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PETITIONER: MAHARAJA BOOK DEPOT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE  OF GUJARAT

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/10/1978

BENCH: TULZAPURKAR, V.D. BENCH: TULZAPURKAR, V.D. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1979 AIR  180            1979 SCR  (2) 138  1979 SCC  (1) 295  CITATOR INFO :  R          1981 SC1649  (15)  D          1986 SC 386  (6)

ACT:      Essential  Commodities  Act,  1955  (Act  10  of  1955) Section 3(a)(vii)  and the Gujarat Essential Articles Dealer (Regulation) order  1971-Schedule 1  Item 13-  Term "Paper"- Whether includes "exercise-books".      Interpretation of  Statutes-Rule of strict construction or narrow  construction   in favour  of the  subject, to  be applied only  when there  is some  equivocation or ambiguity about a word or provision.

HEADNOTE:      The term  "paper" is  described as  "paper",  including newsprint, paper-board  and strawboard"  in s. 2(a) (vii) of the Essential  Commodities Act.,  1955 as well as in Item 13 in Schedule  I to  the Gujarat  Essential  Articles  Dealers (Regulation) order  1971. By  a notification  dated July 10, 1975, the  Schedule 1 of the Regulation order was recast and more items  were added.  Item No. 13 of the Regulation order after it  was recast by the amendment of 1975 and renumbered as S. No. 14 read as follows:-           "14. Paper  including newsprint, paper, strawboard      and exercise note-books."      The appellant is a firm dealing in books and stationery articles.  On  a  surprise  inspection  and  search  of  the appellant’s shop  it was  found that  in regard  to exercise books the  appellant  committed  breach  of  the  Regulation order, in that he did not display the stock; thereof that he did not  write the names of customers on the bills issued to them and  that he  did  not  maintain  the  stock  registers properly and  thereof a  sizable quantity  of exercise books were seized.      The Collector  found that  the appellant  was guilty of breach of  the Regulation order and directed that the seized stocks of  exercise books  be confiscated under s. 6A of the Act.      In appeal  the Sessions Judge set aside the Collector’s order on  the ground that exercise books did not fall within the item  "paper" as envisaged in the Act and the Regulation order.

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    In proceedings  under Art. 227, the High Court book the view that the term "paper" was wide enough to cover exercise books,  which  was  nothing  but  a  collection  of  papers, stitched together  by a  piece of string or pinned with pins of stappler, and quashed the order of the Sessions Judge.      Dismissing the appeal to this Court: ^      HELD: (1) On a true and proper construction, within its normal dictionary  meaning the  item "paper" as described in s. 2(a)(vii)  of the  Act and  Item 13  in Schedule I to the Regulation order covers an exercise book Such a construction would be  in consonance  with and  carry out effectively the object or  purpose of  the Act  and  the  Regulation  order. [144H-145A] 139      Black’s Law  Dictionary  (Revised  Fourth  Edn.  1968).      Webster’s New  World Dictionary  (1962  Edn.);  Concise      oxford Dictionary, referred to.      (2) ’Though  s. 2(a)  of the  Act and  cl. 2(v)  of the Regulation order  purport to define ’essential article’ that expression has  no meaning of its own and what follows is an enumeration  of  articles  regarded  as  essential  for  the purposes of the Act and the order. [143 F]      (3) An inclusive description has been given to the item "paper" in  the  Act  and  the  Regulation  order,  but  the inclusive part  refers to  things that may not ordinarily be regarded as  paper and,  therefore, an  extended meaning  or description is  given to  the expression  "paper". Since  an exercise-book (which  is nothing  but a collection of sheets of paper  intended to be used for writing), squarely t‘falls within the  dictionary meaning of the word "paper" there was no necessity  to mention  it in  the inclusive  part of  the description. [144 F-H]      (4) The amendment and enlargement of the item ’’paper’’ so as  to include  specifically exercise-books  was made  ex majore  cautela   to  make   things  abundantly  clear  and, therefore, no  inference as  regards the initial legislative intent that  it  was  to  exclude  exercise-books  from  the expression "paper"  under item  13 in Schedule I to the said order as it originally stood can be drawn. [145 D]      (5) It  is only  when there  is  some  equivocation  or ambiguity about  a word  or provision in a penal statue that the rule  of strict  or narrow construction in favour of the subject is  to be  applied but  if there is no ambiguity and the act or omission falls clearly within the mischief of the statute then  the construction  of a  penal statute will not differ from that of any other. [145 H-146A]      Maxwell on  interpretation of  Statutes (12th  Edn.) p.      246 referred to.      (6) In  the instant  case  there  is  no  ambiguity  or equivocation of  the  item  ’paper"  and  an  exercise  book squarely falls  within the  dictionary meaning  of  "paper". [146 B]      State of  Bihar v. Bhagirath Sharma & Anr., AIR 1973 SC      2198 distinguished.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal 227 of 1977.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated  17-2-1977  of  the  Gujarat  High  Court  in  Special Criminal Application No. 1 of 1977.      M.F. Thakkar and S. S. Khanduja for the Appellant.

