  and unless he did  so he  would lose  his right  to  get  the purchase price  under s.  32H of  the Tenancy Act, 1948. We  are clearly  of the  view that  the time limit imposed  by s. 16 of the impugned Act, 1958, is,  in   these  circumstances,  and  unreasonable restriction and  cannot be  justified  under  Art.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 20 of 44  

19(5) of the Constitution.      In view  of this finding it is unnecessary to consider  the   effect   of   Art.   31   of   the Constitution. On  behalf of  the respondent  State reliance was  sought to  be placed  on Art. 31A of the Constitution.  That Article,  in our  opinion, has no  application to the present cases, inasmuch as there  was no  acquisition by  the State of any estate or any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification  of any  such rights.  On April 1, 1957, the  tenure-holders had ceased to be tenure- holders in  respect of lands held by non-permanent tenants. The  relation between  the tenure-holders and the  tenants had changed from that of landlord and tenant  to that  of creditor and debtor. When, therefore, the  impugned Act,  1958, affected  the right of  the petitioners  as creditors  to get  a certain sum  of money from the debtors, it did not provide for  the acquisition  by the  State of any estate or  of  any  rights  therein;  nor  did  it provide for  the extinguishment or modification of any such 440 rights. Therefore, Art. 31A has no application and cannot save the impugned Act, 1958.      It has  been contended  before us  that while implementing  the  provisions  of  s.  5A  of  the Taluqdari Abolition  Act, 1949,  it was found that because of  the failure  or inability  of the  ex- Taluqdar to  produce old  records  concerning  the tenants it  was difficult  for the tenants to take the  benefit  of  that  provision;  therefore,  it became necessary  for the  Legislature  to  define permanent tenant  in such  a way  that the tenure- holder might  not defeat  the provisions of s. 5A. That it  was stated,  was the  reason for enacting ss. 3,  4 and  6 of the impugned Act, 1958. We are unable to  accept this argument as correct. If the reason was as stated above, then the tenure-holder should have  been given  a chance  to contest  the claim of  the tenant  whenever he  made a claim of being a  permanent tenant.  It appears  to us that the true scope and effect of the provisions in ss. 3, 4  and 6  of  the  impugned  Act,  1958  is  to considerably reduce  the purchase price payable to the petitioners  and this  has been secured by the device of  defining permanent tenant in such a way that the  tenure-holder has no real opportunity of contesting the  claim of the tenants. In that view of the  matter, the  impugned Act,  1958, does not fall within  any entry  of List  II or List III of the Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution and is a piece   of   colourable   legislation.   What   is colourable legislation was explained by this Court in K.  C. Gajapati  Narayan Deo  v. The  State  of Orissa (1). This Court said that the idea conveyed by the expression "colourable legislation" is that although apparently  a legislature  in  passing  a statute purported  to within  the  limits  of  its powers,  yet   in  substance  and  in  reality  it transgressed those powers, the transgression being veiled by  what appears, on proper examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise. We are of the view that, that  is what  has happened  in the  present case. Under the guise of defining a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 21 of 44  

441 permanent tenant  or changing  a rule  of evidence what has been done is to reduce the purchase price which became  payable  to  the  tenure-holders  on April 1, 1957.      For these  reasons we must hold that ss. 3, 4 and 6  of the impugned Act, 1958 in so far as they deem  some   tenants  as   permanent  tenants   in possession of  taluqdari land are unconstitutional and  void.   Under  the   guise  of  changing  the definition of a permanent tenant, they really take away a  large part of the right of the petitioners to get  the purchase  price under  s. 32H  of  the Tenancy Act, 1948, from some of their tenants. The petitions must  accordingly be allowed with costs. As the  petitions have  been heard  together there will be only one hearing fee.      MUDHOLKAR, J,-Writ  petition No.  120 of 1958 was heard  along with  writ petitions  Nos. 147 to 158 of  1958. But  a common  argument was advanced before us on behalf of the petitioner in each case by Mr. G.S. Pathak and by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State of Gujarat and by Mr. Nathwani on behalf of the tenants.      The petitioners in these cases were Talukdars of certain  villages in  that part  of the  former state of Bombay which is now the State of Gujarat. The rights  of Talukdars  in  different  parts  of Gujrat to Taluqdari villages were regulated by the Ahmedabad Taluqdars Act, 1862 (Bom. 6 of 1862) and the Broach  and Kaira Incumbered Estates Act, 1881 (XXI of 1881) and the Gujarat Taluqdars Act, 1888. The Bombay  Taluqdari Tenure  Abolition Act,  1949 (herein referred to as the Abolition Act) repealed the aforementioned Taluqdari Acts and s. 3 thereof abolished  the   Taluqdari  tenure   wherever   it prevailed.  That  section  further  abolished  all incidents of the said tenure attaching to any land comprised in a Taluqdari Estate. Section 5 of that Act made  all the  taluqdars  "occupants"  of  the lands in their 442 possession, within  the meaning  of the expression "occupant" occurring  in the  Bombay Land  Revenue Code (hereafter  referred to  as the  Code).  Like "Occupants" in  other areas  of the  Bombay  State these persons became liable to pay land revenue to the Government subject to the provisions of cl.(b) of sub-s.2  of s.5.  Nothing,  however,  turns  on these provisions.  Section 16 of the aforesaid Act makes the  provisions of  the Code  applicable  to taluqdari    villages     subject    to    certain modifications with which we are not concerned. The validity  of  the  Abolition  Act  was  challenged before this  Court but  that challenge failed vide Dhisubha  Devisingh   Gohil  v.   The   State   of Bombay(1).      Vast areas of lands in these villages were in the  occupation  of  inferior  holders,  permanent tenants, protected  tenants, ordinary tenants etc. It is  not disputed that the provisions of Ch. VII of the Code which deals with "superior holders and inferior holders"  govern the relationship between the  tenure  holders  and  permanent  tenants.  In addition to  these provisions  there are  those in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 22 of 44  

the Bombay  Tenancy and  Agricultural  Lands  Act, 1948 (hereafter  referred to as the ’Tenancy Act’) which deal  with the relationship between landlord and tenant  and till  April 1,  1957, it  is these provisions   which    exclusively   governed   the relationship between the tenure-holder and tenants other than permanent tenants and inferior holders. It would  be necessary  to refer  to some  of  the provisions of  this Act  while  dealing  with  the arguments advanced before us.      By Bombay Taluqdari Abolition (Amendment) Act 1 of  1955 which came into force on March 1, 1955, the Abolition  Act was amended and a new provision was added therein, viz: s. 5A the relevant portion of which reads thus:           "(1) Notwithstanding anything  contained      in section 5 a permanent tenant in possession 443      of any  taluqdari land,  and also an inferior      holder holding such land on payment of annual      assessment  only,   shall  be  deemed  to  be      occupants within  the  meaning  of  Code,  in      respect of  such land in their possession and      shall  be   primarily  liable  to  the  State      Government for  the payment  of land  revenue      due in  respect of  such land,  and shall  be      entitled to  all  the  rights  and  shall  be      liable to  all the  obligations in respect of      such land  as occupants under the Code or any      other law for time being in force:           Provided that-           (a)  such  permanent   tenant  shall  be      entitled to  the rights  of  an  occupant  in      respect  of  such  land  on  payment  to  the      taluqdar or the cadet as the case may be :-                (i)  of   the    occupancy    price           equivalent  to  four  multiples  of  the           assessment fixed for such land, and                (ii) for  the   extinguishment   or           modification  of   any  rights   of  the           taluqdar or  cadet, as  the case may be,           including the  right of reversion in the           lands, of  a further  sum equivalent  to           two multiples of such assessment;                x              x              x           (2)  The  right   conferred  under  sub-      section (1)  shall not be exercisable after a      period of (five) years from the date on which      the  Bombay   Taluqdari   Tenures   Abolition      (Amendment), Act 1954 comes into force.                x              x              x This section  for the  first time conferred upon a permanent tenant  the right  to acquire the status of an  occupant in respect of the land held by him as a  permanent tenant  of the  tenure-holder upon payment of  a certain sum of money as the price of occupancy to  the tenure-holder  within five years of the commencement of the Amending Act of 1955. 444 It was accepted before us that the period fixed by s. 5A  has  been  extended  upto  the  year  1962. Section 5A  of the  Act has never been challenged, and the  argument before  us  proceeded  upon  the footing that it is a perfectly valid piece of law.      Though  the  Abolition  Act  by  s.  5A  thus

