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PETITIONER: MAHARAJA PRAVIR CHANDRA BHANJ DEO  KAKATIYA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/11/1960

BENCH: IMAM, SYED JAFFER BENCH: IMAM, SYED JAFFER KAPUR, J.L. GUPTA, K.C. DAS DAYAL, RAGHUBAR AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1961 AIR  775            1961 SCR  (2) 501  CITATOR INFO :  E          1971 SC 530  (208,261)

ACT: "Ruler"-Recognition   by  President-Whether   ex-Ruler   for purposes  outside  the  Constitution-Maufidar,  Meaning  of- Constitution of India, Art. 366(22)-Madhya Pradesh Abolition of  Proprietary  Rights (Estates, Mahals,  Alienated  Lands) Act, 1950 (M.  P. 1 of 1951), S. 2(m).

HEADNOTE: The appellant was the Ruler of the State of Baster which was later  integrated with the State of Madhya Pradesh.  He  was recognised by the President as a Ruler under Art. 366(22) of the  Constitution.   The respondent  resumed  certain  lands belonging   to  the  appellant  under  the  Madhya   Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals,  Alienated Lands) Act, 1950.  The appellant contended that he was still a Ruler and not an ex-Ruler and as such did not come  within the definition of "proprietor" given in the Act. Held, that the appellant was an ex-Ruler for the purposes of the Act and was within the class of persons who were by name included  in the definition of ’proprietor’ and  was  within the  scope of the Act.  Factually the appellant was  an  ex- Ruler.   He was a Ruler for the purposes of the privy  purse guaranteed to him.  There was nothing in Art. 366(22)  which required  a  court  to treat such a person as  a  Ruler  for purposes  outside the Constitution.  Further, the  appellant was  also a maufidar in respect of the lands acquired  which were exempt from the payment of rent or tax.  The expression "maufidar" was not necessarily confined to a grantee from  a State or a Ruler of a State; he could be the holder of  land which was exempted from payment of rent or tax.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 198 of 1954. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated October 16,  1952, of the former Nagpur High Court in Misc.  Petn.; No. 1231 of

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1951. M.   S. K. Sastri, for the appellant. H.   L. Khaskalam, B. K. B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent. 64 502 1960.  November 18.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM,  J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of the  Nagpur High  Court dismissing the appellants petition  under  Arts. 226  and 227 of the Constitution of India.  The  High  Court certified  under  Art. 132(1) of the Constitution  that  the case  involved  a  substantial question of  law  as  to  the interpretation  of  the  Constitution.   Hence  the  present appeal. The  appellant was the Ruler of the State of Baster.   After the  passing  of  the Indian  Independence  Act,  1947,  the appellant  executed  an  Instrument  of  Accession  to   the Dominion  of  India  on August  14,  1947.   Thereafter,  he entered  into  an  agreement  with  the  Dominion  of  India popularly known as "The Stand Still Agreement".  On December 15,  1947, he entered into an agreement with the  Government of  India  whereby  he  ceded the State  of  Baster  to  the Government  of  India  to be  integrated  with  the  Central Provinces  and  Berar (now the State of Madhya  Pradesh)  in such  manner as the Government of India thought  fit.   Con- sequently  the Governments in India came to  have  exclusive and  plenary  authority, jurisdiction and  powers  over  the Baster State with effect from January 1, 1948. The  Legislature of the State of Madhya Pradesh  passed  the Madhya  Pradesh  Abolition of Proprietary  Rights  (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (Madhya Pradesh Act 1  of 1951),  hereinafter referred to as the Act,  which  received the  assent of the President of India on January  22,  1951. The  preamble of the Act stated that it was one  to  provide for the acquisition of the rights of proprietors in estates, mahals,  alienated  villages and alienated lands  in  Madhya Pradesh  and to make provisions for other matters  connected therewith.   Under s. 3 of the Act, vesting  of  proprietary rights  in  the  State Government  takes  place  on  certain conditions,, mentioned in that section, being complied with. The definition of ’proprietor’ is stated in s. 2 cl. (m) and it is "in relation to- 503 (i)  the Central Provinces, includes an inferior proprietor, a  protected  thekadar  or  other  thekadar,  or   protected headman; (ii) the  merged territories, means a maufidar including  an ex-Ruler  of an Indian State merged with Madhya  Pradesh,  a Zamindar,  Ilaquedar,  Khorposhdar or  Jagirdar  within  the meaning  of  wajib-ul-arz,  or  any  sanad,  deed  or  other instrument,  and  a gaontia or a thekadar of  a  village  in respect of which by or under the provisions contained in the wajib-ul-arz  applicable to such village the  maufidar,  the gaontia, or the thekadar, as the case may be, has a right to recover rent or revenue from persons holding land in such village;". The  definition  of ’mahal’ is stated in s. 2(j) and  it  is "mahal",  in relation to merged territories, means any  area other  than  land in possession of a raiyat which  has  been separately  assessed  to  land revenue,  whether  such  land revenue  be payable or has been released, compounded for  or redeemed in whole or in part;". Before  the High Court the appellant contended that  he  was