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    B.V. Patel,  S. P.  Nayar and  M.  N.  Shroff  for  the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      TULZAPURKAR,  J.-This   appeal  by   special  leave  is directed against the judgment and order of the; Gujarat High Court  dated   February  17,   1977  in   Special   Criminal Application No. 1 of 1977 filed under Articles 140 226 and  227 of  the Constitution  whereby  the  High  Court reversed the  order of the learned Sessions Judge, Broach in Criminal Appeal  No. 39  of 1975 and sent the matter back to the learned  Sessions Judge for passing an appropriate order in regard  to the  question as  to whether the entire seized stock of  exercise-books of  the appellant  or part  thereof should  be   confiscated  under   s.  6A  of  the  Essential Commodities Act,  1955. The question raised in the appeal is whether exercise  books are  covered  by  the  item  "paper" occurring in  s. 2(a)  (vii) of that Act as also in Entry 13 of Schedule  I to  the Gujarat  Essential Articles  Dealers’ (Regulation) order, 1971 ?      The  question   arises  in   these  circumstances:  The appellant Maharaja  Book Depot is a partnership firm dealing in books  and  stationery  articles  at  Rajpipla,  District Broach. Its shop was inspected and searched by the Mamlatdar of  Rajpipla   on  July   4,  1975   when  certain   alleged irregularities came  to light.  During the  search 78  gross exercise books  of controlled variety and 97 gross exercise- books of  non-controled variety  were seized  on the  ground that the  appellant had  committed breaches  of Clauses 3, 9 and  11   of  the   Gujarat  Essential   Articles   Dealers’ (Regulation) order  1971 (hereinafter  referred to  as  "the Regulation order"),  in  that  the  appellant  (a)  did  not display at  any conspicuous part of the premises the opening stock of  the exercise-books, (b) did not write the names of the customers  on the  bills issued  to them for the sale of the exercise-books  and (c)  did not keep a register showing the stock of controlled and non-controlled exercise-books. A notice under  s. 6B  of the  Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred  to as  ’the Act’)  was served  by the Collector, Broach,  calling upon the appellant to show cause why  the  seized  stock  of  exercise-books  should  not  be confiscated  and   after  taking   into  consideration   the explanation offered  by the  appellant the  Collector by his order dated  September 17, 1975 held that the appellant firm was guilty  of the  breaches of  Clauses 3, 9 and 11 of the, Regulation order  and directed  that the entire seized stock be confiscated  to the  State Government  under s. 6A of the Act. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Sessions Court at Broach  being Criminal  Appeal No.  39 of  1975  and  the learned Sessions  Judge by  his  judgment  and  order  dated October 16,  1976 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of  confiscation   on  the  ground  that  the  Act  and  the Regulation  order   did  not  apply  to  the  exercise-books inasmuch as  an exercise-book  which is a distinct commodity did  not  fall  within  the  item  "paper"  enlisted  as  an essential commodity in s. 2(a) (vii) of the Act and in Entry 13 of  Schedule I  to the  Regulation order.  This order was challenged by  the State  of  Gujarat  in  Special  Criminal Application  No.   1  of   1977  under   Art.  227   of  the Constitution. The High Court by its judgment and order dated February 17, 1977 took the view that the 141 item "paper"  as enlisted  both in  s. 2(i) (vii) of the Act and Entry  13 A  in Schedule  I to  the Regulation order was wide enough  to cover an exercise-book which was nothing but