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 23 of 44  

conferred  upon   the  permanent  tenants  in  the taluqdari villages  the right become occupants, it did not  define what a permanent tenant was. By an amendment made by Bombay Act XVIII of 1958, it was provided that  certain persons  would be permanent tenants but  that does  not really  define what  a permanent tenant is. This absence of definition of a permanent  tenant did  not, however,  create any difficulty because  in Bombay  that term  has been understood  to   mean  the   tenant  described  in paragraph 2  of s.  83 of the Code. Indeed, in the petitions themselves it is stated that s.83 of the Code  defines   a  permanent  tenant.  The  second paragraph of that section is in these terms:           "And where by reason of the antiquity of      a tenancy  no satisfactory  evidence  of  its      commencement is forthcoming, and there is not      any  such  evidence  of  the  period  of  its      intended  duration,   if  any,   agreed  upon      between the  landlord and  tenant,  or  those      under whom  they respectively’ claim title or      any usage  of the  locality as to duration of      such  tenancy,   it  shall,  as  against  the      immediate landlord of the tenant, be presumed      to be  co-extensive with  the duration of the      tenure of  such landlord  and  of  those  who      derive title under him." Under this  section, therefore, a permanent tenant is one  whose tenure  is co-extensive with that of his landlord  and a tenant is to be presumed to be such a  tenant when  by reason  of antiquity,  the commencement of  the tenancy  cannot be proved and there is  no satisfactory  evidence of  the agreed duration of  the tenancy  or of  any usage  of the locality as 445 to  such   duration.  The   Bombay   Tenancy   and Agricultural Lands  Act, 1956  (13 of  1956) which among other  provisions, has  amended s.  2 of the Tenancy  Act   has  given   a  definition  of  the expression in  the new sub-s.10A thereof but it is not necessary to reproduce it as no argument based on it  is advanced  before us as indeed none could be advanced.      That  Act  made  extensive  and  far-reaching amendments in  the  Bombay  Tenancy  Act.  Several sections  thereof   were  recast  including  s.32. Amongst the  Provisions added  are ss. 32A to 32-R which appear  in the  second part  of Chapter 3 of that  Act,  dealing  with  "Purchase  of  land  by tenants" to  which we  will  refer  hereafter.  By virtue of  s.32, sub.  s. 1,  on  April  1,  1957, called the  "tillers’ day" every tenant, including permanent  tenant   was,  subject   to  the  other provisions of  that section  and of the succeeding sections deemed to have purchased the tenancy land in his  possession from  the landlord  free of all encumbrances  subsisting   thereon.  Section  87A, which also  was added  to the  Tenancy Act  by the Amending Act of 1956, provided that nothing in the Tenancy Act was to affect the provisions of any of the  Land   Tenure  Abolition  Acts  specified  in Schedule II  (which includes  the Abolition Act in question) in  so far  as such provisions relate to the confinement of the right of an occupant upon a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 24 of 44  

permanent tenant  in respect  of land held by him. In consequence  of this  the provisions of s. 32-H of the  Tenancy Act  which deal  with the purchase price payable  by permanent tenants will not apply to such  permanent tenant.  He  would,  therefore, have only  that right  which is  conferred upon  a permanent tenant  by s.  5-A of the Abolition Act. The result  of this  is that he would not be bound to pay the purchase price at once under s. 32-H of the Tenancy  Act and  can  make  his  election  to acquire or not to acquire the right of an occupant within the  period allowed  by s. 5-A (as extended from time to time). 446      The  records   relating   to   tenancies   in taluqdari villages  used to  be maintained  by the tenure-holders. It  is  from  these  records  that information could  be obtained as to the nature of the tenancies  of the  tenants in  those villages. While implementing the provisions of s. 5-A of the Abolition Act  it was  found that  because of  the refusal, failure  or inability  of the taluqdar to produce old  records concerning the tenants it was difficult for  the tenants  to take the benefit of that provision.  Therefore, the legislature passed Bombay Act  No. 57  of 1958 called the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition  Laws (Amendment)  Act, 1958. The long title  of the  Act runs thus: "An Act further to define  permanent tenants, inferior holders and permanent holders for the purposes of certain Land Tenure Abolition  laws and  to provide for certain other matters."  Section 4  of this Act states who are to  be deemed  to be permanent tenants for the purpose  of   the  Land   Tenure  Abolition   laws specified in  Part II  of the Schedule to the Act. The validity of this Act (hereafter referred to as the  impugned   Act)  and  in  particular  of  the provisions of s. 4 is challenged before us.      We will  reproduce hereafter this section and certain other  provisions of  the Act which have a bearing upon the arguments addressed before us.      According to  Mr. Pathak  s. 4  of the Act in effect expands  the category  of permanent tenants by bringing  within  its  fold  persons  who  were merely ordinary  tenants prior to the enactment of this provision.  So far  as an  ordinary tenant is concerned it  is Mr.  Pathak’s contention  that on the tillers’ day he became an occupant of the land or at  any rate  the landlord  (or  tenure-holder) lost his  interest therein and that thereafter the latter became  entitled to receive from the tenant the purchase price by the combined operation of s. 32(1) and  s. 32-H(1)  (i)  of  the  Tenancy  Act. Section 32(1) so far as material runs thus: 447           "On  the   Ist  day   of  April,   1957,      (hereinafter referred  to  as  ’the  tillers’      day’) every  tenant  shall,  subject  to  the      provisions of  the next  succeeding sections,      be  deemed   to  have   purchased  from   his      landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting      thereon on the said day, the land held by him      as tenant, if           (a) such  tenant is  a permanent  tenant      thereof  and   cultivates  the   land  leased

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 25 of 44  

    personally;           (b)  such  tenant  is  not  a  permanent      tenant  but   cultivates  the   land   leased      personally; and           (i)  the landlord  has not  given notice      of termination  of this tenancy under section      31: or           (ii) notice has been given under section      31, but  the landlord  has not applied to the      Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March,      1957   under   section   29   for   obtaining      possession of the land; (or)           (iii) the  landlord has  not  terminated      this tenancy  on any of the grounds specified      in section  15,  or  has  so  terminated  the      tenancy but  has not applied to the Mamlatdar      on or  before the  31st day  of  March,  1957      under section 29, for obtaining possession of      the lands;           ...       ...       ...       ... ..." Section 32-H, so far as material, runs thus:           "(1)  Subject   to  the   additions  and      deductions as provided in sub-sections 1A and      1B, the  purchase price  shall be reckoned as      follows, namely:-                (i) In  the  case  of  a  permanent           tenant  who   is  cultivating  the  land           personally 448           the  purchase   price   shall   be   the           aggregate of the following amounts, that           is to say,-           ...       ...       ...       ... ..."                (ii) In the  case of  other tenants           the  purchase   price   shall   be   the           aggregate of the following amounts, that           is to say,-                     (a)   such   amount   as   the                Tribunal may  determine  not  being                less than  20 times  the assessment                and not  more than  200  times  the                assessment;                ...       ...       ...       ...      ..." According to  the petitioner  in W. P. 120 of 1958 the total area of land held by him in his villages is 62,588 acres out of which only 703 acres are in his personal  cultivation and  the rest is held by tenants who are non-permanent tenants. He contends that by  the operation of s. 4 of the impugned Act most of  these persons  are likely to be placed in the category  of permanent tenants with the result that the  petitioners would be compelled to accept purchase price at a much lower rate, that is, they would get only six times the assessment instead of between 20 and 200 times the assessment, as may be determined by  the tribunal.  According to him his estimated loss  would be  over Rs.  14,00,000.  On behalf  of   the  State  it  is  denied  that  the petitioner would be put to any such loss.      The substance  of the  argument of Mr. Pathak is that  the right  to  claim  compensation  under s.32H(1)(ii)  from  the  ordinary  tenants  having

