NON- REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.  6125 OF 2008

[Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.4764 of 2006]

Maganlal son of Kishanlal Godha      .... Appellant

Versus

Nanasaheb son of Udhaorao Gadewar  .... Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  arises  out  of  the  judgment  and  order  dated

01.12.2005 passed by the Division Bench of  the High Court  of

Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur.  By the impugned

order, the Division Bench has set aside the judgment and order

dated 14.02.1995 of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.

400/1990  and  restored  the  order  dated  06.11.1989  of  the

Appellate Authority whereby the order dated 07.03.1988 recorded

by  the  Rent  Controller,  Nagpur  granting  permission  to  the

landlord under Clause 13(3) (iv) and (vi) of the Central Provinces

and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, has

been quashed and set aside.

3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are as follows:

Maganlal Kishanlal Godha, appellant herein, is the owner of

three storey house bearing Corporation No. 57/0-4 in Ward No. 28

in Bapurao Gali, Itwari, Nagpur.  One portion on the ground floor

of the said house, except one room, is occupied by Nanasaheb the

respondent-tenant herein on rent of Rs. 140/- per month.

4. The  appellant-landlord  on 30.09.1982,  filed  an application

before  the  Rent  Controller,  Nagpur  seeking  permission  to

terminate the tenancy of the respondent-tenant under Clause 13

(3)  (iv)  and  (vi)  of  the  Central  Provinces  and  Berar  Letting  of

Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as

“Rent Control Order”).  It was the case of the appellant-landlord

before the Rent-Controller that he purchased the suit house by a

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registered sale  deed in the year 1968 from the previous owner.

The appellant-landlord was carrying on cloth business at Gondia

and  his  son  Pradeep  Jain,  at  the  time  of  filing  of  the  eviction

application, was studying in M. Tech. and residing in a Hostel at

Nagpur.   It  was contended that after  completing the education,

Pradeep  Jain  will  start  independent  business  for  which  the

demised premises were required by the appellant-landlord.  The

appellant-landlord  further  stated  that  he  wanted  to  shift  his

residence  from  Gondia  to  Nagpur,  therefore,  he  needed  the

demised premises for his  bona fide requirement as well.  During

the pendency of the eviction proceedings, the appellant-landlord

filed  an application  seeking  amendment  of  the  pleadings.   The

said  application  was  allowed  by  the  Rent  Controller  on

08.07.1985.  The appellant-landlord had pleaded in the amended

petition that he has applied for licence to manufacture of Oxalic

acid in Bhandara District.   According to the appellant-landlord,

his  son  Pradeep  Jain  had  completed  his  M.Tech.  education  in

Chemical Engineering and wanted to look after the sales of Oxalic

acid  business  to  be  started  in  the  demised  premises  by  the

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appellant-landlord.   On  these  premises,  the  appellant-landlord

sought the eviction of the respondent-tenant.  

5. The  respondent-tenant,  in  the  written  statement  filed  on

06.01.1983,  admitted  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant

between the appellant and himself.   He denied the allegation of

change of user  of  the demised premises  from residential  to the

non-residential  as alleged by the appellant-landlord.   He stated

that the demised premises were let out to him for non-residential

purpose  by  predecessor-in-title  of  the  appellant-landlord.   He

specifically stated that the alleged bona fide need, pleaded by the

appellant-landlord,  is  nothing  but  a  pretext  to  secure

enhancement of the rent and also to get him evicted by illegal and

unfair method.

6. On the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller framed

necessary  issues.   Both  the  parties  went  to  trial  and led  their

evidence.   After  considering  the  evidence,  the  Rent  Controller

granted  permission  to  the  appellant-landlord  to  determine  the

tenancy under Clause 13 (3) (iv) and (vi) of the Rent Control Order.

7. Being  aggrieved  by  the  order  of  the  Rent  Controller,  the

respondent-tenant  preferred  an  appeal  under  Clause  21  of  the

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Rent Control Order and the Additional District Magistrate, Nagpur

(Appellate Authority) by order dated 06.11.1989 allowed the said

appeal and set aside the order of the Rent Controller.