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collection of  papers stitched together by a piece of string or pinned with pins of stappler and quashed the order of the learned  Sessions   Judge  but   instead   of   straightaway confirming the  Collector’s confiscation  order it  remanded the appeal  back  to  the  Sessions  Judge  for  passing  an appropriate order  after deciding the question as to whether the  entire  seized  stock  or  a  part  thereof  should  be confiscated under  s. 6A  of  the  Act.  The  appellant  has challenged the legality and or validity of the view taken by the High Court in this appeal.      In order  to appreciate  properly  the  submissions  of counsel  for  the  appellant  on  the  construction  of  the expression "paper"  occurring in  the concerned legislations it will be necessary to set out the purpose and the relevant provisions thereof.  The Act was put on the Statute Book, as its preamble  will show,  with a  view to  provide,  in  the interests  of  the  general  public,  for  the,  control  of production,  supply  and  distribution  of,  and  trade  and commerce in  certain commodities  defined  and  enlisted  as "essential commodities"  in s.  2, which enlistment has been enlarged  from   time  to   time   by   Central   Government Notifications. In  other words,  the obvious  purpose of the enactment  is   to  control   the  production,   supply  and distribution of  certain commodities which are essential for the society  at large  with a view to ensure that the common man gets them at fair prices without let or hindrance on the part of  the trade.  Section 3 confers powers on the Central Government to  regulate or  prohibit the production,, supply and distribution  of essential  commodities  and  trade  and commerce therein  by issuance  of orders  in that behalf for maintaining or  increasing supplies  of such  commodities or for securing  their equitable  distribution and availability at fair  prices etc. while under s. 5 the Central Government can delegate  its powers  in that  behalf to  an officer  or authority subordinate  to it  or to any State Government. It appears that  on December  8, 1971 in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. (1) read with cls. (d), (e), (i) and (j) of sub-s.  (2) of s. 3 of the Act read with the order of the Government of  India, Ministry of Commerce No. so 1844 dated June 18,  1966, and  the order  of that  Government  in  the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development and Co- operation (Department  of Food)  No. G.S.R.  1111 dated July 24, 1971,  the State of Gujarat passed its order called "The Gujarat  Essential   Articles  Dealers  (Regulation)  order, 1971", for  the purpose of maintaining supplies of essential articles and  for securing  their equitable distribution and availability at  fair prices.  Now,  the  Act  as  also  the Regulation Order  contain an  enlistment of  items which are regarded  as   ’essential  commodities’   or  ’.   essential articles’; s. 2(a) of the 142 Act defines  ’essential commodity’  as meaning  any  of  the classes of  commodities enlisted  in its various sub-clauses and sub-cl.  (vii) refers  to the item "paper" while cl. (v) of the  Regulation  order  defines  ’essential  article’  as meaning any of the articles specified in Schedule I and item 13 in  that Schedule  relates to  "paper" but  at  both  the places the item has been described in identical manner, viz:           "Paper,  including   newsprint,  paper-board   and strawboard".      It seems that the enlistment of the item "paper" in the above manner  in s.  2(a) (vii)  of the  Act  has  not  been amended, altered  or  changed  but  its  enlistment  in  the Regulation  order   has  undergone   a  change,   for  by  a Notification dated  July 10,  1975, the  Schedule I  of  the