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still  a Sovereign Ruler and absolute owner of the  villages specified  in Schedules A and B of his petition under  Arts. 226  and 227 of the Constitution.  He urged that his  rights had  been  recognized and guaranteed  under  the  agreements entered  into  by  him with the Government  of  India.   The provisions of the Act, therefore, did not apply to him.   It was further contended that the provisions of the Act did not apply to a Ruler or to the private property of a Ruler which was  not assessed to land revenue.  He relied on Art.  6  of the Instrument of Accession and the first paragraph of  Art. 3 of the Merger Agreement.  The High Court held that if  the petitioner’s  rights  under  Art. 6  of  the  Instrument  of Accession  and  Art.  3 of the  Merger  Agreement  had  been infringed  it was clear from the provisions of Art.  363  of the Constitution that interference by the courts was  barred in disputes arising out of these two instruments.  The  High Court was also of the opinion that Art. 362 of the Constitu- tion was of no assistance to the appellant. 504 After  referring to the definition of the word  ’proprietor’ in the Act, the High Court was of the opinion that the  word ’maufidar’  in s. 2(m) of the Act had not been used  in  any narrow  or  technical sense.  A ’maufidar’ was  not  only  a person to whom a grant of maufi lands had been made but  was also one who held land which was exempt from the payment  of "rent  or tax".  It accordingly rejected the  contention  on behalf  of  the  appellant  that  the  word  ’maufidar’   is necessarily  confined to a grantee from the State  or  Ruler and  therefore a Ruler could not conceivably be a  maufidar. The High Court also rejected the contention on behalf of the appellant  that  as he was a "Ruler" within the  meaning  of that  expression in Art. 366(22) of the Constitution he  did not  come within the expression ’ex-Ruler’ as  contained  in the  definition  of the word ’proprietor’ in the  Act.   The expression  ’Ruler’  as  defined  in  Art.  366(22)  of  the Constitution applied only for interpreting the provisions of the  Constitution.  The expression ’ex-Ruler’ given  in  the Act must therefore be given the ordinary dictionary meaning. According  to  Shorter Oxford  English  Dictionary,  ’Ruler’ means "one who, or that which, exercises rule, especially of a   supreme  or  sovereign  kind.   One  who  has   control, management,  or head-ship within some limited sphere".   The High  Court  accordingly  took the view  that  although  the appellant did exercise such a rule in the past he ceased  to exercise  it  in his former Domain after the  agreements  of accession  and merger had come into operation.   Accordingly the appellant must be regarded as an ex-Ruler and as he  was also  a maufidar he fell within the definition of  the  word ’proprietor’ in the Act. The  question whether the villages mentioned in Schedules  A and  B  of  the  petition under Arts. 226  and  227  of  the Constitution  fell  in  any  of  the  categories,  "Estates, Mahals,  Alienated lands", was also considered by  the  High Court.  In its opinion they did not fall within the category of  Estates or Alienated lands but they did fall within  the category of Mahals.  According to the definition of  ’Mahal’ in  s. 2(j) of the Act the same must be separately  assessed to land 505 revenue.   According  to  the appellant they  had  not  been assessed  to land revenue but this was denied on  behalf  of the  State  of Madhya Pradesh.  The High Court  was  of  the opinion that in these circumstances it was for the appellant to  establish that the villages in question had  never  been assessed  to  land revenue but no evidence had been  led  to

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this effect.  On the contrary, according to the High  Court, it  would appear from the documents on the record  that  the villages  known as ’Bhandar villages’ had been  assessed  to land revenue.  As the rest of the villages in Schedule A and the villages in Schedule B, upto the date of the High  Court judgment, had not been recognized as the private property of the appellant by the Government of India as required by  the second  and  third paragraphs of the Merger  Agreement,  the appellant  could  not assert his ownership over  them.   The High Court, accordingly, dismissed his petition under  Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Two  questions in the main were urged before us (1)  whether the  appellant  is a proprietor within the meaning  of  that expression  in  the  Act and (2)  whether  the  villages  in question  came  within the definition of  the  word  ’mahal’ contained  in  the Act.  On behalf of the appellant  it  had also been urged that the Act could not defeat the rights  of the  appellant  guaranteed  under  Art.  3  of  the   Merger Agreement.   It seems clear to us, however, that in view  of the  provisions  of  Art. 363(1)  of  the  Constitution  any dispute   arising  out  of  the  Merger  Agreement  or   the Instrument  of  Accession is beyond the  competence  of  the courts to enquire into.  The High Court rightly decided this point against the  appellant. With  reference to the first point we would  first  consider whether the appellant is an ex-Ruler for the purposes of the Act.   That  he is so factually cannot be denied,  since  he ceded his State to the Government of India to be  integrated with  the  Central  Provinces and Berar (now  the  State  of Madhya  Pradesh) in such manner as the Government  of  India thought  fit.  He further ceded to the Government’ of  India full  and  exclusive authority, jurisdiction and  powers  in relation 506 to  the  governance  of his State when he  agreed  that  the administration  of  that State would be transferred  to  the Government  of India as from January 1, 1948.  The  question is   whether  his  recognition  for  the  purposes  of   the Constitution  as Ruler by virtue of the provisions  of  Art. 366(22) of the Constitution of India continues his status as a  Ruler  for purposes other than  the  Constitution.   Art. 366(22) states: "  "Ruler" in relation to an Indian State means the  Prince, Chief or other person by whom any such covenant or agreement as  is referred to in clause (1) of article 291 was  entered into  and  who  for  the time being  is  recognised  by  the President as the Ruler of the State, and includes any person who for the time being is recognised by the President as the successor of such Ruler". Article 291 refers to the privy purse payable to Rulers.  It states: "Where  under any covenant or agreement entered into by  the Ruler  of any Indian State before the commencement  of  this Constitution, the payment of any sums, free of tax, has been guaranteed  or assured by the Government of the Dominion  of India to any Ruler of such State as privy purse- (a)  such  sums  shall be charged on, and paid out  of,  the Consolidated Fund of India; and (b)  the sums so paid to any Ruler shall be exempt from  all taxes on income." Article 291 refers to any covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian State before the commencement  of the Constitution.  The covenant or agreement referred to  in this Article certainly includes the Instrument of  Accession and  the  Merger  Agreement.   The  effect  of  the   Merger