8. Against  the  Appellate  Authority’s  order,  the  appellant-

landlord filed Writ Petition No. 400/1990 before the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench.  The learned Single Judge,

by  order  dated  14.02.1995,  partly  allowed  the  writ  petition

upholding  the  order  of  the  Appellate  Authority  to  the  extent  it

quashed  the  order  of  the  Rent  Controller  granting  relief  to  the

appellant-landlord  under  Clause  13  (3)  (iv)  of  the  Rent  Control

Order. However, the order of the Rent Controller dated 07.03.1988

granting  permission  to  the  appellant-landlord  to  terminate  the

tenancy of the respondent-tenant under Clause 13 (3) (vi) of the

Rent Control Order was restored and to that extent the order of

the Appellate Authority was set aside.

9. Being  aggrieved,  the  tenant  filed  a  writ  appeal  before  the

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court,  which  was  allowed  by  the

Bench on 01.12.2005 whereby the judgment and order passed by

the  learned  Single  Judge  was  set  aside  and  the  order  of  the

Appellate Authority dated 06.11.1989 was restored.  Hence, the

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appellant-landlord has challenged the correctness and validity of

the order of the Division Bench of the High Court in this appeal.

10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their

assistance, examined the material on record.  The relationship of

landlord and tenant between the appellant and the respondent is

not in dispute.   

11. The Division Bench of the High Court, while setting aside the

judgment  and  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  observed  as

under:

“The learned Single Judge totally ignored the material  on record  which was  considered  by the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Order,  which  totally  belies  the  claim  of  the respondent-landlord for bona fide requirement and it is evident from the documents placed on record  by  the  appellant-tenant.   The  first notice dated 12.07.1982 sent to the appellant- tenant by Advocate Shri Mahajan, which is in the form of a quit notice wherein reason given for issuing the quit notice is stated in para 4 which reads as under:

‘That the premises occupied by you can easily fetch the rent of Rs. 1,000/- per month.  You are an undesirable tenant and hence this quit notice is issued.’

The same was replied by the Advocate for the appellant-tenant on 15.07.1982 in which it is specifically  denied  that  the  premises  were

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given  for  residential  purpose,  on  the  other hand it  was claimed  that  the  premises  were given on rent for non-residential purpose and the  appellant-tenant  was  running  his Dispensary  since  1958.   In  so  far  as  the demand  for  rent  is  concerned,  it  was stated that  previously  the  rent  was  Rs.  80/-  per month and it was raised from time to time and now the appellant-tenant is paying Rs. 140/- per month.  It was specifically denied that the premises can fetch Rs. 1,000/- per month as alleged.   It  was  further  contended  that  the alleged  termination  of  tenancy  is  illegal. Therefore, it can be seen that the whole object of respondent-landlord in issuing the notice to quit was that the premises were fetching less rent whereas it can fetch Rs. 1,000/- and as the appellant-tenant was paying Rs. 140/-, he was  an  undesirable  tenant.   There  is  no whisper in the said notice, which was sent to the  appellant-tenant  hardly  a  month  before the  rent  control  proceedings  came  to  be initiated  and  if  the  respondent-landlord wanted  the  premises  for  his  bona  fide occupation then there  is  no reason why this fact  was  not  mentioned  in  the  said  notice. Therefore,  it  can be  necessarily  inferred that the  need  to  occupy  the  premises  by  the respondent-landlord  cannot  be  said  to  be natural, real, necessary and honest.  Further, there  are  documents on record  to show that except  for  portion  of  the  ground floor  of  the house which is in occupation of the appellant- tenant,  rest of the house was already in use and  occupation  of  the  respondent-tenant, which has been brought on record by placing the declaration given by the respondent-tenant to  the Municipal  Corporation as required  for assessment  of  taxes.   Unfortunately,  the

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learned  Single  Judge  ignored  this  material evidence in spite of the fact that the Appellate Authority  under  the  Rent  Control  Order  has based its findings by placing reliance on these documents which are material on record.”

12.   The  only  question  arising  for  our  consideration  in  this

appeal is whether the Division Bench of the High Court has erred

in  appreciating  the  evidence  considered  by  the  learned  Single

Judge in his order and whether the order impugned before us is

not in conformity with the provisions provided in the Rent Control

Order.  The relevant provisions applicable to the present case may

be referred to for examining the factual situation as well as the

finding of the Division Bench on legal issue.

13. Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order provides the grounds on

which the landlord is entitled to determine lease of tenancy.  The

provisions relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal reads

as under:

“13  (1)  No  landlord  shall,  except  with  the previous written permission of the Controller :-

(a) give notice to a tenant determining the lease or  determine  the  lease  if  the  lease  is

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expressed to be determinable at his option ; or

(b) xxxx xxxx     (2)  A landlord who seeks to obtain permission

under sub-clause (1) shall apply in writing to the Controller in that behalf:

Provided  that  where  the  tenancy  is  for  a specified  period  agreed  upon  between  the landlord  and  the  tenant,  no  application  under items  (vi)  and  (vii)  of  sub-Clause  (3)  shall  be entertained by the Controller before the expire of such period.

   (3) If after hearing the parties, the Controller is satisfied:-

                 (i) xxxx xxxx

        (ii) xxxx xxxx                   (iii) xxxx xxxx          

(iv) that the tenant has used  the  house or premises or any  part thereof for a purpose other than that for which it was leased;  or

             (v) xxxx xxxx      

(vi) that the landlord needs the house or a portion thereof for the purpose of his  bona fide residence, provided he is not occupying any  other  residential  house  of  his  own in the city or town concerned; or

(vii)  xxxxx

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(viii)  xxxxx

(ix)   xxxxx ”

14. The eviction of the respondent-tenant recorded by the Rent

Controller has been confirmed by the learned Single Judge on the

ground of bona fide requirement of the appellant-landlord in terms

of Clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Rent Control Order.  On plain reading of

the language of Clause 13 (1) (a) of the Rent Control Order, it is

clear that the question of determination of tenancy would arise

only after permission to serve such notice is granted by the Rent

Controller.  Thus, the notice issued by the Advocate on behalf of

the appellant-landlord prior to filing of the application for eviction

of  the  respondent-tenant  under  Clause  13  (3)  (vi)  was  not  a

mandatory  requirement  postulated  under  the  provisions  of  the

Rent Control Order.  As there was no statutory requirement that

the landlord should issue a notice of eviction to the tenant before

initiating  proceedings  under  clause  13(3)  of  the  Rent  Control

Order,  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  was  not  right  in

drawing an inference against the appellant-landlord for not stating

the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises in the notice

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dated  12.07.1982  issued  to  the  respondent-tenant  before  the

institution  of  eviction  proceedings  which  commenced  on

30.09.1982.

15.  The  appellant-landlord  applied  to  the  Rent  Controller  for

determination  of  the  tenancy  of  the  respondent-tenant  on  two

grounds, i.e. under clause 13 (3)(iv) and (vi) of the Rent Control

Order.  His claim was that his son Pradeep Jain, at the time of

application,  was  a  student  of  M.  Tech.  at  Nagpur  and  after

completing his examination in Chemical Engineering, he wanted

to start his business of manufacturing oxalic acid in the factory to

be set up in the demised premises.  He stated that he also wanted

to  shift  his  business  and  residence  from  Gondia  to  Nagpur,

therefore, he was in need of the premises for himself and for the

bona fide  occupation  of  his  son.   During  the  pendency  of  the

eviction  proceedings,  the  Rent  Controller  vide  Order  dated

08.07.1985 allowed the application of the appellant-landlord for

amendment  of  the  pleadings.   In  para  5  (a)  of  the  amended

application,  the  appellant-landlord  stated  that  his  son  Pradeep

Jain  has  since  qualified  M.  Tech.  examination  in  Chemical

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Engineering  and  the  applicant  has  also  applied  for  licence  to

manufacture Oxalic acid in Bhandara District.  According to the

version of the appellant-landlord, his son Pradeep Jain will reside

at Nagpur in the demised premises and will look after the sales of

Oxalic  acid.   Alternatively,  it  was  claimed  by  the  appellant-

landlord that if the licence for manufacturing Oxalic acid is not

granted by the competent authority, his son will shift to Nagpur

and start an industry for manufacturing chemical products.  It is

further established that Pradeep Jain cannot make up his future

career by staying in Gondia which is a small town and, therefore,

for building up his future career, Pradeep Jain has to be shifted to

Nagpur.   In  the  light  of  the  evidence  on record,  we  are  of  the

opinion that the order of the Division Bench of the High Court

cannot be sustained.   The entire approach of the Division Bench

in setting aside the finding recorded by the Rent Controller and

affirmed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  was  erroneous  and  the

Division Bench mis-directed itself while considering the question

of bona fide requirement in terms of Clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Rent

Control Order, which postulates that there must be an element of

need as opposed to a mere desire or wish of the landlord.