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 26 of 44  

vested in  the petitioner  it cannot be taken away by  the   Bombay  legislature   by  extending  the definition of  "permanent tenant" so as to include within it  those who  were merely ordinary tenants on the  "Tillers’ Day".  He formulated his grounds of attack on the legislation as follows:           (1)  The  Bombay   legislature  was  not      competent to  enact the  impugned Act  as the      subject 449      matter thereof is not covered by any entry in      List II.           (2)  The  impugned   Act  is  colourable      legislation as it amounts to a device adopted      for the  purpose of  confiscating money,  the      right  to  claim  which  had  vested  in  the      landlord as  purchaser on  April 1, 1957, and      that the  State legislature  had no  power to      make a law with respect to this matter.           (3)  The impugned  Act being outside the      legislative   competence    of   the   Bombay      legislature, taking  away of the petitioner’s      money was  a contravention  of Art.  31(1) of      the Constitution.           (4)  The acquisition of money is not for      a public purpose as taking money from one and      giving to another is not a public purpose.           (5)  Even assuming  that the acquisition      was for  a public purpose no compensation has      been provided  by the  Act or could indeed be      provided by  the  Act  and,  therefore,  Art.      31(2) is contravened.           (6)  The impugned  Act contravenes  Art.      19(1)(f) of  the Constitution  inasmuch as it      authorises the confiscation of money.           (7)  The Act  infringes Art.  14 of  the      Constitution as  there are  other classes  of      tenure-holders similarly  situate to whom the      impugned Act does not apply. All these grounds of attack, except the last, rest upon one assumption and that assumption is that s. 4 of  the impugned  Act extends  the definition of permanent  tenants  and  brings  within  its  fold persons who  were till April 1, 1957, that is, the "tillers’  day",   ordinary   tenants.   If   this assumption is invalid then the whole edifice which Mr. Pathak has built upon it must tumble down. Let us 450 consider what  exactly s.  4 of  the impugned  Act does. In order to appreciate Mr. Pathak’s argument properly it  would be  desirable to reproduce that section as well as ss. 3 and 6. These sections run thus:           Section 3  : "A person shall, within the      meaning of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition      law, be  deemed to  be an  inferior holder, a      permanent holder  or, as  the case  may be, a      permanent  tenant,   on  the   date  of   the      abolition of the relevant land tenure, if his      name has  been  recorded  in  the  record  of      rights or  other public or revenue records as      an  inferior   holder,  permanent  holder  or      permanent tenant  in respect  of any  tenure-      land-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 27 of 44  

              (a) on the date of the abolition of           the relevant land tenure, or                (b) in  pursuance of  orders issued           during the  course  of  any  proceedings           under the relevant Land Tenure Abolition           law or,  as the  case may be, the Bombay           Land Revenue Code, 1879-                     (i) before the commencement of                this Act, or                     (ii) after the commencement of                this  Act   in   cases   in   which                inquiries  were   pending  at   the                commencement of this Act, or                (c) in pursuance of an order issued           by the  Mamlatdar in respect of an entry           under section 6 of this Act." The relevant  Land Tenure  Abolition law  for  our purposes is  the Bombay  Tenancy Abolition Act and tenure land means taluqdari land.      Section 4 runs thus:           "For the  purposes of  the relevant  Act      specified  in  part  I  of  the  Schedule,  a      person- 451           (a)  who on the date of the commencement      of that Act was holding any tenure land, and           (b)  who  and   whose  predecessors   in      title, if  any were,  immediately before that      date for such continuous periods as aggregate      to a  total continuous period of twelve years      or more,  holding the same tenure-land or any      other tenure-land,           as a tenant or inferior holder under the      tenure-holder for  the time  being on payment      of an  amount exceeding the assessment of the      land,  shall  unless  it  is  proved  by  the      tenure-holder that  he would  not have been a      permanent tenant  on the  basis of  continued      possession of  the land  under clause (b), be      deemed to  be a  permanent tenant of the land      under clause  (a) and  all the  provisions of      that Act  shall apply to him as they apply to      a permanent tenant."      Section 6 runs thus:           "(1) The rights  of an  inferior holder,      permanent holder  or permanent  tenant  under      sections 4  and 5  shall be  entered  in  the      record of  rights  unless  the  tenure-holder      applies in  writing to  the Mamlatdar  within      six months  from the date of the commencement      of this Act for a declaration that any holder      or  tenant  under  him  is  not  an  inferior      holder, a  permanent holder  or, as  the case      may be, a permanent tenant.           (2)  Any  such   application  shall   be      disposed of  as if  it were an application in      respect of a disputed case under section 135D      of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879." Thus according  to s.  3 a  person whose  name  is recorded in  the record  of rights or other public revenue records  as a  permanent tenant in respect of tenure land he will be deemed to be a permanent 452 tenant  within   the  meaning  of  the  expression occurring in the Abolition Act.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 28 of 44  

    As  already   stated,  for  ascertaining  the meaning of the expression one has to go to para. 2 of s. 83 of the Code. No doubt, it merely raises a presumption as  to permanent tenancy but from that para. we  can deduce  the essential  feature of  a permanent tenancy.      The argument  is that  s. 3  being a  deeming provision in  so  far  as  the  Abolition  Act  is concerned, gives  new definition  of  a  permanent tenant. What  the section  says  is  that  certain persons will be deemed to be permanent tenants for the purpose  of the  Abolition Act.  Who are these persons ?  Are they  chosen arbitrarily and put in that class  though they  could not  possibly  have been so  put under  the  previous  law  ?  A  bare perusal of  clauses (a)  to (c) of s. 3 shows that only tenants  who have been found on enquiry to be permanent tenants,  at least presumptively, are to be regarded  as permanent  tenant, for the purpose of  the   Abolition  Acts   and  their  status  as permanent tenants  can no longer be questioned. In regard to  persons whose  cases fall under clauses (a) and  (b) all  that the  section has done is to take  away  the  right  of  the  tenure-holder  to challenge in  a collateral proceeding their status as permanent  tenants. As  regards tenants falling under cl.  (c) what  the provision  has done is to require  the   tenure  holder  to  object  to  the recording  of  such  person  as  permanent  tenant within a  certain time before the mamlatdar. If he fails to avail himself of the opportunity the door is shut  to his  saying thereafter that the person is not  a permanent tenant. It is to be noted that tenants  who  are  to  be  regarded  as  permanent tenants for the purposes of the Abolition Act have been so  found in enquiries held by revenue courts and not  persons arbitrarily  selected or  persons who could  not reasonably be regarded as permanent tenants. 453      The inclusion of persons as permanent tenants in the  register of  rights may  be prior  to  the commencement of  the Abolition  Act or  after  its commencement. The  proceedings for  the  inclusion may have been instituted prior to the commencement of the  Abolition Act  or may  be instituted under the impugned  Act. If  they hold  in favour of the tenant he will be deemed to be a permanent tenant. The landlord  cannot then be permitted to say that he is  not a  permanent tenant. It is difficult to see how this disability imposed upon a landlord to dispute the  fact that  a person  is  a  permanent tenant be  regarded as enlarging the definition of a permanent  tenant. It  is true  that s. 135.J of the Code granted the landlord a right to challenge the correctness  of an  entry  in  the  record  of rights in collateral proceedings without reference to  time  and  that  right  is  abrogated  by  the impugned Act  but even  so doing  that  cannot  be regarded as  taking away  a vested  right.  Within what time,  in what  circumstances  and  in  which manner a  particular fact  is open to challenge is only a  matter  of  procedure  and  it  cannot  be disputed  that   there  is   no  vested  right  in procedure.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 29 of 44  