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Regulation order  was recast  and  more  items  were  added. Schedule I  so amended by the said Notification now includes the item "paper" at sl. No. 14 which runs thus:           "14. Paper"  including news  print,  paper  board,      straw board and exercise note-books." In other  words, by  the Notification  dated July  10,  1975 exercise note  books have  come to  be specifically added to the item "paper".      The main question is whether exercise-books are covered by the  item "paper"  as described  in s. 2 (a) (vii) of the Act and  in Item 13 in Schedule I to the Regulation order as it stood before its amendment by the Notification dated July 10, 1975.  Counsel for  the appellant  raised two  or  three contentions  before   us  in  support  of  this  appeal.  He emphasized the  fact that  on July 4. 1975 when the stock of exercise books  was seized  from the appellant’s shop by the Mamlatdar both  in s. 2(a) (vii) of the Act as well as under Entry 13  in Schedule  I to  the Regulation  order the  item "paper"  as  an  essential  commodity  was  described  in  a particular manner  without the  addition of  "exercise-note- books" which  was made  in the  Regulation order  after  the seizure had  been effected.  On  construction  of  the  item "paper" he  first  contended  that  the  expression  "paper" ordinarily means a sheet or sheets of paper and an exercise- book being a distinct commodity was excluded from that item. Secondly, he urged that this would be. so because even while providing for  an inclusive  description  of  the  item  the legislation has  included only news prints, paper boards and straw  boards   within  it   but  not   exercise-books  and, therefore, the  expression "paper"  should be  construed  as excluding exercise-books.  Thirdly, he  urged that so far as the Gujarat Regulation order is concerned the very fact that by Notification  dated July  10, 1975  Item 14 in Schedule I was enlarged  so as  to include  specifically exercise-note- books within the expression "paper" clearly shows that 143 the legislative  intent was  to exclude  exercise-books from the expression   "paper"  under Item  13 in Schedule I as it stood prior  to that  date. Lastly,  he urged that since the provisions of  the Act  as well as the Regulation order were penal in  character, the  item "paper"  should be  construed narrowly in  favour of  the person  proceeded against and as such the  view taken by the learned Sessions Judge should be upheld. In  support of these submissions counsel relied upon a decision  of this  Court in  State of  Bihar v.  Bhagirath Sharma and  Another,(1) where  this Court,  having regard to the legislative history and penal character of the concerned order took  the view that the item like "component parts and accessories of  automobile", though  of wide  import did not cover tyres  and  tubes  of  motor  cars  and  motor-cycles. According to  him, therefore, the learned Sessions Judge was right in  his view that the expression "paper" did not cover exercise-book and  that the  seized exercise  books were not liable to be confiscated under s. 6A of the Act.      The question thus centres round the proper construction of the item "paper" as described in s. 2(a) (vii) of the Act and item  No. 13  of Schedule  I to the Regulation order. On this question  the object  or purpose  of the  Act  and  the Regulation order  as well  as the manner in which ’essential commodity’ or  ’essential article  has been  defined therein will have  considerable  bearing.  As  stated  earlier,  the object or  purpose of  both the  pieces of legislation is to control the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities or  essential articles  with view to ensure that the common  man gets  them at fair prices without any let or

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hindrance on  the part  of the  trade and  it is  with  this object that  the  item  "paper"  has  been  enlisted  as  an essential commodity or essential article in the Act and take Regulation order.  Further though s. 2(a) of the Act and Cl. 2(v) of  the Regulation  order purport  to define ’essential commodity’ or  ’essential article’  that expression  has  no meaning of  its own  and in  substance both  under s.  2 (a) (vii) of  the Act  and Cl.  2 (v) of the Regulation order an enumeration or  enlistment has been made of several items as constituting essential commodities or essential articles for the purposes of the Act and the Regulation Order and it will appear clear  that items  have been  enumerated or  enlisted under broad  general heads  and some of the items are stated to include certain things which may not in ordinary parlance fall within  the broad  general head.  The item ’paper" will have to  be considered  in the  light of this position which emerges clearly on a consideration of several items enlisted as essential  commodities or  essential articles.  The  item "paper" is described thus:           "Paper including news print, paper board and straw      board". (1) A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2198. 144 According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary paper means-           "A substance  used for writing, printing, drawing,      etc. made  of interlaced  fibres of  rags, straw, wood,      etc." In Webster’s New World Dictionary (1962 Edn.) the meaning of the word "paper" is given as follows:           "Paper-thin flexible material in sheets or leaves,      made from  rags, wood  pulp., or other fibrous decorate      etc." In Black’s  Law Dictionary (Revised Fourth Edition 1968) the expression "paper" is explained thus:           "Paper-a manufactured substance composed of fibres      (whether vegetable  or  animal)  adhering  together  in      forms consisting  of sheets  of various  sizes  and  of      different thicknesses,  used for writing or printing or      other   purposes   to   which   flexible   sheets   are      applicable." In substance,  therefore, paper,  whether  lined  or  blank, means a  material on  which writing,  printing, drawing etc. can be  done. In  light of  this meaning  of the  expression "paper" the  question is  whether an  exercise book would be covered by  that expression  or not  ? It cannot be disputed that an  exercise-book is nothing but a collection of sheets of paper  (blank or  lined) stitched  together by a piece of string or  pinned together  with pins of a stappler and is a substance used  for writing  and, therefore,  would  clearly fall within  the item  "paper". The  test would  be  whether because  of  stitching  or  pinning  them  together  such  a collection of  sheets looses  its identity  as paper  ?  The answer must be in the negative. Looked at from this angle it is difficult  to accept the contention that an exercise-book is a distinct commodity other than paper. It is true that an inclusive description  has been given of the item "paper" in s. 2(a)  (vii) of  the Act  and Item 13 in Schedule I to the Regulation order,  but if  the inclusive  part is  carefully scrutinised it  will appear  clear that the things mentioned in the  inclusive part  may not  ordinarily be  regarded  as paper and,  therefore, by  the inclusive  part  an  extended meaning or  description is  given to the expression "paper". Since an exercise-book (which is nothing but a collection of sheets of  paper intended  to be  used for writing) squarely falls within  the dictionary  meaning of  the  word  "paper"

