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PETITIONER: MAHARAJA PILLAI LAKSHMI AMMAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MAHARAJA PILLAI THILLANAYAKOM PILLAI AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/11/1987

BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:  1988 SCR  (1) 780        1988 SCC  (1)  99  JT 1987 (4)   281        1987 SCALE  (2)933

ACT:      Hindu Succession  Act, 1956 Right of widow to property- Whether absolute  right under  section 14(1)  or  restricted right under section 14(2) of the Act.

HEADNOTE: %      Under a  family partition  deed (Ex. 1), the properties under ’A’  schedule were  allotted to  Maharaja Pillai,  and after his  death, his  widow was given the right to take the income from the properties.      One of  the  sons  of  Maharaja  Pillai  filed  a  suit claiming his  right to  1/3rd share in the properties above- said. The trial court held that the widow got absolute right over the  properties in  dispute under  section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession  Act. On  appeal, the  appellate court held that the  widow got  only a  restricted right  under section 14(2) of  the Act.  On further appeal, the High Court mainly upheld the  view of  the first  appellate court. Against the judgment of  the High  Court, appeal was filed to this Court by special leave.      Allowing the  appeal and  restoring the judgment of the trial court, the Court, ^      HELD: The  question to  be decided is whether the widow got an  absolute  right  or  a  restricted  right  over  the properties in  the ’A’  schedule after the coming into force of the  Hindu  Succession  Act.  During  the  life  time  of Maharaja Pillai,  his wife  (The  widow  in  the  case)  was maintained by  him.  After  his  death,  the  widow  was  in exclusive possession  of the ’A’ schedule properties and was taking the  income from those properties. She had a right to utilise that  income for  her maintenance.  That  right  was conferred on her under Ex. D. 1. The properties possessed by the widow  fairly and  squarely fall  under Section 14(1) of the Act.  The property  mentioned in  section 14(1)  may  be acquired by  a female  by inheritance  or  devise  or  at  a partition  or   in  lieu   of  maintenance   or  arrears  of maintenance, etc. The right to maintenance of a Hindu female is a  personal obligation of the husband. If the wife is put in exclusive possession of property with the right to take 781

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income for  her maintenance,  it must  be presumed  that the property is  given  to  her  in  lieu  of  maintenance.  The property under  ’A’ schedule  was allotted against the share of  Maharaja   Pillai.  That   property  was  given  to  the possession of  the widow with a right to take income for her maintenance, and this is sufficient to get the protection of section 14(1) of the Act. [782B; 783D-E; 784C-D; 786G]      Gulwant Kaur  & Anr.  v. Mohinder  Singh &  Ors., Civil Appeal  No.   112  of  1980,  date  20.7.87;  Bai  Vajia  v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai  & Ors.,  [19793 3 SCR 291; V. Tulsamma v. Sesha Reddi, [1977] 3 SCR 261 at 310. referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 266 of 1974. C      From the  Judgment and  order  dated  7.2.1973  of  the Kerala High Court in S.A. No. 763 of 1970.      S. Padmanabhan and N. Sudhakaran for the Appellant.      G. Vishwanatha  Iyer  and  Miss  Lily  Thomas  for  the Respondent N and 5.      D.M. Nargolkar for the Respondent No. 1.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      JAGANNATHA SHETTY,  J. This appeal by special leave has been  preferred   against  the  judgment  and  decree  dated February 7,  1983 passed  by the  High Court  of  Kerala  in Second Appeal No. 763 of 1970.      Under the  family partition  deed  Ex.  1  executed  on August 2,  1950, the  properties  under  ’A’  schedule  were allotted to  Maharaja Pillai  and after  his death his widow was given the right to take the income therefrom. One of the sons of  Maharaja Pillai  filed a suit claiming his right to take 1/3rd  share in those properties. The trial court while construing the  terms of  Ex. 1  held  that  the  widow  got absolute right  over ’A’ schedule under section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession  Act. The  appellate court, however, took a different view.  The appellate  court held  that  the  widow could get only a restricted right under Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession  Act. Upon  further appeal,  the High Court agreed with the view taken by the appellate court. The 782 High Court,  however, granted  a small  share to  the  widow stating that  according to  law in  force in  the  erstwhile Travancore State,  the widow  would have inherited the share which would have fallen to any of the sons.      The question for our consideration is whether the widow got absolute  right or  only a restricted right over the ’A’ schedule after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. The  answer to  the question  turns upon  the scope and meaning to  be given  to the  terms of  Ex. 1,  the relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder:           "... 3.  As it  was decided by us to partition our           family   properties    providing    to    maintain           Kothamachiyar Ammal,  who is the wife of executant           No. 1  and mother  of  others  and  the  aforesaid           Lakshmi Ammal, this partition deed is written with           the stipulation  mentioned below  and it  is fully           agreed by  us to abide by the provisions contained           herein.           xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx           9. During  the life  time of  the 1st executant as           and when the marriage of the said Lakshmi Ammal is           decided  to   be  conducted  the  first  executant           himself shall  meet the expense in connection with