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Agreement  is clearly one by which factually a Ruler  of  an Indian  State ceases to be a Ruler but for the  purposes  of the  Constitution  and for the purposes of the  privy  purse guaranteed, he is a Ruler as defined in Art. 366(22) of  the Constitution.   There is nothing in the provisions  of  Art. 366(22) which requires a court to recognise such a person as a  Ruler  for  purposes outside the  Constitution.   In  our opinion, the High Court rightly held that 507 the  appellant was an ex-Ruler and that Art. 366(22) of  the Constitution  did not make him a Ruler for the  purposes  of the Act.  As the appellant was an ’ex-Ruler’, he was  within the class of persons who were by name specifically  included in  the  definition of ’proprietor’  and  therefore  clearly within the scope of the Act. That  the appellant was not only an ex-Ruler but a  maufidar appears to us to be clear.  The ordinary dictionary  meaning of maufi is "Released, exempted, exempt from the payment  of rent  or tax, rent free" and maufidar is "A holder of  rent- free  land,  a grantee".  It was common ground in  the  High Court  that  the villages in question were exempt  from  the payment  of  rent or tax.  In our opinion,  the  High  Court rightly took the view that the expression ’maufidar’ was not necessarily confined to a grantee from a State or a Ruler of a State.  A maufidar could be a person who was the holder of land which was exempted from the payment of rent or tax.  In our  opinion,  the  appellant  certainly  came  within   the expression  ’maufidar’  besides  being an  ex-Ruler’  of  an Indian State merged with Madhya Pradesh. It  is, however, contended on behalf of the  appellant  that the most important part of the definition was the concluding portion  where it was stated that in the case of a  maufidar he must be a person who by or under the provisions contained in the wajib-ul-arz applicable to his village, had the right to recover rent or revenue from persons holding land in such village.  It was contended that even if the appellant was  a maufidar,  there was nothing to show that with reference  to any village held by him it was entered in the  wajib-ul-arz, that he had a right to recover rent or revenue from  persons holding  land in such village.  In the petition under  Arts. 226  and 227 of the Constitution, filed by the appellant  in the High Court, it was nowhere asserted that even if he  was regarded  as a maufidar it was not entered in the  wajib-ul- arz with respect to any of his maufi villages that he had  a right  to recover rent or revenue from persons holding  land in such villages.  From the judgment of the High 508 Court  it  would appear that no such argument  was  advanced before  it.   In the application for a  certificate    under Art.  132(1) of the Constitution we can find no  mention  of this.  In the statement of the case filed in this Court also there is no mention of this fact.  There is thus no material on  the  record  to  establish that  the     appellant  as a maufidar  had  no  right to recover  rent  or  revenue  from persons holding land in his villages.  The burden was on the appellant  to  prove this fact which he never  attempted  to discharge.   It  is  impossible  therefore  to  accept  this contention  on behalf of the appellant raised for the  first time  before  us in the course of the  submissions  made  on behalf of the appellant. Regarding the second point arising out of the definition  of ’Mahal’, the High Court definitely found that the petitioner had  given  no evidence to establish that  the  villages  in question  were  not  assessed  to  land  revenue.   On   the contrary,  at least with reference to the  Bhandar  villages

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documents on the record showed that these villages had  been assessed  to land revenue.  Since it was a question of  fact whether  the  villages had been assessed  to  land  revenue, which  was denied on behalf of the State of Madhya  Pradesh, the  High  Court  rightly held that the  contention  of  the appellant in this respect could not be accepted.  As for the other villages, in Schedules A and B of the petition of  the appellant  under Arts. 226 and 227 of the  Constitution  the High  Court, in our opinion, rightly held that the  petition was  not  maintainable as these villages had  not  yet  been recognised  by  the  Government  of  India  as  the  private property of the appellant. In  our  opinion,  the  appeal  accordingly  fails  and   is dismissed with costs.                                       Appeal dismissed. 509