    The effect  of the  provision thus is that in proceedings under  the Abolition Act for conferral of a right of an occupant the claimant’s status as a permanent  tenant cannot,  if he  satisfies  the requirement of any of the three clauses of s. 3 of the impugned  Act  be  open  to  question  by  the tenure-holder. Would  the position  have been  any different if  the impugned Act had not been passed ? Let  us consider  s. 5A  of the Abolition Act by itself. Suppose  a person  recorded as a permanent tenant in  the record of rights claimed to enforce the right  conferred by this section to obtain the right of  an occupant  in proceedings  thereunder. These proceedings  would be taken before a revenue officer and  he would be bound to act on the entry in the record 454 of  rights   until  and  unless  it  was  lawfully substituted  by   another.  No   suit   lies   for correcting an  entry in the record of rights. Only in a  collateral proceeding  could  it  have  been challenged and  the jurisdiction  of a civil court be invoked.  Where no  such suit  or proceeding is pending when the proceedings under s. 5A are going on the  tenure-holder cannot  be permitted  to  go behind  the   entry.  However,  as  an  additional safeguard the  Abolition Act has provided in s. 5A itself a  remedy and that is to approach the State Government or an authority empowered by it in this behalf for deciding to question.      Clause (b)  of s.  3 of  the impugned Act, as also cl.  (c), expressly  contemplate cases  where there is  a dispute  as to  the status of a person and if it has been decided in favour of the person claiming to  be a  permanent tenant  he is  to  be deemed to  be a  permanent tenant for the purposes of the  Abolition Act.  True that  thereafter  the tenure-holder cannot  challenge the fact even in a collateral proceeding  but that would be by reason of the  provisions of  s. 5A itself which have not been challenged.  No doubt  after the commencement of the impugned Act no new proceedings under s. 5A of the  Abolition Act  are permissible but that is because an  alternative remedy  is available under s. 6 of the impugned Act.      We must  now  examine  s.  4  in  detail.  It provides that  a person  who, on  the date  of the commencement of  the Abolition Act was holding any tenure land  and who,  and whose  predecessors  in title, if  any, were  immediately before that date "for such  continuous periods  as aggregate  to  a total continuous  period  of  12  years  or  more" holding the  same tenure land or any other land as a tenant  be  deemed  to  be  a  permanent  tenant "unless it  is proved by the tenure-holder that he would not  have been  a permanent  tenant  on  the basis of  continued possession  of the  land under clause (b)".  It is difficult to appreciate how it expands the  definition of permanent tenant. True, it says that such a 455 tenant will be deemed to be a permanent tenant but it does  not stop there. It goes on to say that he will be  so deemed  unless the  tenure-holder  can show that  he cannot  be so deemed ! What does s.4

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 30 of 44  

mean when it says that a tenant shall be deemed to be a  permanent tenant  ? Clearly, the legislature had in  mind the  provisions of  s. 83 of the Code which by  virtue of  s. 16  of the  Abolition  Act apply to all ex-taluqdari villages. To repeat, the impugned Act  does not  define "permanent  tenant" anywhere and  that it  is from  para 2 of s. 83 of the Code  that we  must infer  that a person whose tenancy is  co-extensive with that of the landlord is a permanent tenant. A tenure-holder can get rid of the  presumption raised by this provision if he can show  the precise  date of the commencement of the tenancy  or if he can show that the tenancy is terminable in  particular circumstances  or  on  a particular date.  We find  nothing in  s. 4  which directly or  indirectly modifies  the requirements of the definition of "permanent tenant". No doubt, para 2  of s.  83 of  the Code  sets  out  certain conditions for  raising a presumption of permanent tenancy and  s. 4  of the  impugned  Act  modifies them. But  by doing so, it is difficult to see how it alters  the basic  requirements of  a permanent tenancy as  deducible from  para 2 of s. 83 of the Code.  All   that  s.  4  does  is  to  alter  the conditions for  raising the  presumption but  that cannot  amount   to  altering  the  definition  of "permanent tenant."      According to Mr. Pathak, however, the section permits the landlord to prove only that the tenant and  his   predecessors  in   title  were  not  in possession for a continuous period of twelve years or more,  on the  date of  the commencement of the Abolition Act and that if they fail to prove this, the presumption  raised by  the section  would  be irrebuttable. Thus  according to  him s. 4 makes a person who  is in  possession as a tenant for over twelve years,  a permanent tenant even if the date of the commence- 456 ment of  his tenancy  was known  or  the  duration thereof was for a definite period. In our opinion, reading the  section that  way would  lead  to  an absurdity. It  is admitted on both hands that s. 4 is intended  to be  availed of only in proceedings under s.6  to which  a landlord  would be a party. Clause (b) of that section which enacts the second condition which  has to  be fulfilled  by a person before he  can avail  himself of  the  presumption under  that   section   prescribes   the   minimum "duration" of a tenancy and does not deal with the question of  its commencement or terms. Either the tenant fulfils  that condition  or he does not. If he does  not fulfil  it no further question arises and he must be deemed to be an ordinary tenant and nothing more.  Therefore, if  the tenant satisfies the condition,  it would be meaningless to give to the tenure-holder an opportunity of disproving the very thing  which had  been proved in his presence and upon  proof of  which the tenant has been able to enlist  the presumption  created by the section in his  aid. Such  a construction would render the provision absurd or at best useless.      If the  section was  capable of being read in the way  Mr. Pathak  wants, it would read thus: "A person who  has been  in possession of tenure land

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 31 of 44  

at the  commencement of  the Abolition Act and was holding the  same or any other land under the same tenure holder  for a continuous period of 12 years he shall  unless the  tenure holder proves that he was  not   holding  the  land  or  lands  for  the continuous period  of 12  years, be deemed to be a permanent tenant".  Surely this  would  be  making nonsense of  the section. We are wholly unable  to accept such  a reading.  We think, therefore, that the tenure-holder can prove under the section that on the  basis of twelve years continued possession the tenant  would not have been a permanent tenant for other reasons. These other reasons must be the reasons which in spite of the 457 length of  possession would  show that he is not a permanent tenant  because the tenancy commenced at a certain  time or  because a term had been agreed upon for the tenancy or fixed by usage.      It may  be, as  the learned Solicitor General says, that the language used by the legislature is not felicitous.  Even so,  we think  that it would not at  all  be  far-fetched  to  construe  it  as meaning that  the tenure-holder  has the  right to establish for  getting over  the presumption, that the tenancy originated at a definite point of time or was  of a finite duration. The language used by the legislature  is in  our view  capable of  only such construction.      Then  it  is  said  that  even  if  s.  4  is construed as  giving an opportunity to the tenure- holder to  prove otherwise than by disproving that the tenant  had been  in continuous  possession of land under  him for  twelve years that he is not a permanent tenant, that opportunity is illusory and really nonexistent  and, therefore, s. 4 in effect extends the definition of a permanent tenant. This contention is  based on  s. 6 of the Act which, it may be  stated gives the tenure holder a period of six months  from the  commencement of the impugned Act  to  move  the  Mamlatdar  in  writing  for  a declaration that  the tenant  is not  a  permanent tenant within  s. 4.  It may  be stated  that  the respondents concede that s. 6 has that effect.      We are,  however, unable  to agree  that s. 6 makes the  opportunity to  rebut  the  presumption raised under  s. 4  by continuous  possession  for twelve years  illusory or  non-existent.  We  have first to  point out that we do not find this point taken in  the  petitions.  Secondly,  we  fail  to appreciate why  the six  months’  time  prescribed should be considered as if no time had really been given to  the tenure-holder  which  would  be  the effect of accepting the petitioners’ contention. 458 Since six  months is  not a  short period,  within that time  it is  easily possible  for the tenure- holder to  move the  required application. Then it is said that it is illusory because there may be a very large number of tenants and the tenure-holder could be  required to  make numerous applications. Even so, we do not see why it should not have been reasonably possible  to lodge  these  applications within the  period allowed.  All that  the tenure- holder has  to do  is to name the tenant concerned