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         that and  conduct her marriage and if her marriage           happened to  be conducted  after the  death of 1st           executant, executants  Nos. 2  and  3  shall  have           right to encumber the ’A’ schedule property for an           amount up  to  Rs.2,  to  meet  the  expenses  for           marriage  ceremonies   and  for   dowry  and  gold           ornaments and  the A schedule proper ties shall be           liable for  so much  amount. 10.  Kothamachi  kyar           Ammal, the  wife of  first executant and mother of           other  executants   may  reside  in  the  building           included in  the A  Schedule during  her life time           and take  the income of the properties included in           the  A   schedule  after  the  death  of  the  1st           executant; after  the death  of the  1st executant           the successor-in-interest  of  the  1st  executant           shall have no right to create any document, except           in  the   manner  stated  in  paragraphs  9  above           encumbering A  schedule properties  so as  not  to           affect the  right of  enjoyment of the said person           but this  provision will not be binding on the 1st           executant as regards his absolute right over the A           schedule properties. 783      The first  executant referred  to  above  was  Maharaja Pillai. The  widow we  are concerned was his wife. On August 31, 1955  Maharaja Pillai  died.  There-after  ’A’  schedule items in the partition deed were being enjoyed by the widow. While she  was in  possession of  those properties the Hindu Succession Act  of 1956  came into  force. Subsequently, the widow had gifted those properties in favour of her daughter. The case  of the  plaintiff was  that  after  the  death  of Maharaja Pillai,  the said properties would devolve upon his heirs and  he would  be entitled to 1/3rd share. It has been urged by  Mr.  Vishwanath  Iyer,  learned  counsel  for  the respondents that  the properties  in A schedule would remain in possession  of the  widow with  the right  to utilise the income therefrom for her maintenance but the properties were not given  to her  in lieu of maintenance. It was also urged that Maharaja Pillai had absolute power of disposal over the properties during  his life  time, and it would be therefore not proper to hold that the widow got the properties in lieu of her maintenance.      We are  unable to  agree with  these contentions. It is not necessary  for us to examine what would have happened to the rights  of the  wife if  Maharaja Pillai had disposed of the ’A’  schedule. The  fact remains that he did not. During the life  time of  Maharaja Pillai, the wife was residing in the house  allotted to her husband. She was being maintained by her  husband. After  the death  of husband,  she  was  in exclusive possession of the ’A’ schedule. She was taking the income from  those properties.  She had  a right  to utilise that income for her maintenance. That right was conferred on her under  Ex. D1. The children also were, allotted separate properties under  Ex. D1.  They had  taken their  respective shares from  the  family  properties.  In  our  opinion  the properties possessed  by the  widow fairly and squarely fall under Section  14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 14 provides:           " 1.  Any property  possessed by  a female  Hindu,           whether acquired  before or after the commencement           of this  Act, shall  be held  by her as full owner           thereof and not as a limited(l owner           Explanation-In   this    sub-section,   "Property"           includes  both   movable  and  immovable  property           acquired by  a  female  Hindu  by  inheritance  or

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         device  or   at  a   partition,  or   in  lieu  of           maintenance or  arrears of  maintenance or by gift           from  any  person,  whether  a  relative  or  not,           before, at  or after  her marriage  or by  her own           skill  or   exertion,  or   by  purchase   or   by           prescription or any other manner what so 784           ever, and  also any  such property  held by her as           stridhan A  immediately before the commencement of           this Act.           (2) Nothing  contained in  sub-section  (1)  shall           apply to  any property  acquired by way of gift or           under a  will or  any other  instrument or under a           degree or order of a civil court or under an award           where  the  terms  of  the  gift,  will  or  other           instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe           "a restricted state in such property."      The property  possessed by  a female  referred to under Section 14(1)  includes property both movable and immovable, property.  It   may  be   acquired  by  a  female  Hindu  by inheritance or  devise or  at a  partition  or  in  lieu  of maintenance or  arrears of  maintenance etc. The deed or any other arrangement by which the husband gives the property to his wife for maintenance need not specifically state that it is given in lieu of maintenance. It is not an act of charity the husband  does. It  is out  of his personal obligation to maintain her. The right to maintenance of a Hindu woman is a personal obligation  of the husband. If, therefore, the wife is put  in exclusive  possession of  the property  with  the right to  take the  income for  her maintenance,  it must be presumed that  the property  is given  to  her  in  lieu  of maintenance. The  very right to receive maintenance which is inherent in her, is itself sufficient to enable the ripening of possession  of any  property into  full  ownership  under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.      It was, however, urged for the respondents that Section 14(1) does  not take  within its  fold every  property  that comes into  possession. Of  the widow.  It must be a limited estate in  the sense  of  ownership  without  the  right  of disposal. It  should be  a specific property given to her in lieu of her right to maintenance.      Similar contentions  have been  considered and rejected in a recent decision of this Court in Gulwant Kaur & Anr. v. Mohinder Singh  & Ors.,  Civil Appeal  No. 112  of 1980 date 20.7.87 (to  which one  of us  was a  party,  K.  Jagannatha Shetty, J. ) . There it was observed:           "It  is  obvious  that  Section  14  is  aimed  at           removing restriction no limitation on the right of           a female  Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner property           possessed by  her so  long as  her  possession  is           traceable to  a lawful  origin, that is to say, if           she  has  a  vestige  of  a  title.  It  makes  no           difference whether  the property  is  acquired  by           inheritance or device or at a 785           partition or  in lieu of maintenance or arrears of           maintenance or  by gift  or by  her own  skill  or           exertion or  by pruchase  or by prescription or in           any  other   manner  whatsoever.  The  explanation           expressly refers  to property  acquired in lieu of           maintenance and  we do  not see what further title           the widow  is required to establish before she can           claim  full   ownership  under  Section  14(1)  in           respect of  property given to her and possessed by           her in  lieu of  maintenance. The  very  right  to