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there was  no necessity- to mention it in the inclusive part of the  description. On  a  true  and  proper  construction, therefore, we are clearly of the view that within its normal dictionary meaning  the item "paper" as described in s. 2(a) (vii) of the Act and Item 13 in Schedule I to the Regulation order covers an exercise-book. 145 Moreover, such  a construction  would be  in consonance with and carry   out effectively the object or purpose of the Act and the Regulation order.      Counsel for  the appellant  undoubtedly relied upon the fact  that  so  far  as  the  Gujarat  Regulation  order  is concerned it  was by  notification dated  July 10, 1975 that the description  of item  "paper" (being  item No. 14 in the recast  Schedule   I)  was   enlarged  so   as  to   include specifically ’exercise-notebooks’ and, according to counsel, this clearly shows that initially the legislative intent was to exclude  exercise-book from  the expression "paper" under Item 13  in Schedule  I to  the said  order as it originally stood. It  is not  possible to infer such legislative intent from the  mere fact  that the  item "paper" has been amended and enlarged  so as  to include  within it exercise-books by means of  the subsequent Notification. In fact, as discussed earlier, since  an exercise-book  squarely falls  within the dictionary meaning  of the  expression "paper"  we have held that it  was unnecessary to mention it in the inclusive part of the  description as  it  originally  stood  and  in  that inclusive part  such things  had been mentioned as could not in ordinary parlance be regarded as "paper". In our view the amendment and  enlargement of  the item  "paper"  so  as  to include  specifically  exercise-books  was  made  ex  majore cautela to  make things  abundantly clear and, therefore, no inference as  regards the  initial legislative intent of the type suggested can be drawn.      Counsel also  contended that  since the  Act as well as the Regulation  order contain  penal  provisions,  the  item "paper" should  he construed strictly and narrowly in favour of the  appellant-firm which  was  being  proceeded  against under the  said pieces  of legislation.  The  true  rule  of construction in  that behalf  has been set out in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) at page 246 where the following passage occurs:           "The effect  of the  rule of  strict  construction      might be  sum med up by saying that, where an equivocal      word or ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable doubt of      its meaning  which the canons of interpretation fail to      solve, the  benefit of the doubt should be given to the      subject and against the legislature which has failed to      explain itself.  If there  is no ambiguity, and the act      or  omission  in  question  falls  clearly  within  the      mischief of  the statute,  the construction  of a penal      statute differs  little, if  at all,  from that  of any      other."      It would  thus appear  clear that it is only when there is some  equivocation or ambiguity about a word or provision that the  rule of strict construction or narrow construction in favour of the subject is to be applied 146 but if  there is  no ambiguity and the act or omission falls clearly within the mischief of statute then the construction of a  penal statute  will not differ from that of any other. Applying this  principle to the facts of the present case it is clear  that there  is no ambiguity or equivocation of the item "paper’  occurring in s. 2(a) (vii) of the Act and Item 13 of  Schedule I  of the  Regulation  order  and  since  an