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 32 of 44  

and state  that he  wants a  declaration that  the tenant is  not a permanent tenant. It is also said that the tenure-holder has to make the application in anticipation of the tenant making a claim to be a  permanent   tenant.  But   we  are   unable  to appreciate  how   this  by  itself  can  make  the opportunity to  rebut  non-existent.  We  find  no practical difficulty  in the  tenure-holder making the application in anticipation.      Furthermore,   the   question   has   to   be considered according to the realities of the case. It is  admitted in  the petitioners’  affidavit in opposition that  the preparation  of the record of rights in  respect of the tenants in the taluqdari villages commenced  soon after  the Abolition  Act came into  force, that  is, soon  after August 15, 1950.  Many  of  the  tenants  have  already  been recorded as permanent tenants and since this could only  have   been  done   with  reference  to  the provision of s. 83 of the Code the petitioners can have no  grievance against  such entries. Further, s. 3(b)(ii) of the impugned Act takes into account the fact  that the  proceedings in  respect of the preparation of  the record  of rights were pending at  the   commencement  of   this  Act.  In  these proceedings the  tenure holder  must already  have objected-of course  where he  thought  fit-to  the tenant being recorded as a permanent tenant. These again would  cover quite  a number of cases. It is only in regard to the remaining cases that 459 applications under  s. 6  would  be  required.  We think it  right also  to point out that the rights under s. 4 of the impugned Act can be claimed by a tenant  who   pays  for   his  holding  an  amount exceeding the  assessment of  the  land.  This  we suppose would further reduce the number of tenants to whom  s. 6 would apply. We have no materials on which to  show that  these would form a very large number. As  we have already stated the petitioners not having  raised the  present point out of s. 6, they have  not given  any materials  to  show  the cases  of   how  many   tenants  are  outstanding. Therefore,  on   the  facts   on  this  case,  the petitioners cannot legitimately urge any practical difficulty in  making applications  under s. 6. We may also state here that many claims by tenants to be permanent  tenants  must  have  long  ago  been raised because  under s.  5A of the Abolition Act, as originally framed, a tenant had five years from its commencement,  that is,  from August 15, 1950, within which to exercise his right. At the date of the impugned  Act this  period had  been  extended upto February 28, 1960. The impugned Act came into force on  June 10, 1958. Therefore, at the date of the impugned Act the tenant had about one year and nine months  within which  to exercise  the  right given to him by s. 5-A of the Abolition Act. It is apparently for  this  reason  that  s.  6  of  the impugned Act fixed the period of six months. It is true  that   later  the  period  under  s.5-A  was extended but  that was  by Act XVIII of 1960 which came  into   force  on  April  8,  1960  and  had, therefore, no  bearing on  the legislature  fixing the time under s. 6 of the impugned Act.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 33 of 44  

    According  to   one  of   our  brethren   the definition  of   "permanent  tenant"  is  enlarged because even  though the  point of  time when  the tenancies of  persons over certain lands commenced were known  these persons are also included in the definition  of   "permanent  tenant"   under   the impugned Act  and cl.  (b) of  s. 4  is said to do this. We may point out 460 that this was not one of the arguments advanced at the Bar  and the respondents had no opportunity of meeting it.  That apart,  it is  clear  that  this clause has  to be  read with Expl. II to s. 5-A of the Abolition  Act. As  already stated  s. 5-A was not attacked  as unconstitutional.  Explanation II thereto provides as follows:           "For the  purpose  of  this  section,  a      permanent tenant  includes a tenant who holds      a  taluqdari  land  in  exchange  of  another      taluqdari land  of which  he was, and but for      the exchange  would  have  been  a  permanent      tenant  and   who  has   been  in  continuous      possession  thereof   since   the   date   of      exchange." We may  assume that  the Explanation  extends  the definition of  "permanent tenant" but its validity has not  been challenged by the plaintiffs. Clause (b) of  s. 4 of the impugned Act merely takes note of the practice in tenure villages of changing the holdings of  tenants from  time to  time and it is apparently for  this  reason  that  there  was  no challenge to  s. 4  of the  impugned Act  on  this ground. It  is  only  the  persons  who  or  whose predecessors  in  title  were  tenants  in  tenure villages from  time immemorial  who will  get  the benefit of  the impugned Act and no others. No new persons will  thus be brought in by s. 4(b) and so it is  idle to say that it enlarges the definition of permanent tenant.      It is said that s. 4 widens the definition of permanent  tenant   by   including   tenants   the commencement  of  whose  tenancies  is  definitely known. But  does it  do that  ? The  tenant  in  a tenure village is a person holding tenure land. It is not  necessary that  he and his predecessors in title should  have been holding the same parcel of land since  the commencement of their tenancy. The practice of  exchanging parcels of lands prevailed in tenure villages and Expl. II to s. 5-A has been founded upon  it. Section 83 of the Code refers to the per- 461 manency of the relationship of landlord and tenant and not to the existence of permanent tenancy with respect  to  a  specific  parcel  of  land.  These provisions have  to be read along with s. 4 of the impugned Act  because this Act cannot stand or was not intended  to stand  by itself. It adds certain provisions to  the Abolition  Act and the Code and these provisions  must necessarily  be assimilated to those of the main Act. Looked at this way it is clear that  what s. 4 contemplates is a person the commencement of  the tenancy of whose predecessors in title is unknown but who has been in possession of the  same or  different parcels  of tenure land

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 34 of 44  

for a  period of  not less than twelve years prior to the  commencement of  the Abolition Act. It may be possible to say when he came into possession of a parcel  of land  ‘X’ where  it was  taken by him within  or   more  than   twelve  years   of   the commencement of  the Abolition Act but that is not the same thing as saying that the relation between him and  tenure-holder came into existence on that date for  the first  time. If in fact it came into existence  more   than  twelve  years  before  the Abolition Act came into force, may be with respect to different parcels of land from time to time, he is entitled  to be regarded as a permanent tenant, unless of  course it  can be shown by the landlord that he  or his  predecessor in  title  was  first inducted as  a tenant  in the  tenure village at a definite period of time or that the tenancy was of a finite duration.      Thus, in  our judgment,  s. 4 of the impugned Act does  not expand the definition of a permanent tenant. Therefore,  it cannot  be said that it has the effect  of taking  away from  the landlord any property which  had vested  in him on the tillers’ day. It  may be  that a  tenant who,  prior to the enactment of  s. 4,  was  merely  recorded  as  an ordinary tenant because he could not show that the origin of  his tenancy  was lost  in the  mists of anti- 462 quity  and  that  now  availing  himself  of  this provision,  he  can  get  himself  recorded  as  a permanent  tenant   by  showing   his   continuous possession for twelve years. But s. 4 does not, as we read it, say that he becomes a permanent tenant in these circumstances in every case. He would not become one  if the landlord shows that his tenancy commenced on a particular date beyond those twelve years or is of a finite duration.      Section  32H(1)  does  not  confer  upon  the landlord the right to claim the price of occupancy at the  rates prescribed  in sub-s. (1)(ii) from a person because  he  is  recorded  as  an  ordinary tenant but only from one who is in fact other than a  permanent   tenant.  If,  in  fact,  he  was  a permanent tenant,  or can  be  presumed  to  be  a permanent tenant though till the coming into force of the impugned Act he was not recorded as such no right to  claim the  price  of  occupancy  on  the footing that  he is  not  a  permanent  tenant  of tenure land  vested in the tenure-holder by virtue of that provision. Section 87-A of the Tenancy Act renders  s.  32H(1)(i)  inappropriate  to  such  a tenant. No  question of  infringement of the right under Art.  19(1) (f)  therefore  arises  in  such cases.      It was  also said  that s.  6 of the impugned Act  is  void  because  it  puts  an  unreasonable restriction upon the tenure-holder’s right to hold property and,  therefore, offends Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.  This point  does not  appear to have been  taken in the petitions. In any case, if our construction  of  s.  4  is  right,  then  the impugned Act  would be  saved by  Art. 31-A of the Constitution and its validity would not be open to attack  on   the  ground  that  it  violated  Art.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 35 of 44  