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16. This  Court  in  Sait  Nagjee  Purushotham & Co.  Ltd.  v.

Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors. [(2005) 8 SCC 252] held that it is

always  a  prerogative  of  the  landlord  that  if  he  requires  the

premises  in  question  for  his  bona  fide use  for  expansion  of

business, this is no ground to say that the landlords are already

having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad, therefore, it is

not genuine need.  Further, it is held that it is not the tenant who

can dictate  the  terms to  the  landlord  and advise  him what  he

should do and what he should not.  It is always the privilege of the

landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of the

business.

17. In  the  case  of  Pratap  Rai  Tanwani  v.  Uttam  Chand

[(2004) 8 SCC 490], it was held that the bona fide requirement of

the landlord has to be seen on the date of the petition and the

subsequent events intervening due to protracted litigation will not

be  relevant.   It  was  held  that  the  crucial  date  is  the  date  of

petition;  therefore,  the  normal  rule  is  that  the  rights  and

obligations  of  the  parties  are  to  be  determined  on  the  date  of

petition  and  that  subsequent  events  can  be  taken  into

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consideration for moulding the reliefs provided such events had a

material  impact on those rights and obligations.  It was further

observed that it is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the

litigation  the  more  would  be  the  number  of  developments

sprouting up during the long interregnum.  Therefore, the Courts

have  to  take  a  very  pragmatic  approach  of  the  matter.   It  is

common experience in our country that especially landlord-tenant

litigations prolong for a long time.  It is true that neither can the

person  who  has  started  the  litigation  sit  idle  nor  can  the

development  of  the  event  be  stopped  by  him.   Therefore,  the

crucial event should be taken as on the date when the suit for

eviction was filed, unless the subsequent events materially change

the ground of relief.

18. In the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001)

2  SCC  604], this  Court  held  that  the  landlord  should  not  be

penalized for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial date

for deciding the facts of the requirement of the landlord is the date

of his application for eviction.  It is also observed that the process

of  litigation cannot  be  made the basis for  denying the landlord

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relief  unless  the  litigation  at  least  reaches  the  final  stages.

However, it is further added that subsequent events may, in some

situations, be considered to have overshadowed the genuineness

of the landlords’  needs but only if  they are of such nature and

dimension as to completely eclipse such need and make it lose the

significance altogether.  

19.  So  far  as  the  findings  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  with

regard to the eviction of the respondent-tenant on the ground of

using the demised premises for the purpose other than that for

which it was leased under Clause 13 (3) (iv) is concerned, that has

been held against the appellant-landlord and there was no cross-

appeal before the Division Bench.  Therefore, we need not go into

the  merits  of  the  findings  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  on  that

ground.   

20.  In the result, for the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed

and  the  judgment  and  order  dated  01.12.2005  passed  by  the

Division  Bench of  the  High Court  in  Letters  Patent  Appeal  No.

58/1995 is set aside and the judgment and order of the learned

Single  Judge  dated  14.02.1995  recorded  in  Writ  Petition  No.

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400/1990  is  upheld.   Consequently,  the  order  of  the  Rent

Controller dated 07.03.1988 granting permission to the appellant-

landlord to terminate the tenancy of the respondent-tenant under

Clause  13  (3)  (vi)  of  the  Rent  Control  Order,  1949  shall  stand

restored.

21.  The respondent-tenant is directed to handover the vacant

possession of  the suit  premises  to the appellant-landlord on or

before 31st July, 2009.  He shall file usual undertaking before this

Court within four weeks from the date of this order.

22.  In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left

to bear their own costs.

........................................J.                                                 (R. V. Raveendran)

........................................J.                                                 (Lokeshwar Singh Panta)

New Delhi. October 16, 2008.

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