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         receive maintenance  is sufficient title to enable           the ripening  of possession into full ownership if           she is  in possession  of the  property in lieu of           maintenance. Subsection  (2) of  Section 14  is in           the nature  of an  exception to  Section 14(1) and           provides  for   a  situation   where  property  is           acquired  by   a  female  Hindu  under  a  written           instrument or a decree of court and not where such           acquisition  is   traceable  to   any  antecedents           right."      It was  urged that  the view  taken in  above case  was contrary  to   the  decision  in  Bai  Vajia  v.  Thakorbhai Chelabhai &  Ors., [1979]  3 SCR  291. We  do not agree with this contention  also. Indeed a similar contention was urged in Gulwant Kaur’s case and it was rejected by observing:           "We do  not understand  that court  as laying down           that what was enlarged by sub-section 1 of Section           14 into a full estate was the Hindu women’s estate           known to  Hindu law.  When the Court uses the word           limited estate,  the words  are used  to connote a           right in  the property  to which the possession of           the female  Hindu may  be legitimately traced, but           which is  not a  full right  of  ownership.  If  a           female Hindu  is put  in  possession  of  property           pursuant to  or  in  recognition  of  a  right  to           maintenance, it  cannot be  denied  that  she  has           acquired  a  limited  right  or  interest  in  the           property and  once that  position is  accepted  it           follows that  the  right  gets  enlarged  to  full           ownership under  Sec. 14(1) of the Act. That seems           to us  to follow clearly from the language of Sec.           14(1) of the Act."      Bai Vijia’s  case, has  not  laid  down  any  different principle. It  has expressly  accepted the  view taken in V. Tulsamma v.  Sesha Reddi, [1977] 3 SCR 261 at 310 this Court summarised the scope of Section 14 as follows: 786           "(1) The  Hindu female’s  right to  maintenance is           not an  empty formality or an illusory claim being           conceded as  a matter of grace and generosity, but           is a  tangible right  against property which flows           from  the   spiritual  relationship   between  the           husband  and   the  wife  and  is  recognised  and           enjoined by  pure Shastric  Hindu Law and has been           strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurist           starting from  Yajnavalkya to  Manu. Such  a right           may not  be a  right to property but it is a right           against property  and the  husband has  a personal           obligation to  maintain his  wife and if he or the           family has property the female has the legal right           to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created           for the  maintenance of  a female  the said  right           becomes a  legally enforceable  one. At  any rate,           even without a charge the claim for maintenance is           doubtless  a   pre-existing  right   so  that  any           transfer declaring  or recognising  such  a  right           does not  confer any new title but merely endorses           or confirms the pre existing rights.           (2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have           been couched  in the widest possible term and must           be liberally  construed in favour of the female so           as to  advance the  object of 1956 Act and promote           the socio  economic ends  sought to be achieved by           this long need legislation.           (3) Sub-section (2) of S. 14 is in the nature of a

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         proviso  and  has  a  field  of  its  own  without           interfering  with   the  operation   of  S.  14(1)           materially. The proviso should not be construed in           a manner  so as  to destroy the effect of the main           provision or the protection granted by S. 14(1) or           in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with           the main provision.           XXX       XXX       XXX       XXX       XXX      In the  instant case  the property under A Schedule was allotted against  the share  of Maharaja  Pillai.  The  same property was  given to  the possession  of the  widow with a right to  take the  income  for  her  maintenance.  This  is sufficient to  call into  aid Section  14(1)  of  the  Hindu Succession Act.      In the  result, we  allow the  appeal,  set  aside  the judgment OF  the High  Court and  also the  lower  appellate court and restore that of the trial court. S.L                                          Appeal allowed. 787