19(1)(f) of the Constitution.      Furthermore, it  is difficult  to  appreciate how the  tenure-holder’s right to hold property is affected by s. 6. His right of property with which we are 463 concerned, is  as occupant  of certain land having some permanent or other tenants under him. Section 5-A of  the  Abolition  Act  gives  the  permanent tenants  the  right  to  convert  themselves  into occupants and  thereby cease  to be tenants of the tenure-holder. The  validity of  this provision is not at  all challenged.  A tenant  may  claim  the benefit under  this section only if he establishes that he  is a  permanent  tenant.  It  is  plainly conceivable that  in many  cases the tenure-holder may dispute that the tenant is a permanent tenant. On such  dispute being  raised, the  tenant has to prove that he is a permanent tenant. All that s. 6 does is  to fix  a time  limit  within  which  the tenure-holder shall have the right to dispute that certain  permanent   tenants  are   not  permanent tenants.  That   does  make  those  who  were  not permanent tenants,  such tenants.  Therefore, s. 6 can in  no way  be  said  to  affect  the  tenure- holder’s right to property.      Further, it  would appear  that in most cases the  tenure-holders   themselves   including   the petitioners,  have   actually   applied   to   the mamlatdars for a declaration in their favour under this provision and those applications are pending. The learned  Solicitor-General informed us that as a matter  of fact  upon the  basis of  the records made available  by  the  tenure-holders  tentative entries  were   made  in   the  record  of  rights immediately after  the coming  into force  of  the impugned Act and that thereupon the tenure-holders have applied  to the  mamlatdar  well  within  six months for  a declaration  under  that  provision. Thus, according to him the section affords and has afforded a  real opportunity to the tenure-holders to rebut the presumption created by s. 4. We agree with him.      To summarise,  the position  is that  s. 4 of the  impugned   Act   by   merely   enacting   the presumption does not take away any property of the tenure-holder. His property such as it is, is left in tact. That section 464 does not confer any new property upon a tenant. It only comes to the rescue of a permanent tenant who is faced  with the  task of  proving the nature of his  tenancy,   by  raising   a   presumption   of permanency in  his favour.  If in fact his tenancy is not  permanent and has been extinguished by law but he  is tentatively recorded or is sought to be recorded as  permanent, the  landlord  can,  in  a proceeding under  s.6(1) rebut  the presumption by producing  the  documents  in  his  possession  or otherwise  that   the  tenancy   is  not  in  fact permanent and, therefore, has been extinguished by the operation of s.32(1) of the Tenancy Act. If he proves  this   he  will   be  entitled   to  claim compensation  or   purchase  money  at  the  rates permissible under  s. 32H(1)(ii) of that Act. That

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 36 of 44  

right of  his is  not affected  in any  way by the impugned  Act.   If  he   does  not   succeed   in establishing that,  then he  will be only entitled to get purchase price at the rate provided in s.5A of the  Abolition Act.  That, however, would be by virtue of  the operation  of s.5A of the Abolition Act-a provision which, as we have already said has not been  challenged-and not because any provision of the  impugned Act  deprives him  of a  right to claim a higher purchase price.      The impugned  Act is  plainly applicable only to matters  arising out  of a relationship between landlord  and   tenant.  Its  provisions  are  not intended to apply where such relationship does not subsist. Therefore,  the law  must be  held to  be within the competence of the legislature by virtue of entry  18 of  List II of the Constitution which is to the following effect :           "Land, that is to say, rights in or over      land, land  tenures including the relation of      landlord and  tenant, and  the collection  of      rents;    transfer    and    alienation    of      agricultural  land;   land  improvement   and      agricultural loans; colonization." 465 There can be no question of regarding the impugned Act as  colourable because it directly falls under Entry 18  and deals  with  matters  which  have  a bearing upon  the  relationship  of  landlord  and tenant. The  law being  thus within the competence of  the   Bombay  legislature,  Art.31(1)  of  the Constitution  cannot   be  said   to   have   been infringed. The  first three  points urged  by  Mr. Pathak accordingly fall to the ground. The fourth, fifth and  sixth points  are  also  based  on  the assumption that  the impugned Act confers upon the persons whose  tenancy rights were extinguished on April 1,  1957, rights  of permanent tenancy. Upon the  construction  which  alone  can  properly  be placed on s. 4 it cannot be said to confer any new rights on  such persons.  To repeat,  the  section applies to permanent tenants and permanent tenants alone. Therefore,  the three contentions raised by Mr. Pathak do not fall for consideration.      The seventh point urged by Mr. Pathak is that ss. 4  and 5  of the  impugned Act do not apply to other occupants  under  the  Bombay  Land  Revenue Code, who  are  similarly  situate  and  that  the result of this would be that they will be entitled to higher  purchase price  than  that  permissible under s.  5A of the Abolition Act. This, according to him, is a classification without any reasonable connection with  the objects sought to be achieved by the  statute. If  our construction  of s.  4 is correct,  Art.  31-A  of  the  Constitution  would protect the  law  and  the  petitioners  would  be precluded from  challenging it  on the ground that it infringes  Art 14. Apart from that we may point out that  though the  impugned Act applies only to tenure villages  and not  to non-tenure  villages, there is,  in fact a ground of distinction between villages of  the two  types. That  ground  is  the availability or  otherwise of  the records. In the former all  the relevant  records  were  with  the tenure-holders themselves,  but as  stated in  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 37 of 44  

statement of 466 "objects and  reasons" were  not produced  by them and this  created difficulties  in completing  the record of rights. In the latter the records having been maintained  by the  Government were available and therefore,  no difficulty  was experienced  in completing   the    record    of    rights.    The classification is  thus based on the extent of the availability  of   the  material  for  raising  an inference or  a presumption  and, therefore, has a reasonable nexus  with the  object  sought  to  be achieved by the impugned Act.      Upon  this   view  it  is  not  necessary  to consider the  other points  urged by Mr. Pathak on the authority  of various  decisions  because  the very basis  of those arguments is, in our opinion, unsound. The  petitions are,  therefore, dismissed with costs.  As there was only one common argument we direct  that there  will be  only  one  set  of costs.      AYYANGAR, J.-I  entirely agree with the order proposed to be passed by my Lord the Chief Justice and my learned Brother S.K. Das J. The only reason for my separate judgment is because of the views I entertain regarding  the import of the Bombay Land Tenure  Abolition   Laws  (Amendment),   Act  1958 (Bombay Act  LVII of 1958) hereinafter referred to as the  impugned Act,  and in  particular of  s. 4 thereof.      The  facts  of  the  case  and  the  relevant statutory provisions  bearing upon  it are set out in extenso in the judgments of my learned brethren and they do not need to be repeated      Before entering  on a  consideration  of  the proper construction  of the  impugned  Act  it  is necessary to  state that  I did not understand the learned Solicitor-General  to contest the position that if  the impugned  Act extended the definition of the  term permanent  tenant beyond  that  which obtained under  s.83 of the Land Revenue Code, and brought into that category tenants who before then were  comprehended  within  the  class  of  "other tenants". 467 under s.32H(1)(ii)  of Bombay  Act 13 of 1956, its constitutional validity could be sustained, having regard to  the decision  of this  Court in Sri Ram Ram Narain  Medhi v.  State of  Bombay(1)  holding that the  effect of  the 1956  legislation was  to replace the relationship of landlord and tenant by that  of  vendor  and  purchaser  as  between  the tenure-holder and  his tenants. His submission was accordingly  directed  to  establishing  that  the impugned Act while not modifying in any manner the basic requirements needed to constitute a person a "permanent tenant" under s. 83 of the Code, merely shifted the  onus of proof on to the tenure-holder on certain stated facts being found.      It is  this view  which has found favour with my   learned   brother   Mudholkar   J.   On   the Construction of  the relevant  provisions  of  the impugned Act,  he has  held  that  the  status  or character of  a permanent tenant or the definition of that  term has  not been altered in any manner,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 38 of 44  