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exercise-book squarely  falls within  the dictionary meaning of "paper"  as used in the said provisions, there will be no question of  construing that  item narrowly so as to exclude exercise-book therefrom and in favour of the appellant-firm.      That takes us to the decision of this Court in State of Bihar v.  Bhagirath Sharma  and Anr.  (supra) on  which  the appellant-firm strongly  relied. In  that case  the question was whether  Motor Tyres and Motor Tubes were covered by the item  "Component   parts  and  accessories  of  automobiles" occuring in  Item No. 1 in Schedule I to the Bihar Essential Commodities  Act-other  than  Foodgrains-Prices  and  Stocks (Display and  Control) order 1947 and this Court undoubtedly took the  view that though the said item I was widely worded it did  not include  Motor Tyres  or Motor Tubes and that no interference was  called for in the order passed by the High Court acquitting the respondents of the charge that they had failed to  display the  price-list and the stock position of the Motor  Tyres anywhere  in their shop in contravention of Cl. (4)  of the  said order.  In our  view, the  decision is clearly distinguishable  on the  ground  that  the  drafting precedents furnished  by several Notifications that obtained there warranted  such a conclusion. From the inception along with Item 1 (component parts and accessories of automobiles) there was  in the  concerned Prices  and Stocks (Display and Control) order,  1947 another  item being  Item 5  which ran thus: "Cycle tyres and tubes (including cycle rickshaw tyres and tubes)"  which suggested  that where  "Tyres and  Tubes" were intended  to be  included as  the Item  in the Schedule these had actually been expressly so stated as distinct from the  "component   parts  and  accessories  or  automobiles"; further, by  a  Gazette  Notification  (No.  GSR  82)  dated September 18, 1970 published in the Bihar Government Gazette (Extra ordinary)  four items  were added,  one of them being Item No.  11, Which  ran thus:  "Tyres and  tubes  of  cars, buses, jeeps,  vans,  trucks  automobiles  of  any  category whatsoever,  tractors   and  tractor-trollies.",   even  the Central  Government   had   issued   three   Notifications-a Notification dated 11 January, 1968 (No. S.O. 218) issued by the Ministry  of Commerce,  in which  "Tyres  and  Tubes  of Scooters" were  expressly mentioned as essential commodities distinct  from   the  component  parts  and  accessories  of automobiles; a  Notification dated 22 August, 1968 (No. s o. 2878) in which "Tyres and Tubes of Cars etc." were. 147 specifically  mentioned   as  essential   commodity  and   a Notification dated  A 3rd  January, 1969  (No. S.O.  25)  in which "Tyres  and Tubes  of Cars  " were  mentioned  in  the manner  almost  similar  to  the  one  found  in  the  Bihar Government  Gazette   Notification  No.   GSR  82  dated  18 September, 1970. It was in the back ground of these drafting precedents furnished  by such  Notifications that this Court took  the  view  that  the  draftsman  did  not  intend  the scheduled item  No. 1  in the Order as in force in May, 1969 to cover  "Tyres and  Tubes of  Motor-cars". In  the instant case before  us there are no such drafting precedents of the type which  obtained in  the aforementioned  case. As stated earlier, the  Item "paper"  in s.2  (a) (vii) in the Act has all  along  remained  the  same  without  any  modification, alteration or  enlargement and it is only the item No. 13 in the Schedule to the Regulation order (a subordinate piece of legislation) that  has undergone  a change  and the item has been  amended  so  as  to  include  specifically  "exercise- notebooks". We  have no  doubt in  our minds  that the  said amendment  to   the   item   "paper"   is   declaratory   or clarificatory in nature.

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    In the  circumstances, in  our view, the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the exercise-books of the  appellant-firm   that  were   seized  were   liable  to confiscation and the remand order made by the High Court was proper.      The appeal is accordingly dismissed. N.V.K.                                     Appeal dismissed. 148