and that whereas before the impugned enactment the onus  was   upon  the  tenant  to  prove  all  the necessary elements  to establish his claim to be a permanent tenant,  the change  effected by the Act of 1958 was to throw on the landlord the burden of proving  the   origin  of   the  tenancy  and  its terminable character  in the  event of  its  being proved that  the tenant  had been in possession of his holding  for twelve  Dears before  August  15, 1950. If  this construction  of the  effect of the impugned Act  were accepted  I agree it would go a considerable   way    towards   establishing   the constitutional validity of the impugned provision.      I feel  myself however  unable to  accept the construction of  s.4 of the impugned Act which was put forward  before us  by the  learned Solicitor- General for  the State  and Mr. Nathwani on behalf of the contesting tenants. To start with, the long 468 title of the Act itself states that the Act is one for further  to  "define"  permanent  tenants.  No doubt, where  the operative words of the provision are clear  that only  a shifting  of the  onus  of proof is  effected, the  long  title  of  the  Act cannot be  called in  aid  to  vary  their  proper interpretation, but that is not the position here. On the  other hand  as I shall show presently, the operative provisions  of the  enactment appears to me designed  to clearly  carryout the  purpose set out in  the long  title, viz.,  to "define"  or to redefine  the   class  of  persons  who  shall  be considered  to  be  "permanent  tenants"  for  the purposes of  obtaining the benefits conferred upon "permanent tenants"  under the  law  that  existed before that date.      The operative  provisions of the impugned Act relevant to the present enquiry are ss. 3, 4 and 6 and they read :           "3. A  person shall,  within the meaning      of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition Law (in      the  context  the  Taluqdari  Abolition  Act,      1949), be  deemed to  be .......  a permanent      tenant on  the date  of the  abolition of the      relevant land  tenure, if  his name  has been      recorded in  the record  of rights  or  other      public or  revenue record  as.....  permanent      tenant in respect of any tenure-land           (a) on  the date of the abolition of the      relevant land tenure, or           (b) in pursuance of orders issued during      the  course  of  any  proceedings  under  the      relevant Land Tenure Abolition law or, as the      case may be, the Land Revenue Code, 1879-                (i) before the commencement of this      Act,                (ii) after the commencement of this           Act in  cases in  which  inquiries  were           pending at the commencement of this Act,           or 469                (iii)  in  pursuance  of  an  order           issued by the Mamlatdar in respect of an           entry under section 6 of this Act."           "4. For the purposes of the relevant Act      specified  in  Part  I  of  the  Schedule,  a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 39 of 44  

    person-           (a) who  on the date of the commencement      of that Act was holding any tenure-land, and           (b) who and whose predecessors in title,      if any were, immediately before that date for      such continuous  periods as  aggregate  to  a      total continuous  period of  twelve years  or      more, holding  the same  tenure-land  or  any      other tenure-land,           as  a  tenant......  under  the  tenure-      holder for  the time  being on  payment of an      amount exceeding  the assessment  of the land      shall unless  it is  proved  by  the  tenure-      holder  that   he  would   not  have  been  a      permanent tenant  on the  basis of  continued      possession of  the land  under clause (b), be      deemed to  be a  permanent tenant of the land      under clause  (a) and  all the  provisions of      that Act  shall apply to him as they apply to      a permanent tenant.           Explanation.-The  assessment   for   the      purpose of  this section shall be reckoned as      provided in  clauses (a)  and (b)  of section      5."           "6. (1)  The  rights  of  ...........(a)      permanent tenant under sections 4 and 5 shall      be entered in the record of rights unless the      tenure-holder  applies   in  writing  to  the      Mamlatdar within  six months from the date of      the  commencement   of   this   Act   for   a      declaration that  any holder  or tenant under      his is not....... a permanent tenant.           (2)  Any   such  application   shall  be      disposed of  as if  it were an application in      respect of a 470      disputed  case  under  section  135D  of  the      Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879." to extract  only  the  portion  pertinent  to  the controversy before us.      It will be seen that by force of s. 3 persons are deemed  to  be  permanent  tenants  under  the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, if the name of such tenant is  recorded in  the record  of  rights  or other public  records as  "a permanent  tenant" in any one of the three events specified in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of the section. In so far as reference is made  to persons already recorded in the record of rights  before the  passing  of  the  Act,  the characteristics for  determining who  a  permanent tenant was  would obviously have been based on the pre-existing  law   and  they   would  have   been permanent tenants  under the  law apart  from  the "deeming"  provision.   The  position   of   those recorded under cl. (b) might be similar, and it is unnecessary to  enter  into  a  discussion  as  to whether in cases where an enquiry commenced before the commencement  of  the  Act  but  is  completed thereafter, the  tests brought  in by  s. 4 of the Act could be availed of to determine the status of the tenant.  If one  proceeded on  the  assumption that the provisions of the impugned Act are not to be brought  in into  an  enquiry  already  started there would  be no difference between cls. (a) and (b) of s. 3-and in both cases they would be actual

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 40 of 44  

and not  statutorily deemed  "permanent  tenants". Sub-cl. (c) however stands on a different footing. It brings  in, if  my construction  of s.  4(b) is correct, a  new class  of  "permanent  tenants"  - persons who  were before  the date of the impugned enactment non-permanent  tenants in whom by virtue of the  provisions of  Bombay Act  13 of  1956 the interest of  the landlord stood transferred and by whom the  purchase-price specified in s.32H(1)(ii) was  payable,  into  the  category  of  "permanent tenants." 471      Section 3(c)  refers to  an entry  made by  a Mamlatdar under  s. 6,  but when one looks at s. 6 he is  referred to  s. 4 as containing or defining the  class   of  tenants  whom  the  Mamlatdar  is enjoined to  enter in  the revenue  records  as  a "permanent tenant."  Turning now to s. 4, it would be seen  that persons  are deemed to be "permanent tenants"  if   they  satisfied   three  cumulative conditions :  (a) they must be holding tenure-land on the date of the commencement of that Act, viz., The Taluqdari  Abolition Act,  i.e., on August 15, 1950, (b)  they or  those  from  whom  they  claim should immediately  before August  15, 1950,  have been continuously  in possession  of that  or  any other tenure-land for twelve years, (c) the amount of  rent   payable  by   them  should  exceed  the assessment  leviable   on  the   land   calculated according to  s. 5.  The effect  of condition  (a) would be to exclude from the category of permanent tenants those  who came  into occupation  or  were inducted on  the land of which they could claim to be permanent  tenants, after  August 15, 1950. But every tenant  who was in possession of tenure-land on  that   date  could   apparently  qualify   for obtaining the  status of a permanent tenant, being deemed to  be such,  if he satisfied the other two conditions. As  regards condition  (b),  there  is obscurity   and    contradiction   attending   the expression "continuous  periods aggregating  to  a total  continuous   period   of   twelve   years". Aggregation would  obviously mean  an addition  of integers, and  when units of time are the integers as is apparent from the context, in plain words it would mean  the addition  of  broken  periods.  To posit continuity  in such  a case,  might possibly suggest that  it refers to cases where a tenant is in possession  of different parcels of tenure-land throughout the  twelve-year period,  though he  is not  in   possession  of   any  particular  parcel continuously for  a period  of 12  years, and that the terms of the section would be satisfied and he would be deemed to have been in "continuous 472 possession"  of  the  land  of  which  he  was  in possession at  the commencement  of the  Taluqdari Abolition Act  for the  purpose of  qualifying for permanent tenancy  of that  parcel. An analysis of the  circumstances  attendant  on  this  condition would reveal  the following  : (1)  Let us take it that during  the period twelve years before August 15, 1950  a tenant had been in possession of three distinct parcels  of tenure  land ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ at different  periods but  continuous, i.e., there

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 41 of 44  

being no  point of  time at  which he  was not  in possession of  one or  the other  of  these  three parcels and  that on  the date of the commencement of the  Act he  is in possession of parcel ‘C’. It is possible that such a situation might arise from exchange of  holdings  with  the  consent  of  the tenure-holder by  a person  who  was  a  permanent tenant under  the existing  law. But the provision on its  terms is not confined to exchanges by such tenants, but  is  of  wider  application.  If  the proper construction  of this  unclear provision of s. 4  be as  above, any  tenant who  satisfied the other conditions  of the  section, would be deemed to be a permanent tenant in respect of parcel ‘C’. It will  at once  be seen  that the  origin of his tenancy of  holding ‘C’  is  ex  concessis  known. Surely, such  a tenant  would not  be a  permanent tenant within  s. 83  of the  Bombay Land  Revenue Code. It  has only  to be  added that he would not fall within  the definition  of a permanent tenant even under  s. 2(10A)  of the Tenancy Act inserted by Bombay  Act 13 of 1956. The argument, therefore that s.  4 was  merely intended  to and provided a rule of  evidence for  determining who a permanent tenant was  under s. 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879  and did  not extend  such category  of persons by  an artificial definition, would appear to be  negatived even by the first paragraph of s. 4(b).      This  conclusion   is  strengthened   by  the provision made  at the  end  of  s.  4(b)  of  the impugned Act as regards the grounds upon which the landlord or 473 the tenure-holder  could disprove  the right  of a tenant to  the status  of a permanent tenant. That provision reads:           "Unless it  is  proved  by  the  tenure-      holder  that   he  would   not  have  been  a      permanent tenant  on the  basis of  continued      possession of land under clause (b)......" The learned  Solicitor-General submitted  that  to read this  portion of s. 4 (b) as meaning that the landlord has  to  disprove  what  the  tenant  has already proved  would be  to give it no meaning at all and  that consequently  it should be held that in order  to give  some rational  meaning  to  the words quoted they refer to tenure-holder having to prove that  the tenant  was not a permanent tenant under s.  83 of  the Bombay  Land Revenue Code. To put it differently, the construction suggested was that on  the conditions laid down in s. 4(b) being fulfilled, viz.,  continuous possession of tenure- land by  a tenant  for twelve  years  computed  as described, the  onus was  shifted to  the  tenure- holder to  prove that  the  tenant  did  not  fall within the  category of persons described in s. 83 of the  Code. I  find myself unable to accept this interpretation of the section. Even if one started with the  presumption that  what the  impugned Act sought to  achieve was not to "define" a permanent tenant but merely to shift the onus of proving the status-the conditions  of s.  83 of the Code being assumed to be still the determinant, I do not find words in  s. 4 to support the interpretation which

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 42 of 44  

the learned Solicitor-General desires the Court to accept. There  is no  reference to  s. 83  in  the impugned Act  and the  class of  persons  who  are termed "permanent tenants" are expressly stated to be those  who are  deemed to  be such. That itself would be  some indication  that the  class  is  an artificial creation  brought into existence by the Act. That  apart, I  have already pointed out that the opening words of the 474 first paragraph of s. 4(b) contemplate cases where the origin of the tenancy of the parcel in respect of which  permanent tenancy  is claimed  is known. Lastly, the  words in  which the  content  of  the right of the tenure-holder to dispute the "deemed" permanent   tenancy   are   couched   are   wholly incompatible with  his having a right to establish that the  tenant does not satisfy the requirements of s. 83 of the Code. The words used are "that the tenant would  not have  been a permanent tenant on the basis  of continued  possession of  land under clause (b)".  The conditions  on the fulfilment of which a  person is deemed to be a permanent tenant are, as  already pointed  out, three  and of these two  are   set  out  in  sub-cl.  (b),  viz.,  the "continuous" possession  of  tenure-land  and  the rent of  the land  being higher  than the  revenue assessment. In  my opinion  the argument about the irrationality of  the literal  construction of the quoted words  or s. 4(b) stems from the assumption that s.  4 contemplates  an enquiry  or proceeding initiated by the tenants who by evidence establish the matters  set out  in s.  4 and  it is  on that basis  that   the  submission  is  made  that  the legislature could  not have  made a  provision for the same  matters being  disproved by  the tenure- holder.  Even  if  the  basis  be  assumed  to  be correct,  I  do  not  see  any  absurdity  in  the provision. But  that apart, in my judgment s. 4(b) does  not   contemplate   or   provide   for   any application by  the tenant  and therefore there is no question  of the tenant having established that the conditions  of s.  4(b) have  been  satisfied. Section 4(b)  enacts a  positive rule  of  law  by which a  person in  possession  of  a  holding  of tenure-land on August 15, 1950 is "deemed" to be a permanent  tenant   on  the  fulfilment  of  three conditions, the  tenure-holder being  entitled  to establish that the conditions of that section have not  been  satisfied  when  proceedings  for  that purpose are initiated by him. The 475 provision for  proceedings being  initiated by the tenure-holder  to  take  advantage  of  the  right granted to him by s. 4(b) is to be found in s. 6.      What has  just been stated is amply borne out by the  terms of  s. 6,  for it  enacts  that  the rights of  a permanent tenant under s. 4 "shall be entered in the record of rights unless the tenure- holder applies  in writing to the Mamlatdar within six months  from the  commencement of the Act of a declaration that  the tenant  under him  is not  a permanent tenant"  (to  quote  only  the  material words). It will therefore be seen that the concept of permanent  tenant as  envisaged under  s. 4  is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 43 of 44  

incorporated into  the  texture  of  s.  6.  Every person who satisfies the definition of a permanent tenant  under  s.  4  is  therefore  automatically entitled without application by him, to be entered in the  revenue records  as a  permanent tenant by the Mamlatdar  unless the tenure-holder applies in writing objecting  to  the  entry.  Obviously  the objections which he could raise and which would be the subject  of adjudication  under s. 6 are those set out  as being  open to him under s. 4. In this connection it has to be noticed that s. 6 does not specify the  grounds upon  which the tenure-holder might object  to  a  tenant  being  treated  as  a permanent tenant and it is on the absence of those provisions  that   the  learned  Solicitor-General bases his  argument suggesting that the objections of the  tenure-holder would  extend to  disproving that the tenant was a permanent tenant under s. 83 of the  Code. It is not possible to accede to this submission. It is common ground that no enquiry is contemplated under  s. 4(b)  and that the right of the tenure-holder  to object  to the  entry of the tenant  as   a  permanent   tenant  is  by  taking advantage of  the provision  in  s.  6.  It  would therefore  follow  that  s.  4(b)  and  s.  6  are integrated provisions,  the one  laying  down  the grounds of  objection open  to the  tenure-holder, and s.  6 making  provision for the forum in which and 476 the procedure  by which  such objections  could be urged. To  put the  matter slightly differently s. 4(b) specifies  the grounds of objection open to a tenure-holder but  does not  indicate where and in which proceeding  the objections  could be raised- while s.  6 indicates that the authority to decide is the  Mamlatdar and that the proceeding would be initiated by  an objection  petition filed  by the tenure-holder. Both  s. 4(b)  and s.  6  would  be truncated unless  they were  read  as  forming  an integrated whole.  It is  in this  manner  that  a reconciliation is  possible between  the terms  of ss. 4  and 6  which  so  to  speak  form  together provision for  determining,  after  investigation. the class  of persons  who shall  be  entitled  to claim  rights  as  permanent  tenants.  Section  4 having defined  a  permanent  tenant  in  positive terms, s.  6 steps  in and sets up a procedure and creates a  forum in  which that positive provision might be  tested and  if not  displaced  would  be given effect  to. In the view I have expressed the reference to  the enquiry  being under  s. 135D of the Code  would not  make any  difference, because the officials  and Tribunals or Courts vested with authority under  s.  135D  of  the  Code  and  the related provisions  would have  still to  consider whether the  tenant had or had not qualified to be a permanent  tenant  by  the  application  of  the criteria enacted  by s.  6. I am therefore clearly of the  opinion that the entire object and purpose of the impugned enactment which is given effect to by its  operative provisions  enacts not a rule of evidence for determining who permanent tenants are under the  pre-existing law, but to define, create and as  it were,  add a  new class  of  "permanent

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 44 of 44  

tenants", i.e., those who satisfy the requirements of s. 4.      If this  were the  proper construction of the impugned enactment  it was not seriously contested that   the    enactment   would    be   void   and unconstitutional and  liable to  be struck down. I agree therefore  that these  petitions  should  be allowed. 477      BY COURT  : In accordance with the opinion of the majority,  these petitions  are  allowed  with costs. As  the petitions  have been heard together there will be only one hearing fee.